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TRANSFORMATIONS OF "PURITY" 
IN CHRISTIAN DISCOURSES OF DEMON COMPULSION 
THROUGH THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 
Jason Edward Roberts, PhD 
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Supervisors:  Katherine Arens, Sandra Straubhaar 
An ongoing discourse about "purity" shared by "Solomonic" magic and theology 
links Christian antiquity with Martin Luther. An apocryphal narrative about Solomon's 
demon compulsion recurs to answer questions about purity, the believer, and the practice 
of religion. Using Malinowski's tripartite definition of magic as rite, formula, 
and condition of the performer, supplemented with work by Mary Douglas, Jacob 
Neusner, and Dorothea Salzer, we trace how historical negotiations about theological 
definitions of "purity" emerge as tools for religious hegemonies differentiating 
themselves by separating licit acts of demon compulsion (exorcism) from illicit ones 
("magic"). The result argues for considering Western magic in tandem with official 
theologies, acknowledging longitudinal continuities in theological argumentation, and 
situating even theological texts in the context of historical Christianities. 
Chapter 1 addresses demon compulsion in Christian antiquity with reference to 
apologetic and polemical works by Justin Martyr, Origen, and the anonymous fourth 
 vii 
century Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila and the Testament of Solomon. Here the initial 
condition of the performer is purity as absence-of-idolatry.  
 Chapter 2 examines broader Christian theological developments defining "purity" 
as religious authorization, the rise of "Solomonic" magic as illicit, Aquinas' theological 
innovations in his De Potentia Dei (a more stable anti-magic theology).  
 Chapter 3 takes up early modern humanist authors, including Ficino, Pico della 
Mirandola, and Reuchlin, who obscured their allusion to Solomon in their published 
works. Their works have striking parallels with texts of "Solomonic" magic as 
exemplified in comparing Reuchlin's Christian Cabala, De Verbo Mirifico (1494), and the 
twelfth century grimoire, the Liber Razielis. 
 Chapter 4 compares Aquinas' and Luther' theologies with respect to "purity" as 
presence-of-faith showing a turn to result from Luther's doctrine of justification by faith 
alone. Luther's Vom Schemhamphoras, arguably Luther's "missing" demonology, 
instrumentalizes the Jews as demons in an effort to solve the problem of demonstrating 
the guilt of the magician (corpus delicti). 
 The project thus sets into dialogue a number of neglected texts, thereby situating 
misconstrued theological arguments within history. Tracking the persistence of altered 
forms of "purity" within Christianity in this way illuminates how scholars might 
investigate religious beliefs and practices - even modern Protestantism.  
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The Favor of God:  
Purity, Grace, and Faith, in Solomonic Demon Compulsion 
 
 
And from hence you enter into Golgotha. There is here a large hall, on the 
place where our Lord was crucified. Round about it, on the hill itself, are 
railings of silver, and on the hill itself a kind of flint-stone is deserving of 
notice. It has a silver door at which the Cross of our Lord is displayed, all 
covered with ornaments of gold and jewels, with the open sky above it; there 
are railings much adorned with gold and silver, and here also is the charger 
wherein the head of St. John was carried; and here is the horn with which 
David and Solomon were anointed; and in this place, too, is the ring with 
which Solomon sealed demons, which ring is of electrum.1 
 
 
                                                
1 Stewart's translation cited here is from: Eucherius, Aubrey Stewart, Charles W. Wilson, and Eucherius, The Epitome 
of S. Eucherius About Certain Holy Places: And the 'breviary', or Short Description of Jerusalem (New York: AMS 
Press, 1971) 14. The original Latin text is provided in an appendix to Stewart's published translation. The Latin original 
of excerpt quoted above can be found in Stewart's apendix (p. 21) and reads: "Et inde intras in Golgotha. Est ibi atrium 
grande, ubi crucifixus est Dominus. In circuitu, in ipso monte, sunt cancelli argenti, et in ipso monte genussilicis 
admoratur. Habet ostium argentum, ubi fuit crux Domini exposita, de auro et gemmis ornata tota, cœlo desuper patente; 
auro et argento multum ornate cancelli; ubi est elle discus, ubi caput sancti Johannis portatum fiut; ubi est illud cornu, 
quo David unctus est et Salomon, et ille annulus ibidem, unde Salomon sigillavit daemones, et est de electro […]." 
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That the sixth-century Christian author of the Jerusalem Breviary (ca. 530 CE), a 
sort of early pilgrim's guide to Jerusalem, should conclude the list of holy relics he beheld 
at Golgotha with "the ring with which Solomon sealed demons" may come as a surprise 
to the modern reader.2 However, the so-called "Ring of Solomon" belongs to an 
apocryphal tradition concerning an ability of the builder of the First Temple to compel 
demons. This narrative, though far less familiar in Christian contexts now, was known 
and shared for centuries by Jews, Christians, and Muslims alike.3  
Record of this tradition of Solomon's power over demons survives in a variety of 
sources. It appears in Flavius Josephus' late first century Antiquities of the Jews, the 
Babylonian Talmud (compiled ca. 500 CE),4 the Quran (early seventh century),5 and in 
the writings of multiple Christian theologians from Origen in the third century to Aquinas 
in the thirteenth. It also survives as folklore, incorporated for example into one of the 
tales of One Thousand and One Nights (compiled in Arabic and published 1704), and in 
archeological evidence such as seventh century Babylonian incantation bowls inscribed 
with references to "Solomon the magician."6 Examples like the incantation bowls 
demonstrate how stories of Solomon's power over demons were taken as a model for 
practical application and leveraged into a practice of "Solomonic" magic. In fact, the 
                                                
2 Indeed, Stewart seems to have been so scandalized by this as to have translated "Salomon sigillavit daemones" as 
"Salomon sealed his writings" in the 1890 publication by the Committee for the Palestine Exploration Fund. A footnote 
to the Latin text given in the appendix to the published translation claims that the manuscript reads "dermones." 
Stewart renders this as "sermones" in the printed Latin. Moreover, "electrum," now understood to be an alloy consisting 
of part gold and one part silver, was formerly believed to refer to amber. 
3 For extensive examples of the apocryphal narrative of Solomon's authority over demons in folklore, see: Georg 
Salzberger, Die Salomo-Sage in der Semitischen Literatur. Ein Beitrag zur Vergleichenden Sagenkunde (Berlin, 1907).  
4 See Gittin 68a-b.1 in the Babylonian Talmud. 
5 See especially surah 34. 
6 See: Jozef Verheyden, The Figure of Solomon in Jewish, Christian and Islamic Tradition: King, Sage and Architect 
(Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2013) 115-117. 
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apocryphal tradition of Solomon's demon compulsion provided the origin myth and 
paradigm for a variety of technologies and texts of ritual magic ranging from an early 
example in the Greek Magical Papyri,7 probably dating from the second century CE, to 
the Clavicula Salomonis Regis, an anonymous seventeenth century English grimoire.8  
Solomonic "demonic" magic, like Christian exorcism, derives from the idea that, 
as creator of everything, the Abrahamic God has authority over demons, and, moreover, 
that he can invest mortals with his divine authority if he so wishes. The Ring of Solomon, 
mentioned in the opening quote from the Jerusalem Breviary, would have impressed 
early pilgrims as a physical sign of that investiture with authority, much like a scepter or 
a crown. According to perhaps the most developed surviving account of this early 
apocryphal tradition, the Testament of Solomon (first to third century C.E.),9 God 
invested Solomon with the ring through his emissary, the archangel Michael, and with it 
divine authority over demons.  
 While not all references to the apocryphal tradition of Solomon's power over 
demons include mention of a ring, many of them acknowledge perhaps the central trope 
of this material: the idea that the favor of the divine authority represented by the ring is 
                                                
7 "Greek Magical Papyri" (Latin Papyri Graecae Magicae, abbreviated PGM) refers collectively to a body of papyri 
from Graeco-Roman Egypt containing a number of magical spells, formulae, hymns and rituals dating from the second 
century BCE to the fifth century CE. The most complete collection of these is: Hans D. Betz, The Greek Magical 
Papyri in Translation Including the Demotic Spells (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). 
8 Peterson notes, "The date 1641 occurs in the text and may indicate that its present form dates from then." See: 
Joseph H. Peterson, The Lesser Key of Solomon: Lemegeton Clavicula Salomonis (York Beach, ME: Samuel Weiser, 
2001) xi, here n1. 
9 Duling identifies the Testament as "first to third century A.D." in the introduction to his commentary and new 
translation of the text in D. C. Duling, "Testament of Solomon," The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, Vol. 1: 
Apocalyptic Literature & Testaments (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1983) 934-87. Additionally, for a summary 
and detailed discussion of the scholarship and general scholarly consensus regarding the dating of the Testament, see: 
Dennis Duling, "The Testament of Solomon: Retrospect and Prospect" Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha 1.2 
(1988): 88-91. 
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conditional. The ability of the magician or exorcist to wield this divine authority depends 
upon his (or more rarely her) state of "purity," as we will demonstrate below. Thus, 
throughout the tradition, it is the conditional nature of the divine authority that the ring 
represents (and not the ring itself) which stands at the center of both magical and 
theological discourses concerned with "Solomonic" compulsion of demons.10  
This theological assumption thus serves as the point of departure for the present 
project. For, according to both the apocryphal tradition and canonical scripture, Solomon 
eventually lost his favor with God, when in his later years he turned to the worship of 
idols as described in 1 Kings 11:1-40.11 
Scholars have adduced many readings of the apocryphal narrative of Solomon's 
power over demons concerning both traditions of Solomonic ritual demon compulsion 
(including both "magic" and exorcism) and anti-magic theology. However, what has been 
overlooked in the scholarship is the fact that the central narrative (of which the individual 
retellings may be understood as refractions) represents far more than a magical tradition 
of pseudoepigraphy reaching from late antiquity through the early modern era – a span of 
some fifteen hundred years that bridges religious schisms and confessional breaks.  
To fill this lacuna, the present project contends that the tradition of Solomonic 
demon compulsion is thus as much about the paradigm which the apocryphal narrative of 
the figure of Solomon provides (including, especially, the significance of purity) as it is 
                                                
10 Julien Véronèse observes: "In magic, the use of divine names, although widespread, is nevertheless subject to strict 
rules involving physical cleanliness, chastity or abstinence, fasting – in other words, corporal and spiritual purity. In 
magical as in religious contexts, the virtus of names depends fundamentally on the individual state of the operator." 
Julien Véronèse, "God's Names and Their Uses in the Books of Magic Attributed to King Solomon" Magic, Ritual, and 
Witchcraft 5.1 (2010): 30. 
11 See 1 Kings 11:1-40. 
 
  5 
about the authority suggested by the pseudoepigraphic attribution of the various ritual 
texts and technologies to the person of Solomon. Hence it is that the narrative tradition, 
over this great stretch of time, is a key to understanding a larger evolution of theological 
thought over the Christian era.    
To make this case, I will use the remaining sections of this introduction to outline 
my rationale for stressing the role of purity in the narrative traditions (both apocryphal 
and canonical) of Solomon's power over demons which figure so strongly in discussions 
of demon compulsion (both "magical" and "exorcistic")12 with which the present study is 
concerned. This rationale has in it multiple moving parts, each of which will be discussed 
separately. After that, the individual chapters of the project will show how the link 
between purity and Solomonic demon compulsion helps to open out a set of theological 
and popular texts that all too often have been either dismissed as inconsequential entries 
in the catalogues of particular authors' œuvres or as cultural oddities.   
What comprises these chapters will be summarized at the end of this introduction. 
This introduction, however, will begin not with the summary of the individual chapters, 
but with the justification for their existence: the case for taking up purity and Solomonic 
                                                
12 As will be discussed in our investigation of the anti-magic theology of Thomas Aquinas in chapter 2, the distinction 
between "magic" on the one hand, and "exorcism" on the other is one that arose out of the very discourse that this 
project serves to investigate. The need to describe both "magic" and "exorcism" as comparable, but distinct versions of 
a single phenomenon has led us to the adoption of the circumscription "demon compulsion" in the present project. The 
difference between these two categories, we will argue, is a theological one. Thus, because this project traces ideas of 
demon compulsion within Christian discourses, the ability to discuss the categories both in terms of sameness and 
difference is crucial. Our approach to this distinction, in turn, represents a crucial methodological difference between 
the present project and that of Pablo A. Torijano's Solomon, the Esoteric King: From King to Magus, Development of a 
Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 2002). Torijano sees a progression in the Solomon literature of view from Hebrew King, to 
Hellenistic King, to exorcist, to Hermetic sage, to "Son of David," to "horseman," to "astrologer, and finally to 
"magician." Torijano views Solomon as an essentially Jewish figure in his project and his corpus is much broader. By 
contrast, the present project (as we have stated) is focused on the figure of Solomon in Christian theological discourse 
and the discourse-internal processes of othering that drove the changes from legitimate exorcist to black magician. 
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magic/anti-magic in tandem, and thus challenging present scholarship to see the centrality 
of such debates.   
The first justification for that link rests on the narrative tradition used to speak of 
Solomonic ritual demon compulsion itself, and the second, on the scholarship on religion 
that treats this body of "magic." Thus I begin my justificatory narrative by rehearsing the 
significance of the term "purity," and then how it functions in the work on purity and 
magic of Mary Douglas and Bronislaw Malinowski, respectively. These scholars have set 
the ground for understanding what is at stake in linking purity and magico-religious idea 
of demon compulsion. Using them allows me to isolate a set of critical links between the 
apocryphal narrative of Solomon's authority over demons and a more specific subset of 
ritual acts (here: "purity" as prerequisite to ritual demon compulsion as both "magic" and 
exorcism). This will take us to discuss Dorothea Salzer's term, unio magica, in reference 
to the associative link between a paradigmatic narrative and the staging of the magico-
religious act as participation rather than reenactment.  
Resting on these reference points in scholarship, I will return, re-stage and render 
more complex a reading of the apocryphal narrative of King Solomon's authority over 
demons as it is reflected in several extant non-ritual sources. My goal is to highlight how 
that narrative material grounded a paradigmatic argument about the link between purity 
and divine authority, a narrative focusing especially on the conditional nature of 
Solomon's investiture with divine authority – how he came to have it and how he lost it.  
This connection, in turn, amplifies the relation of ritual to the question of 
purity/authority, as that question is structured in both texts of ritual magic and anti-magic 
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theological arguments that engage with questions of the efficacy of such ritual. The 
discussion of the source materials in relation to how the Solomon narrative functioned as 
argument logic accomplishes two things. First, it reveals how a particular understanding 
of the circumstances of Solomon's loss of the favor of God, both in canonical and 
apocryphal traditions, led to the understanding of purity as an element sine qua non for 
the compulsion of demons. Second, it will show that, while the concern for purity 
remains a constant element within the tradition(s) of Solomonic magic (i.e. "demonic" 
magic or nigromantia), the particular understanding of "purity" reflected in the 
tradition(s) changes over time with major changes occurring at the points of religious 
(Jewish-Christian), philosophical (Scholastic/Aristotelian-Platonic/Augustinian), and 
confessional (Catholic-Protestant) breaks. 
I conclude this justification of the conceptual framework of my discussion by 
outlining the significance of my findings for the study of Solomonic demon compulsion 
(i.e. magic/anti-magic and exorcism), including observations on the contributions of 
orthodox theology to the development of demonic "magic" – its theory and practice as 
reflected in extant manuals of Solomonic ritual demon compulsion. This discussion will 
presage some thoughts in the conclusion of the present project, in adducing evidence that 
ideas of purity which appear to be informed by Protestant theology were incorporated 
into sixteenth century Solomonic-type demonic magic. A particularly noteworthy 
example of this potentially Protestant demonic magic, was one of the most popular 
magical grimoires of the later, nineteenth century English occult revival and modern 
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occultism in general, The Book of Abramelin the Mage, to which we will return briefly in 
the conclusion of the project. 
 
Defining Purity: Prelude to Reading Solomonic Ritual Demon Compulsion 
 
As already indicated, this project hangs in no small part on a theological 
commonplace within this tradition: the link between the definition of "purity" and ideas 
of divine authorization that could be read into the narrative of Solomon's ability to 
compel demons. That idea of "purity" not only recurs overtly, in various guises over the 
long course of the tradition(s) of Solomonic ritual demon compulsion, but also in 
terminological constellations that exemplify its consequences as seen in Western 
theologies and religious practices. For instance, some medieval authors write not of 
"purity" per se, but rather of grace or the acts believed to lead to it. Early modern authors, 
as we will see, circumlocute purity as faith or even predestination. Regardless of how this 
idea of purity is described in these magical and anti-magical texts, however, the rituals 
derived from the apocryphal Solomon-narrative consistently involve the favor of God, 
and assume that in order to obtain God's favor (and thus become authorized to compel 
demons), one must be "pure."13  
                                                
13 See Thorndike on William of Auvergne. He writes: "This brings William to the delicate question of divine names. 
He censures the use of the name of God by 'magicians and astronomers' in "working their diabolical marvels (De 
legibus, cap. 27). He also notes that they employ a barbaric name and not one of the four Hebrew names of God. They 
forbid anyone who is not pure and clad in pure vestments to presume to touch the book in which the name is written, 
but they try to gain evil ends by it and so blaspheme against their Creator" in Lynn Thorndike, A History of Magic and 
Experimental Science During the First Thirteen Centuries of Our Era: Vol. 2 (New York & London: Columbia 
University Press, 1923) 352. Also see Thorndike: "The magicians declare that it is impossible for a wicked or impure 
man to work truly by the magic art, in which they assert that the spirits are compelled against their will by pure men" 
(284). 
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My choice to adopt the term "purity" in my discussion to refer to this requisite 
state of the ritual specialist is primarily informed by two concerns. First, "purity" is the 
word used in the oldest extant Solomonic ritual texts – those included among the Greek 
Magical Papyri.14 These texts are the procrustean bed for the whole discussion of 
Solomonic ritual demon compulsion: given their early dates, any later magician or 
theologian who interacted with ritual traditions of demon compulsion as described in 
these texts would have been forced to confront such ideas of purity as requisite for 
obtaining God's favor and to find equivalents or differences according to their purposes 
and circumstances.  
I highlight the term "purity" also to underscore a historiographic case. The 
persistence of the condition of purity as referring to the requisite state of the ritual 
specialist speaks to the continued inclusion of ancient Jewish ideas and practices of purity 
(such as abstinences and ablutions) alongside medieval and early modern additions – this 
procrustean bed of purity as requisite condition for achieving power over demons as 
associated with the apocryphal Solomonic tradition persists into many later contexts in 
fairly consistent, recognizable forms. For example, any number of revisions or re-
elaborations of "purity" by both magicians and theologians within the relatively constant 
framework of the tradition of Solomonic demon compulsion bears witness – as will be 
seen – to the historical recognition of Levitical purity, sacramental grace, faith, and even 
predestination as various possible answers to the persistent question of what merits the 
                                                
14 See specifically PMG IV 3007-86, which refers specifically to Solomon: "A tested charm of Pibechis for those 
possessed by daimons." See also PGM XII. 270-350: "A Ring. A little ring for success and favor and victory." This 
example does not specifically refer to Solomon but does describe a ritual for the creation of a ring with very similar 
demon-compelling powers to that of Solomon. See: Betz, 96f. and 163-5, respectively. 
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favor of God in both the practices of certain forms of illicit magic and of orthodox 
theology. Furthermore, the textual record appears to indicate that as magicians made new 
elaborations of these rituals, their prescriptions for the personal preparation of the 
magician reflected – to a great extent – religious and confessional ideas of "purity" 
according to changing orthodox theologies. In chapter 1 below, I will pursue how the 
ancient Jewish roots of the medieval Christian discourse on Solomonic demon 
compulsion provide a point of departure for a comparison among ideas of purity within 
the narrative tradition; subsequent chapters will trace other iterations of the idea of purity.  
For the present, it suffices to note that the subject of purity is both well attested 
and thoroughly researched by scholars who have dealt extensively with both magical and 
non-magical cultic practices of ancient Judaism (the details of which will be found in the 
next chapter). Perhaps the most useful of these for the structure of my argument is 
anthropologist Mary Douglas' critical afterword to historian Jacob Neusner's book, The 
Idea of Purity in Ancient Judaism, in which Neusner speculates on the changes in 
understandings of purity within Judaism from the period of ca. 300 BCE to ca. 700 CE. 
Neusner and Douglas point to a tendency toward "spiritualizing and metaphoricizing" 
purity rules in ancient Judaism. This tendency, I believe, continues within Christianity as 
it, too, spread beyond a single locus or community: 
The holiness of the Temple is a focal point of the purity rules of the biblical 
legacy. In the later periods, sectarian communities constituted themselves in 
relation to the Temple and revived purity rules to signify their apartness and 
holiness: so the Pharisees, the Qumran and the Zealots. For them the symbolism 
of the Temple does not come to rest upon a building; the Temple itself signifies 
their godly community. The further from the Temple in time or space, the more 
the tendency to spiritualise and metaphoricise the rules: so Philo and Hebrews. 
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With one modification, this is extremely convincing. Any sect tends to define 
itself with purity rules whether a biblical corpus lies at hand or not. I would 
modify the conclusion by suggesting that the further from membership of a 
sectarian group, the more the tendency to turn purity rules into metaphors of 
spiritual good instead of regulations for daily entrances and exits and rankings.15 
 
While both Neusner's claims and Douglas' emendations deal explicitly only with ancient 
Judaism, they nevertheless have interesting implications for the present project.  
I suggest that the same tendency toward spiritualizing and metaphoricizing cultic 
purity rules can be observed within Christianity as its various sects move farther away in 
time and space from the understood physical presence of the divine after the crucifixion 
of Jesus.16 As ancient Judaism's concern for achieving and maintaining a state of purity is 
supplanted in medieval Catholicism by a concern for achieving and maintaining a state of 
grace through sacramental (mediated) grace, so Catholic ideas of a state of grace are 
replaced in early modern Protestantism by ideas of the unmediated grace of "faith" and, 
later, even predestination or election.17 Douglas' emendation to Neusner's conclusion 
concerning the effect of one's degree of separation from the Temple on the tendency 
toward metaphorical versus physical understandings of purity may also account for the 
                                                
15 Jacob Neusner and Mary Douglas, The Idea of Purity in Ancient Judaism: The Haskell Lectures, 1972-1973 (Leiden: 
E. J. Brill, 1973) 141. 
16 The religious significance of the Temple as well as changes to cultic purity laws that come about with increased 
distance from it must be approached in light of the belief that the God of the Hebrews was believed to physically dwell 
in the Holy of Holies within the Temple. Thus, Douglas' reference to the increased distance "in time and space" 
between the Jews and the Temple may be understood to implicate both the physical center of cultic worship and the 
understood physical presence of the divine. This view of the Temple as signifying the physical presence of God 
informs the Christian comparison of Jesus to the Temple. See especially John 2:18-22: "So the Jews said to him, 'What 
sign do you show us for doing these things?' Jesus answered them, 'Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it 
up.' The Jews then said, 'It has taken forty-six years to build this temple, and will you raise it up in three days?' But he 
was speaking about the temple of his body. When therefore he was raised from the dead, his disciples remembered that 
he had said this, and they believed the Scripture and the word that Jesus had spoken." The bible quotes given in this 
project are all from the New American Standard Bible (NASB) unless otherwise indicated. 
17 Interestingly enough, election seems to exist at least partly as a response to the idea of total depravity, which may be 
understood as a complete lack of confidence in the efficacy of ritual purification and not as an abandonment of the idea 
of spiritual pollution. We will return to a brief discussion of predestination and election as spiritualized "purity" in the 
conclusion of the project. 
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occasional reemergence of very literal understandings of purity within magical traditions. 
For example, medieval and early modern magicians identified more with the ancient 
sectarian groups (e.g. Jewish and Neo-Platonic pagan) from whose philosophies they 
derived their magical practices than did their contemporaries. As a result – it may be 
argued – they often co-emphasized physical and spiritual purity rather than focusing only 
on the spiritualized and metaphoricized purity of Douglas' hypothesis as did their coevals. 
That observation grounds my inclusion of various texts in the present project. 
Douglas' claim that sects tend to define themselves by means of purity laws suggests that 
it may be possible – to some extent – to identify the confessional affiliations or 
inclinations of the authors of certain anonymous or pseudoepigraphic magical texts. The 
logic is straightforward: if a sect defines itself by its purity laws, so too do the purity laws 
describe the sect. The implications of this are particularly interesting with regard to 
sixteenth-century texts of demonic magic, which – chronologically – could be either 
Catholic or Protestant, but a number of which have not been conclusively sourced. Some 
of these texts include ideas of faith, predestination, and election that are consistent with 
contemporaneous Protestant theology, but not with contemporaneous Catholic theology.18 
In such cases, the idea of predestination functioning as purity within the ritual texts 
would imply the existence of an early modern Protestant practice of demonic magic – a 
practice so often cast as a product and survival (in the Tylorian sense)19 of the "Catholic 
                                                
18 We refer here to Arbatel and the aforementioned Book of Abramelin the Mage, to both of which we return briefly in 
the conclusion to the present project. 
19 The anthropological meaning of the term "survival" is credited to the late nineteenth century, British anthropologist 
E. B. Tylor, who defined it in his 1871 book, Primitive Culture, as follows: "processes, customs, and opinions, and so 
forth, which have been carried on by force of habit into a new state of society different from that in which they had 
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Middle Ages." Both Neusner's and Douglas' observations may thus potentially be used to 
address the question of who was practicing demonic magic and offer guidance as to how 
we might begin to answer such questions about the practitioner by examining the 
contours and presuppositions of the ritual. 
The shared narrative tradition of Solomon's demon compulsion, which extends 
from late antique Judaism through medieval Catholicism into early modern Protestantism 
allows us to suggest that the idea of a state of faith, and even predestination or election – 
even more than the idea of a state of grace – is an extreme form of metaphoricized purity 
within a continuum that begins with Levitical purity laws. Even as religious and 
confessional constructs are transformed across time, it is easy to trace how grace, faith, 
predestination, and election come to occupy the same space within ritual demon 
compulsion as that which ritual or cultic purity had earlier occupied within ritual demon 
compulsion: the terms all describe requisite states of the exorcist or magician.  
Scholars like Bronislaw Malinowski confirm that it is legitimate to generalize 
about such transformations in individual criteria within a ritual paradigm. For instance, in 
his discussion of Trobriander magic in Argonauts of the Western Pacific, Malinowski 
describes "the condition of the performer" as essential to magic:  
[…] magic all the world over, however rudimentary or developed it might be, 
presents three essential aspects. In its performance there are always some words 
spoken or chanted, some actions carried out, and there are always ministers of the 
ceremony. In analyzing the concrete details of magical performances, therefore, 
we have to distinguish the formula, the rite, and the condition of the performer.20 
 
                                                                                                                                            
their original home, and they thus remain as proofs and examples of an older condition of culture out of which a newer 
has been evolved." Edward Tylor, Primitive Culture (New York: J. P. Putnam's Sons, 1920 [1871]) 16. 
20 Bronislaw Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific (New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, 1960 [1922]) 404. 
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Malinowski's insight into the tripartite nature of magic is borne out in the accounts of 
Solomonic demon compulsion discussed in the present study, as well. In them, "purity" is 
the primary condition of the performer for the ritual compulsion of demons. The present 
project takes such substitutions as critical to trace, as evidence of continuities across time 
and across religious schisms and divides among confessions. To ignore such 
commonalities means to overlook defining aspects of arguments that emerge in historical 
contexts where they flag specific transformations. 
Malinowski's definition of  "three essential aspects" as the basis of that which he 
calls magic is critical to my strategy of argumentation. The accounts of Solomonic demon 
compulsion that come down to us, including the ritual texts themselves, consistently 
speak to all three of these elements, albeit with varying degrees of attention, and thus do 
belong to the domain of "magic," as defined by scholarship in Malinowski's tradition. In 
the historical documentation, the names and the astrological associations of demons, the 
names of the angels with the power to contain them, and the sacred names of God by 
which the demons are adjured usually make up the bulk of the formulae.21 The rite, too, 
is present in extant accounts (if not always in great detail) as descriptions or prescriptions 
of where, when, and how the magician should attempt to summon, compel, and dismiss 
the demons. Finally, the requirements for the condition of the performer are variously 
expressed in terms of physical or spiritualized and metaphoricized purity. These are 
                                                
21 In Magic in the Middle Ages, Richard Kieckhefer offers a definition of necromancy as "[e]ssentially […] a merger of 
astral magic and exorcism." While this often appears to be the case in manuals of medieval magic, Kieckhefer's 
definition seems problematic in the context of the present study in that the implied dichotomy would seem to 
essentialize astrology as "magical" and exorcism as "religious" without sufficient regard for the ancient provenances of 
astrological cosmologies as "religious" and pre-medieval conceptions of demon compulsion without anachronistic 
distinction between exorcism (in the modern sense) and demonic magic. See: Kieckhefer 165-172. 
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described either directly, as a precondition of a successful ritual, or by implication in the 
form of praise of Solomon's great virtue that moved God to grant him the authority over 
demons which the magician seeks to embody.  
Yet the evidence that I will adduce in the present project introduces a caution into 
any blanket acceptance of Malinowski's observation. Significantly, the textual evidence 
for Western ritual demon compulsion suggests that the magicians and theologians 
concerned with Solomonic demon compulsion came to prioritize the "three essential 
aspects" by which Malinowski defines the practice magic differently than did his 
Trobriander informants in ways that suggest differences between pre-axial and post-axial 
magic. 
Malinowski's analysis of Trobriander magic contains explicit evidence, which 
allows me to use his definitions, even if its elements are reprioritized. For example, he 
notes that, "To the direct question of the subject, the natives always reply that the spell is 
the more important part." The real strength of the magic is understood to be in the spell. 
He continues, "The condition of the magician is, like the rite, essential to the performance 
of the magic, but it also is considered by the natives as subservient to the spell."22 It 
should not surprise us, then, that such elements as Malinowski's informants regarded as 
the most powerful were also understand to be the most valuable, and therefore to be 
guarded most carefully:  
The spell is the part of the magic which is kept secret and known only to the 
esoteric circle of practitioners. When a magic is handed over, whether by 
purchase, gift, or inheritance, only the spell has to be taught to the new recipient 
                                                
22 Malinowski 418. 
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[…]. When one speaks about magical knowledge, or inquires whether an 
individual knows some magic, this invariably refers to the formula, for the nature 
of the rite is always quite public knowledge.23 
 
The similarities of Malinowski's data to the accounts of Solomonic demon compulsion 
that I treat below are striking. As with Trobriander magic, the "magic" of Solomonic 
ritual demon compulsion consists primarily of formula – the litanies of the names of 
demons and angels, and the sacred Names of God. Moreover, both Malinowski's oral 
evidence and my written sources admonish their readers against revealing these secrets 
too the uninitiated. The Liber Consecratus, for example, a fourteenth century magical 
manual,24 instructs its user to keep it carefully concealed so it does not fall into the hands 
"of the foolish."25 Likewise, the author of the Sepher Razielis known from a sixteenth 
century copy admonishes the reader that, "Semiforas [the ineffable and efficacious name 
of God] is a word which ought not to be shown to all men, neither by it ought any man to 
work (except with great necessity or anguish)."26 
However, unlike with Malinowski's observation of the Trobrianders, the present 
study reveals that concern with the condition of the performer of Solomonic magic seems 
to have increased over time – even to the point of eclipsing the formula as "the more 
important part" in magical texts of the early modern period. It is this change which I take 
as indicative of the shift toward a literate, axial religion and thus a literate, axial magic. 
                                                
23 Malinowski 418. 
24 The first definite mention of the Liber Consecratus (also known as the Sworn Book of Honorius, Liber Juratus, 
Liber Sacer, and Liber Sacratus), which was purportedly written by Honorius of Thebes, is in the 1347 trial record of 
Olivier Pepin from Mende, France. The oldest extant manuscript copy, Sloane MS 3854 (fol 117-144), also dates from 
the fourteenth century. See Jan Buhlman, "Notice of the Liber juratus in Early Fourteenth-century France," Societas 
Magica Newsletter 14.4 [Fall, 2005] 4. 
25 Richard Kieckhefer, Magic in the Middle Ages (Cambridge u.a: Cambridge Univ. Pr, 2009) 163.  
26 See Don Karr and Stephen Skinner, Sepher Raziel (Llewellyn Worldwide Ltd, 2010) 216. 
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These changes are evident in both manuals of ritual magic and anti-magic theology of 
Solomonic demon compulsion, and I will point to them in the texts to be discussed in the 
chapters below as evidence of commonality: as a reason to consider evidence which, on 
initial inspection, seems to belong to different categories as part of the same tradition of 
argument.  
 
Defining Evidence for Solomonic Demon Compulsion:  Not a Corpus, but a 
Narrative Tradition 
The theoretical point I have just made about associating evidence that initially 
might seem disparate has a corollary point: criteria such as those Malinowski adduces to 
define magic – his "three essential aspects" – exist in the forms of traditions expressed 
within the cultures of their users. In working with the narrative of Solomon's demon 
compulsion, we are working with a broadly familiar tradition: pieces of it are tucked into 
some of the sacred texts of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, all of which, in turn, use the 
account in their respective canonical sacred texts to ground their narrative traditions (not 
as direct models for the story-telling). That narrative tradition provided both the exorcist 
and the magician with the paradigmatic models for their practice, yet it is not preserved in 
any single, authoritative, or canonical account: none of the extant texts provides what 
could be understood as a clear, complete origin story, but rather appear to presuppose 
their audiences' familiarity with this apocryphal aspect of Solomon's biography.27 Far 
                                                
27 There is reason to consider that the magicization of the figure of Solomon was itself a response to expectations of 
mythic kingship in the Hellenized world. I.e., what was true of kings and pharaohs should also be true of Solomon if he 
were to continue to be considered a great king. Other scholars have argued this. For example, L. H. Feldman has 
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more detail about how Solomon came to have (and to lose) this power is found at and 
beyond the borders of orthodoxy – many texts record only allusions or embellishments to 
that traditional narrative material, and not the main narrative itself.  
Significantly for the case of the practice of Solomonic demon compulsion over 
time, it is apocryphal religious texts, many of which have been recovered only relatively 
recently after being lost (or suppressed) for centuries that give some of the most detailed 
accounts.28 The writings of early apologists and historians – now only selectively 
recollected by their successors – also provide significant details as a natural consequence 
of their antagonistic polemics. 
For the same reason, another important source for recovering the apocryphal 
narrative of Solomon's power over demons is the theological record of orthodox 
Catholicism's battle against demonic magic. For example, the eighth century German 
Homily on Sacrilegious Practices of Pseudo-Augustine condemns as pagans those who 
produce the writings of Solomon and fashion charms or phylacteries with them; as it does 
so, it provides some small amount of detail about what Malinowski would classify as 
                                                                                                                                            
studied the treatment of several biblical figures in the writings of Josephus and maintains that the figure of Solomon is 
Hellenized to appeal to the Hellenized Jew and educated Greek in Josephus audience. See: Louis Feldman, "Josephus 
as an Apologist to the Greco-Roman World: His Portrait of Solomon," Aspects of Religious Propaganda in Judaism 
and Early Christianity, edited by Elisabeth Fiorenza-Schüssler (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976) 
69–98, especially 87-92. However, it is absolutely unnecessary for Josephus to have been the instigator of this turn in 
the depiction of Solomon. In fact, we argue that Josephus' depiction of Solomon functioned because it argued with 
popular expectation and not against it. By this logic, then, it is at least possible that the "Solomonic" exorcism 
Josephus' Antiquities (discussed in the following chapter) is both the earliest representative account of this type of 
depiction of Solomon and effectively incomplete. In this case, Josephus' task would not be to establish an expectation 
(e.g. an entire narrative of Solomon's semi-divine power), but rather merely to confirm that what was held to be true of 
other great kings was also true of Solomon. In this case, we would need to look to the narratives Hellenic kings and 
pharaohs in order to trace this narrative any further back, and not to search (in vain) for older narratives of Solomon's 
power over demons. See also: Pablo A. Torijano, Solomon, the Esoteric King: From King to Magus, Development of a 
Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 2002) 38f. 
28 Two such examples are related: the Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila and The Testament of Solomon. Both will be 
treated in chapter 1. 
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formula and rite.29 Likewise, in his Historia Scholastica (ca. 1170), Petrus Comestor 
ascribed all the magic books and paraphernalia current in his time to Solomon.30 Thomas 
Aquinas, too, acknowledged just enough of this apocryphal chapter of Solomon's 
biography to record a version of it as he forbade any attempt at emulating it in his 
Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei (1265-66).31 Still greater detail comes to us from 
the many ritual texts themselves – bits and scraps or even entire books of "magic" that 
orthodox theologians failed to eliminate. Pieces and evidence of the rituals for demon 
compulsion that survive – often against all odds – on everything from papyrus to 
parchment, amulets to potsherds, were framed as part of the legacy of Solomon's 
apotropaic powers and thus allow us to reconstruct at least much of what was believable, 
if not all of what was believed (and practiced) in these narrative and ritual traditions.  
The present study thus does not presume to examine the full textual record of 
Solomonic demon compulsion across so much time and space as it actually occupies, nor 
across every affected source type and religion. Not only would there be difficulties in 
creating a coherent corpus of texts, given such large amounts of data, but the 
indeterminate provenance of many of the sources and the multifarious religious contexts 
would necessitate essentializing "Solomonic magic" in a methodologically fatal way. In 
                                                
29 See Gager's discussion of the Homily on Sacrilegious Practices of Pseudo-Augustine in: John G. Gager, Curse 
Tablets and Binding Spells from the Ancient World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) 167. Gager notes that 
the text emanates geographically from Germany and chronologically is from the eighth century C.E. He translates the 
quite ordinary Latin of the popular sermon (Ch 6 § 19) as follows: "Whoever produces writings of Solomon, whoever 
ties around the neck of humans or dumb animals any characters, whether on papyrus, on parchment, or or metal tablets 
made from bronze, iron, lead, or any other material, such a person is not a Christian but a pagan" (167). The Latin 
original is published in C.P. Caspari, Eine Augustin fälschlich begelegte Homilia de sacrilegiis (Christiania, 1886), 
263f.  
30 Trachtenberg 63f. 
31 We will return to this in the next chapter. 
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consequence, this study follows the narrative trope of Solomon's demon compulsion as a 
tradition (as related to narrative, rather than texts), and only within Christian discourse. 
That said, Jewish examples from late antiquity are included (including examples recorded 
later which reflect Jewish practices from that earlier time), as they play a role in how 
Christian authorities defined their own practice – both as original model and later as 
polemical counterfoil. However, the use of the trope of Solomon's demon compulsion in 
later Jewish traditions falls outside the scope of this study, as does any discussion of 
Solomon's power over the jinn in Islamic tradition.32 After the initial break with Judaism 
in late antiquity, the idea of Solomon's power over demons became an internal concern 
shaping the demonological and moral theology of magic where the paradigmatic trope 
was not only preserved, but also even cultivated. The notable (partial) exception of the 
medieval satirical Jewish anti-Christian tract, the Toledot Yeshu, will be discussed in 
chapters 2 and 4. 
What emerges as a fruitful corpus for investigating this narrative and ritual 
tradition of Solomonic demon compulsion, then, is a series of situated conversations 
                                                
32 See, for example: Surah 21:81-82 "And to Solomon [We subjected] the wind, blowing forcefully, proceeding by his 
command toward the land which We had blessed. And We are ever, of all things, Knowing. And of the devils were 
those who dived for him and did work other than that. And We were of them a guardian." See also Surah 27:38-40 
[Solomon] said, "O assembly [of jinn], which of you will bring me her throne before they come to me in submission?" 
A powerful one from among the jinn said, "I will bring it to you before you rise from your place, and indeed, I am for 
this [task] strong and trustworthy." Said one who had knowledge from the Scripture, "I will bring it to you before your 
glance returns to you." And when [Solomon] saw it placed before him, he said, "This is from the favor of my Lord to 
test me whether I will be grateful or ungrateful. And whoever is grateful - his gratitude is only for [the benefit of] 
himself. And whoever is ungrateful - then indeed, my Lord is Free of need and Generous." See also Surah 34:12-14 
"And to Solomon [We subjected] the wind - its morning [journey was that of] a month - and its afternoon [journey was 
that of] a month, and We made flow for him a spring of [liquid] copper. And among the jinn were those who worked 
for him by the permission of his Lord. And whoever deviated among them from Our command - We will make him 
taste of the punishment of the Blaze. They made for him what he willed of elevated chambers, statues, bowls like 
reservoirs, and stationary kettles. [We said], "Work, O family of David, in gratitude." And few of My servants are 
grateful. And when We decreed for Solomon death, nothing indicated to the jinn his death except a creature of the earth 
eating his staff. But when he fell, it became clear to the jinn that if they had known the unseen, they would not have 
remained in humiliating punishment. All quotations are from Sahih International Version. 
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between Christian authorities and those whom they would convert or coerce into their 
respective forms of orthodoxy. These encounters exemplify how by manipulating the 
definition of "purity" in a system of expectation (God's) and authorization (man's), 
Christian religious authorities sought to establish and maintain jurisdiction over 
intervention into the chain of supernatural causation which incentivized demon 
compulsion in the first place.33 In other words, around the central notion of purity, I am 
establishing a corpus of conversations (some more complete, some more fragmented), 
each of which represents a moment in an evolving tradition of understanding and 
mobilizing traditional apocryphal narratives of Solomonic demon compulsion by using 
and altering one of its criteria: the condition of the performer.   
My goal in establishing such a corpus around the concept of purity in Solomonic 
demon compulsion and exploring how it was used to establish or claim religious 
authority is twofold. First, the analyses that I offer in the chapters which follow take an 
impetus like Malinowski's into textual studies, allowing me to focus on the logics and 
expectations underlying textual representations as much as or more than the irregular 
forms of available records. 
My second goal is historical, aiming at describing the persistent effects of certain 
traditional criteria (i.e. purity) within theological arguments, even across confessional 
lines. By comparing the arguments of successive Christian authorities (first the early 
apologists, then Scholastic theologians, and finally the Protestant reformer, Martin 
Luther) to contemporaneous textual examples of demon compelling rituals, I will show 
                                                
33 Clark offers a helpful discussion of the ramifications of demonology as a natural science. See: Stuart Clark Thinking 
with Demons: The Idea of Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe (Oxford [etc.: University Press, 2005) 153. 
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how what most likely began as a late antique straw man in the Christian polemic against 
Judaism came to define much of the actual pursuit and practice as well as the prohibition 
of nigromantia (demonic magic) for the next millennium and a half. That is: I will show 
that orthodoxy was in large part responsible for the creation of its own ideal enemy – the 
priest created the sorcerer, and both appeared in specific variants appropriate for local 
evolutions of Christian theology. 
 
The Solomon Narrative(s) as Paradigm: A Mode of "Magical Thinking" 
The apocryphal narrative of Solomon's power over demons is of interest to us for 
the same reason that it was of interest to the exorcists, magicians, apologists, and 
theologians to be discussed in this study: it provided a sense of religious authorization 
and legitimation to do what Solomon had done – to compel the demons that populated the 
imaginations of the ancient Hellenized world.  
The "demons" involved had many faces, as they were drawn into these narrative 
traditions. The respective cosmologies of Greeks, Egyptians, Romans, and Persians all 
included hierarchies of intermediary beings between the gods and humanity.34 These 
demons (from the Greek "δαίμων" or "daimon") were thought to be the invisible actors 
behind all sorts of otherwise inexplicable causation, from weather and illness 
(possession) in particular, to success or failure in general. Thus, the power to control 
demons not only protected one from the threats presented by these intermediary beings, it 
also granted the one who could control them a greater degree of agency within the causal 
                                                
34 A.O. Lovejoy's Great Chain of Being (1942) is perhaps the most famous modern discussion of intermediary forms. 
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chain in which humanity was thought to be exclusively on the receiving end of every 
yank or ripple. Those who could compel such forces wielded super-human power, even if 
only by proxy. The persistence of such belief during the formation of early Christianity 
(as will be discussed in Chapter 1 below) facilitated both the rhetorical logic of 
compelling demons in the name of Jesus and the persistence of the Solomon narrative.35 
The numerous charms, amulets, and manuals of ritual magic that claim 
association with Solomon – the textual record – show that connecting oneself and one's 
own ritual to the apocryphal narrative of Solomon's power over demons represented both 
efficacy and legitimacy. For example, a charm from the Greek Magical Papyri (to be 
examined further in the following chapter) makes much of compelling the demon to 
which the formula is addressed "by the seal that Solomon used." Interestingly, however, 
no seal – no graphic representation or written description of it – is included in the text. In 
this and numerous other, similar, charms, it seems to have been thought sufficient to 
make the allusion to Solomon's seal without actually reproducing it.36  
                                                
35 For example, in the writing of Origen (c. 184 CE - c. 253), to whom we will return in the following chapter, we find 
a logic that presupposes a Great Chain of Being. In his Fourteenth Homily on Numbers, for example, he writes: "And 
what is so pleasant, what is so magnificent as the work of he sun or moon by whom the world is illuminated? Yet there 
is work in the world itself too for angels who are over beasts and for angels who preside over earthly armies. There is 
work for angels who preside over the nativity of animals, of seedlings, of plantations, and many other growths. And 
again there is work for angels who preside over holy works, who teach the comprehension of eternal light and the 
knowledge of God's secrets and the science of divine things." See: Lynn Thorndike, A History of Magic and 
Experimental Science: Vol. 1 (New York, NY: Columbia Univ. Press, 1970) 454. Likewise, in his De Principiis 1.8, we 
read, "[…] nor are we to suppose that it is the result of accident that a particular office is assigned to a particular angel: 
as to Raphael, e.g. the work of curing and healing; to Gabriel, the conduct of wars; to prayers and supplications of 
mortals. For we are not to imagine that they obtained these offices otherwise than by their own merits, and by the zeal 
and excellent qualities which they severally displayed before the world was formed; so that afterwards, in the order of 
archangels, this or that office was assigned to each one, while others deserved to be enrolled in the order of angels, and 
to act under this or that archangel, or that leader or head of an order." See: Ante-nicene Fathers: 4. Grand Rapids, 
Mich: Eerdmans, 1979) 264f. 
36 "Solomon's seal" also belongs to this narrative tradition. Like other elements of the narrative, descriptions of it are 
often quite vague. The ambiguity of the seal within the traditional narratives appears to have contributed to the 
durability of the motif by establishing an expectation of a specific piece of magical knowledge (i.e. Malinowski's 
"formula"). I note here that in many accounts within the narrative tradition of Solomonic demon compulsion, the seal of 
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Certainly, there were charms, amulets, and ritual manuals with other 
pseudoepigraphic attributions. Among ancient and medieval Jewish examples of such 
texts and artifacts, we find pseudoepigraphic attributions to Moses, Joseph, and others.37 
In Christian examples, we find St. Cyprian, Honorius of Thebes,38 Albertus Magnus, 
Roger Bacon, and even St. Thomas Aquinas!39 Allusion to these, however, failed to 
produce nearly as many new texts (or prompt the "rediscovery" as many "lost" ones) as 
did allusion to Solomon. The Solomon example seems to have had particular significance 
over a long period of time, based on the sheer number of its appearances. 
In making such claims, however, we should be cautious to maintain the 
distinction between the association of magic with the figure of Solomon and the 
pseudoepigraphic attribution of a magical charm or text to the person of Solomon – each 
is a different logic of association. While these logics of association are not mutually 
exclusive, nor are they are necessarily mutually inclusive. Consider: the pseudepigraphic 
attribution of a theological text, for example, to a recognized authority such as Augustine 
of Hippo serves to lend the authority to the content of the assertion(s) in the text. This, in 
fact, is the case with the aforementioned eighth century prohibition against Solomonic 
                                                                                                                                            
Solomon includes the ineffable and efficacious name of God - the literal "formula" for compelling demons - and, 
furthermore, that according to many accounts the seal was thought to have been inscribed on Solomon's ring. 
37 See Salzer's discussion of multiple specific allusive biblical referents: Dorothea M. Salzer, Die Magie der 
Anspielung: Form und Funktion der Biblischen Anspielungen in den Magischen Texten der Kairoer Geniza (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2010) 221-245. 
38 "Honorius of Thebes, a possibly mythical character from the Middle Ages, is said to have authored The Sworn Book 
of Honorius, although the first printed manuscript of this work did not appear until 1629. Considerable mystery still 
exists about the identity of Honorius, both Pope Honorius I and Pope Honorius III have been linked to the character. 
Honorius of Thebes is also claimed to be the creator of the Theban alphabet, in Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa's De 
Occulta Philosophia (1531) and Johannes Trithemius' Polygraphia (1518). According to the Sworn Book of Honorius, 
he is supposed to be 'the son of Euclid, master of the Thebians.' But the book delivers no source to whom this might be. 
39 See: Robert Mathiesen, "A Thirteenth Century Ritual to Attain the Beatific Vision from the Sworn Book of 
Honorius of Thebes," Conjuring Spirits: Texts and Traditions of Medieval Ritual Magic, edited by Claire Fanger, 
(Pennsylvania State University Press, 2015) 143–162, here 143. 
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demon compulsion by the anonymous writer now identified as Pseudo-Augustine. By 
contrast, the attribution of a type or tradition of magic to Solomon as a recognized 
"magician" lends the assumption of efficacy to the content of the ritual act: authority vs. 
efficacy. 
Nonetheless, the significance of the figure of Solomon was never in doubt. 
Solomon's fame (or infamy) as demon conjurer is attested in examples from the first 
century well into the seventeenth. In this sense, Solomon was the magical equivalent of 
"a brand you can trust." Other objects of such pseudoepigraphic attribution, such as 
Honorius of Thebes, Thomas Aquinas, and others, simply did not have the sort of 
reputations to sustain credible allusion in the way that Solomon had. In particular, in the 
popular imagination, they lacked an association with power over demons. The promise of 
a magical formula attributed to Solomon thus lay not so much in the belief that Solomon 
himself had written it, but rather in the belief that it would reveal how the great Solomon 
had achieved the feats upon which his reputation for demon compulsion was founded. 
The pseudepigraphic value of a magical manual thought to have been written by Solomon 
was in the promise of an authoritative account of his process, which was already 
recognized as effective (even if illicit) thanks to consistent apocryphal, pseudoepigraphic, 
patristic, and theological acknowledgement of it, which, by comparison, was lacking in 
the magical pseudepigrapha of Thomas Aquinas, for instance. 
Nor was this association only the stuff of the often particularly fantastical 
discourse of manuals of ritual magic. By all accounts, medieval Catholic theologians 
themselves took quite seriously the narrative tradition concerning Solomon's power over 
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demons – the narrative was of equal interest to both those inside and those outside of 
institutional power structures. In addition to Aquinas, already mentioned, Peter Cantor 
(died 1197), William of Auvergne (c. 1180/90-1249), and Thomas of Chobham (c. 1160-
1233/36) all treated of Solomon's relationship to licit or illicit magic in their respective 
theological works. Indeed, as Joshua Trachtenberg points out in The Devil and the Jews, 
"Petrus Comestor, in his Historia Scholastica, written about 1170, ascribed all the magic 
books and paraphernalia current in his time to Solomon."40 Trachtenberg further notes, 
that so established was the belief in Solomon's power to compel demons that, by the later 
Middle Ages, demonic magic and the name of Solomon were nearly synonymous: 
The Solomon cycle of legends merits special attention since it seems to have 
made a particularly strong impression upon the medieval imagination. These 
legends possessed two main elements: the wise monarch's dominion over the 
devil and demons and his utilization of this power for magical ends. This latter 
theme was developed with all kinds of variations, so that Solomon came to be 
regarded both as the type of the sorcerer and the original source of occult science. 
So deeply did the belief in his magical supremacy enter into medieval thought that 
nothing more was required to authenticate the worth of a formula or an amulet 
than to trace it to him, and the most popular magical works drew their authority 
from his reputation.41 
 
Thus at the time, it is not surprising that magicians not only sought to avail themselves of 
Solomon's wisdom, but also to attempt what Solomon had accomplished in compelling 
demons – to act in loco Salomonis. It is equally unsurprising, then, that the theologians 
not only sought to suppress texts attributed to Solomon, but also to forbid any attempt at 
recreating his process. The concern both on the side of magicians and of the anti-magic 
                                                
40 Trachtenberg 64. 
41 Trachtenberg 63. 
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theologians was one of the significance of imitating Solomon, as I will expand upon in 
Chapter 2 below.   
For the present, it suffices to note that scholars have found great interest in this 
two-fold effect of pseudoepigraphic attribution, asking how, then, did the magician seek 
to connect his (or much more rarely her) ritual acts to the apocryphal narrative of 
Solomon's power over demons? And why was doing so thought to confer efficacy and 
legitimacy?  
Dorothea Salzer addresses these questions with her examination of biblical 
allusion in the magical texts of the Cairo Geniza in her book, Die Magie der Anspielung: 
Form und Funktion der biblischen Anspielungen in den magischen Texten der Kairoer 
Geniza (The Magic of Allusion: Form and Function of biblical allusion in the magical 
texts of the Cairo Geniza, 2010). Salzer notes the tendency of magicians to try to connect 
their magical acts to biblical figures as I have described, locating it in numerous magical 
texts found in the Cairo Geniza, a collection of texts including some 300,000 manuscript 
fragments from the storeroom or "geniza," (thence the name) of the Ben Ezra Synagogue 
in Fustat, or Old Cairo, Egypt. The Hebrew, Arabic, and Aramaic manuscripts that 
constitute the geniza span a period of more than a thousand years, from around 870 CE to 
the nineteenth century, and by no means are they all magical in nature. Rather, they 
reflect a range of the religious and magical as well as the political and economic activities 
of Jews in North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean. 
In Salzer's corpus – those texts of the Cairo Geniza that are explicitly magical –, 
she identifies allusions not only to Solomon, but also to David, Moses, the prophets, and 
 
  28 
even to God himself. "The choice of person whose words the magician uses is in no way 
coincidental," she writes. "Rather, it frequently involves particularly prominent figures 
from biblical history."42 Salzer's investigation leads her to conclude that these allusions 
have both syntagmatic and paradigmatic functions. Thus, the choice of biblical figure to 
whom the magician alludes in his or her formula must be understood in the context of the 
magician's intention for the magical act. The syntagmatic function of such allusions 
"encompasses the role and meaning of an allusion within the text." The paradigmatic 
function of biblical allusion, by contrast, "refers to the mode of a text's semantic 
expansion through the use of allusion as well as the associations that are thus made 
possible,"43 [emphasis added]. Salzer goes on to specify the following main paradigmatic 
functions of the biblical allusions in her corpus: authorization, legitimation, basis for 
efficacy, orientation toward clientele, and orientation in the address.44  
It is the latter, paradigmatic function that primarily directs the present discussion 
of the Solomon figure in the texts and practices of demonic magic for we are concerned 
with the intertextuality (expansion) of the phenomenon of Solomonic demon compulsion. 
The chapters that follow trace one particular set of associations with Solomon – those of 
                                                
42 The English translation is my own. Salzer's German reads, "Die Wahl der Personen, deren Worte der Magier 
übernimmt, ist keineswegs zufällig. Vielmehr handelt es sich dabei vor allem um besonders prominente Personen der 
biblischen Geschichte." See: Dorothea M. Salzer, Die Magie der Anspielung: Form und Funktion der Biblischen 
Anspielungen in den Magischen Texten der Kairoer Geniza (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010) 221. 
43 The English translation is my own. Salzer's original German is as follows: "Während der Begriff, syntagmatische 
Funktion' die Rolle und Bedeutung einer Anspielung innerhalb des manifesten Textes umfaßt, richtet sich die Frage 
nach den paradigmatischen Funktionen einer Anspielung auf die Art und Weise der semantischen Erweiterungen, 
welche der manifeste Texte durch die Applikation einer Anspielung und die dadurch eröffneten Assoziationen erfährt. 
[...] Was bedeutet es, wenn in den magischen Texten der biblische Prätext evoziert wird? Welche Folgen hat dies für 
den manifesten Text und für das Verständnis der magischen Handlung?" Dorothea M. Salzer, Die Magie der 
Anspielung: Form und Funktion der Biblischen Anspielungen in den Magischen Texten der Kairoer Geniza (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2010) 218. 
44 Salzer's terms in the original German are as follows: Autorisierung, Legitimation, Wirksamkeitsbegründing, 
Klientenausrichtung, Adressenausrichtung. Dorothea M. Salzer, Die Magie der Anspielung: Form und Funktion der 
Biblischen Anspielungen in den Magischen Texten der Kairoer Geniza (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010) 218. 
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his demon compulsion. And, furthermore, they demonstrate how the popularity of the 
figure of Solomon in both magic and anti-magic theology may be attributed to the 
versatility of the allusive potential in the paradigmatic apocryphal narrative connected 
with him: with demons a magician can do anything. 
That such allusions have particular power in these contexts is not simply an 
assumption of Salzer. Her idea of allusion as a magical thought process joins neatly to the 
well-established framework of Sir James George Frazer's "Law of Sympathy," put 
forward in The Golden Bough (1890).45 Salzer's claim is that allusion enables association, 
and, according to Frazer, association – false association – is the foundation of 
homeopathic magic.46 Despite the obvious affinity, however, Salzer does not appeal 
directly to Frazer. Instead, she accounts for the idea of association through allusion – the 
magical thinking – by drawing on Schumacher's prior work on the historiola and 
Analogiezauber (analogy magic),47 as well as Assmann's idea of "unio liturgica."48 On 
this foundation, Salzer proposes the concept of "unio magica" which she defines as 
follows: 
In the context of the present investigation, this term [unio magica] applied to the 
magical texts of the Cairo Geniza and the question at hand, indicates the 
phenomenon of the magician's merging with a particular biblical figure during 
magical acts through the application of bible verses. Through equation with this 
                                                
45 Frazer first published The Golden Bough in two volumes in 1890; then a second edition in three volumes in 1900; 
and finally, the third edition comprising twelve volumes, in 1906–15.  
46 See: James G. Frazer, The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion (London: Macmillan, 1963) 13f. 
47 Meinolf Schumacher, "Geschichtenerzählzauber: Die Merseburger Zaubersprüche und die Funktion der Historiola 
im Magischen Ritual," Ed. Rüdiger Zymner. Erzählte Welt - Welt des Erzählens: Festschrift für Dietrich Weber (Köln: 
Edition Chōra, 2000). 201-15, here 203. 
48 Jan Assmann, "Unio Liturgica: Die Kultische Einstimmung in Götterweltlichen Lobpreis als Grundmotiv 
'Esoterischer' Überlieferung im Alten Ägypten," Secrecy and Concealment (Leiden: Brill, 1995): 37-60, especially 46-
58; 60. 
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figure his authority transfers to the person of the magician who can consequently 
use the authoritative power of the biblical person for his own ends.49  
 
What Salzer calls "biblical allusion" must be modified here to accommodate apocryphal 
narrative tradition as well, but as such allusion to the apocryphal narrative tradition of 
Solomon in ritual magic may be interpreted as an intentional effort to merge with 
Solomon specifically. Consequently, the paradigmatic functions of the allusion are 
Solomon's authorization and legitimation, his basis for efficacy, an orientation toward 
Solomon's clientele, and orientation of his address. The Solomonic magician thus alludes 
to the apocryphal narrative of a Solomon who – as we will describe below – treated 
demons as slaves or personal servants. Contrariwise, analogous allusion to the Jesus of 
canonical narratives – unio magica with a Jesus who does not use demons as slaves – 
would not serve the magician who wants Solomon's relationship (as described in the 
apocryphal narrative) with demons and not that of Jesus.   
 
Defining Magic: A Tradition as Corpus 
At this point, it is useful to return to the problem of defining the corpus on which 
this study is based, as a way to consolidate the study design premises I have been 
reviewing in this introduction. In them lie the justifications for – considering what might 
initially sound like a limited problem – a significant address to the greater study of early 
modern magic and theological thought. To make that case, I will, before summarizing the 
                                                
49 The English translation is my own. Salzer's original German is as follows: "Auf die magischen Texte der Kairoer 
Geniza und hier behandelte Fragestellung übertragen soll dieser Begriff im Rahmen der vorliegenden Untersuchung das 
Phänomen bezeichnen, daß der Magier durch die Applikation von Bibelversen während der magischen Handlung mit 
einer bestimmten biblischen Figur verschmilzt. Durch die Gleichsetzung mit dieser Figur geht deren Autorität auf die 
Person des Magiers über, und der Magier kann folglich die autoritative Machtpotenz der biblischen Person für seine 
Zwecke verwenden" (220). 
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chapters that follow, address some of the objections that might still be raised about my 
analyses. 
The most significant objection may be raised in how I adapt my theoretical 
models. Malinowski's work sets up the possibility of a syntagmatic and paradigmatic 
approach to my corpus, as I have argued above. However, Salzer's study theorizes the 
functions of biblical allusion in general (i.e. not just allusions to Solomon) within the 
context of a specific corpus of magical texts – the texts of the Cairo Geniza. All of the 
texts in Salzer's corpus were found in a single synagogue storeroom, and thus represent 
the thoughts and practices of a narrowly definable community. By contrast, the present 
study is concerned with the biblical figure of Solomon specifically in magical texts more 
generally. 
The corpus on which the present study is based is in many respects broader if not 
larger. Significantly, whereas the texts of the Cairo Geniza can all be reliably associated 
with a single Jewish community in Old Cairo, the texts addressed in the present study 
belonged to multiple communities over a wide geographic area. Moreover, whereas 
Salzer's corpus reflects the magical practices of a Jewish community, that of the present 
study is concerned with Christian magical practices. Such differences in the two studies 
thus precipitate the question: Are Salzer's findings relevant to the present study?  
I proceed with the conviction that Salzer's findings apply to the present study, 
despite the difference in corpuses. Salzer draws heavily from previous scholarship on the 
magico-religious functions of allusion and analogy to arrive at her model of the unio 
magica and how it opens out the function of allusion for magical practice. Her work 
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furthers central projects by Meinholf Schumacher on the "historiola" (historiola magic 
ritually references a situation in which someone has already successfully magically 
acted),50 and Jan Assmann on unio liturgica.51 Neither the theoretical work of 
Schumacher on the historiola nor that of Assmann on unio liturgica are confession or 
corpus dependent, but rather theorize the "magical" potential of particular allusive logics. 
The corpus of narratives on which I rely is comprised of examples built around such 
allusive logics, in their earliest forms, associated directly with Solomon. They represent a 
persistent narrative tradition rather than simply a textual tradition; they document a 
tradition of religious argumentation rather than a site or sect – a logic of allusion that was 
considered generally legible and comprehensible.  
Because of such foundations, Salzer's work on unio magica is especially well 
suited to ground my study of Christian religious magic, given that part of the 
foundational work for Salzer's development is based on work, which incorporates 
analysis of the Catholic mass. For example, in his work on the Merseburger 
Zaubersprüche52 as historiolas Schumacher incorporates the example of the Catholic 
mass, citing the work of Bernhard Lang, who writes, "Just as in the modern Catholic 
                                                
50 "Das magische Erzählen kann, aber es muß nicht nach dem Simila-Prinzip geschehen, […]. Geht es beim 
Analogiezauber um die Ähnlichkeit zwischen dem was jemand tut (oder spricht), und dem, was geschehen soll (also 
etwa Wasser auf einen Stein gießen soll Regen provozieren usw.), so setz die historiola-Magie an einer Situation an, in 
der schon einmal jemand erfolgreich magisch gehandelt hat." See: Meinolf Schumacher, "Geschichtenerzählzauber: 
Die Merseburger Zaubersprüche und die Funktion der Historiola im Magischen Ritual," Ed. Rüdiger Zymner. Erzählte 
Welt - Welt des Erzählens: Festschrift für Dietrich Weber (Köln: Edition Chōra, 2000) 201-15, here 203. 
51 Salzer draws her definition of unio liturgica primarily from the work of Schumacher and describes it as "die 
liturgische Vereinigung mit einem göttlichen Wesen, die durch die Wiedergabe göttlicher Rede geschehe. Die Funktion 
der unio liturgica in der Magie sei die Gleichsetzung des Magiers "mit den zaubernden Göttern oder götterähnlichen 
Wesen der Vorzeit (Idisen, Wodan) [...] in der Hoffnung, damit eine ähnliche Macht auszuüben, wie es 'einstmals' 
geschah" (219). In her definition, Salzer herself cites Schumacher (see above), 212f. 
See also: Jan Assmann, "Unio Liturgica: Die Kultische Einstimmung in Götterweltlichen Lobpreis als Grundmotiv 
'Esoterischer' Überlieferung im Alten Ägypten," Secrecy and Concealment (1995): 37-60, especially 46-58, 60. 
52 The Merseburger Zaubersprüche or "Merseburg Charms" are ninth/tenth century syncretic Christian-pagan charms 
preserved in in Old High German. 
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mass, the priest assumes the role of Christ when he speaks certain words, so the ancients 
equated themselves with gods when they carried out certain cultic functions."53 In a 
parallel move joining two different religious sites, Assmann uses unio liturgica in 
reference to the esoteric literature of ancient Egypt. 
 Certainly there are differences to be found in what we may call the "magical 
allusion" (or allusive logic) of late antique and medieval Jews on the one hand, and late 
antique and medieval Christians on the other, but these scholars share with foundational 
voices like Malinowski the goal of offering paradigms for assumptions that are shared 
between "liturgical" and "magical thinking,"54 acknowledging assumptions shared by 
individuals that underlie both categories. Thus Salzer's work assumes that magical union 
through allusion is a potentially universal function of religious thought – a logic that joins 
ritual practices to power.  
To be sure, the present study could never hope to provide an exhaustive 
examination of various forms of magic or magical thinking within two religions, each 
with its own multiple faces over time. Instead, I have targeted a recurrent, specific set of 
moments in which the two religious domains interact to clarify problems that arise when 
they share a discourse but need to stake out separate positions: here, the problem of the 
compulsion of demons through conditional access to divine authority.   
                                                
53 The English translation is mine. Lang's German reads: "Wie der Priester in der heutigen katholischen Messe die 
Rolle Christi einnimmt, wenn er bestimmte Wörter spricht, so setzten sich die Alten oft mit Göttern gleich, wenn sie 
bestimmte kultische Handlungen ausführten." See: Bernhard Lang, Heiliges Spiel: Eine Geschichte des Christlichen 
Gottesdienstes (München: C.H. Beck, 1998) 315.  
54 In the anthropological sense, as it is intended here, "magical thinking" refers to a fallacious attribution of a causal 
relationship between action and event. The term sometimes has an unfortunate association with "the primitive" in the 
social-evolutionary fallacy of colonial anthropology, in which "magical thinking" served as evidence of "the primitive." 
Here, the intended sense of the term is strictly in reference to the nature of the logic. 
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Salzer herself has demonstrated that the theoretical framework of her unio magica 
is applicable in both Christian and Jewish contexts by combining Schumacher's work on 
historiolas with Assmann's concept of unio liturgica and applying it to the study of 
Jewish magic. She provides an important insight into differences between types of 
allusive union and thereby effectively bridges the conceptual gap, connecting Assmann's 
unio liturgica within the context of liturgy to unio magica within the context of 
efficacious, but not specifically scripted, "magical" acts. She explains: 
The phenomenon of an unio, as described by Schumacher, is also found in the 
Jewish-magical texts of the Cairo Geniza – the conceptual merging of the 
magician with persons or figures of biblical prehistory. However, a clear 
difference to the Hekhalot literature is evident in the magical texts which pertains 
to their liturgical focus: the goal of the magician is not participation in a heavenly 
liturgy, but rather the completion of a magical act by means of which a particular 
outcome is to be achieved. It therefore seems advisable to make a terminological 
distinction in reference to the magical texts and to refer in that case not to an unio 
liturgica, but rather to an unio magica.55 
 
The same applies (at least in its early development) within the emerging Christian 
discourse of late antiquity and the early Middle Ages with which I begin this study. This 
connection was likely also part of the historical reason for which early Christian 
apologists objected to Solomon, because, in this context, the figure of Solomon was in 
competition with the figure of Jesus as a figure of power and authority. In one theological 
reading of the figures, the persistence of a preference for magical union (unio magica) 
                                                
55 The English translation is my own. Salzer's German reads: "Auch in den jüdisch-magischen Texten aus der Kairoer 
Geniza findet sich das Phänomen einer unio, wie sie von Schumacher beschrieben wird, einer konzeptioneller 
Vereinigung des Magiers mit Personen oder Gestalten der biblischen vorzeit also. Allerdings ist in den magischen 
Texten eine deutlische Differenz zur Hekhalot-Literatur augenscheinlich, die im Hinblick auf deren liturgischen Fokus 
besteht: Ziel des Magiers ist nicht die Partizipation an einer himlischen Liturgie, sondern die Durchführung einer 
magischen Handlung, mit der ein bestimmter Zweck erreicht werden soll. Es erscheint daher geraten, eine 
terminologische Unterscheidung vorzunehmen und bezüglich der magischen Texte nicht von einer unio liturgica, 
sondern vielmehr von einer unio magica zu sprechen" (220). 
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with Solomon in the context of demon compulsion easily was seen to imply that the 
allusive potential of the figure of Jesus was in some way inferior to that of Solomon – in 
other words, that Solomon was more powerful. Such a vote of no confidence, had it not 
been addressed, could have been devastating to the emerging Christian religion, and thus 
offers at least one potential explanation for the vehemence of the rejection of Solomonic 
allusion on the part of Christian apologists and theologians. That is, the two figures both 
were implicated in narratives about divine power and authority in an era of theological 
change, and the idea of magical allusion points up what was at stake in choosing one over 
the other. 
Using magical allusion across religious boundaries to illuminate how narrative 
logics work, then, the first chapter of this study begins by establishing how the Christian 
discourse of demon compulsion (both magical and theological) actually originated within 
a Jewish "magical" discourse of the sort that Salzer theorizes, as one religion was 
growing out of the other and developing its own identity in belief and practice. In 
understanding this connection, as I have noted above, the idea of purity will figure 
prominently in my expositions. 
In subsequent chapters, this study's focus on Solomonic demon compulsion will 
extend into the sixteenth century to include examination of how the trope of Solomon's 
authority over demons recurs in Protestant theology and in what I will suggest as forms 
of Protestant magic in the conclusion.  
Taking that project into the sixteenth century, however, might raise an additional 
objection to my study's design. On the surface, the historical record suggests that the 
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popularity and practice of the pseudoepigraphic attribution of magical texts to Solomon 
declines sharply in the late fifteenth century even as the production of texts of ritual 
magic appears to have increased. The question thus arises: Are texts that do not claim 
Solomonic authorship relevant to this study? And by extension: Can magic that does not 
overtly claim Solomon's authorship still be classified as Solomonic? 
The question can be addressed, I believe, by recourse to my explanation that I am 
addressing a narrative tradition, rather than a textual tradition per se. To restate this 
explanation in the more theoretical terms taken up here: I am dealing with one particular 
discourse of allusion that is preserved in many texts and text types, not one single class of 
books or genre. The status of these texts is from the first multiple. First of all, the magical 
texts considered in the present study are all pseudepigraphic, from the earliest to the last. 
None of them were actually written by Solomon. Indeed, scholars do not attribute any 
extant text – not even canonical texts – in whole or part to the hand of the Hebrew 
monarch. In this sense, the very question of the status of a text of Solomonic ritual demon 
compulsion as "authentic" in a tradition which consists entirely of pseudoepigrapha is 
hopelessly mal posée. In this sense, the "text" or textual corpus I consider is the tradition 
of narratives that allude to Solomon's apotropaic power over demons as a particular logic 
of argument. In order to accomplish such allusion, I will argue, it is not necessary to 
name Solomon much less attribute a text to his authorship. 
A second consideration about textual allusion to Solomon arises here: a question 
of what we today would call censorship or covert speech. Here, a historical fact also 
comes into play. The narrative attribution of ritual demon compulsion (i.e. demonic 
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magic or nigromantia) to Solomon did not wane naturally so much as it was vigorously 
suppressed by theologians. Historically, the late Middle Ages saw an explosion of 
Solomonic manuals of ritual demon compulsion, and so, as a reaction, numerous 
Scholastic theological treatises forbade the possession of books of magic – many of them 
by name. By the sixteenth century, then, ritual texts attributed to Solomon were easily 
recognizable to both theologian and magician as forbidden, and the consequences for 
being found in possession of expressly forbidden texts became potentially deadly. The 
narratives were still understood in traditional terms, but they were revalued culturally 
This proscription was not merely a doctrinal argument in words. After the 
promulgation of the "Witch Bull in" 1484, the consequences of practicing magic during 
the witch craze were certainly grave enough to cause a magician to consider recording his 
work in somewhat less obvious ways. Indeed, in manuals of demon compulsion 
composed during the sixteenth century, we do see a shift in discourse logic away from 
direct allusion to established authority (or efficacy) of the Hebrew monarch to more 
veiled references to the recovered or secret authority of ancient Jewish (or Egyptian) 
traditions: the so-called "prisca theologia" (including Kabbalah), which is discussed in 
chapter three. These later texts alluded not to Solomon, but to an intellectual space that 
clearly included him without declaring him a sole authority. Allusion to Solomon gives 
way in ritual texts to allusions to anonymous or "rediscovered" sages with demonstrably 
similar narratives attached to them as prologues or epistles integrated into the ritual texts.  
That censorship played into this shift is easily argued. The sixteenth century texts 
of ritual magic to which we will return in the conclusions the present study share the 
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feature of unknown authorship, as do many others in the era. The Arbatel de Veterum 
Magicae (published Basel 1575)56 is anonymous, and the author of the Book of 
Abramelin the Mage identifies himself as an otherwise unknown fifteenth century Jew 
from Worms named Abraham.57  
Yet how can a magical text which does not claim to have been written by 
Solomon, or indeed, which in fact claims to have been written by someone other than 
Solomon, be interpreted as alluding to Solomon in such a way that a case can be made to 
include them in a corpus representing "Solomonic" demon compulsion? At first blush, 
the anonymity (or at least unfamiliarity) of the authors of these texts would certainly 
appear to strain the applicability of Salzer's "unio magica" to the examination of them in 
this study. The answer to this question again refers back to my argument for a tradition 
comprising my corpus rather than a set of genres or book types: while these texts do not 
allude directly to the apocryphal tradition of Solomon's power over demons, Solomon's 
reputation as archetypal magician is so well established by the sixteenth century – as will 
be shown – that it is sufficient to allude to the tradition (i.e. to Solomonic magic and 
                                                
56 See, for example, the recent parallel text modern edition: Joseph H. Peterson, Arbatel – Concerning the Magic of the 
Ancients: Original Sourcebook of Angel Magic (Lake Worth, FL: Ibis Press, 2009). 
57 The date and authorship of this text are contested among scholars. The most conservative is that of Carlos Gilly, who 
identifies the text as being a Rosicrucian pseudepigraphon dating from 1608: "Die ältesten heute erhaltenen Kopien des 
'Wormbser Buchs' mit dem Abfassungsdatum 1608 samt einem Anhang mit der Übersetzung von Jüdischen Gebeten 
für die Jahre 1608-1609 befinden sich sämtlich in der HAB Wolfenbüttel. Bei dem hier ausgestellten Exemplar handelt 
es sich um die kodierte Kopie, die Fürst August nicht entziffern konnte (die Zeilen sind in drei Spalten geteilt, jede 
Spalte um eine Stufe nach unten verschoben, sodass der Text treppenförmig zu lesen ist). Herzog August hat später 
selber eine Entschlüsselungstabelle für die durch Buchstaben ausgedrückten Zahlen und Begriffe angefertigt und auch 
einen Teil des Buches eigenhändig ins Reine geschrieben (Cod. Guelf. 13.12 Aug 4°, Cod. Guelf. 13.12 Aug. 4°). 
Somit steht fest, dass nicht nur die legendären Reisen von Christian Rosenkreuz und Abraham von Worms in die 
gleiche Zeit (Ende des 14. Jahrhunderts) gesetzt wurden, sondern dass auch beide Reiseberichte um das Jahr 1608 
gleichzeitig verfasst worden sind." Carlos Gilly, Cimelia Rhodostaurotica: Die Rosenkreuzer im Spiegel der Zwischen 
1610 und 1660 Entstandenen Handschriften und Drucke: Ausstellung der Bibliotheca Philosophica Hermetica 
Amsterdam und der Herzog August Bibliothek Wolfenbüttel [in] Wolfenbüttel, Herzog August Bibliothek, 1995 [und] 
Amsterdam, Universitätsbibliothek, 1995 (Amsterdam: In de Pelikaan, 1995)18-19. 
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magicians).58 Again, these texts share allusion to a particular narrative (where I extend 
Salzer), what I will here designate the narrative paradigm of the magical ritual involved, 
recognizable by its particular prescriptions and assumptions regarding the formula, the 
rite, and the condition of the performer. As we shall see below, these texts reveal allusion 
to the Solomonic paradigm itself without naming him specifically; they rely on an 
understanding shared by their most probable readership that they refer to Solomonic 
magic, even then they simply invoke only ancient Hebrew tradition. As we shall see in 
the next chapter, this narrative paradigm is also a well-defined ritual grammar: the 
formula (demonic/angelic and divine names), the rite (demon/spirit compulsion), and the 
condition of the performer ("pure") continue to fit the paradigm or ritual grammar 
established and cultivated in the long discourse of demon compulsion within Christian 
theology. 
The texts that constitute the examples for this study are, however, not grouped 
together uncritically. They represent my conscious periodization of the development of 
the idea of "purity" in the broader discourse of Solomonic demon compulsion within 
Christianity. Each new period represents an important turn in the discourse – a point at 
which the narrative trope of Solomon's power over demons and the associated ideas 
constructs of "purity" are deployed to some new end, or deployed to a familiar end, but 
within changed parameters. The following chapters are organized to demonstrate major 
turns in that discourse, major moments in which the Solomonic material becomes 
                                                
58 In this sense, I am claiming that the narrative of Solomonic demon compulsion needs to be considered as part of 
what Michel de Certeau calls "the order of books" in this era: not just a set of books or genres, but also a set of shared, 
period-specific understandings about how, where, when, and by whom the material in books is to be used 
authoritatively or normally. 
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contentious in new and critical ways. Together, they establish the ubiquity of the 
Solomonic paradigm of demon compulsion up through the sixteenth century with 
examples from the theological-demonological discourse. These examples reveal the 
persistence of "purity" as necessary for demon compulsion (both "magical" and 
"religious") in the same manner in which it was cultivated in the medieval discourse of 
demon compulsion that was cast unquestionably as "Solomonic," in arguments about 
ritual purity in particular.  
The first period – discussed in the next chapter, the first in this study – includes 
examples from late antiquity (first century CE through fifth century CE). These examples 
represent the mobilization of the trope of Solomon’s demon compulsion in the anti-
Jewish polemics of early Christian apologists. Chapter 2 follows with high and late 
medieval examples of the Scholastic anti-magical theology of Thomas Aquinas, his 
immediate predecessors in Paris and his successors. In chapter 3 we trace the process by 
which the figure of Solomon is obscured in print examples of the narrative paradigm and 
demonstrate that it nonetheless persists in ways that justify a continued discussion of 
Solomonic magic in the Renaissance texts and Protestant theology where the figure of 
Solomon appears to be absent. The final turn in the more abstract discussions of 
institutional arguments about Solomonic magic comes with the Protestant Reformation 
and is treated in chapter four, which analyses the developments in the idea of purity as 
"faith" in the anti-magical theology of Martin Luther.  
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Let us return now to one of the earlier documented moments in the history of the 
emergence of Christianity in the west: to early confrontations about the very definition of 
Solomonic demon compulsion as the core of what would become Solomonic magic. 
  
 









THE FIGURE OF SOLOMON IN EARLY CHRISTIAN  
CONTRA-IUDAEOS POLEMICS: 






This chapter deals with the first instrumentalization of the apocryphal narrative of 
Solomon's power over demons. Beginning in the first century, and continuing into the 
early Middle Ages,1 the primary value of narratives of demon compulsion in Christian 
discourse seems to have been in creating a rhetoric of proof of God's favor. While the 
complete logic of such proofs is not always demonstrable from individual extant 
examples, a clear pattern emerges from the investigation of multiple texts. Narratives of 
                                                
1 Regarding the use of this logic and its eventual decline, MacMullen writes: "What [the Christians] said now had an 
authority acknowledged by the emperors themselves; it hardly needed miracles to rest on. There were correspondingly 
fewer tales of miracles, then, and they circulated most often in remote areas." See: Ramsay MacMullen, Christianizing 
the Roman Empire: (a.d. 100-400) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984) 114. 
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demon compulsion were offered as a sort of litmus test in which a successful attempt at 
demon compulsion demonstrated both the power of God and the worthiness of the person 
doing the compelling. However, the rhetorical value of the narrative is not limited to 
accounts of successful attempts. Narratives of failed attempts were also consistently 
employed as demonstrations of the inferiority either of the deities or the performers. 
Moreover, for an audience familiar with this sort of proof logic, such narratives could 
sometimes be very brief or even incomplete. 
Both uses of the narrative will be discussed in this chapter. While both Jewish and 
Christian examples survive in which the narrative of successful demon compulsion is 
used to demonstrate the power of God or as proof of God's favor on the performer, the 
deployment of failed attempt narratives is also of interest to us here because much of the 
early Christian discourse on the apocryphal narrative of Solomon's power over demons 
focuses on Solomon's inferiority to Jesus. Christian apologists and polemists insisted that 
demons compelled by Solomon's authority or methods would not obey, and that only by 
invoking the name of Jesus would the demon be compelled. Early Christian authors even 
pressed this polemic to argue that the relative ineffectiveness of compelling demons by 
the authority or methods of Solomon versus that of Jesus could be taken as proof of what 
appears to have been the central concern of their Contra-Iudaeos literature: Jesus and not 
Solomon was the King of the Jews promised in Old Testament prophecies. 
Underlying this polemical difference, however, is a shared logical ground. Purity 
is the lynchpin in all these narratives (pro or contra, complete or sketched briefly) 
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because "impurity" was understood to cause demon compulsion to fail.2 At the same 
time, how purity is defined in practice shifts in distinct ways. In the early Christian 
discourse, for example, the purity we encounter appears to be akin to that which Neusner 
describes in ancient Judaism as the absence-of-contamination or defilement. One of the 
earliest examples of ritual texts of Solomonic demon compulsion, found in the Greek 
Magical Papyri, stipulates "purity" as the condition of the performer and specifies the 
avoidance of pork for the performer to attain that status.3 Additionally, close examination 
of an excerpt from the Antiquities of the Jews (93/94 CE) by Flavius Josephus (37 CE - 
100) reveals his use of a narrative of successful demon compulsion as proof of Solomon's 
favor with God (i.e. "purity").4 Yet the earliest Christian references to the apocryphal 
                                                
2 The Christian New Testament offers examples of exorcisms that fail because of some deficiency to the condition of 
the performer. One, we find in Matt 17:14-21, (NASB): When they came to the crowd, a man came up to Jesus, falling 
on his knees before Him and saying, "Lord, have mercy on my son, for he is a lunatic and is very ill; for he often falls 
into the fire and often into the water. I brought him to Your disciples, and they could not cure him." And Jesus 
answered and said, "You unbelieving and perverted generation, how long shall I be with you? How long shall I put up 
with you? Bring him here to Me." And Jesus rebuked him, and the demon came out of him, and the boy was cured at 
once. Then the disciples came to Jesus privately and said, "Why could we not drive it out?" And He said to them, 
"Because of the littleness of your faith; for truly I say to you, if you have faith the size of a mustard seed, you will say 
to this mountain, 'Move from here to there,' and it will move; and nothing will be impossible to you. ["But this kind 
does not go out except by prayer and fasting."] Another can be found in Acts 19:11-20: "God was performing 
extraordinary miracles by the hands of Paul, so that handkerchiefs or aprons were even carried from his body to the 
sick, and the diseases left them and the evil spirits went out. But also some of the Jewish exorcists, who went from 
place to place, attempted to name over those who had the evil spirits the name of the Lord Jesus, saying, "I adjure you 
by Jesus whom Paul preaches." Seven sons of one Sceva, a Jewish chief priest, were doing this. And the evil spirit 
answered and said to them, "I recognize Jesus, and I know about Paul, but who are you?" And the man, in whom was 
the evil spirit, leaped on them and subdued all of them and overpowered them, so that they fled out of that house naked 
and wounded. This became known to all, both Jews and Greeks, who lived in Ephesus; and fear fell upon them all and 
the name of the Lord Jesus was being magnified. Many also of those who had believed kept coming, confessing and 
disclosing their practices. And many of those who practiced magic brought their books together and began burning 
them in the sight of everyone; and they counted up the price of them and found it fifty thousand pieces of silver. So the 
word of the Lord was growing mightily and prevailing." 
3 This text cannot be considered "Christian" in the modern doctrinal sense because it predates a defined orthodox 
tradition. 
4 The logic behind his argument seems to be that if Solomon had lost God's favor through idolatry (impurity), then his 
method of exorcism would not still be effective. Since, however, Josephus witnessed successful exorcisms performed 
according to Solomon's methods, Solomon must not have lost God's favor. This reading would appear to be confirmed 
by early Christian contra-iudaeos polemics, which are couched within the same logical frame, but, which argue to the 
contrary, that Solomon did indeed lose the favor of God and therefore his exorcistic authority cannot still be valid. This 
logic is examined throughout the chapter. 
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Solomon narrative – those found in the anti-Jewish polemics of the early Christian 
apologists – seem to blur the lines between what Malinowski has separated into condition 
of the performer and formula. Origen, for example, objects to the use of Solomon's 
formulas for compelling demons, insisting that demons should instead be compelled in 
the name of Jesus. This we will reveal to be a sort of doctrinal purity (rather than ritual 
purity), possible only within monotheism akin to what Neusner has identified in ancient 
Judaism. In the late antique Christian discourses of demon compulsion, it is the figure of 
Solomon that becomes a source of doctrinal impurity. 
By the beginning of the Middle Ages, the deployment of the apocryphal Solomon 
narrative by Christian apologists against the Jewish interpretation of prophecy seems to 
reflect a rhetorical change of strategy. Two important pieces of such apologia, the 
Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila (sixth century) and the Testament of Solomon (fourth 
century), with which we will conclude this chapter, argue not for the superiority of Jesus, 
but for the inferiority of Solomon. As a result, for the first time in Christian discourse, we 
see Christian apologists adduce and even elaborate upon the canonical account of 
Solomon's idolatry from 1 Kings 11 in an effort to establish that Solomon could not be 
the intended subject of contested Old Testament prophecies. Solomon's demon 
compulsion must fail because he lost the favor of God through his idolatry (impurity) – 
theologically, that argument had to be portrayed as resolved. Moreover, as we will 
discuss in the following chapter, this same Christian focus on Solomon's impurity 
becomes the basis of Aquinas' theory of magic as an explicit or implicit demonic pact – a 
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theory that justifies his prohibition of all magic and allows him to distinguish 
fundamentally magic from exorcism.5  
Returning, however, to the present discussion, the texts and fragments with which 
we are concerned represent many different voices taken from more than one conversation 
and thus resist attempts to organize them for presentation. Some sources – those that are 
presumably Jewish or syncretic Jewish-pagan – assume or seek to demonstrate Solomon's 
favor with God (i.e. "purity" in the more-or-less Levitical sense of absence-of -
contamination), while others – presumably Christian texts – seek to demonstrate 
Solomon's idolatry ("impurity") and thus his inferiority to Jesus. Reconstruction of the 
discourse is further complicated by the spotty availability of extant sources as well as the 
different types of texts in which the narrative appears: some texts consist only of 
narrative and suggest no ritual use while others were obviously intended for ritual 
purposes.  
Yet regardless of whether the authors of the examples in this chapter sought to 
prove or disprove Solomon's favor with God, whether their intentions were practical or 
polemical, they all did so with a related concept of "purity" for what Malinowski has 
called the condition of the performer. That concept of purity – though already somewhat 
spiritualized and metaphoricized compared to the earliest Jewish examples – was based 
on the idea of fidelity to one god (i.e. monotheism or, framed another way, the absence of 
the defilement of idolatry) and represents the first of three that will be explored in this 
project. 
                                                
5 This differentiation, which first becomes reflected first in the institutional church, later extends into the social 
sciences. 
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This chapter could be meaningfully organized in a number of ways, but because 
the main purpose of the larger project is to track what Mary Douglas has hypothesized as 
the spiritualization and metaphoricization of purity, we will present the material 
chronologically, and use this organization to position the individual voices within an 
underlying discourse that has essentially disappeared from view today. 
 
The Cultic Value of Demon Compulsion: The Many Narratives of Solomon 
While the apocryphal narratives of Solomon's power over demons consistently 
include or imply issues of power and purity, there is no indication of the extant versions 
of the narrative having originated from a single, discernable Urtext. Moreover, no version 
of the narrative ever achieved the sort of canonical status that would have helped to 
protect it from change as it was retold and rerecorded from text to text. In consequence, 
the narrative's details changed over time, as it could be – and was – deployed for different 
ends by various people over a long period of time.  
Most notably, details shift between various versions of the narrative regarding the 
means by which Solomon was able to compel demons. The rite (in the Malinowskian 
sense) appears to be the most changeable. For example, the ring (Solomon's ring) which 
in many accounts is crucial to the rite and is, in fact, inscribed with part the formula (i.e. 
the name of God) is wholly absent in other versions of the narrative. By comparison, the 
formula seems much more stable, usually involving the power of names – the name or 
names of God, and sometimes also the secret names of the demons (or angels) to be 
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compelled (particularly when the name of God is inscribed on the ring).6 The most 
consistent of the aspects of magic in Malinowski's three-part division, however, is the 
condition of the performer. Even in the most fragmented examples, it is clear Solomon's 
power over demons was a spiritual gift from God – borrowed power that was given to 
him as a reward for his fidelity (prior to his losing God's favor through idol worship).  
Powerful efficacious names and demon compulsion were not unique to the Jews. 
In fact it is quite possible that the idea came into ancient Judaism as a result of contact 
with neighboring cultures in the Hellenistic world. The many examples of similar rituals 
found in the Greek Magical Papyri that do not mention Solomon or even the Hebrew 
God attest to this fact. Yet the Jewish analogue did have at least one feature that set it 
apart: monotheism.  
In the early context of what we are calling "Solomonic" demon compulsion, the 
ancient Jews of the Hellenized Eastern Mediterranean recognized a relationship of 
expectation to authorization between their singular god and themselves. This belief 
supported the mandate of the First Commandment7 and functioned to keep the Hebrews 
from falling into idolatry – polytheism or paganism. The belief was that their one true 
god expected his people to keep his covenant, and that in return he would reliably protect 
them by authorizing the use of his divine power over his creation, including demons. The 
                                                
6 I suspect that when the name of God is already present on the ring, for example, the names of the demons take on 
additional significance as part of the formula (i.e. as secret knowledge) in much the way that Malinowski describes. 
However, when the name of God is not already present in such a way – when the name(s) of God must be revealed as 
secret knowledge in the text –, then the names of the demons seem to be of less importance. 
7 See Exodus 20:3-6, (NASB): "You shall have no other gods before Me. You shall not make for yourself an idol, or 
any likeness of what is in heaven above or on the earth beneath or in the water under the earth. You shall not worship 
them or serve them; for I, the LORD your God, am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers on the children, on 
the third and the fourth generations of those who hate Me, but showing loving kindness to thousands, to those who love 
Me and keep My commandments."  
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Jews knew theirs was the most powerful god because, according to their sacred 
narratives, those among them who were able to invoke him had worked greater wonders 
than foreigners who invoked foreign gods. 
Belief in the veracity of that narrative had important cosmological and religious 
implications. First, it guaranteed the very possibility of demon compulsion. Regardless of 
the claims of surrounding cults, the power of the God of Israel was sufficient to subdue 
any supernatural threat, and that power was accessible, not only through petitions and 
sacrifices, but through invocation. At least that much of the narrative was accepted in 
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Indeed, the belief that God could grant power over 
demons to his people is a necessary prerequisite to the idea and practice of exorcism in all 
three religions. Second, and closely related to the first implication, it meant that demon 
compulsion – however exceptional it might be – fell within the domain of religious 
practice. Tradition, both apocryphal and canonical, held that God had granted certain 
individuals access to his own divine power for the necessary purpose of protecting and 
defending his people from both worldly and supernatural evil.8 Thus, the act of demon 
compulsion in itself could not be seen as inherently sinful (impure), although invoking 
foreign gods for similar purposes (i.e. idolatry) was regarded as the greatest source of 
                                                
8 There are many examples in both canonical and apocryphal literature as well as theological arguments, which reflect 
this model of demon compulsion by conditional investiture with divine authority. See, for example, surahs 21:81-82, 
27:38-40, and 34:12-14 of the Quran, previously cited in a footnote on page 21. These concern Solomon's authority 
over the jinn (i.e. "demons"). See also Thomas Aquinas' De Potentia Dei (Q 6, A 10): "We conclude then that the 
demons which give success to the magic art may be both compelled and enticed. They are compelled by a higher being: 
sometimes by God himself, —sometimes through the divine power by holy angels and men. Thus the demons are said 
to be curbed by the angelic order of Powers. Holy men, even as they participate in the gift of the Virtues inasmuch as 
they work miracles, so do they share in the gift of the Powers inasmuch as they cast out devils. Sometimes too they are 
compelled by superior demons; and this compulsion alone can be effected by means of magic."  
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defilement (impurity).9 Finally, it meant that the power was ultimate. Insofar as the late 
antique Hebrews believed that the Jewish god was all-powerful, it meant that there was 
no greater, surer means for humans to compel spirits than with the power of the God of 
Israel. In short, given the belief in the narrative of their god's authorization of human 
agents with his divine power, there was no reason for the ancient Hebrews to turn to any 
other powers for protection. An important effect of this belief, as it became part of a 
shared discourse, is that demon compulsion played a significant role in the gaining of 
converts especially from Judaism in early Christianity. 
The logic of expectation and authorization that plays out in the narrative of 
Solomon's demon compulsion was well suited to the largely polytheistic world in which 
the ancient Jews lived. It is not hard to see the potential for cultic pragmatism in the 
cultivation of a narrative that offered divine protection from the gods and demons of 
neighboring pagans (or the threats and curses of their priests and sorcerers) in exchange 
for religious fidelity-as-purity. In the case of the Hebrews, however, religious fidelity 
also meant cultic purity – the Jewish Covenant with their god.10 It carried the obligation 
of physical, outward signs that not only served to preserve cultic practices and narratives 
                                                
9 Again, Neusner writes, "First, impurity is seen as a sign of rejection of God or by God. […] Closely related to the use 
of purity as an indication of divine acceptance, second, is the very frequent allusion to idolatry as unclean. Just as 
impurity signifies the rejection of God, so the greatest rejection of all, represented by idolatry, will be understood as a 
principle source of impurity. Foreign gods defile, so Gen 35:2" (13f.).  
10 See, especially Ezekiel 20:1-32. For example: "I said to them, 'Cast away, each of you, the detestable things of his 
eyes, and do not defile yourselves with the idols of Egypt; I am the LORD your God.' But they rebelled against Me and 
were not willing to listen to Me; they did not cast away the detestable things of their eyes, nor did they forsake the idols 
of Egypt. Then I resolved to pour out My wrath on them, to accomplish My anger against them in the midst of the land 
of Egypt. But I acted for the sake of My name, that it should not be profaned in the sight of the nations among whom 
they lived, in whose sight I made Myself known to them by bringing them out of the land of Egypt. So I took them out 
of the land of Egypt and brought them into the wilderness. I gave them My statutes and informed them of My 
ordinances, by which, if a man observes them, he will live. Also I gave them My sabbaths to be a sign between Me and 
them, that they might know that I am the LORD who sanctifies them" (v. 7-12). 
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from syncretic blending, but also to police the social interactions of Jews and non-Jews. 
This purity as the absence of defilement entailed adherence to social norms that were 
curated by priests – religious authorities. God authorized the pure, but the priests who 
controlled access to the Temple determined purity.11  
 As we have mentioned, that same relationship of expectation to authorization that 
was at work in the dynamics of ancient Jewish religious life provided the followers of 
Christianity with a logical frame in which to be convinced (and in turn, to convince 
others) that Jesus was the prophesied Messiah. If Jesus was able to work greater miracles, 
then, according to this logic of divine authorization, his must be the more powerful god. 
Since, however, Jesus did not invoke a foreign god, but rather claimed to be the son of 
the God of Israel, then – by the same logic – that claim must be true. The dynamics of 
this logic are apparent in the one-upmanship of many of the miracles attributed to Jesus 
in New Testament Gospels and Apocrypha when juxtaposed with Old Testament 
parallels. Moses provided bread (manna) in the desert – Jesus provided bread and fish. 
Moses parted the sea – Jesus walked across it. This was the context of Christian interest 
in the apocryphal Solomon narrative. Solomon was known to have cast out demons, so 
Jesus drove out legions.12 While we do not find direct comparison of the exorcistic 
capabilities of Solomon an Jesus in the Gospels, we do see them explicitly compared in 
Matthew 12:42: "The queen of the South will rise up with this generation at the judgment 
                                                
11 Neusner, for example, writes, " An inductive inquiry into the uses of the words unclean and clean in biblical 
literature will show that they occur chiefly with reference to cultic acts. If you are impure, you cannot enter the Temple 
or participate in certain cultic acts. If you are pure you may do so" (2). 
12 See Mark 5:1-20 and Luke 8:26-39. 
 
  52 
and will condemn it, because she came from the ends of the earth to hear the wisdom of 
Solomon; and behold, something greater than Solomon is here."13 
Yet Christianity's relationship with the narrative of Solomon's demon compulsion 
was ambivalent. Early apologists – as we will see – gladly employed its logic, but 
emergent Christian theology had an uncertain and ambivalent relationship with the 
physical purity requirements of Levitical Law.14 All who believed were authorized, and, 
consequently stories of early Christianity are filled with the humiliations and expulsions 
of demons. For the late antique Christian, the price of access to its supernatural power 
was comparatively low without the many purity requirements of Levitical law, and 
Christianity spread quickly.15 However, the Christian narrative itself placed the apologists 
in a double bind. In order for Jesus to be the fulfillment of Jewish prophecies, the 
prophecies and the prophets must be valid. The rhetoric of "One greater than Solomon" is 
only effective if the object of comparison is also great, which meant that this narrative of 
Solomon was preserved even in Christianity.  
 
Roots and Traces of the Apocryphal Solomon Narrative 
Despite the prevalence of the apocryphal Solomon narrative and the significance 
of its deployment in early Jewish-Christian polemics, its origins, as we have said, remain 
                                                
13 Matthew 12:42, (NASB). 
14 For a recent study on purity discourses in early Christianity, see: Moshe Blidstein, Purity, Community, and Ritual in 
Early Christian Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
15 MacMullen, especially 32-42.  
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obscure.16 Parts of the narrative are shared among all three Abrahamic religions. Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam have all cultivated biographies of Solomon as the builder of the 
First Jerusalem Temple in a combination of canonical and apocryphal texts – some 
referencing his power over demons, and some not. In the section that follows, we present 
two narrative Jewish texts. The texts are scriptural, not ritual, and they do not suggest any 
polemical readings. At the time when they were written, they represented what was 
probably a Jewish author speaking to a Jewish reader. The first, from the Book of Kings, 
is canonical in Judaism as well as Catholic and Protestant Christianity. The second is 
considered deuterocanonical (secondary canon) in Catholic tradition,17 but apocryphal in 
Protestant tradition and no longer considered canonical in Judaism.  
This early description of Solomon's unrivaled wisdom from the Book of Kings (ca. 
550 BCE) may be earliest hint of the narrative:  
And God gave Solomon wisdom and understanding beyond measure, and 
largeness of mind like the sand on the seashore, so that Solomon's wisdom 
surpassed the wisdom of all the people of the east, and all the wisdom of Egypt. 
For he was wiser than all other men, wiser than Ethan the Ez'rahite, and Heman, 
Calcol, and Darda, the sons of Mahol; and his fame was in all the nations round 
about. He also uttered three thousand proverbs; and his songs were a thousand and 
five. He spoke of trees, from the cedar that is in Lebanon to the hyssop that grows 
out of the wall; he spoke also of beasts, and of birds, and of reptiles, and of 
                                                
16 Torijano has the following to say regarding the emergence of the apocryphal narrative: "[I]n contrast to the way he is 
represented in biblical literature, his reputation for wisdom is only secondary in the pseudepigrapha, except for Wisdom 
of Solomon. After a relative period of oblivion in the first two centuries CE, Solomon became the exorcist, the magician 
par excellence, acquiring extreme popularity in late antiquity and the early Middle Ages." See: Pablo A. Torijano, 
Solomon, the Esoteric King: From King to Magus, Development of a Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 2002) 2. 
17 The term deuterocanonical means "secondary canon." The Catholic deuterocanonical scriptural texts are: Tobit, 
Judith, Additions to Esther (Vulgate Esther 10:4–16:24), Wisdom (also called the Wisdom of Solomon, Sirach (also 
called Ecclesiasticus), Baruch, including the Letter of Jeremiah (Additions to Jeremiah in the Septuagint); and include 
additions to Daniel: Prayer of Azariah and Song of the Three Holy Children (Vulgate Daniel 3:24–90), 
Susanna (Vulgate Daniel 13, Septuagint prologue), Bel and the Dragon (Vulgate Daniel 14, Septuagint epilogue); and 
Maccabees 1 and 2. 
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fish. And men came from all peoples to hear the wisdom of Solomon, and from 
all the kings of the earth, who had heard of his wisdom.18   
Scholars have suggested that the idea that Solomon's wisdom included magical 
knowledge – an idea so evident in later texts, as we will see – may already have been 
implicit in the above claim that "Solomon's wisdom surpassed the wisdom of all the 
people of the east, all the wisdom of Egypt."19 The reason for this is that inherent to such 
a claim is a comparison not only to Pharaoh's magicians20 but also to the legendary 
Egyptian sage and magus, Hermes Trismegistus.21  
 Yet regardless of the extent to which such a reading had been previously implicit, 
by the first century CE, the claim had become explicit in the Book of the Wisdom of 
Solomon. This passage – obviously parallel to the above passage from Kings – appears to 
take the form of an aretology22 and has certainly become more overtly magical. Here 
(7:15-22), it is Solomon who speaks:  
May God grant me to speak with judgement, and to have thoughts worthy of what 
I have received; for he is the guide even of wisdom and the corrector of the wise. 
For both we and our words are in his hand, as are all understanding and skill in 
crafts. For it is he who gave me unerring knowledge of what exists, to know the 
structure of the world and the activity of the elements; the beginning and end and 
middle of times, the alternations of the solstices and the changes of the seasons, 
the cycles of the year and the constellations of the stars, the natures of animals 
                                                
18 1 Kings 4:29-34, (Revised Standard Version). 
19 See: Georg Salzberger, Die Salomo-sage in der Semitischen Literatur: Ein Beitrag zur Vergleichenden Sagenkunde 
(Berlin, 1907) 92, who writes, "Sollte Sal. weiser sein denn alle Menschen, weiser selbst als die zauberkundigen 
Ägypter, so musste er kennen und beherrschen, die, von Gott verdammt und aus dem Himmel verstossen, die 
unausrottbaren Feinde der Erdengeschöpfe sind." 
20 Exodus 7:11, 7:22, 8:7, etc. 
21 Hermes Trismegistus (Ancient Greek: Ἑρμῆς ὁ Τρισμέγιστος, "thrice-greatest Hermes"; Latin: Mercurius ter 
Maximus) was thought to have been the author of the Hermetic Corpus, the body of texts, which form the basis 
of Hermeticism. 
22 An aretology (from ancient Greek ἀρετή/aretá, meaning goodness, virtue, or excellence of any kind and also 
"marvelous deed") refers, in the strictest sense, to a narrative about a divine figure's miraculous deeds. In the Greco-
Roman world, aretologies represent a religious branch of rhetoric and are a prose development of the hymn as praise 
poetry. See: Collins, Adela Yarbro, "Aretalogy", in: Religion Past and Present.  
 
  55 
and the tempers of wild animals, the powers of spirits and the thoughts of human 
beings, the varieties of plants and the virtues of roots; I learned both what is secret 
and what is manifest, for wisdom, the fashioner of all things, taught me.23  
 
The difference in the two descriptions of Solomon is striking. In his book, Solomon the 
Esoteric King: From King to Magus, Development of a Tradition (2002), Pablo Torijano 
points to both the magnification (and magicization) of Solomon's gifts as well as the turn 
to the first person perspective that is consistent with other aretologies known to the 
ancient world.24 The author of Wisdom not only presents Solomon as a magus himself, 
but also presents God as patron and teacher of the magical arts. Moreover, we note that 
because this later Jewish work is considered deuterocanonical in Catholic tradition, it 
would have informed the writings of both early Christian Contra-Iudaeos literature and 
medieval anti-magic theology. 
 
The Rhetoric of Ex Post Facto Proofs  
By the first century CE, the idea that Solomon's great wisdom included 
knowledge of occult forces had been made explicit, as we have seen in the above quote 
from the Book of Wisdom. However, at the same time, we find the earliest narratives of 
Solomon demonstrating a specific power to compel and constrain demons. The Testament 
of Truth, (IX, 3 in the Nag Hammadi Codex 2nd-3rd century CE),25 for example, which 
                                                
23 Wisdom 7:15-22 (Revised Standard Version). 
24 Lester L. Grabbe, (Wisdom of Solomon. London: T & T Clark International, 2003) 92. 
25 See: Robinson James, The Nag Hammadi Library in English (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 2007) 458. 
"They are wicked in their behavior! Some of them fall away to the worship of idols. Others have demons dwelling with 
them, as did David the king. He is the one who laid the foundation of Jerusalem; and his son Solomon, whom he begat 
in adultery, is the one who built Jerusalem by means of the demons, because he received power. When he had finished 
building, he imprisoned the demons in the temple. He placed them into seven waterpots. They remained a long time in 
the waterpots, abandoned there. When the Romans went up to Jerusalem, they discovered the waterpots, and 
 
  56 
was recovered as part of the Nag Hammadi Library, includes a story of Solomon putting 
demons to work in the construction of Jerusalem before sealing them in waterpots and 
burying them beneath the Temple where they remained until the Romans released them 
into the world.26 Additionally, near the end of the first century we find the earliest 
account of a tradition of demon compulsion according to methods attributed to Solomon 
in Flavius Josephus' Antiquities of the Jews.  
In the section that follows, I will first establish how the narrative works with 
Josephus, then I present examples of how that tradition of attributing to Solomon the 
power to compel demons was expounded and mobilized in early Christian apologiae and 
Contra-Iudaeos polemics, as well as how the idea of purity grows in importance as a 
means of discrediting Solomon vis-à-vis Jesus as a demon compelling authority. This 
discourse frequently took the form of a debate over the relative efficacy of various 
methods of "exorcism," which, at the time, was simply understood as demon compulsion 
and not distinct from "magic," as it would later become.27 At its beginnings in late 
antiquity, the discourse on Solomonic demon compulsion is still consistent with 
                                                                                                                                            
immediately the demons ran out of the waterpots, as those who escape from prison. And the waterpots remained pure 
thereafter. And since those days, they dwell with men who are in ignorance, and they have remained upon the earth. 
Who, then, is David? And who is Solomon? And what is the foundation? And what is the wall which surrounds 
Jerusalem? And who are the demons? And what are the waterpots? And who are the Romans? But these are mysteries 
…"  
26 Compare to the accounts of Solomon's having forced demons into building the Temple as in the Testament of 
Solomon discussed below. 
27 The Gospel of Matthew provides us with a helpful linguistic comparison for understanding the relative lack of 
difference between the concepts of compulsion, adjuration, and even exorcism in the ancient world. We read in 
Matthew 26:63: "The high priest stood up and said to Him, "Do You not answer? What is it that these men are 
testifying against You?" But Jesus kept silent. And the high priest said to Him, "I adjure You by the living God, that 
You tell us whether You are the Christ, the Son of God." The Latin vulgate (26:63) of the same passage we read: "Et 
dixit ei princeps sacerdotum: Adjuro te per Deum vivum, ut dicas nobis si tu es Christus Filius Dei. Et dixit ei Jesus: Tu 
sixisti." What is translated as "I adjure" in the English and Latin is given in the original Greek as:  Ἐξορκίζω 
(Exorkizō). Thus, we may understand that the sort of compulsion (or adjuration, or exorcism) "by the living God" that 
the high priest attempts to press on Jesus in the Gospel of Matthew is conceptually the same as the ancient 
exorcist/magician, who likewise commands demons through the invocation of divine names.  
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Malinowski's observation regarding formula in which he remarks, "To the direct question 
of the subject, the natives always reply that the spell is the more important part."28 (See 
below the example from the Greek Magical Papyri promises "a first rate name.") This, 
however, will change by the Middle Ages with the rise of a clerical class and the 
establishment of an institutional and hierarchical church. At that point, in a literate 
religion, the formula is too knowable, and so control becomes maintained by policing the 
condition of the performer said to be required for such compulsion. 
 Extant papyri, amulets, and charms bear witness to the fact that, in the ancient 
Eastern Mediterranean world, it was common practice to invoke whatever gods whose 
aid might be appropriate to a particular situation – gods of war, gods of love, gods of 
harvest, childbirth, and so on. Ancient pagan magicians, it seems, subscribed to a 
philosophy of strength in numbers where divine aid was concerned. Moreover, prior 
knowledge or affiliation with the owner of the name appears not to have been necessarily 
required. In fact, one charm from the Greek Magical Papyri promises efficacy insured by 
"a first rate name," suggesting that the transcriber of that charm anticipated its being used 
with little or no knowledge of the deity attached to it.29 In the respective monotheistic 
cases of Christianity and Judaism, however, that philosophy had to be modified, even if it 
could not be done away with entirely. Thus, rather than invoking as many gods as 
possible, the Jewish exorcist-magician invoked the one god by as many of his epithets 
and cognomens as possible, as well as, apparently, in association with great personages: 
                                                
28 Malinowski 418. 
29 At least according to the translator, see: Hans D. Betz, The Greek Magical Papyri in Translation Including the 
Demotic Spells (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986) 163. 
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the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob, etc.30 The effect would have 
found resonance both with impressively lengthy titulature of ancient kings and pharaohs, 
and the ancient Greek aretologies, already mentioned.  
Both Jewish and Christian demon compellers were, however, obviously at odds 
with their pagan counterparts in respect to this aspect of their magical practice. Where a 
pagan would not necessarily see anything wrong with invoking the aid of both Helios and 
Isis together, the Jewish magician could not approach demon compulsion so blithely: 
"You shall not bow down to them or serve them, for I the LORD your God am a jealous 
God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers on the children to the third and the fourth 
generation of those who hate me" (Exodus 20:5). After all, the invocation of a deity, 
insofar as it is a call for aid, is also a vote of confidence – an expression of belief that the 
deity invoked can and will intercede. Thus, the god one invokes first is the god one trusts 
the most. A Jewish exorcist-magician who risked invoking multiple gods not only forced 
                                                
30 See Origen's Contra Celsum (4.33): "[...] Celsus, assailing the contents of the first book of Moses, which is 
entitled Genesis, asserts that the Jews accordingly endeavoured to derive their origin from the first race of jugglers and 
deceivers, appealing to the testimony of dark and ambiguous words, whose meaning was veiled in obscurity, and which 
they misinterpreted to the unlearned and ignorant, and that, too, when such a point had never been called in question 
during the long preceding period. Now Celsus appears to me in these words to have expressed very obscurely the 
meaning which he intended to convey. It is probable, indeed, that his obscurity on this subject is intentional, inasmuch 
as he saw the strength of the argument which establishes the descent of the Jews from their ancestors; while again, on 
the other hand, he wished not to appear ignorant that the question regarding the Jews and their descent was one that 
could not be lightly disposed of. It is certain, however, that the Jews trace their genealogy back to the three 
fathers, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. And the names of these individuals possess such efficacy, when united with the 
name of God, that not only do those belonging to the nation employ in their prayers to God, and in 
the exorcising of demons, the words, God of Abraham, and God of Isaac, and God of Jacob, but so also do almost all 
those who occupy themselves with incantations and magical rites. For there is found in treatises on magic in many 
countries such an invocation of God, and assumption of the divine name, as implies a familiar use of it by these men in 
their dealings with demons. These facts, then— adduced by Jews and Christians to prove the sacred character of 
Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, the fathers of the Jewish race— appear to me not to have been altogether unknown 
to Celsus, but not to have been distinctly set forth by him, because he was unable to answer the argument which might 
be founded on them." See: Ante-Nicene Fathers, Vol. 4, edited by Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. 
Cleveland Coxe (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1885); revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin 
Knight  <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/04164.htm>. 
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YHWH to share the stage – for exorcisms were quite public and performative31 – but by 
implication, suggested that the God of Israel may not be up to the task on his own. 
Likewise, the Christian exorcist-magician understood that what was true before the 
Incarnation was equally valid afterwards: "Whoever believes and is baptized will be 
saved, but whoever does not believe will be condemned. And these signs will accompany 
those who believe: in my name they will cast out demons; they will speak in new 
tongues; etc.," (Mark 16:16-17). Like Father, like Son. Thus, the development of fidelity-
as-purity (i.e. absence-of-defilement through idolatry) as a component of the relationship 
of expectation to authorization may have been partially responsible for the initial success 
of monotheism, perhaps one encouraged by the temple priests. 
What is noteworthy about both of these examples is that the same power that is 
invoked for aid demands something very particular in return. In both the Jewish and 
Christian paradigms, the conditional investiture with divine power is strictly covenantal, 
not contractual – an ongoing relationship, not a limited transaction. Access to power thus 
demanded not just sacrifice (as in the familiar do ut des, or "I give that you might give" 
magical logic of antiquity)32 but also loyalty to a relationship. In addition to whatever 
physical forms of purity had to be observed as part of the covenant, fealty was built into 
the narrative to which the exorcist-magician alluded as the paradigmatic source of power 
(as Salzer explains in Magie der Anspielung). Solomon's power was a reward for his 
fidelity to the one god of Israel, thus magical union (unio magica) with the figure of 
                                                
31 See MacMullen 27f. 
32 See, for example, Georg Luck's discussion of the term in Arcana Mundi: Magic and the Occult in the Greek and 
Roman Worlds (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006 [1985]) 479. 
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Solomon required the same. There is no reason to suspect that, absent the paradigmatic 
narratives, monotheism of either the Jewish or Christian variety (and, with it, the 
possibility of idolatry as defilement) would have appealed to any ancient magician or 
exorcist, given its restriction to a single god rather than to multiple gods tailored for 
specific purposes. Monotheism and the possibility of idolatry-as-impurity developed 
together, as numerous Jewish-pagan syncretic examples of papyri and other charms attest 
with their otherwise forgotten examples of invocations of the Hebrew god alongside the 
god of Egypt.33 
Yet the implications of demon compulsion were not limited to the religious 
experience of the individual compeller and his (or possibly her) relationship with the 
divine. The early Christian apologists concerns over demon compulsion become 
altogether comprehensible when we shift perspectives from those of the exorcist and 
demoniac (in anthropological terms, "the magician and the client") to that of a crowd of 
witnesses. While the invocation of a deity certainly may be seen as a vote of confidence 
on the part of the invoker (especially if he can only invoke one deity), it was also an 
opportunity for the invoker to stage a demonstration of a favored deity's power for an 
audience of eager onlookers. Likewise as we have already mentioned, the same scenario 
also provided an opportunity for demonstrating the inferiority of a deity (or invoker) with 
                                                
33 On the development of monotheism and the differences between Jewish and Christian (and Muslim) monotheisms, 
see: Jan Assmann and Robert Savage, The Price of Monotheism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010). Assmann 
writes, "Christianity and Islam [...] have lashed out in violence again and again throughout history. Whereas the Jewish 
people's belief in its own election requires that it exclude itself, the Christian obligation to evangelize and the Muslim 
obligation to compel submission require that they both exclude the Other. In choosing Israel to be his people, god 
marks it out from all other peoples and forbids it to adopt the customs of the environment. By commanding Christians 
and Muslims to spread the truth to all four corners of the earth, god ensures that those who close their minds to this 
truth will be shut out. Only in this form does monotheism's inherent potential for exclusion explode into violence" (18). 
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a failed exorcism narrative. Early Christian apologists understood the rhetorical value of 
both scenarios, and, consequently, we find a demonstrably strong interest in demon 
compulsion in their apologiae.  
In his book, Christianizing the Roman Empire, Ramsay MacMullen explains that 
public exorcisms seem to have been a significant – if not the primary – means of winning 
new converts in late antique Christianity:  
In a host of passages, it is explained by Tertullian or Origen that daimons, not 
gods, had produced all the miracles, oracles, epiphanies, signs, and even 
benefactions of any sort that constituted the whole divine history of the non-
Christian world since time began. So a campaign of demotion was under way.34  
 
The logic offered to account for the conversions he produced – that he or the 
divinity he invoked was of greater authority than the daimons, and that that power 
could both greatly help and greatly hurt one – fit altogether naturally with the 
logic described earlier (above, pp. 26ff.). No alternative equally natural suggests 
itself, and none is attested.35  
 
From the apologist's perspective, then, a well-attended, successful exorcism was an 
opportunity not to be squandered on an obscure or ambiguous divine name. The names 
and epithets invoked were not only intended for the purpose of intimidating the demon, 
but also to burnish the reputation of the deity involved and spread that deity's fame. 
Here, too, a clear differentiation between Jewish and Christian practices may have 
arisen. The Jewish exorcist had at his disposal multiple epithets for his one god. If 
carefully managed, these could be presented in such a way as to instruct the onlookers 
while simultaneously intimidating the demon. In part of a somewhat syncretized 
exorcistic charm from The Greek Magical Papyri (PGM IV. 3007-86), known as "A 
                                                
34 MacMullen 18. 
35 MacMullen 61. 
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tested charm of Pibechis for those possessed by daimons,"36 we can clearly see the 
homiletic side of demon compulsion: 
[…] because I conjure you by god, light-bearing, unconquerable, who knows what 
is in the heart of every living being, the one who formed of dust the race of 
humans,37 the one who, after bringing them out from obscurity, packs together the 
clouds, waters the earth with rain and blesses its fruit, [the one] whom every 
heavenly power of angels and archangels praises. I conjure you by the great god 
SABAŌTH, through whom the Jordan River drew back,38 and the Red Sea which 
Israel crossed, became impassable,39 because I conjure you by the one who 
introduced the one hundred and forty languages and distributed them by his own 
command.40 I conjure you by the one who burned up the stubborn giants with 
lightning,41 whom the heaven of heavens praises, whom the wings of cherubim 
praise. I conjure you by the one who put the mountains around the sea [or] a wall 
of sand and commanded the sea not to overflow.42 The abyss obeyed;43 and you 
obey, every daimonic spirit, because I conjure you by the one who causes the four 
winds to move44 together from the holy aions, [the] skylike, sealike, cloudlike, 
light-bringing, unconquerable [one]. I conjure you by the one in holy Jerusalem,45 
before whom the unquenchable fire burns for all time,46 with this holy name 
IAEŌBAPHRENEMOUN (formula), the one before whom the fiery Gehenna 
trembles, flames surround, iron bursts asunder and every mountain is afraid from 
its foundation. I conjure you, every daimonic spirit, by the one who oversees the 
earth and makes its foundations tremble,47 [the one] who made all things which 
are not into that which is. 
 
                                                
36 Hans D. Betz, The Greek Magical Papyri in Translation Including the Demotic Spells (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1986) 96f. 
37 Gn 2:7. 
38 Jos 3:13-14; Ps 113:3. 
39 Ex 14:27 
40 Most Jewish sources speak of seventy nations and seventy languages in the world. But there are authorities, who 
name 140 languages. For discussion and references, see Ginzberg, The Legends of the Jews I, 173, 214; V 194-95. 
41 Gn 6:4; 19:24-29. 
42 Jb 38:10-11; Jer 5:22. 
43 Prv 8:26-29; Jb 38:30, 34. 
44 Ps 134:7; also Gn 8:1; Nm 11:31, Jb 28:25, etc. 
45 The name is given as Hierosolymon. For the various forms of the city's name, see G. Fohrer and E. Lohse, TDNT 7 
(1971), s.v. Σιων κτλ., sections A. I. 2; B. I (esp. nn. 133, 134); C. I. 2. 
46 This refers to the seven-branched candelabrum (menorah) of the Jerusalem Temple. Its undying light was legendary 
in antiquity. See PGM IV. 1219 and n.; Ps.-Hecataeus, in Iosephus, c. Ap. 1. 199; and LXX Ex 27:20; Lv 6:12-13; 
Diodorus Sic. 34. 1. 4 (also in Stern, Greek and Latin authors on Jews and Judaism I [Jerusalem: The Israel Academy 
of Sciences and Humanities, 1976], p. 180 (#63). For additional references, see Schürer, The History of the Jewish 
People II (1979) 297 and n. 18. 
47 Ps 103:32. 
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The cumulative effect falls somewhere between a curriculum vitae and a sermon. It is 
hard to imagine that early Jewish and even pagan exorcists weren't aware of the 
prosthelytic potential of litanies of invocations of "the god who…" prior to the efforts of 
the third century Christian apologist Origen, who discusses the matter directly in his 
Contra Celsum. 
Compared to the Jewish apologist-exorcist, his Christian counterpart was at 
somewhat of a disadvantage. As an exorcist, the Christian was free to invoke the God of 
Israel, and – as will be discussed below in a section on Origen – apparently did. After all, 
the Christian Gospels record Jesus himself appealing in prayer to God as his father, and 
we are told that Jesus said, "I and the Father are one" (John 10:30). However, as an 
apologist, the Christian who failed to emphasize the divinity of Jesus by compelling 
demons in his name risked appearing indistinguishable from his Jewish counterpart in the 
performance (or account) of the exorcism – his first and best chance of winning new 
converts from paganism. Worse still, were he to find himself performing an exorcism 
before a crowd of potential converts from Judaism, the invocation of Jesus might appear 
no more than optional if the ritual were not markedly different from Jewish version. In 
other words, from his own perspective, the Christian exorcist could invoke the god of 
Israel or Jesus, or both, but the prosthelytic value (whether performative or rhetorical) of 
such an act would be counterproductive faced with a Jewish audience.  
The volume of late antique Contra-Iudaeos literature by Christian apologists does 
assure us that converting Jews (or at least keeping them converted) was of great concern. 
After all, Christianity presented itself as the realization of the promise of Jewish 
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prophecy. The Jews' conversion or refusal to convert was tantamount to their acceptance 
or rejection of the early Christian sect's central claim that Jesus was the Messiah – the 
fulfillment of Jewish prophecies. Because of the particular relationship of Christianity to 
Judaism – as contested fulfillment of its prophecies – the usual prosthelytic logic of 
exorcisms seems to have fallen flat with Jews. Simply put, Christians could not argue the 
inferiority of one deity to another without undermining their own position because the 
Christians claimed their deity was the son of the god of the Jews. We even find examples 
of early Christian apologists defending the superiority of the god of Israel with the ex 
post facto demon-compulsion-as-proof argument. For example, in his Contra Celsum, 
Origen argues at length the point that demons compelled in the name of the God of Jacob, 
the God of Isaac, and the God of Abraham must obey both Jews and Christians. He even 
boasts that pagans have worked wonders with these names in support of the superiority of 
his god.48 In Contra Celsum, however, Origen was arguing with a pagan (Celsus) who 
recognized little if any distinction between Christians and Jews. Origen's ex post facto 
demon compulsion argument defended both Jews and Christians, but did not distinguish 
them let alone produce a case for the inferiority of the Jewish belief. Thus, a different 
polemical strategy was ultimately necessary for Christians.  
At this point, we find a distinct change in the narrative used by Christians to 
create a new reference point for demon compulsion in ways that were comprehensible to 
Jewish audiences, but which stressed a new beginning. The Jewish tradition of Solomonic 
exorcism provided the opportunity for a straw man. Christian apologists argued the 
                                                
48 Refer to note on p. 60. 
 
  65 
inferiority of Solomon as YHWH's chosen, rather than of YHWH himself. Naturally, 
then, Christian apologists argued for the superiority of exorcisms that invoked the name 
of Jesus over those that invoked the authority of Solomon or were allegedly composed by 
him. In two examples potentially four centuries apart, Justin Martyr's Dialogue with 
Trypho (second cent.) and the anonymous Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila (sixth cent.), 
the apologists framed their accounts as dialogues between Christians and Jews. However, 
in both cases scholars suspect that voice of the Jew is overwhelmingly or even entirely a 
rhetorical construct and that the dialogues probably do not represent record of historic 
disputations.49 
To be sure, when Origen addresses a Christian audience, he expresses concern 
about the use of "adjurations composed by Solomon," but his comments are made in the 
context of a commentary on the Gospel of Matthew, and could thus hardly be interpreted 
as part of an open debate between Christians and Jews – this was not a text directly aimed 
at conversions, as public demon compulsion could have been.50  
                                                
49 We find the same logic applied in Acts 19:13-20: "But also some of the Jewish exorcists, who went from place to 
place, attempted to name over those who had the evil spirits the name of the Lord Jesus, saying, 'I adjure you by Jesus 
whom Paul preaches.' Seven sons of one Sceva, a Jewish chief priest, were doing this. And the evil spirit answered and 
said to them, 'I recognize Jesus, and I know about Paul, but who are you?' And the man, in whom was the evil spirit, 
leaped on them and subdued all of them and overpowered them, so that they fled out of that house naked and wounded. 
This became known to all, both Jews and Greeks, who lived in Ephesus; and fear fell upon them all and the name of the 
Lord Jesus was being magnified. Many also of those who had believed kept coming, confessing and disclosing their 
practices. And many of those who practiced magic brought their books together and began burning them in the sight of 
everyone; and they counted up the price of them and found it fifty thousand pieces of silver. So the word of the Lord 
was growing mightily and prevailing." 
50 MacMullen writes, "Writings originally directed or later offered from within the church to an audience beyond did 
not include, of course, any pages that are now canonical or, for that matter apocryphal; for those pages were rather for 
internal consumption. At best, the occasional outsider who investigated them was an enemy, like Celsus or Porphyry. 
That leaves nothing but Apologetic literature for a wider readership. On the basis of a statement by Tertullian and on 
general probability, however, the experts today are generally agreed that the literature likewise served chiefly for 
internal consumption" (20). 
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Despite the lack of evidence in extant Christian texts that real Jewish interlocutors 
engaged with Christians in "dialogues" like those named above, which included 
discussion of the relative merits of exorcisms composed by Solomon and those performed 
in the name of Jesus, the rhetorical potential of Solomon's exorcistic authority appears 
not to have been an entirely one-sided polemical exercise. Predating the earliest example 
in the Christian apologia – and roughly contemporaneous with the writing of the 
Christian gospels –, Jewish historian Flavius Josephus devotes his attentions to 
Solomon’s ability to compel demons in an episode in his Antiquities (ca. 93 CE). While 
Josephus does not explicitly draw a comparison with Christian exorcisms, he does go out 
of his way to stress the efficacy of Solomon's formulas and the force of his name in 
exorcizing demons. Moreover, the reason for his digression into a discussion of demons 
compelled according to Solomon's methods in Antiquities, was, in his own words, "that 
all men may know the vastness of Solomon's abilities, and how he was beloved of God."  
To be sure, this is the report of a single Solomonic exorcism. It is not altogether 
clear what that statement meant at the time. Nonetheless, this earliest extant account, 
from Josephus' first century Antiquities, seems to be cast as participating in a polemic 
already underway. What follows is a set of further examples of ex post facto proofs that 
use precisely the same logic, relating an invocation of Solomon to the invocation of 
efficacious names. Within ten years of Josephus, the gospel accounts were recorded. In 
the following decades (and century) we find the accounts of Justin Martyr, Origen, 
Tertullian, and the anonymous Testament of Solomon. These are addressed in the next 
section. 
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Josephus: Earliest Jewish Witness to the Phenomenon 
In this same world of Hellenic Judaism, merely a few decades later, we find the 
first explicit account of Solomonic demon compulsion as an evolution of earlier practice. 
In Antiquities of the Jews (CE 93), Flavius Josephus both provides a detailed description 
of a Solomonic exorcism and clearly demonstrates the relationship between ritual 
reenactment and the mythic Urform:  
Now the sagacity and wisdom which God had bestowed on Solomon was so great, 
that he exceeded the ancients; [….] God also enabled him to learn that skill which 
expels demons, which is a science useful and sanative to men. He composed such 
incantations also by which distempers are alleviated. And he left behind him the 
manner of using exorcisms, by which they drive away demons, so that they never 
return; and this method of cure is of great force unto this day; for I have seen a 
certain man of my own country, whose name was Eleazar, releasing people that 
were demoniacal in the presence of Vespasian, and his sons, and his captains, and 
the whole multitude of his soldiers.  
 
The manner of the cure was this: He put a ring that had a Foot of one of those 
sorts mentioned by Solomon to the nostrils of the demoniac, after which he drew 
out the demon through his nostrils; and when the man fell down immediately, he 
abjured him to return into him no more, making still mention of Solomon, and 
reciting the incantations which he composed. And when Eleazar would persuade 
and demonstrate to the spectators that he had such a power, he set a little way off 
a cup or basin full of water, and commanded the demon, as he went out of the 
man, to overturn it, and thereby to let the spectators know that he had left the 
man; and when this was done, the skill and wisdom of Solomon was shown very 
manifestly: for which reason it is, that all men may know the vastness of 
Solomon's abilities, and how he was beloved of God, and that the extraordinary 
virtues of every kind with which this king was endowed may not be unknown to 
any people under the sun for this reason, I say, it is that we have proceeded to 
speak so largely of these matters.51 
 
                                                
51 Josephus, Ant. 8.2.5 in: Flavius Josephus, William Whiston, Henry Stebbing, and David J. Ridges, The Life and 
Essential Works of Flavius Josephus (Cedar Fort: Plain Sight Publishing, 2013) 227. 
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Josephus draws attention to the connection between the legendary accomplishments of 
Solomon and the exorcisms he witnessed. Eleazar's use of a ring with a "Foot of one of 
those sorts mentioned by Solomon"52 to draw out the demon and the incantations that 
Solomon composed to adjure it together represent the mimetic recreation of the imagined 
Urform provided by the paradigmatic narrative of Solomon's own demon compulsion – 
allusion to the figure of Solomon in order to achieve unio magica. 
But what if anything can be determined about the condition of the performer from 
Josephus' account? The idea of purity appears to be missing from this episode. Yet it is 
not. For the success of Eleazar's exorcisms is attributed to his adherence to Solomon’s 
method and his reliance on Solomon's spiritual authority. Josephus is not concerned here 
with the purity of Eleazar, but with that of Solomon. Eleazar was able to exorcize demons 
because Solomon was able to so, and Solomon was able to exorcise demons because he 
could command demons with divine authority while he had the favor of God. Finally, 
Solomon had the favor of God because he kept the Law (i.e. purity laws).53 As a result, 
Eleazar's success in compelling demons is understood not only as a de facto sign of his 
own purity, but as an ex post facto affirmation of Solomon's purity as well. In fact, 
                                                
52 Here "foot" presumably refers here to the flat part of a signet ring. Later magical examples specify that a cabochon 
gem be engraved with the "Seal of Solomon" (i.e. the pentalpha) and the Sacred Names of God. 
53 1 Kings 3:1-15 describes how God grants Solomon's request for wisdom. See especially verses 10-14: It was 
pleasing in the sight of the Lord that Solomon had asked this thing. God said to him, "Because you have asked this 
thing and have not asked for yourself long life, nor have asked riches for yourself, nor have you asked for the life of 
your enemies, but have asked for yourself discernment to understand justice, behold, I have done according to your 
words. Behold, I have given you a wise and discerning heart, so that there has been no one like you before you, nor 
shall one like you arise after you. I have also given you what you have not asked, both riches and honor, so that there 
will not be any among the kings like you all your days. If you walk in My ways, keeping My statutes and 
commandments, as your father David walked, then I will prolong your days." 
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Josephus' insistence that it is Solomon's method that is "of great force unto this day" may 
have been his reason for including this account in Antiquities.  
The portrait of Solomon that Josephus presents in this episode is of a great king, 
pious, wise, and beloved of God. Any discussion of the king's eventual turn to idolatry is 
absent here. The significance of this omission lies in the particular late antique Jewish 
understanding of purity as the absence-of-contamination or defilement and of idolatry as 
the chief source of contamination.54 Josephus means for his reader to infer that God’s 
chastisement of Solomon for his idolatry in 1 Kings 11 (verses 9-13)55 did not include 
stripping him of his spiritual gifts (i.e. his authority over demons). Thus, though Josephus 
treats the subject of Solomon's apostasy elsewhere in Antiquities, by avoiding it here, he 
allows Solomon's spiritual authority to stand.56  
                                                
54 Neusner clarifies in The Idea of Purity in Ancient Judaism: "Purity and impurity – THR and TMP – are not hygienic 
categories and do not refer to observable cleanliness or dirtiness. The words refer to a status in respect to contact with a 
source of impurity. […] An inductive inquiry into the uses of the words unclean and clean in biblical literature will 
show that they occur chiefly with reference to cultic acts. If you are impure, you cannot enter the Temple or participate 
in certain cultic acts. If you are pure you may do so" (1). Elsewhere he writes, "What are the specific and concrete 
metaphors assigned to the metaphors of purity and impurity? First, impurity is seen as a sign of rejection of God or by 
God. […] Closely related to the use of purity as an indication of divine acceptance, second, is the very frequent allusion 
to idolatry as unclean. Just as impurity signifies the rejection of God, so the greatest rejection of all, represented by 
idolatry, will be understood as a principle source of impurity. Foreign gods defile, so Gen 35:2" (13f.). 
55 1 Kings 11 describes Solomon's loss of favor with God. In 9-13, we read: "Now the Lord was angry with Solomon 
because his heart was turned away from the Lord, the God of Israel, who had appeared to him twice, and had 
commanded him concerning this thing, that he should not go after other gods; but he did not observe what the Lord had 
commanded. So the Lord said to Solomon, 'Because you have done this, and you have not kept My covenant and My 
statutes, which I have commanded you, I will surely tear the kingdom from you, and will give it to your servant. 
Nevertheless I will not do it in your days for the sake of your father David, but I will tear it out of the hand of your son. 
However, I will not tear away all the kingdom, but I will give one tribe to your son for the sake of My servant David 
and for the sake of Jerusalem which I have chosen.'" 
56 Josephus' editorial choice not to address Solomon's idolatry directly in this episode is consistent with a larger pattern 
of "rewriting techniques" that C.T. Begg notes regarding Josephus' handling of the biblical source material in his 
portrayal of Solomon's apostasy in Antiquities. Begg identifies "a series of indications suggestive of Josephus' concern 
to play down, to some extent at least, the enormity of the king's offense as portrayed in the [biblical] source." See: C.T. 
Begg, "Solomon's Apostasy (1 Kgs. 11,1-13) According to Josephus," in the Journal for the Study of Judaism in the 
Persian, Hellenistic, and Roman Period, 28.3 (1997): especially "conclusions," 309-313. In line with Begg's analysis, 
we argue that Josephus' inclusion of the Eleazar account seems to follow his program of attenuating Solomon's guilt of 
idolatry (i.e. impurity) by offering evidence that both Solomon's method and his spiritual authority in demon 
compulsion ("making still mention of Solomon") were still effective.  
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Following the same logic of Josephus' use of the efficacy of Solomonic exorcism 
as ex post facto evidence of God's continued favor for Solomon, early Christian 
apologists and polemists began to cite counterexamples – the failure of Solomonic demon 
compulsion – as evidence that Solomon had in fact lost divine favor. If Solomon fell from 
God's favor, they argued, then Jesus, and not Solomon, must therefore be the "Son of 
David" promised in prophecy: Solomon's disregard for the Law meant that he could not 
be who was intended. We see this logic at work a mere half century after Antiquities, in 
the Dialogue with Trypho (Ch. 85) of early Christian apologist Justin Martyr (100 – 165 
CE) in which he undertakes to convince a Jewish interlocutor that Christianity is the new 
universal Law:  
[S]ome of you venture to expound the prophecy which runs, "Lift up your gates, 
ye rulers; and be ye lift up, ye everlasting doors, that the King of glory may 
enter," as if it referred likewise to Hezekiah, and others of you [expound it] of 
Solomon; but neither to the latter nor to the former, nor, in short, to any of your 
kings, can it be proved to have reference, but to this our Christ alone, […] and of 
this you may, if you will, easily be persuaded by the occurrences which take place 
before your eyes. For every demon, when exorcised in the name of this very Son 
of God […]57 is overcome and subdued. But though you exorcise any demon in 
the name of any of those who were amongst you—either kings, or righteous men, 
or prophets, or patriarchs—it will not be subject to you. But if any of you exorcise 
it in [the name of] the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of 
Jacob, it will perhaps be subject to you. Now assuredly your exorcists […] make 
use of craft when they exorcise, even as the Gentiles do, and employ fumigations 
and incantations.58  
 
                                                
57 Again, according to the ex post facto logic of demon compulsion, the effectiveness of the compulsion (i.e. exorcism) 
confirms the validity of the epithet (in this case, "Son of God") by which the demon is compelled. 
58 George Reith, Marcus Dods, and B. P. Pratten The Writings of Justin Martyr and Athenagoras (Edinburgh: T & T. 
Clark, 1867) 205. 
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Justin's argument reads as though it could have been directed at Josephus' exorcist, 
Eleazar.59 Indeed, it is entirely possible that he had read Josephus' Antiquities. However, 
whether or not Justin's Dialogue was actually intended to be shared with Jews, the 
didactic purpose of instrumentalizing the apocryphal Solomon narrative is clear: the new 
Law of Christianity supersedes the old Law of Judaism and thus deliverance from 
demons can only be assured through adherence to the Christian religion – to the authority 
of Jesus as "king" rather than Solomon. Additionally, his derisive comment regarding the 
use of "craft" ("fumigations and incantations") suggests a concern for preventing the 
admixture of both foreign rites and formulae into Christian demon compulsion.60 (We 
will return to this point in the following chapter in our discussion of Thomas Aquinas' 
treatment of the question of whether demons can be compelled by any "sensible" means – 
i.e. incense, amulets, etc. in his Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei.) 
A bit of third century Gospel commentary by Origen (184 – 254 CE) provides 
another example, similar to that in Justin's Dialogue, and it reveals a narrowing of focus 
on the figure of Solomon as the theology of demon compulsion continues to develop as 
part of the early Christian polemic against Judaism: 
Somebody asks if it is necessary to adjure demons: and whoever looks back to the 
many who have dared to do such things will say this may be done not without 
rationale. Whoever has watched Jesus commanding demons and also giving the 
power to his disciples over all demons that they may cure their infirmities, he will 
say that it is not according to the power given by the savior to compel demons 
                                                
59 Scholarly consensus would seem to be that the figure of Trypho does not represent a historical Jewish interlocutor, 
but rather a fictitious rhetorical construct. Setzer, for example, claims that, whether a character on which Trypho was 
based existed or not, one can generally assume that Trypho's words are "largely put in his mouth by Justin." See: 
Claudia J. Setzer, Jewish Responses to Early Christianity: History and Polemics: 30-150 C.E. (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1994) 215. See also: Larry R. Helyer, Exploring Jewish Literature of the Second Temple Period: A Guide for 
New Testament Students (Downers, Grove, Ill: InterVarsity Press, 2002. Print) 493. 
60 Examples of syncretic Christian magic in the Greek Magical Papyri certainly make such concerns understandable. 
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because that is Jewish (Judaicum est enim) 61[It is customary to adjure demons 
with adjurations written by Solomon. But they themselves who use these 
adjurations sometimes use books not properly constituted; indeed they even 
adjure demons with some books taken from Hebrew.]62  
 
His commentary is obviously a reference to a continued practice of Solomonic demon 
compulsion in early Christianity, possibly like that described by Josephus. This would not 
be surprising. Even centuries after Origen's time, we continue to see from pilgrims' 
accounts of Jerusalem (like the Jerusalem Breviary cited in the introduction) that 
Solomon continued to be venerated for his ability as exorcist.63 However, with Origen's 
comments, "iudaicum est enim" ("that is Jewish"), we can also see the emergence of a 
                                                
61 Origène and Charles H. E. Lommatzsch. Origenis opera omnia quae graece vel latine tantum exstant et ejus nomine 
circumferuntur: Tomus V, Pars III. Berolini: Haude et Spener, 1835) "Quaeret aliquis, si convenit vel daemones 
adjurare; et qui respicit ad multos, qui talia facere ausi sunt, dicet non sine ratione fieri hoc. Qui autem adspicit Jesum 
imperantem daemonibus, sed etiam potestatem dantem discipulis suis super omnia daemonia, et ut infirmitates 
sanarent, dicet quoniam non est secundum potestatem datam a Salvatore, adjurare daemonia; Judaicum est enim. Hoc 
etsi aliquando a nostris tale aliquid, fiat, simile fit ei, quod a Salomone scriptis adjurationibus solent daemones adjurari. 
Sed ipsi, qui utuntur adjurationibus illis, aliquoties nec idoneis constitutis libris utuntur; quibusdam autem et de 
Hebraeo acceptis adjurant daemonia" (6-8). 
62 The bracketed portion of the translation is not my own. See: Mattheum comm. ser. (tract. 33) 110, Migne, PG vol. 
13 1757; McCown, Testament, p. 94; JPOS 2 (1922) 9. See also: Duling (1983), 949.  
63 Torijano offers several examples in a note (p. 85): "The fourth century pilgrimage of he Spanish nun Egeria is the 
most conspicuous and early example of such 'touristic' visits to the holy places in Late Antiquity; she explicitly 
mentions both the seal and the spot where it was preserved (P. Geyer, Itinera Hierosolymitana, Vindobonae: 1893, p. 
21): At ubi autem oscultati fuerint crucem, pertransierint, stat diaconus, tenet anulum Salomonis et cornu illud, de quo 
reges ungebantur. Oscultantur et cornu, attendunt et anulum… ("but when they had kissed the cross and passed by, the 
deacon stands, he holds the ring of Solomon and that horn, from which the kings were anointed. They kiss also the horn 
and give heed also to the ring"). In addition to this we can quote the testimony of a pilgrim from Bordeaux who wrote 
in 333 (Geyer, Itenera, 21): Est ibi et crepta ubi Salomon daemones torquebat (“the crypt where Solomon examined 
the demon is there as well”). A very similar note can be found in the Breviarius de Hierosolyma (Geyer, Itinera, p 154) 
which is dated to 530 C.E.: illud cornu, quo David uncturs uest et Salomon et ille anilis ibidem, unde Salomon sigillavit 
demones, et est de electro ("that horn, from which David was anointed and Solomon as well, and that ring, with which 
Solomon sealed the demons and which is made from electrum"). [...] Finally, we can observe in the following passage 
from the Breviarius (Geyer, Itinera, p. 153) how different traditions were integrated in everyday life: in circuita 
duodecim columnae marmoreae (omnio incredibile), super ipsas columnas hydriae argenteae duodecim, ubi sigillavit 
Salomon daemones ("in a circle there are twelve columns made of marble [absolutely unbelievable], over the same 
columns there are twelve vessels made of silver, where Solomon sealed the demons"). The pilgrim is describing the 
apse of the church of Constantine or, the Martyrium; the fact that elements from the traditions concerning Solomon's 
power over the demons were forged for the pious tourist again shows the popularity of such traditions and the inability 
of the church to uproot such beliefs from the people's imagination. 
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theological distinction between a right way and a wrong way – purity and impurity of 
belief and practice, as aligned with Christianity.64  
Thus, in both the example from Origen and the previous example from Justin 
Martyr, what appears to be a concern with formula and even rite (in the Malinowskian 
sense) is in actuality still a concern with the condition of the performer as "purity" 
defined as the absence-of-defilement through idolatry. In early Christian apologia, 
reliance on the figure of Solomon as exorcistic authority appears to cast as the very sort 
impurity of which Solomon himself was guilty: idolatry. The choice of whether to adjure 
a demon by the authority of Solomon or the authority of Jesus is not merely a choice 
between formulae, but a choice between kings.65 
We turn next to the Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila, dated to some time between 
the second half of the third and the sixth century CE.66 Like Justin Martyr, the 
anonymous Christian author of this work frames his polemical apologia as a conversation 
between a Christian and a Jew. Also like Justin, the author uses the dialogue to counter 
the Jewish assertion that Solomon represented the fulfillment of those Hebrew 
                                                
64 It is clear that Origen read Josephus; see: Joseph W. Trigg, Origen (London [u.a.: Routledge, 2004) 73. However, it 
is less clear how many Jews there were in Alexandria when he lived there and how much he would know about their 
exorcisms from first hand experience.  
65 MacMullen underscores the idea of divine kingship in his book: "It was exiguous: monotheism, to begin with. That 
was taught, and God was compared, in familiar fashion, to a monarch with his companies of servants about him; and 
contrast was drawn between him and mere imitations, the daimones that passed for gods by animating idols and so 
forth. Word spread of divine wrath and punishments, the more readily imagined through being leveled at evildoers 
resurrected in the flesh; while immortal delights were also known to await the blessed. The very stark blacks and whites 
of this whole crude picture of Christianity, and the unsteady focus on the role of Jesus, are most striking" (21). One 
might also consider the emergence of distinct concept of "heresy" within Christian discourse during this time as a sort 
of "doctrinal impurity." The term first appears in the famous Adversus Haereses (ca. 180) of Origen's contemporary, 
Irenaeus of Lyon (d. 202 CE). Demonstrating the possible connection between "impurity" and "heresy" in the writings 
of Irenaeus, however, lies outside the scope of the present project. 
66 For a recent discussion of the difficulties of dating Timothy and Aquila and a new hypothesis, see: Jacqueline Z. 
Pastis, "Dating the Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila: Revisiting the Earlier Vorlage Hypothesis" The Harvard 
Theological Review 95.2 (2002): 195. 
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prophecies, which Christians held to refer to Jesus. For instance, when Aquila, the Jew, 
insists that Psalm 2:7 ("You are my son; today I have begotten you") refers to Solomon, 
Timothy cites Solomon's idolatry and exogamy (1 Kings 11:1-8) as proof of the 
impossibility of the claim.  
Unlike Justin, the author of Timothy and Aquila does not appeal directly to 
Solomon's lack of authority over demons as evidence of his loss of the favor of God, but 
rather to an apocryphal account in which Solomon offers sacrifice to idols (9:8-13):  
"Know, therefore, that Solomon greatly provoked the Lord God of heaven, 
because he disobeyed him. So the anger of the Lord was upon Solomon, and He 
spoke to Ahijah the Shilonite that he should anoint Jereboam son of Nebat as king 
over Jerusalem, saying to him: if David was not my servant, I would destroy 
Solomon (1 Kings 11:34). "Know then, oh Jew, that he worshipped graven images 
and slaughtered locusts to them." The Jew said: He did not slaughter them but he 
crushed them in his hand unwillingly. However these things are not included in 
the book of the Kings but are written in his Testament." The Christian said: "Then 
it is all the more certain because this was not revealed by the hand of a historian 
but was made known by Solomon himself."67 
 
While Solomon's turn to idolatry is canonical, this particular account of his sacrificing 
locusts to foreign gods is not. There is, in fact, only one other contemporaneous account 
from which it is known: the apocryphal Testament of Solomon to which Aquila's 
comment appears to refer. In the final chapters of the Testament, Solomon relates how, 
seduced by the beauty of a foreign woman, he agreed to sacrifice locusts to the gods 
Raphan and Moloch and thus fell from God's grace, losing his power over the demons 
(TSol, 26.8).  
                                                
67 William C. Varner and Evagrius, Ancient Jewish-Christian Dialogues: Athanasius and Zacchaeus, Simon and 
Theophilus, Timothy and Aquila: Introductions, Texts, and Translations (Lewiston, N.Y: E. Mellen Press, 2004) 157.  
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The author of Timothy and Aquila presents the admission of idolatry (impurity) in 
the Testament "made known by Solomon himself," as a signed confession. While the 
final chapters of the Testament indeed describe Solomon's sacrifice of locusts, the 
account there is presented as part of the clearest, most developed narrative from any late 
antique or medieval source of Solomon's loss of authority over demons as a consequence 
of his idolatry. Thus, it would seem, the author of Timothy and Aquila has nevertheless 
indirectly appealed to the question of Solomon's authority over demons as evidence of his 
loss of the favor of God.  
The status of the Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila is clearly that of apologia or 
polemic and not that of ritual text, but the same cannot be said of the Testament of 
Solomon. Its peculiar straddling of those two categories will be discussed below. 
However, it is significant that part of its narrative belongs to the early Christian polemic 
against Solomon – the same part that presages the anti-magic theology of Thomas 
Aquinas.  
 
The Testament of Solomon 
We come now to the most developed example of the extra-biblical reputation of 
Solomon as engaged with demon compulsion known to us from late antiquity or the 
Middle Ages, the Testament of Solomon. The anonymous Testament represents a 
significant development in theology, magic, and polemics of the discourse of Solomonic 
demon compulsion. For the first time, we find a clear and developed example of 
compulsion of demons (within the Solomonic context) for purposes other than expulsion 
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or banishment – for "magical" purposes.68 Equally significantly, we also see God strip 
Solomon explicitly of his authority over demons as a consequence of his idolatry.69 
Whether the details of Solomon's reputation as exorcist, the means by which he was able 
to compel the demons, and the manner in which he lost that ability originated with the 
Testament of Solomon, whether they were first recorded there, or whether the Testament 
is simply the oldest extant record of these details, the Testament has become the source of 
our understanding of an extensive and well-represented tradition of "Solomonic" magic, 
based on its the narrative of Solomon's demon compulsion.70  
Nonetheless, the Testament, as it is known in its reconstructed form,71 is a baffling 
text. It appears to function equally well as a pro-magic apologia, early Christian 
pseudepigraphon (complete with prophecies of the crucifixion put into the mouths of 
demons who are bound by Solomon), Jewish aggadah, and as a disguise for a manual of 
pre-Christian ritual "magic." Given its interstitial qualities, the Testament could also be 
discussed as a ritual text. Its significance as such, however, fall largely outside the scope 
of the present study. Nevertheless, because the author (or possibly a later redactor) of 
                                                
68 Note Josephus' exorcist, Eleazar, has the demon knock over a basin of water as proof of its expulsion (as well as its 
existence). Compare with Mark 5:1-20 & Luke 8:26-39. 
69 Salzberger notes this as the first reference to Solomon's compulsion of demons to assist in the construction of the 
Temple: Immerhin wird es hier zum ersten Male ausgesprochen, daß Sal. Geister beim Tempelbau verwendet habe und 
daß er, durch die Liebe zu einer Jebusiterin in heidnischen Kult verstrickt, der Macht über die Geister verlustig 
gegangen und ihnen zum Gespött geworden sei." See: Georg Salzberger, Die Salomosage in der Semitischen Literatur: 
Ein Beitrag zur Vergleichenden Sagenkunde (Berlin, 1907) 11. 
70 See quotes in chapter 3, especially Peuckert. 
71 With reference to the reconstructed nature of the text as it is known, Klutz writes, "[What] is conveniently called 'the 
Testament of Solomon' is not so much a solid text with a clear identity as it is a blurry and elusive textual space thinly 
populated by an assortment of heterogeneous manuscripts whose chief source of unity is their mutual interest in certain 
secrets obtained by Solomon from the demonic realm." The idea that the catalogue of demons, which makes up largest 
portion of the Testament, may represent an older complete, and possibly ritual (i.e. "magical") text is the basic thesis in: 
Todd E. Klutz, "The Archer and the Cross: Chorographic Astrology and Literary Design in the Testament of Solomon," 
Magic in the Biblical World: From the Rod of Aaron to the Ring of Solomon (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2004) 
219-44, quote from 224. 
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Timothy and Aquila has rhetorically handled the Testament as scriptural authority in the 
portion of the text which was quoted above, it is also worth discussing its ending as a 
crucial part of the paradigmatic narrative which establishes the rite, the formula, and the 
condition of the performer in the narrative of Solomon's power over demons.  
The account given in the Testament is quite detailed. During the construction of 
the Temple, Solomon becomes aware that a young worker whom he favors has become 
increasingly thin and weak. Dismayed, Solomon questions the boy, curious how it is that, 
despite his being paid twice as much as the other laborers and receiving a double portion 
of food, the boy is wasting away. When confronted by the king, the young worker reveals 
that he is tormented every night by the demon Ornias, who robs him of half pay and half 
of his food and, furthermore, drains off much of his strength by sucking the thumb of the 
boy's right hand. At this explanation, the King understands and resolves to appeal to God 
for help.  
The details of what follows are significant enough to later discussion as to warrant 
being quoted directly here from D. Duling's English translation of the Testament: 
When I, Solomon, heard these things, I went into the Temple of God and, praising 
him day and night, begged with all my soul that the demon might be delivered 
into my hands and that I might have authority over him. Then it happened that 
while I was praying to the God of heaven and earth, there was granted me from 
the Lord Sabaoth through the archangel Michael a ring which had a seal engraved 
on precious stone. He said to me, "Solomon, Son of David, take the gift which the 
Lord God, the highest Sabaoth, has sent to you; (with it) you shall imprison all the 
demons, both female and male, and with their help you shall build Jerusalem 
when you bear this seal of God.72 
                                                
72 Denis C. Duling, "Testament of Solomon." The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, Vol. 1: Apocalyptic Literature & 
Testaments, edited by James H. Charlesworth (New York: Doubleday, 1983) 935–987, here 962. Conybeare's 1898 
translation includes here the line: "And this engraving of the seal of the ring sent thee is a Pentalpha." Here, 
"pentalpha" refers to the pentagram because five uppercase A's can be arranged and overlapped to create the shape. 
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The following morning, Solomon summons the boy, instructs him to take the ring, and 
that night, when the demons appears, to cast it against the breast of the demon. Having 
thus bound the demon, he is to exclaim, "Come! Solomon summons you."73 This the boy 
does, thus binding the demon, and then dragging him to the throne of Solomon. There, 
the king questions the demon and subsequently orders him to retrieve the Lord of all the 
demons, Beezelbul. Ornias obeys and returns with Beezelbul, whom Solomon also seals 
with the ring. Solomon then questions him insistently in spite of his arrogant behavior, 
and finally, Beezelbul is made to present all the other unclean evil spirits, one at a time, 
to Solomon.74 
 The first three chapters thus establish a frame story for the catalogue of demons 
which follows in great detail, in chapters 4-25. One by one, Solomon seals each demon 
with the ring, questions it about its name and the maladies or misfortunes for which it is 
responsible, for its astrological constellation ("In which sign of the zodiac do you live?"), 
and then for the name of the angel who presides over it and who has the power to 
constrain it. Finally, Solomon forces each demon to participate in the construction of the 
                                                                                                                                            
There are a few such notable differences between Duling's translation and that of Conybeare in: F. C. Conybeare, "The 
Testament of Solomon," The Jewish Quarterly Review, 11.1 (1898): 1-45. Joseph Peterson provides a side-by-side 
comparison of these two translations. See: Joseph Peterson, "The Testament of Solomon," Esoteric Archives, 1997; 
web, 30 July 2017, <http://www.esotericarchives.com/solomon/testamen.htm>.  
73 Here, Conybeare's translation reads: "In the name of God, Solomon calls thee hither." See previous note for 
reference to side-by-side comparison. 
74 It is interesting to note that Aquinas demonology in De Potentia is consistent with this portrayal of the more 
powerful demons' abilities to compel the less powerful. In De Potentia Dei (vi, 10) he writes "Sometimes too [demons] 
are compelled by superior demons; and this compulsion alone can be effected by means of magic." Whether or not 
Aquinas was familiar with the Testament, such commonalities in cosmology between "Solomonic" magic and Aquinas' 
anti-magic theology support the suggestion that Aquinas' anti-magic strategy was largely a targeted response to that 
tradition of magical practice. 
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Temple: spinning hemp, sawing marble stone, or lifting heavy stone and passing them on 
to the workers.  
 After the parade of demons is complete, the Testament returns to the narrative 
frame to undercut the figure of Solomon and put a definitive end to his apotropaic power. 
Solomon turns to his audience and relates how, seduced by the beauty of a foreign 
woman, he agreed to sacrifice locusts to the gods Raphan and Moloch and thus fell out of 
God's grace, losing his power over the demons (TSol, 26.8). He ends his Testament by 
exhorting other people to use the information that he has passed on to them to protect 
themselves against demons as best they can, and to resist temptations to leave their faith 
better than he had (TSol, 26.8). Once again, for the sake of detail, I quote directly:  
[...] However, I did not want to worship (their gods), so I said to them, "I will 
worship no foreign god."  
 
But they threatened violence against the maiden, saying, "If you have the 
opportunity to go to the kingdom of Solomon, say to him, 'I will not go to bed 
with you unless you become like my people and take five locusts and sacrifice 
them in the name of Raphan and Molech.'" So because I loved the girl - she was 
in full bloom and I was out of my senses - I accepted as nothing the custom (of 
sacrificing) the blood of locusts. I took them in my hands and sacrificed in the 
name of Raphan and Molech to idols, and I took the maiden to the palace of my 
kingdom. 
 
So the spirit of God departed from me and from that day on my words became as 
idol talk. She convinced me to build a temple to idols.  
 
As a result I, wretched man that I am, carried out her advice an the glory of God 
completely departed from me; my spirit was darkened and I became as a laughing 
stock to the idols and demons. For this reason I have written out this, my 
testament, in order that those who hear might pray about, and pay attention to, the 
last things and not to the first things, in oder that they might finally find grace 
forever. Amen."75 
                                                
75 Duling (1983), 986f. Conybeare's translation of the same passage is slightly different. See Conybeare (1898): "And 
when I answered that I would on no account worship strange gods, they told the maiden not to sleep with me until I 
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At this point, the apocryphal narrative is at its most developed; this represents the most 
complete version of the trope to which both later manuals of ritual magic and anti-magic 
theological arguments harken back. Solomon's power over demons is explicitly divinely 
authorized. The ring, already present in Josephus and the accounts of early Christian 
pilgrims, is accounted for. The names and astrological associations, as well as the names 
of the angels by whom the demons are compelled are present. The names of the demons 
are also present.  
Finally, the Testament adds to the narrative conditions leading to the explicit loss 
of Solomon's control over demons: "I then, wretch that I am, followed her advice, and 
then the glory of God quite departed from me; and my spirit was darkened, and I became 
the sport of idols and demons." This element of the text absolutely serves the previous 
polemic of Justin and Origen by confirming (albeit pseudepigraphically) that Solomon's 
spiritual authority is nullified – exactly the portrait of Solomon that Josephus was trying 
to avoid. Interestingly, and somewhat paradoxically, it also fits the logics of both later 
ritual texts which insist on a "pure" condition of the performer and of an argument by 
Aquinas' (discussed below) in which he effectively argues against the possibility of a 
Solomonic magic because of the loss of his purity through idolatry. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
complied and sacrificed to the gods. I then was moved, but crafty Eros brought and laid by her for me five 
grasshoppers, saying: "Take these grasshoppers, and crush them together in the name of the god Moloch; and then I 
will sleep with you." And this I actually did. And at once the Spirit of God departed from me, and I became weak as 
well as foolish in my words. After that I was obliged by her to build a temple of idols to Baal, and Rapha, and to 
Moloch, and to the other idols. I then, wretch that I am, followed her advice, and then the glory of God quite departed 
from me; and my spirit was darkened, and I became the sport of idols and demons. Wherefore I wrote out this 
Testament, that ye who get possession of it may pray, and attend to the last things, and not to the first. So that ye may 
find grace forever and ever. Amen" 45. 
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Conclusion 
The loss of Solomon's favor with God, which Josephus sought to attenuate and 
Christian apologists sought to elaborate, is significant to early Christian theology because 
of how it relates to his spiritual authority. Exorcism (demon compulsion) in the ancient 
world of the Evangelists, Josephus, and the early apologists provided a platform for 
testing the force of divine authority. If an exorcism failed to expel a demon, the natural 
inclination of the polytheistic exorcist would likely have been to seek the aid of a 
stronger god, not to question his own faith. We find ample evidence that the competition 
between divine kings included not only Solomon and Jesus, but also Helios, Hermes 
Trismegistus, and others whose sacred names are invoked for the compulsion of demons 
in similar charms or even together in a single charm. The perceived efficacy of a 
"Solomonic" exorcism – regardless whether that would have meant in the name of 
Solomon or according to a formula which he provided – would render the recognition of 
Jesus as the fulfillment of Hebrew prophecies as optional or even unnecessary.  
What was at stake in this shift of narrative was monotheism. Evidence from 
recovered caches of magical formulae like those cited here suggests a tendency toward 
syncretism – toward merely adding Jesus to an increasingly crowded late antique 
pantheon. Devotion to the pagan deities and divine kings of Hellenized Egypt was 
combated as idolatry – as false and offensive to God (much the same terms on which it 
was rejected in Jewish law.) Solomon's position, however, was necessarily different. His 
story – his role as divinely appointed king of a monotheistic tribe that rejected the 
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physical depiction of the divine – meant that he could not simply be written out of the 
narrative. He had to be deposed.  
It is in this context that we must understand the Christian polemical position that 
Solomon lost his authority as a result of his idolatry which we find in the Justin Martyr's, 
Dialogue with Trypho, was already present as the unheard counterpoint to Josephus' 
description of the Eleazar episode. Both Justin and Origen would have had in mind the 
words of the author of Acts of the Apostles 19:13-20 (ca. 80-90 CE, almost exactly the 
same time as Josephus), who writes: 
But also some of the Jewish exorcists, who went from place to place, attempted to 
name over those who had the evil spirits the name of the Lord Jesus, saying, "I 
adjure you by Jesus whom Paul preaches." Seven sons of one Sceva, a Jewish 
chief priest, were doing this. And the evil spirit answered and said to them, "I 
recognize Jesus, and I know about Paul, but who are you?" And the man, in 
whom was the evil spirit, leaped on them and subdued all of them and 
overpowered them, so that they fled out of that house naked and wounded. This 
became known to all, both Jews and Greeks, who lived in Ephesus; and fear fell 
upon them all and the name of the Lord Jesus was being magnified. Many also of 
those who had believed kept coming, confessing and disclosing their practices. 
And many of those who practiced magic brought their books together and began 
burning them in the sight of everyone; and they counted up the price of them and 
found it fifty thousand pieces of silver. So the word of the Lord was growing 
mightily and prevailing.76 
 
The continued association of that authority with demon compulsion challenged the 
legitimacy of Jesus as the fulfillment of Hebrew prophecy. Christian apologists 
understood that the trope of Jesus' ability to drive out demons could only be rhetorically 
effective as a sign of his divinity (divine kingship) if the same could not be said of 
                                                
76 Acts 19:13-20. 
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Solomon, or indeed, any other divine king.77 Because Christian canon and Christian 
culture recognized that God had once granted Solomon such authority – indeed, the 
legitimacy of the prophecies which the Christians cited as proof of Jesus' authority 
depended upon it –,78 the resulting bind necessitated a demonstrable, definitive end to 
Solomon's authority over demons. Solomon's chastisement in Kings for defiling himself 
with idols – breaking the chiefest of purity laws – provided that. As a result of the 
Christian polemic, in the case of Solomon, the condition of the performer took on 
heightened significance, and with it, it would seem, the condition of any demon 
compeller. 
The efficacy of demon-compulsion thus continued as a major site of the polemic 
over Jesus as the fulfillment of Hebrew prophecy. However, the attention that was 
devoted to the polemical discourse seems to have had at least two important secondary 
effects, which, in turn, reshaped the discourse as it persisted into the Middle Ages – the 
subject of the next chapter. First, it seems that in the process of apologetic instruction of 
neophyte Christians in the proper formula (i.e. the name of Jesus) not only the rite, but 
also the formula became public knowledge. Note: this is contrary to Malinowski's model. 
As a result of that, it seems, it was the condition of the performer rather than the formula, 
                                                
77 In the Greek magical papyri we see the drama of the early Christian apologists being played out. For example, PGM 
IV. 1227-64 reads: "Excellent rite for driving out daimons: Formula to be spoken over his head: Place olive branches 
before him, / and stand behind him and say: "Hail, God of Abraham; hail, God of Isaac; hail God of Jacob; Jesus 
Chrestos, the Holy Spirit, the Son of the Father, who is above the Seven,/ who is within the Seven. Bring Iao Sabaoth; 
may your power issue forth from him, NN, until you drive away this unclean daimon Satan, who is in him. I conjure 
you, daimon, / whoever you are, by this god SABARBARBATHIŌTH SABARBARBATHIOUTH 
SABARBARBATHIŌNĒTH SABARBARBAPHAI. Come out, daimon, whoever you are, and stay away from him, 
NN, / now, now; immediately, immediately. Come out, daimon, since I bind you with unbreakable adamantine fetters, 
and I deliver you into the black chaos in perdition." Betz 62. 
78 Refer again to note on page 75 for several late antique Christian examples of the continued veneration of Solomon as 
exorcist. 
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which became the most important part of the "magic" of demon compulsion and the most 
significant to the limiting of "magical" or exorcistic authority in the developing 
institutional Church. Second, the more polemics were devoted to Solomon's prior 
authority and the more detailed the accounts of his loss of that authority, the more fitting 
the narrative became for the kind of allusive potential Salzer describes as unio magica. 
Thus, even if the "Solomonic" magic, which the theologians discussed in the following 
chapter struggled to combat, did not causally result from the proliferation of the 
apocryphal narrative through late antique polemics and Contra-Iudaeos polemics, then, at 
the very least, it certainly benefited from them. 
  
 










PURITY AS THE PRESENCE-OF-GRACE:  
 






In this chapter, we examine the next development in the spiritualization and 
metaphoricization of purity as the condition of the performer within traditions of 
Solomonic demon compulsion in Christian theological discourse. The development to be 
discussed in this chapter did not follow immediately on the heels of Christian Antiquity, 
but rather, occurred over centuries in something like a chain reaction, transforming the 
rhetorical forms found in the narrative tradition I sketched above in the texts that clearly 
associate themselves more with arguments from Christian Antiquity (e.g. the use of the 
figure of Solomon in Contra-Iudaeos polemics). Christian discourse on demon 
compulsion, which alluded to Solomon as the prototypical actor persisted, but the specific 
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forms and functions of the discussions changed. So too did the texts which presented 
these discussions. Traditional narrative source materials persisted as part of the 
foundation of Christianity's later developments, but they found new forms in texts that 
had to do different kinds of social, political, and theological work.  
Most critically, as the concept of original sin articulated by Augustine of Hippo 
(354-430 CE) became doctrine, it necessarily impacted Christian constructs of purity 
because it fundamentally changed the Christian understanding of defilement (i.e. 
"impurity"). Familiarly, Augustine argued that original sin was a universal condition 
resulting from the inheritance of the guilt of Adam (defilement) that could only be 
overcome (i.e. "purified") by means of God's grace.79 Though Augustine's model of 
original sin was not unopposed, it ultimately prevailed. Thus the previous understanding 
of purity as the absence-of-contamination or defilement gradually became a theological 
non-starter, because original sin represented universal contamination – the de facto state 
of humanity was "impure." Yet in order for purity to be redefined from the absence-of-
contamination to the presence-of-grace, the institutional Church would have to essentially 
                                                
79 See: Ernesto Bonaiuti and Giorgio La Piana, "The Genesis of St. Augustine's Idea of Original Sin," The Harvard 
Theological Review, 10.2, (1917) 159–175, here 163f. Summarizing Augustine's position, the authors write: "Mankind 
is thus an agglomeration of condemned creatures which cannot acquire any merit before God, and whose hopes for 
forgiveness and atonement are only in the benevolent grace of the Father and the infallible decree of his 
predestination." Moreover, they cite from Augustine's writings as follows: "Ex quo in paradiso natura nostra peccavit, 
non secundum spiritum, sed secundum carnem, mortali generatione formamur, et omnes una massa luti facti sumus, 
quod est massa peccati. Cum ergo meritum peccando amiserimus, nihil aliud, peccantibus, nisi aeterna damnatio 
debetur" (De LXXXIII Quaestionibus: 9, 68, 3). . . . Tunc facta est una massa omnium, veniens de traduce peccati et de 
forma mortalitatis. . ... Sunt igitur omnes homines una quaedam massa peccati, supplicium debens divinae summaeque 
justitiae, quod sive exigatur, sive donetur nulla est iniquitas. A quibus autem exigendum est et quibus donandum sit, 
superbe judicant debitores; quemadmodum conducti ad illam vineam iniuste indignati sunt, cum tantummodo aliis 
donaretur, quantum illis reddetur" (De Divinis Quaestionibus num, I, 16). Agusti ́n and Jacques-Paul Migne, Sancti 
Aurelii Augustini, Hipponensis Episcopi, Opera Omnia: Post Lovaniensium theologorum recensionem castigata denuo 
ad manuscriptos codices gallicos, Vaticanos, Belgicos, etc.; nencnon ad editiones antiquiores et castigatiores, opera et 
studio monachorum Ordinis Sancti Benedicti e congregatione S. Mauri: vol. 6 (Parisiis: Venit apud editorem [J.-P. 
Migne, 1841) 121. 
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commodify grace. This it did gradually as it shaped its doctrine of sacramental grace, the 
full articulation of which comes in the Summa Theologia (written 1265-1274) of Thomas 
Aquinas (1225-1274) who writes, "God's grace is a sufficient cause of man's salvation. 
But God gives grace to man in a way which is suitable to him. Hence it is that man needs 
the sacraments that he may obtain grace."80 Once grace became something that could be 
obtained in defined ways (mediated through the Church's sacraments), it was possible to 
effectively understand purity by the presence of grace, rather than by the absence of 
contamination or defilement – one either had grace or one didn't. 
As we shall see, the turn in the spiritualization and metaphoricization of purity 
which Aquinas articulates in his Summa also enabled him to create a distinction in his 
Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei (1265-66) between exorcism as licit demon 
compulsion in which the condition of the performer is understood as pure (i.e. a state of 
grace; "in statu salutis") and nigromantia as illicit demon compulsion, in which requisite 
the condition of the performer impure (or a state of sin). Because the institutional Church 
controlled the sacraments as conduits of grace-as-purity (See above, Summa Theologia Q 
61. A1. Reply to objection 2), it could also claim control over all licit demon compulsion 
and with it, authority on the matter of demons (i.e. demonology). Furthermore, not only 
does Aquinas provide a theological distinction between exorcism and "magic" by 
stipulating his construct of presence-of-grace (i.e. purity) as the defining condition of the 
performer of the licit, ecclesiastically authorized exorcist, he actually uses the apocryphal 
                                                
80 Aquinas, ST III, Q 61, A1, ad 2.: "Ad secundum dicendum quod gratia Dei est sufficiens causa humanae salutis. Sed 
Deus dat hominibus gratiam secundum modum eis convenientem. Et ideo necessaria sunt hominibus sacramenta ad 
gratiam consequendam." 
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narrative of Solomon's power over demons to do so. For this reason, the medieval 
Scholastic theology of Thomas Aquinas stands at the center of our investigation in this 
chapter – it demonstrates not only the persistence of older narrative materials 
(particularly the apocryphal narrative of Solomon's power over demons) in the evolving 
Church, but also provides a clear example of how Aquinas and other Scholastic 
theologians mobilized the category of "purity" within their theological argumentation to 
establish and enforce orthopraxy. 
The material in this chapter is organized in to a roughly chronological 
presentation, as in the previous chapter, addressing a further selection of texts that 
reference the narrative tradition of Solomonic demon compulsion. The examples are 
drawn from anti-magic theology (i.e. demonology), and are divided into two main 
sections. The reason for this is that the influence of Thomas Aquinas in the development 
of Catholic anti-magic theology (as demonology) is so significant as to warrant its 
presentation in a "before and after" with respect to Aquinas' intervention. 
The aims of this chapter are as follows. First, we will reveal that, during the 
medieval Scholastic period, the idea of purity as condition of the performer in Christian 
discourses of demon compulsion changes from Christian Antiquity's definition of purity 
as absence-of-contamination or defilement (in this case, the contamination of Christianity 
through syncretic practices and beliefs, as discussed in the previous chapter) to purity as 
the presence-of-grace. This formulation both responds to and depends on many threads of 
contemporaneous theological discussion, such as the doctrine of original sin, already 
discussed. Catholic teaching on demon compulsion specifically, can be traced to the 
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theology of Thomas Aquinas who uses the idea of grace-as-purity to force a distinction 
between, on the one hand, licit demon compulsion (as exorcism) in which the requisite 
condition of the performer is "pure," and, on the other, illicit demon compulsion (as 
nigromantia) in which the requisite condition of the performer is "impure."  
Second, we will adduce evidence which suggests that Aquinas' innovation in anti-
magic theology was at least partially a response to specific historical developments in the 
relationship of the Dominican Order with European Jews, specifically the Dominican 
discovery of the Toledot Yeshu (The Life of Jesus), a medieval Jewish satire about the life 
of Jesus in which Jesus was portrayed as a magician.81 Third and finally, this chapter will 
reveal that, by instrumentalizing the apocryphal narrative of Solomon's power over 
demons – deploying within Catholic theological discourse what had originally been part 
of a Contra-Iudaeos polemic –, Aquinas helped not only to create the medieval idea of 
nigromantia as polemic against heterodox practices of efficacious ritual, but also to shape 
actual magical practice in the later middle ages as his construct of purity as presence-of-
grace incorporated into manuals of ritual magic.  
 
Medieval Anti-Magic Theology before Aquinas 
 In this section, we outline the challenges faced by medieval Catholic theologians 
in regulating practices of ritual demon compulsion – that is, to bringing under 
institutional control a set of familiar but poorly defined "religious" practices from the 
                                                
81 Some scholars assert date the source material to no earlier than the 6th century, and the compilation no earlier than 
the 9th century. See: Roland, H. Worth Jr., Alternative Lives of Jesus: Noncanonical accounts through the early Middle 
Ages (2003, NC, McFarland & Co.) 49f. 
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earlier, less hierarchically organized Christianity of late antiquity. Before Aquinas' mid-
thirteenth-century Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei, there was no consistent, 
practical and demonstrable distinction between licit "exorcistic" demon compulsion and 
illicit "magical" demon compulsion. To be sure, centuries earlier, Augustine (354-430 
CE) had defined magic as a demonic pact,82 but actual ritual texts of the medieval period 
– particularly those with allusions to the apocryphal Solomon narrative – were framed in 
terms of demon compulsion by the power of God through the action of a "pure" human 
agent and not in terms of cooperation with a demon as part of a pact. Augustine had, 
therefore, defined the demonic pact, but not refuted demon compulsion by other means in 
any thorough-going way. By Aquinas' era, what early apologists had offered as a selling 
point of Christianity – easy access to supernatural authority over demons83 – had become 
a liability and a threat to the hierarchy of the institutional Church. Yet unfortunately for 
orthodox anti-magic theologians, there was little within the praxis of Christian demon 
compulsion to which to object because there was no clear, external distinction between 
licit and illicit forms which could be discerned from the texts that were scrutinized by the 
theologians.84 
                                                
82 Aquinas, in the formulation of his own anti-magic theology (ST II-II, Q 96, A 1, resp.) cites Augustine's concept of 
the pact: The magic art is both unlawful and futile. It is unlawful, because the means it employs for 
acquiring knowledge have not in themselves the power to cause science, consisting as they do in gazing certain shapes, 
and muttering certain strange words, and so forth. Wherefore this art does not make use of these things as causes, but 
as signs; not however as signs instituted by God, as are the sacramental signs. It follows, therefore, that they are 
empty signs, and consequently a kind of "agreement or covenant made with the demons for the purpose of consultation 
and of compact by tokens" [Augustine, De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20; see above (II-II:92:2. Wherefore the magic art is to be 
absolutely repudiated and avoided by Christian, even as other arts of vain and noxious superstition, 
as Augustine declares (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23).  
83 See the discussion of McMullen in previous chapter and of Acts 19:13-20. 
84 See note about compulsion, adjuration, and exorcism on page 59. 
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As we will see, medieval Scholastic theologians before Aquinas who argued 
against Solomonic demon compulsion struggled against medieval magicians' 
constructions of "purity" as requisite condition of the performer in their rituals. The 
theologians who wrote against demon compulsion as nigromantia at that point, however, 
had only defined it as involving explicit pacts with demons, but not yet including implicit 
pacts – the rhetorical stroke which later allowed Aquinas in his definition of magic to 
prohibit a multitude of ritual practices. Thus the theologians faced a double bind: in order 
to delegitimize the condition of the performer of unauthorized demon compulsion as 
"pure," they would have to deny the efficacy of many of the practices (fasting, 
abstinence, etc.) for the attainment of the "purity" by which they authorized themselves as 
clergy (including their own demon compulsion). Yet to draw this line between licit and 
illicit demon compulsion was a practical requirement, since the authors of earlier 
medieval manuals of demon compulsion had already identified in "purity" an 
authorization and legitimation of their practices (as in the case of the Testament). That 
conflation would have been difficult for orthodox theologians to undermine, for what 
could be objectionable about the fasting and abstinence by which the magician prepared 
for his rituals, if his practices of "purity" were identical to those by which the clergy also 
governed their own lives and legitimated their own authority?  
Unfortunately, few Christian texts of Solomonic ritual demon compulsion survive 
from this early period, though we can be assured of the circulation of these texts by virtue 
of the fact that they are often mentioned by name in early theological prohibitions (some 
of which will be discussed below). Moreover, while many survive in later copies or 
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recensions, these are not necessarily reliable witnesses to all of the details of the texts in 
the forms in which medieval theologians knew them – texts of ritual magic often evolve 
through the intervention of the copyist.85 For that reason our investigation here will be 
limited to anti-magic theological responses to Solomonic pseudoepigrapha and will not 
include the analysis of ritual texts from the twelfth century or earlier.  
Yet the relative scarcity of surviving manuscripts of ritual texts dating from this 
early period does not undermine our methodology. Because our interest is in the turn in 
the definition of "purity" as condition of the performer affected by Aquinas within the 
context of the anti-magic theology of his argument in the Quaestiones Disputatae de 
Potentia Dei, it suffices to compare his anti-magic argument to alternate anti-magic 
theological arguments preceding and roughly contemporaneous with his own. The 
comparison between Aquinas’ construction of purity related and earlier textual examples 
of ritual demon compulsion reveals a decided difference in the respective approaches to 
the idea of purity as condition of the performer between Aquinas and those theologians 
who preceded him.  
As already intimated, the innovation of Aquinas' argument is that it requires 
purity as the presence-of-grace, but that it also makes grace unattainable outside the 
Church. Thus Aquinas has brought any licit demon compulsion under the Church's 
control, given that the condition of the performer of any extra-ecclesial demon 
compulsion is de facto impure. At this point, the goal of this chapter is to demonstrate the 
turn in Aquinas' anti-magical theological definition of purity as condition of the 
                                                
85 The concern is this: if my hypothesis is correct and ideas of purity change with time, then later recensions would 
probably include additions or alterations that reflect later ideas of purity. 
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performer in ritual demon compulsion. Only then will it allow us to show how Aquinas' 
theological innovation was adopted into actual the texts (and therefore presumably also 
practice) of illicit ritual demon compulsion (i.e. nigromantia). These two steps will reveal 
not only Church's evolving resistance to magic theology outside its own control, but also 
how the narrative materials associated with Solomonic magic were used in new ways in a 
new generation of ritual texts that demonstrate a turn in the discourse as a whole, which 
will be discussed briefly in the conclusion to the project. 
That such a turn might occur in the entire magic/anti-magic discourse is not 
surprising, given that Solomonic demon compulsion was not an outside threat. Most, if 
not all, medieval magicians were actually clergy.86 Thus if the practice of Solomonic 
demon compulsion as "magic" was turning into a threat, it was a threat to orthodoxy as 
much as anything else. Just as had been the case in Christian antiquity the danger was 
that the figure of Solomon – either through pseudepigrapha or the allusive potential (i.e. 
unio magica) of the apocryphal narrative – represented a source of power and authority 
outside the Church's control. Early apologists who had simply argued against the 
effectiveness of Solomon's exorcisms had clearly failed to be convincing, for more and 
more ritual texts attributed to the Jewish monarch appeared during the course the Middle 
Ages.87  
The popularity of these texts meant that they needed to be addressed. Even a 
number of important theologians – at least prior to Aquinas – appear to have taken parts 
                                                
86 Richard Kieckhefer, Magic in the Middle Ages (Cambridge u.a: Cambridge Univ. Pr, 2009) 153. 
87 See, for example, the article by Julien Véronèse: "God's Names and Their Uses in the Books of Magic Attributed to 
King Solomon," Magic, Ritual, and Witchcraft 5.1 (2010): 30-50, which compiles numerous examples of such ritual 
texts. 
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of the apocryphal narrative of Solomon's power over demons quite seriously. Peter 
Comestor (1100-1178), for instance, considers Josephus' account of the exorcist Eleazar 
in Antiquities a reliable source with regard to Jewish methods of demon compulsion. 
However, he is explicit in casting Solomon's role and authority as superseded by that of 
Jesus. In his Historia Scholastica, Peter writes: 
[Solomon] also devised characters which were inscribed on gems and placed in 
the noses of the possessed with conspicuous root of Solomon; immediately he 
freed the possessed from demons. This knowledge was of great value to many in 
the Hebrew nation, and was greatly necessary. Before the coming of Christ men 
were often troubled by demons, because they sometimes thrust them down alive 
into hell. Josephus also testifies that he saw a certain exorcist, Eleazar, before 
Vespasian and his sons and princes, curing those troubled by demons in this 
aforesaid manner, and in order to prove to them the leaving of the demon through 
the nose by the spirit of the breath, he placed a basin in their midst, and ordered 
the demon as he was leaving to overturn it in proof of his leaving; and thus he 
did.88 
 
This appraisal has led multiple scholars to conclude that Peter Comestor recognized 
Solomon as the father of exorcism (rather than "magic" in the later sense of nigromantia) 
even as he claims that the power that individual earlier demon-compellers had 
commanded has become contingent upon Christian revelation.89 
                                                
88 See: Liber III Regnum, in Patrologia Latina 198:1352."Exogitavit etiam characteres, qui inscribebantur gemmis, 
quae posita in naribus arreptitii, cum radice Salomoni monstrata, statim eum a daemonibus liberabat. Haec scientia 
plurimum valuit in gente Hebraeorum, et maxime necessaria erat. Ante adventum enim Christi saepius homines a 
daemonibus vexabantur, quod homines vivos ad infernum quandoque detrudebant. Josephus (8.5) quoque testatur se 
vidisse quemdam Eleazarum exorcistam coram Vespasiano, et filiis ejus, et tyrannis, in hunc modum praedictum 
curantem vexatos a daemonibus, et ut proparet eis daemonum egressum per nares cum spiritu anhelantis, vas ponebat in 
medio, et imperabat daemoni egresso, ut illud everteret in argumentum suae egressionis; et ita fiebat." The English 
translation is taken from: Robert M Correale and Mary Hamel Sources and Analogues of the Canterbury Tales: Vol. 1 
(Woodbridge: D.S. Brewer, 2003) 196. 
89 Francis Young, A History of Exorcism in Catholic Christianity (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) 71. 
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Similarly, Thomas of Chobham (c. 1160-1233/36, active 1200-1233)90 speculated 
at some length as to nature of Solomon's power over demons. We include here his 
speculations on Solomon's power over demons in his Summa Confessorum (c. 1216)91 to 
further demonstrate the credulousness of orthodox theologians with regard to the 
discourse in the decades preceding Aquinas' intervention with his Quaestiones:  
It is well known, however, that holy words have much effectiveness on natural 
things. For the natural philosophers say that the force of nature is concentrated 
above all in three things: in words and herbs, and in stones. We know something 
about the power of herbs and stones, but of the power of words we know little or 
nothing.  
 
It is said that only Solomon had this art of words, which now is thoroughly 
unknown to all men. Just as for instance some herbs have a certain effect on the 
human body and others [herbs] on others [bodies], likewise the sound of one 
element is naturally thought to have a certain effect toward a moving or changing 
regarding a particular thing, and the sound of another element regarding [the 
moving or changing of] others. And just as various herbs combined have a certain 
virtue in medicine that have none on their own, likewise multiple elements or 
multiple spoken words [combined] have a certain effect on temporal things if 
similarly some spoken combined [offered altogether] which would they would not 
have if offered individually. But it is not man who knows the virtue of the element 
but [rather] the art of combining words. 
 
By this art Solomon discovers exorcisms by which he binds demons and it is read 
to trap them in glass jars, and many other wonders/miracles in natural things by 
exorcisms. Likewise by this art Pharao’s magicians were believed to make 
serpents/dragons from [their] staffs. If because he were to have a knowledge of 
this art and use it according to nature by not mixing in it the name or the authority 
of the demons, and would not use the art for illicit res or for secular baseness we 
believe that he would not sin, although he would seem to do miracles through 
such an art and neither would a doctor sin who predicts – according to the subtlety 
                                                
90 Thomas studied in Paris, probably under Peter Cantor (who also writes about Solomon). For a list of the few known 
details about the life and activities of Thomas of Chobham, see: Fritz Kemmler, 'Exempla' in Context: A Historical and 
Critical Study of Robert Mannyng of Brunne's 'handlyng Synne,'" (Tübingen: Narr, 1984) 35f. 
91 Before becoming a sub-dean in Salisbury, Chobham studied under Peter the Chanter in Paris. He is principally 
remembered for his influential Summa Confessorum, a treatise on penance, written in the aftermath of the 1215 Lateran 
Council. The treatise, which deals with the issue of commerce, profit and usury was long attributed to John 
of Salisbury.  
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of this art – a future death to someone long before it came although this would 
seem miraculous to the ignorant.92 
 
It is obvious from Chobham's description of Solomon's art that, far from being dismissed 
out of hand, the apocryphal Solomon narrative was a continued source of speculation, 
and one that still answered to present issues.  
 Twelfth century theologians did not doubt that Solomon had been able to compel 
demons. In fact, they had it on good authority – both the Book of Wisdom and Church 
tradition – that he had. It should also be apparent that this sort of speculation could 
potentially be of grave concern to the institutional Church, should it lose control over 
these rituals. Chobham's opinion that Solomon's lost art was not only very real but also 
potentially licit, from the perspective of canon law, was practically an invitation for the 
over-curious (and under-orthodox) to attempt to recover it. From such examples, 
moreover, it is apparent that the theologians' objections to such rituals – prior to the 
thirteenth century – were primarily to the misapplication of what were largely viewed as 
at least potentially legitimate techniques. Yet the tendency of such rituals to stray from 
the paths or orthodoxy in both execution and intent posed challenges to clerics and the 
institutional Church alike.93  
                                                
92 The English translation is my own. The Latin original is from Patrick Hersperger, Kirche, Magie und "Aberglaube": 
Superstitio in der Kanonistik des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts (Köln: Böhlau, 2010) 384f., n 517. See also: Thomas of 
Chobham, Summa Confessorum (Louvin/Paris: hg. von F. Broomfield, 1968) 47f. as cited in Hersperger 384f. 
93 See, for example: Sophie Page, "Uplifting Souls: The Liber De Essentia Spiritum and the Liber Razielis," Invoking 
Angels: Theurgic Ideas and Practices, Thirteenth to Sixteenth Centuries (University Park: Penn State Univ, 2015) 79-
112, here 79. From Page's description of the two texts she treats in her article, it is clear how such rituals often placed 
themselves in direct competition with the functions of the institutional Church: "The Liber de essentia spiritum and the 
Liber Razielis are magic texts in which spiritual advancement is sought and undertaken by the practitioner. The descent 
of spirits to teach the practitioner or grant him celestial knowledge is linked in both texts with a corresponding ascent of 
the practitioner's soul while his body remains living. [...] While the rituals in these texts do not guarantee the soul's 
salvation, they do imply that those worthy to undertake the art will achieve it, and the texts give examples of those who 
have done so."  
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 In the thirteenth century, however, Chobham's younger contemporary, William of 
Auvergne (c.1190-1249), took a view oppositional to Chobham's concerning the 
apocryphal Solomon narrative and "magic." In his De Legibus (1228-1230),94 for 
instance, William firmly denies the possibility of a legitimate astrological magic, which 
seems to have been the prevalent theory of non-demonic magic at the time. He notes that 
the "idolatrous" cult of the stars distinguishes four kinds of magical figures: seals, rings, 
characters, and images,95 but counters that characters, figures, impressions, and 
astrological images have no force unless they are tokens by which demons may recognize 
their worshippers.96 As with Thomas Aquinas a generation later, William of Auvergne 
asserts that the effects of magic can only be achieved through the intervention of demons. 
Turning his attention to the apocryphal Solomon narrative specifically, William insists 
that there is no divinity in the angles of Solomon's pentacle (i.e. seal), for the true nature 
of the rings and seal of Solomon with their "execrable consecrations and detestable 
invocations" represents communication with demons. William's position demonstrates an 
obvious reversal of that of Peter Comestor as well as a rejection of the authority of 
Josephus' account of Eleazar and the ring yet it reflects a continued focus on the formula 
and the rite. 
 Like Thomas of Chobham had before him, William also takes up the possibility of 
compelling demons by means of words. It seems likely that the younger William of 
                                                
94 Benedek Láng, Unlocked Books: Manuscripts of Learned Magic in the Medieval Libraries of Central Europe 
(Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press, 2010) 25. 
95 See: William of Auvergne's De legibus (Cap. 23, p. 65) in Guillaume d'Auvergne and Giovanni D. 
Trajano, Guilielmi Alverni ... Opera Omnia ... Nunc Demum in Hac Psoteriori Editione ... Fide Integra Ad Authoris 
Sensum Recognita ... Per Joannem Dominicum Trajanum (Venetiis: Ex Off. D. Zenari, 1591) as cited in Thorndike 
(351). 
96 See: Auvergne, De legibus (Cap. 27, pp. 86f.), as cited in Thorndike (352).  
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Auvergne would have been familiar with Thomas' Summa Confessorum, given that 
Thomas of Chobham had studied under Peter Cantor in Paris in the 1180s, where William 
was later bishop from 1228 until his death in 1249. Much as Thomas of Chobham had, 
William reasons that, in order for spoken words to have any efficacious virtue, they must 
derive it from either the material of which they are composed, air, or from their form, 
sound; or from what they signify. However, he does not entertain Thomas of Chobham's 
idea of Solomon's lost art of combining words for working wonders through some natural 
force of inherent to their sounds. Instead, William argues that air cannot kill unless it is 
poisoned by a plague, dragon, or toad, and that sound cannot kill, unless it is deafening. 
Yet he counters that what is signified by the word can be the cause: in this case, however, 
images, which are more exact likenesses, would be more powerful than words. Thus, 
William reasons that when sorcerers employ magic words and incantations, they call 
upon demons for aid, just as the worshipers of God sometimes induce Him to work 
wonders by calling upon his name.97  
William presses this argument in a direct assault on two specific magical 
Solomonic texts that include magical images, which he names in chapter 27 of De 
Legibus:  
To this sort of idolatry belong those four figures which are called the Rings of 
Solomon, and a fifth which is called the Seal of Solomon, and nine others which 
are called the Nine Scarabs. The most execrable consecrations and most 
detestable invocations, writings, images in all these contain very evident impiety 
and idolatry. Let Christians not so much mention that unlawful image which is 
                                                
97 Thorndike 352. 
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called the Idea of Solomon, nor that book which is called Sacred and its works, 
nor the figure which is called the Mandal or Almandel and its works.98  
 
William seems to reason that the virtues attributed to such images are so excessive that 
they could belong only to God.99 His position is clear, but his argumentative strategy is 
poor. He disapproves of incantations, and his suggestion that images would be more 
forceful than words is an attempt to implicate word magic in the sin of idolatry.  
Overall, however, neither William's argument against astrological magic nor his 
argument against word magic provides anything more than a strongly worded theological 
opinion. He can only assume blasphemous and idolatrous execrations and demonic pacts 
on the part of the magician. Because of the rhetorical logic of his argument, William 
cannot prove guilt without actually witnessing a ritual, and thus fails to provide a 
satisfying argument for policing the circulation of ritual texts. Moreover, his arguments 
are confounded by the invocation of divine names and practices of purity in any magical 
practices based on the paradigmatic apocryphal narrative of Solomon's power over 
demons. The weakness of his anti-magic theology compared to the later strategy of 
Aquinas is a problem of corpus delicti – no body, no crime.  
It is crucial to note that William does not deny the efficacy (i.e. validity) of the 
magical acts to which he objects. This is all the more significant because William himself 
seems to feel that the names of God do indeed have some virtue not found in ordinary 
                                                
98 Trithemius cites most of these in his Antipalus. See Peuckert: 48-51. The English translation given here is from 
Robert Mathiesen, "A Thirteenth-Century Ritual to Obtain the Beatific Vision from the Sworn Book of Honorius of 
Thebes," Conjuring Spirits: Texts and Traditions of Medieval Ritual Magic Ed. Claire Fanger (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State UP, 2015) 146. 
99 Thorndike paraphrases William's position thus: "So excessive are the virtues attributed to such images that they 
belong only to God, so that it is evident that God has been shorn of His glory which has been transferred to the figures" 
(351). 
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words and concedes – like Origen – that not only servants of God, but also even wicked 
men sometimes cast out demons by making use of holy exorcisms.100 Furthermore, 
because in this way he grants the end but denies the means, he is in a rhetorically 
particularly weak position vis-à-vis the magician who claims to be able to compel 
demons through the power of divine names (i.e. the "holy names of God" familiar from 
Solomonic tradition).  
Structurally, then, William's argument is disadvantageous because he focuses on 
what Malinowski has termed the formula rather than the condition of the performer: the 
bishop theologian of Paris is at an impasse. He simply attacks the intentions of the 
magicians who use the names of God "in working their diabolical marvels," but has 
provided for himself no outward evidence of the condition of the performer in his 
description of their activities. There is no apparent means of determining whether the 
actions of the magicians are blasphemous and execrable or "pure," as the magicians' ritual 
texts would seem to indicate. Thus, for the purposes of the present argument, it is 
significant that William's strategy represents a partial – but incomplete – shift of focus in 
the direction of the condition of the performer. William attacks the condition of the 
performer, but has given himself no way to determine whether the demonic intervention 
in the rituals he describes is achieved through the power of God to compel the demons (as 
described in texts of ritual magic) or through their willing cooperation in exchange for 
                                                
100 See Thorndike's discussion Auvergne's anti-magic argument. Thorndike observes that [William] censures the use of 
the name of God by 'magicians and astronomers' in 'working their diabolical marvels (De legibus, Cap 27, p. 89). 
However, he goes on to conclude that "In short, incantations possess no efficacy, but exorcisms do. This is an 
indication, not merely of William's logical inconsistency, but also of the existence of a Christian or ecclesiastical 
variety of magic in his day" (352). I do not agree with Thorndike's conclusion that William denies efficacy to 
incantations.  
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idolatrous worship (as William and other theologians claim). He simply denies the 
magicians' idea of purity but fails to demonstrate that they are, in fact, impure. "They 
forbid anyone who is not pure and clad in pure vestments to presume to touch the book in 
which this name is written," he writes, "but they try to gain evil ends by it and so 
blaspheme against their creator."101 Thus, William's formulation does not succeed 
rhetorically in demonstrating the condition of the performer, but rather stops at an 
accusation concerning the intent behind the performer’s actions – an accusation even less 
provable within his theory of magic than his assertions of the blasphemous and execrable 
nature of magic itself. Ultimately, then, William fails to wrest his focus from the formula. 
By accusing magicians of abusing purity, he acknowledges both its value and their 
success in achieving it as condition of the performer, while leaving the question of the 
liceity of demon compulsion in the Solomonic tradition essentially untouched.   
By contrast, the impressive theological innovation of Thomas Aquinas in defining 
efficacious illicit magic as necessarily resulting from explicit or implicit demonic pact 
will be in providing one theory in which the requisite condition of the performer of illicit 
demon compulsion (i.e. nigromantia) is a form of "impurity" and another in which the 
requisite condition of the performer of licit demon (e.g. exorcism) is a form of "purity" 
mediated through the Church.102 In this way, he brings all demon compulsion under 
                                                
101 Thorndike 352. 
102 There is potentially some interesting work to be done involving Solomonic magic, demonology, and the University 
of Paris in terms of what Brian Stock describes as "textual communities" in his 1983 The Implications of Literacy. 
Consider: Peter Comestor was chancellor of the University of Paris – possibly the first. Thomas of Chobham studied at 
the University of Paris. William of Auvergne was professor of theology at University of Paris, and Aquinas was 
professor of theology at the University of Paris. This localization of the theological discourse on the apocryphal 
narrative of Solomon's power over demons and its relationship to ritual demon compulsion strengthens the case for 
significance of the apocryphal Solomon narrative in the definition of Catholic demonology. However, that work is 
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Church control. Why, though, was Aquinas brought to do this? I suggest that at least part 
of his motivations can be found historically, in a brief episode which seems to have thus 
far escaped the notice of scholars and which may – at least in part – have been 
instrumental in changing the Christian magic/anti-magic discourse during the Middle 
Ages. 
 
The Christian Discovery of Toledot Yeshu (Life of Jesus) 
 As mentioned in the introduction to the present chapter, there appear to have been 
additional factors at work in Aquinas' introduction of purity as the presence-of-grace into 
his anti-magic theology –, factors beyond his concern about attempts at extra-ecclesial 
demon compulsion. We will return to an examination of the theological argument by 
which he develops this in his Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei (1265-66) in the 
following section.  
First, however, we must return to the main line of the present project: Aquinas' 
redefinition of purity as presence-of-grace and its implications for (and facilitation of) the 
theological distinction between licit exorcism and illicit nigromantia. The critical factor 
that has not emerged in scholars' discussions of Aquinas' innovation is historical: it 
appears to coincide with a particular event in the history of Christian-Jewish relations in 
medieval Europe. This accusation came in the form of a polemical tract called the 
Toledot Yeshu (variously translated as Life of Jesus, Generations of Jesus, etc.), which 
appears to have come to the attention of the Dominicans at about the same time (1264-
                                                                                                                                            
outside the scope of this study. In the following section we turn our attention to possible influences from outside of 
Paris.  
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65) that Aquinas wrote his Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei (1265-66). The 
argument logic of the Toledot Yeshu hearkened back to the purity discourses of early 
Christianity's Contra-Iudaeos polemics and apologiae and issued a brazen denial of Jesus' 
divinity – an accusation of a fraud perpetrated by the Church and probably intended to 
undermine all of the authority of Christian teaching. 
This section briefly traces the historical events that led up to Aquinas' writing his 
Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei, including the discovery of the Toledot Yeshu by 
Dominicans, so that I can tie more explicitly Aquinas' work into this context and its 
particular instantiation of the narrative logics present in earlier discussions of Solomonic 
magic.  
 
Dominican Scrutiny of Jewish Texts 
The connection I propose between the Toledot Yeshu and Thomas Aquinas' 
Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei is framed within a larger context of the 
thirteenth century Catholic campaign against heresy and the question of whether Jewish 
teaching could be subjected to Catholic ecclesial authority. An instrumental part of that 
campaign was the founding of the Dominican Order.  
After waging war with the heretical sects of the Waldensians and Catharites in 
Provence and Languedoc, Pope Innocent III (reigned 1198-1216) ordered the creation of 
the Dominican order for the purpose of preaching orthodoxy and prosecuting heresy. In 
1216, the order was authorized by Innocent's successor, Pope Honorius III (reigned 1216-
1227). However, with the Cathars and Waldenisians already defeated, the attention of the 
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fledgling order (which would eventually be the driving force behind the Inquisition) 
quickly turned to the content of Jewish teaching and learning, as another challenge to 
Christian orthodoxy and, by extension, Church authority. In 1232 the Dominicans burned 
the books of Maimonides in Montpelier, and in 1233, Pope Gregory IX (reigned 1227-
1241) officially tried and condemned the Talmud as an offense to the truth of Christian 
teaching.103 That condemnation rested on a historical logic: having been compiled long 
after the life of Jesus,104 the Talmud contradicted the Christian claim that the validity of 
the Jewish religion had been superseded in Christianity.  
The Toledot Yeshu appears to have come to the attention of the Church in the 
context of this scrutiny primarily intended for the Talmud. In 1239, a converted Jew 
named Nicholas Donin proposed a list of "heresies" in the Talmud. When Donin's list 
came to the attention of the Pope (Gregory IX), he, in turn, sought a theological response 
from William of Auvergne. William was professor of theology at the University of Paris 
(1220-1249) and the pope's appointee as bishop of Paris (1228-1249). The response that 
William gave the pontiff led to a papal bull ordering the confiscation of sacred books 
from synagogues in 1240, and to their burning in 1242.105 Though William himself was 
not a Dominican – the order had been authorized only a few years before he became 
professor of theology at Paris in 1220 – he was supportive of the order. Thus, after his 
                                                
103 Robert L. Chazan, John Friedman, and Jean Hoff, The Trial of the Talmud: Paris, 1240 (Toronto: Pontifical Inst. of 
Mediaeval Studies, 2012) 1. 
104 The Jerusalem Talmud probably found its written form in the 4th century, as a record of oral arguments; the 
Babylonian Talmud comprises documentation from the third to fifth centuries. 
105 Neil Lewis, "William of Auvergne", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/william-auvergne/>. 
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death in 1249, the question of Jewish "heresy" naturally fell to the newly founded 
Dominicans.  
In 1250, eight members of the Dominican order were selected by the provincial 
chapter, sitting in Toledo, to make a study of "oriental languages"106 at a Dominican 
school which had been created for the express purpose of preparing its pupils to engage 
in polemics against Jews and Moors. In March, 1264, Raymond Martín (died after 1284), 
who was one of the eight, was commissioned, along with the Bishop of Barcelona, 
Raymund de Peñaforte, and two other Dominicans, Arnoldus de Sagarra and Petrus 
Janua, to examine the Hebrew manuscripts and books which the Jews, by order of the 
king, were to submit to them, and to cancel passages deemed offensive to the Christian 
religion.107  
Though the Toledot Yeshu was not part of the Talmud and in no sense a canonical 
Jewish text, the Dominicans discovered and translated the Jewish anti-Christian tract 
during the course of their investigation. The text of the Toledot Yeshu recounts a story of 
how Jesus was only able to work his marvels by stealing and employing the Shem ha-
Mephorash – the ineffable and efficacious name of God familiar from so many examples 
of the apocryphal Solomon narrative, including Solomonic ritual texts such as those 
condemned in William of Auvergne's De Legibus.108 The Toledot Yeshu survives in 
                                                
106 "Oriental" here most likely refers to both Hebrew and Arabic. Just as knowledge of Hebrew gave the Dominicans 
access to Jewish texts (for refuting), the latter allowed them to assess Islamic texts. 
107 Isidore Singer and Gotthold Weil, "Raymund Martín," The Jewish Encyclopedia: A Descriptive Record of the 
History, Religion, Literature, and Customs of the Jewish People from the Earliest Times to the Present Day (New York 
and London: Funk & Wagnall, 1905) 351f. 
108 For the authoritative study on the Toledot Yeshu, as well as translations of its many recensions, see: Michael 
Meerson, Peter Schäfer, Yaacov Deutsch, David Grossberg, Avigail Manekin, and Adina Yoffie. Toledot Yeshu =: The 
Life Story of Jesus: Two Volumes and Database (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014). 
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Christian discourse from that period because it was included as a part of Raymond 
Martín's Pugio Fidei (Dagger of Faith). Yet while the Pugio itself was apparently not 
composed until ca. 1280, its contents, including Raymond's translation of the Toledot into 
Latin, represent the results of his earlier investigation, which began in 1264, before the 
date which scholars have assigned to the composition of Quaestiones Disputatae de 
Potentia Dei (1265-66).  
To tie this inquiry together with Aquinas is probably not possible without 
question. Based on current information, it is possible though not conclusive, that Aquinas 
became aware of the Toledot Yeshu before or as he was working on his De Potentia.109  
Even the most cursory reading of that text confirms that Aquinas' formulation of his anti-
magic argument in De Potentia must have been informed by a familiarity with the 
depiction of Jesus as a shem magician in Toledot Yeshu (or its argument logic). Though it 
remains at the level of speculation that Aquinas was made aware of the contents of the 
Toledot Yeshu so soon after its discovery, as professor of theology at the University of 
Paris and particularly as a fellow Dominican, the speculation does not seem unfounded.  
The speculation that Thomas Aquinas's formulation of his anti-magic theology 
was at least in part an indirect response to the accusations against the figure of Jesus in 
                                                
109 Martín's Pugio had clearly reached Italy sometime before 1300 when Porchetus incorporated Martín's translation of 
the Toledot Yeshu into his Victoria Porcheti adversos impios haebreos. Scholar place Aquinas back in Italy since in 
1259 serving as an advisor to the papal court and regent master of Dominicans in their course of studies until 1267. As 
advisor to the papal court, it seems likely that if the pope was made aware of the discovery of the Toledot Yeshu during 
that time that Aquinas was also. As master of Dominicans in studies there, he again conducted disputations like those in 
Paris, one of which was the De Potentia. There is some disagreement among scholars about the place and exact date of 
the composition of the text. According to Pierre Mandonnet, the disputations were written during Aquinas' stay at 
Anagni (1259-1261), but according to Martin Grabmann, they were written in Rome when Aquinas was regent of 
studies at the Priory of Santa Sabina (1265-67). Grabmann's chronology, which appears to be more favored among 
scholars, would allow for the Dominican discovery of the Toledot Yeshu to have influenced the content of Aquinas' De 
Potentia. 
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the Toledot Yeshu would seem further justified by the fact that Aquinas, who did not die 
until 1274, does not directly address the accusation of Jesus’ having been a shem 
magician in any subsequent work. That lacuna suggests three different explanations: that 
Aquinas did not know about it at all, that he did not deem it worthy of response, or that 
he thought the indirect response in De Potentia sufficient. It seems unlikely, given his 
position in the Dominican order, that he would not have been aware of it by the time of 
his death, or that he was insensitive to the context in which the order explicitly invested 
its interest. After all, the purpose of the Dominican school of "oriental languages" in 
Toledo was apologetics and missionary work, not further prosecution, and Aquinas' anti-
magic theology in De Potentia provides a very neat and timely solution to the rather 
significant problem in Christian apologetics which the Toledot Yeshu presented – he 
closes the loop on the theological questions in a way that would have supported Martín's 
apologetics and mission work. 
The value of this last hypothesis is that it would implicate medieval Catholic 
Contra-Iudaeos polemics in Aquinas' formulation of the purity as presence-of-grace 
during the first years of the composition of the Summa Theologia (written 1265-1274). In 
other words, the Scholastic Catholic formulation of grace may have been devised – at 
least in part – in response to the trope of Solomon's power over demons once the figure of 
Jesus stood accused of that type of magic.110  
                                                
110 Furthermore, such findings would fit with the late antique formulation of "purity" as absence-of-contamination – 
the contamination of Christianity with Jewish teachings and practices, as we have already discussed. At the other end of 
the period, with the early modern contra-iudaeos mobilization of the Toledot Yeshu in Luther’s Vom Schemhamphoras 
(see chapter 4), this formulation also presents Judaism as a source of contamination and idolatrous magic. 
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Nonetheless, the primary basis for the speculation that Aquinas was aware of and 
responding to the Jewish polemic against Jesus in the Toledot Yeshu is that his 
formulation of grace-as-purity effectively renders the allegations of Jesus' having been a 
shem magician false by reason of impossibility. To wit: the Quaestio in which Aquinas 
addresses the apocryphal Solomon narrative poses the question of whether demons may 
be controlled by "sensible means." Sensible means here, includes words (and therefore, 
presumably also the name of God), and Aquinas concludes that demons are not 
compelled by "sensible means." Jesus could not have been a shem magician, not because 
of any direct evidence (Aquinas could not prove the negative), but rather because as 
"sensible means," not even the name of God has the power to compel demons absent 
grace-as-purity. Let us look into these formulations in greater detail.  
  
The Turning Point: Purity as the Presence-of-Grace in Quaestiones Disputatae de 
Potentia Dei 
As the previous sections suggests, Aquinas' intervention not only continues an on-
going Church project, but also, I believe, represents a turning point in Christian 
magic/anti-magic discourse. At about the same time that Thomas Aquinas began his 
magisterial Summa Theologia (1265-1274), the medieval Scholastic and Dominican had 
already started working out the demonology that undergirded his anti-magic theology in 
the much shorter De Potentia (1265-1266). While the demonology of his Summa 
Theologia is expanded, it is not fundamentally changed. One conspicuous difference 
significant for the present argument, however, is the absence of any mention of Solomon 
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in the later work's demonology. By contrast, De Potentia contains a direct reference the 
apocryphal narrative of Solomon's ability to compel demons, familiar from the Talmud, 
the Quran, and Christian apocrypha. This difference is significant not because Solomon 
played a particularly prominent role in Aquinas' original argument, but rather because 
these passages support the persistence of the narrative logics of the apocryphal narrative 
of Solomon's authority over demons. Aquinas' use of the folklore concerning the First 
Temple builder's power over demons allowed him to accomplish a primary turn in 
Church organization, in terms of delineating and prohibiting extra-ecclesial demon 
compulsion in medieval Christianity. It is also significant because of context of the 
accusations of the Toledot Yeshu about Jesus. 
One of the arguments Aquinas proposes in support of the thesis – only to refute it 
along with all the others – is the apocryphal reference to Solomon: "It is related of 
Solomon that he performed certain exorcisms and thereby compelled demons to quit 
bodies that were obsessed by them."111 Again, in the later Summa, Thomas refrains from 
relying on the example of Solomon – at least from referring to him by name –, but the 
argument he ultimately constructs in both is this: formulae alone will not suffice to 
compel demons, and Aquinas assumes demonic intervention as the only means by which 
the effects of magic are achievable. It is not possible to compel demons by sensible 
means, including words – even the name(s) of God, an assertion that explicitly 
invalidates earlier forms of the arguments about demon compulsion (in which the names 
God can indeed be used to compel them). Aquinas turns away from the formula of the 
                                                
111 Aquinas, De Potentia, Q 6, A 10.  
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ritual to the condition of the performer. It is possible to compel demons by the power of 
God (as we are told Solomon did) when one is in a state of grace (in statu salutis), but not 
possible when one in a state of sin.112 Thus, Aquinas has equated the authorization to 
perform the ritual (condition of the performer) with purity as the presence-of-grace.  
Obviously, purity as presence-of-grace the way Aquinas uses it, represents a 
significant departure from any Jewish perspective, as well as away from the apparent 
related idea within Christian antiquity of purity as absence-of-idolatry. It also represents a 
distinct move to affirm a more abstract, theological approach to resolving this debate. 
Where ancient Judaism conceived of purity as the absence-of-contamination or 
defilement – most notably through idolatry (this, according to Jacob Neusner in The Idea 
of Purity in Ancient Judaism) –,113 the lapsarian theology of medieval Christianity 
assumes defilement as the de facto state of humanity inherited through the Fall of Adam 
(in other words "original sin") and conceives of purity as the presence-of-grace gained 
through participation in the sacraments within the institutional Church.  
However, Aquinas' move also departs from late antique and previous medieval 
Christian perspectives. Origen (c.184-c.254) and William of Auvergne maintained that 
"wicked men" and non-believers could compel demons in the name of Jesus – the 
formula simply needed to be the correct one. While purity as condition of the performer 
                                                
112 In De Potentia, Q 6, A 10, Aquinas writes: "Should anyone say that they are compelled by the power of God: I 
reply, on the contrary, that to compel the demons by (calling upon) the power of God is the effect of the gift of grace 
whereby the order of heavenly powers is fulfilled. Now this gift is not in unbelievers and wicked men like sorcerers. 
Therefore neither can the demons be compelled by invoking the divine power." Aquinas' Latin reads: "Sed dicendum, 
quod coguntur virtute divina. Respondio; Sed contra, cogere Daemones ex virtute divina est per donum gratiae, quo 
perficitur ordo caelestium potestatum. Hoc autem donum gratiae non adest infidelibus, et hominibus sceleratis quales 
sunt magi. Ergo nec etiam virtute divina Daemones cogere possunt." 
113 Neusner and Douglas, 1. 
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does not appear to be explicit in Origen's commentary on Matthew 26:63, its association 
with demon compulsion is ubiquitous elsewhere in the writings of the ancient 
Mediterranean world. Likewise, in the writings of William of Auvergne, the condition is 
made explicit as something distinct from grace. It is not until the anti-magic theology of 
Thomas Aquinas that we find a clear articulation of the presence-of-grace as "purity" in 
his formulation of the condition of the performer in the Christian discourse of demon 
compulsion.  
Let us now turn more explicitly to how Aquinas' formulation of purity as 
presence-of-grace combines with his reference to the apocryphal Solomon narrative in his 
Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei. As we shall see, it first allows him to create a 
distinction between licit exorcism and illicit nigromantia on the basis of the condition of 
the performer where his predecessors (such as William of Auvergne) had sought to find 
fault with the formula or the rite. Second, comparison of Aquinas' framing of his 
Quaestio with the polemical accusation against Jesus in the Toledot Yeshu, which had 
come to the attention of the Dominicans one or two years before, shows how the two 
texts may be seen to form a dialogue. 
 
"Disputed Questions" as Practice and Genre: New Text Forms for Old (Solomonic) 
Narrative Materials 
Thomas Aquinas composed four comprehensive theological treatises concerning 
God, the universe, and mankind. The Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei (1265-66), 
with which we are concerned, falls roughly in the middle of those efforts. The earliest of 
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the large-scale works was his Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum (Commentary on 
the Sentences of Peter Lombard) written 1252-56, followed by his Summa contra 
Gentiles (Summa Against the Pagans) from 1261-63. His best-known work, the massive 
Summa Theologia (1265-73), was begun at roughly the same time as De Potentia, but not 
finished until much later. Finally, his Compendium Theologiae ad Fratrem Reginaldum 
Socium Suum Carissimum (Compendium of Theology) was written much later, ca. 1273, 
near the end of his life in 1274. 
While thematically of a piece with these larger works insofar as it is concerned 
with the power and nature of God, the Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei is 
nevertheless distinct from the others in that it belongs to a body of treatises on particular 
topics which were composed in a different manner. All of Aquinas' "Disputed Questions" 
are models for – and potentially at least partially records of – public disputations, taking 
the form of arguments intended to convince particular audiences. As such, Aquinas may 
be understood as the editor as much as he might the author of the various collections of 
"disputed questions" of which De Potentia appears to be the earliest.114 As a practice, 
"disputed questions" were an integral part of the Scholastic program of theological study, 
and during his first tenure at the University of Paris (1256-59) as professor of theology, 
Aquinas frequently held the disputations for which the Quaestiones are named. Under 
Aquinas' direction, two mornings every other week were set aside for public disputations 
                                                
114 These include: Disputed Questions on Spiritual Creatures "Quaestiones disputatae se spiritualibus creaturis" 
(1266-69), Disputed Questions on Evil "Quaestiones disputatae de malo" (1269-72), Disputed Questions on the Virtues 
"Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus" (1269-72), Disputed Questions on the Immortality of the Soul "Quaestiones 
disputatae de immortalitate anime" (uncertain date), and Disputed Questions on the Soul "Quaestiones disputatae de 
Anima" (1267). 
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during term, and regular lectures suspended. Such disputations were recorded. Each 
article in the Disputed Questions is thus (potentially) a formalized record of a disputation 
(or perhaps an intended model for such disputations) and the articles in the longest series 
of disputations were grouped together into questions.  
The form of the disputations is reflected in the structure of the recorded texts. 
First, in advance of the disputation, a master of theology proposed a thesis. Article 10 of 
Quaestio 6 provides us with a convenient example: "Whether demons are compelled by 
sensible means, […] and it would seem that they are." On the first day, a bachelor 
defended the thesis under the direction of a master. The audience, which consisting of 
masters, bachelors, students, and attendants, challenged the thesis, while the bachelor 
cited authorities in its defense.115 It is in this context that we find the reference to 
Solomon's authority over demons in Q 6, A 10 of De Potentia: 
It is related of Solomon that he performed certain exorcisms and thereby 
compelled the demons to quit bodies that were obsessed by them. Therefore 
demons can be compelled by adjuration.116 
 
Today, the role of the bachelor seems counterintuitive, as he was effectively tasked with 
staving off an orthodox resolution as long as possible. The practice, however, served to 
expose as many counterarguments as possible to the inevitable statement of orthodoxy 
with which the presiding master concludes the first day's proceedings. On the second 
morning, the presiding master summarizes the points raised on the previous occasion in 
order, citing proof of the thesis and rational argument. Aquinas counters and resolves the 
                                                
115 Tomás de Aquino and Richard J. Regan, The Power of God (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) xvii. 
116 Aquinas, De Potentia, Q 6, A 10. 
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previous day's Solomon example, which was offered in support of the validity of demon 
compulsion by sensible means, in his Reply to the Third Objection: 
If Solomon performed these exorcisms when he was in a state of grace, they could 
derive the power to compel the demons from the power of God. But if it was after 
he had turned to the worship of idols, so that we have to understand that he 
performed them by magic arts, these exorcisms had no power to compel the 
demons, except in the manner explained above [i.e. demonic pact].117 
 
The "replies to objections" in disputed questions are as important as the resolution itself 
because they address apparent contradictions or exceptions. Thus, without the "reply to 
the third objection" – and its explicit reference to the canonical account of Solomon's fall 
from grace, even Aquinas would seem to have recognized the insufficiency of his 
Quaestio to address the practice of "Solomonic" demon compulsion. 
Certain points concerning the context of "Disputed Questions" in general and, 
Article 10 of Question 6 in particular, bear mentioning. To begin with, the disputations 
that gave rise to Aquinas' various collections of disputed questions are oriented toward 
students as pedagogical material. For that reason, "disputed questions" might also 
fruitfully be translated as "questions for disputation." Furthermore, the disputed nature of 
the questions does not refer to an unresolved status in Church teaching, but rather to 
conflicts or "apparent contradictions" among authorities. The practice of disputation was 
thus a form of instruction in arriving at orthodox conclusions in the face of contradicting 
authorities and not a series of unresolved theological questions. With respect to Article 6, 
this, in turn, allows us to conclude that the apocryphal narrative of Solomon's power over 
                                                
117 Aquinas, De Potentia Q 6, A 10, ad 3: "Ad tertium dicendum, quod si Salomon exorcismos suos eo tempore fecit 
quando erat in statu salutis, potuit esse in illis exorcismis vis cogendi Daemones ex virtute divina. Si autem tempore 
illo fecit quo idola adoravit, ut intelligatur eum per magicas artes fecisse, non fuit in illis exorcismis vis cogendi 
Daemones, nisi modo praedicto." 
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demons was widely considered authoritative enough to warrant specific attention and 
refutation by virtue of its inclusion in the disputation among the conflicting authorities. 
Moreover, because Aquinas refers to it in a pedagogical work (whether as author or 
editor), we may further conclude that he regarded Solomon's apocryphal reputation as 
either assumed or necessary knowledge on the part of the students.118  
 
De Potentia Quaestio 6 (Miracles), Article 10 
Quaestio 6, Article 10 of De potentia Dei reads: "The tenth point of inquiry is 
whether demons by sensible and corporeal objects, deeds, or words, be forced to work the 
miracles that seem to be wrought by magic: and seemingly they can." Overtly, Aquinas is 
debating the possibility of the compulsion of demons. Covertly, he has raised, but not 
addressed, the question of how magic works: "the miracles that seem to be wrought by 
magic." Aquinas is arguing off in two directions at once. Over the course of his Quaestio, 
he argues the former and simply concludes the latter without debate. For our purposes, 
what is most significant is the theologian's framing of the question: Can demons be 
compelled by sensible and corporeal objects, deeds, or words?  
The framing of the Quaestio is significant not only to previously unresolved 
concerns over the natural properties of speech (e.g. Thomas of Chobham's speculations) 
                                                
118 There is potentially some interesting work to be done in terms of textual communities. Peter Comestor was 
(possibly the first) chancellor of the University of Paris. Thomas of Chobham studied at the University of Paris. 
William of Auvergne was professor of theology at University of Paris, and Aquinas was professor of theology at the 
University of Paris. That work is outside the scope of this study. However, it suffices for the present to say that the fact 
that the localization of the theological discourse on the apocryphal narrative of Solomon's power over demons and its 
relationship to ritual demon compulsion (if anything) strengthens the case for significance of the apocryphal Solomon 
narrative in the definition of Catholic demonology. In the following section we turn our attention to possible influences 
from outside of Paris. 
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and the efficacy of the symbols and suffumigations of astrological magic (e.g. William of 
Auvergne's case against Solomonic magic), but also related to the accusations raised 
against the figure of Jesus in the Toledot Yeshu, which were discussed in the previous 
section. According to the Toledot Yeshu, Jesus stole a "sensible" word – a name. Granted, 
that particular word was the allegedly efficacious and ineffable name of God, but a word 
nonetheless and Aquinas makes no allowances or exceptions in the formulation of his 
question. The fact that the ancient apologists and William of Auvergne had explicitly 
made such exceptions strongly suggests that Aquinas' failure to do so – even for the name 
of God – was intentional, possibly for the purpose of avoiding a potentially contentious 
issue. Like Thomas of Chobham and William of Auvergne, Aquinas poses the question 
of whether demons are compelled by words, but unlike them, he concludes that this is not 
possible. Moreover, he does this not by attempting to negate the formula and rite, but by 
subordinating them to the condition of the performer, as we will further address. 
 Some of the significance of the framing of Aquinas' Quaestio has been remarked 
upon by Francis Young, for instance, who observes: 
Aquinas was in a difficult position: on the one hand, he was inclined to argue that 
the exorcisms of Christ rather than the exorcisms of Solomon should be the 
pattern for Christian exorcisms, but on the other hand the liturgical exorcisms of 
the church did not resemble Christ's straightforward dispossessions in the Gospel, 
and took a highly ritualized form.119 
 
However, it is our contention here that Young's analysis, while perceptive of the bind in 
which Aquinas found himself, fails to discern the broader dynamics reflected in the 
Toledot Yeshu's accusation that Jesus was a shem magician and the pervasiveness of 
                                                
119 Francis Young, A History of Exorcism in Catholic Christianity (Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) 71. 
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"magical" applications of exorcistic logic at the time. In other words, Young misses the 
fact that Aquinas' primary challenge was not in the fact that medieval Church exorcisms 
did not resemble the "straightforward dispossessions of the Gospel." Quite the contrary!  
 While the exorcisms of the medieval Church may have outwardly borne little 
resemblance to the exorcisms of the Gospel (and, in fact, may have borne more 
resemblance to Solomonic demon compulsion), they were functionally all too similar to 
Gospel exorcisms in the lack of hegemonic restriction to their authorization. Aquinas' 
challenge was one of policing the authorization of exorcism. In order to do that, he 
defined nigromantia – finally succeeding where his predecessors had failed in delineating 
a category that would be the opening for whole new generations of theologians, clergy, 
and laity interested in religious authorization for religious ritual, but also the nature of 
causality in the physical world generally. Where the apologists of the ancient Church had 
denied the efficacy of Solomonic methods, Aquinas concedes at least the possibility of 
efficacy, but only by impure means.  
Aquinas' solution accomplished two things. First, and most obviously, on the 
basis of the condition of the performer he forced a distinction between licit, 
ecclesiastically approved, demon compulsion as exorcism and nigromantia, as 
unapproved and illicit demon compulsion. The second thing he accomplishes, I would 
argue, is intentionally couched in terms that imply a clear intent: his formulation of the 
"physics" of demon compulsion works to invalidate the accusations against Jesus in the 
Toledot Yeshu, rendering them false by reason of impossibility. Without addressing the 
Toledot Yeshu directly, Aquinas "proves" that Jesus could not have been a shem 
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magician. By arguing this way, he avoids the weak position of attempting to prove a 
negative – namely, that Jesus did not work his wonders by means of a stolen shem. 
Instead, by demonstrating that the effects of magic are wrought by demons and demons 
are not compelled by objects, deeds, or words – and, in a departure from the arguments of 
his theological predecessors since Christian antiquity –, he does not make an exception 
for the name of God. Thus, by implication, if Jesus accomplished any miracles at all, they 
would have to have been either by divine power as the Messiah or by means of demonic 
pact. The former position is orthodox, and the latter is clearly heretical. In this way, too, 
Aquinas effectively abolishes any grey areas, leaving no possibility for a licit "magic". 
The point to underscore about his logic is this: Aquinas combined the then well-
known apocryphal narrative of Solomon's power to compel demons with the canonical 
account of the monarch's late-in-life fall to idolatry (as recounted in 1 Kings 11) to create 
an air-tight argument against the then rapidly increasing amount of ritual demon 
compulsion attributed to Solomon. By framing the thesis of article VI in terms of 
"sensible means," Aquinas has effectively included operative premise of virtually every 
species of magic known to medieval Christians. His inclusion of not just words, but also 
physical objects, in turn, addresses (without specifically naming) the exorcistic 
instructions given by the angel Raphael to Tobit in the Book of Tobit,120 the Ring of 
                                                
120 See "Raphael's Instructions" in the deuterocanonical book of Tobit 6:7-8: "Afterward the two of them traveled on 
together till they drew near to Media. Then the young man asked the angel this question: 'Brother Azariah, what 
medicine is in the fish's heart, liver, and gall?' He answered: "As for the fish's heart and liver, if you burn them to make 
smoke in the presence of a man or a woman who is afflicted by a demon or evil spirit, any affliction will flee and never 
return" The New American Bible, Revised Edition (NABRE). 
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Solomon, the mysterious root which Josephus references in connection with the ring "of 
the sort mentioned by Solomon" in the Eleazar story, and other allegedly powerful object. 
Moreover, by including "deeds" and "words" as sensible means, Aquinas includes 
what Malinowski has identified as rite and formula. All of the "seals, rings, characters, 
and images" that William of Auvergne and his predecessors tried to address separately 
(as well as anything unanticipated in these categories), Aquinas is able to cover with 
"sensible means." Of Malinowski's tripartite division of magic, Aquinas leaves only the 
condition of the performer as a possible means of compelling demons, which as we have 
seen, is the basis for his argument against Solomon as exorcist. In Aquinas' model, the 
Solomonic narrative elements still require individual attention, but not as potential author 
of legitimate "magic." Rather, the story launched in Aquinas' text addresses the 
apocryphal narrative of Solomon specifically as a possible exception – a nod, perhaps, to 
the older disputes in the tradition that balance the roles of Jesus and Solomon against 
each other.  
This argument logic of the third objection and his response to it is noteworthy for 
a few reasons. We repeat them here in dialogue: 
Third Objection It is related of Solomon that he performed certain exorcisms and 
thereby compelled the demons to quit bodies that were obsessed by them. 
Therefore demons can be compelled by adjuration.121 
 
Response to Third Objection If Solomon performed these exorcisms when he was 
in a state of grace, they could derive the power to compel the demons from the 
power of God. But if it was after he had turned to the worship of idols, so that we 
have to understand that he performed them by magic arts, these exorcisms had no 
                                                
121 Aquinas, De Potentia Q 6, A 10: "Praeterea, de Salomone legitur, quod quosdam exorcismos fecit quibus 
Daemones cogebantur ut ex obsessis corporibus recederent. Ergo per adiurationes Daemones cogi possunt." 
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power to compel the demons, except in the manner explained above [i.e. demonic 
pact].122 
 
First, Aquinas seems to equate exorcism and magic, but he does so because he has 
defined their relations of sameness and difference. Second, having chosen an example 
from an apocryphal tradition over numerous possible canonical examples of exorcism, he 
concludes no more than "Therefore demons can be compelled by adjuration." Thus, 
according to Aquinas, all "magic" is the result of demonic intervention and can only be 
achieved through either explicit or implicit pact with the intervening demons: in other 
words, to achieve the effects of magic necessitates idolatry, which is a sin, an impurity 
which can only be purified by obtaining grace through the sacraments. Because he and 
most orthodox theologians after him define magic in these terms, it becomes perforce 
impossible to practice magic in a state of grace (i.e. purity). Grace is required to compel 
demons, but grace is lost through sin, and so the only possible condition of the performer 
for a "magician" is sin – impurity as absence-of-grace.  
 Thomas Aquinas wins his argument, then, by introducing a paradox. His 
explanation continues to allow for church-sanctioned exorcism, as well as for miracles in 
general,123 while effectively forbidding any other demon compulsion. In fact, then, it is 
Aquinas' distinction that effectively creates licit exorcism as something distinct from 
                                                
122 Aquinas, De Potentia Q 6, A 10, ad 3: "Ad tertium dicendum, quod si Salomon exorcismos suos eo tempore fecit 
quando erat in statu salutis, potuit esse in illis exorcismis vis cogendi Daemones ex virtute divina. Si autem tempore 
illo fecit quo idola adoravit, ut intelligatur eum per magicas artes fecisse, non fuit in illis exorcismis vis cogendi 
Daemones, nisi modo praedicto."  
123 See especially: De Potentia, Q 6, A 9. In the introduction to the 2012 edition, Regan summarizes article 9: "Saints 
rightly disposed can also instrumentally work miracles by their prayers and power, even faith without charity 
congruously merits that one's petition for a miracle be heard, although charity is the foundation of meriting (A. 9)." 
See: Toma ́s de Aquino and Richard J. Regan, The Power of God (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) xxi. 
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magic, thereby maintaining the salient elements of Solomonic narratives on demon 
compulsion, while virtually foreclosing it outside the boundary of Church supervision. 
Aquinas rejects the old theory of magic, which was contested between Church 
and magicians, and replaces it with two distinct new ones. Moreover, he actually strikes 
at the allusive potential (unio magica) of the figure of Solomon. 
 
Grace-as-Purity in De Potentia Dei 
The claims I have just made are straightforwardly bolstered in examining the 
rhetorical framing of the Thomas Aquinas' argument against the possibility of demon 
compulsion "by sensible means," as in the De Potentia Dei (Q VI, A. 10), a move with 
profound implications both for medieval theology and for modern scholarship. Here, 
again, Malinowski is a useful reference point, with his emphasis on the condition of the 
performer rather than the formula or rite. Using this distinction, Aquinas is able 
effectively to create "magic" (illicit demon compulsion) as its own discourse, distinct 
from Church-approved (i.e. Church-controlled) exorcism (i.e. licit demon compulsion). 
Yet this analysis bears on modern scholarship insofar as it contradicts Malinowski's 
observation that the formula is the most important of the three aspects of "magic." From 
the theological side, it begins to account for the process of the spiritualization and 
metaphoricization of "purity" as an inevitable consequence of the renegotiation of 
authority within the hegemonic structures of competing theological communities.  
With regard to medieval theology, our analysis also shows that Aquinas' 
definition of magic was rhetorically quite effective. Indeed, his explanation of "magic" as 
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demonic intervention achievable only through an explicit or implicit demonic pact still 
represents the official teaching of the Catholic Church.124 Yet despite its rhetorical 
stability, Aquinas' intervention appears to have had little practical effect on stemming the 
medieval tide of the sort of ritual demon compulsion that has come to be called 
"Solomonic" magic. As we have shown, several of Thomas' contemporaries and 
successors collectively cite numerous grimoires attributed to Solomon as illicit texts. Yet 
while Aquinas clearly did not succeed in eradicating "Solomonic magic," he did have a 
tremendous impact on the subsequent demonology of the Middle Ages and early modern 
era by forcing a distinction between licit demon compulsion (as exorcism) and illicit 
demon compulsion as nigromantia. Moreover, his development of grace-as-purity not 
only impacted anti-magic theological discourse, but also magical discourse as well. This 
is reflected in post-Aquinas ritual magic (or post-Aquinas recensions of pre-Aquinas 
texts) that incorporate the obtaining of sacramental grace into the preparations necessary 
for the magician in achieving a pure condition of the performer. 
The idea of the demonic pact was not Aquinas' innovation. Like Augustine before 
him, Aquinas reasoned that any and all magic was necessarily the result of a demonic 
pact since the effects of "magic" were only achievable through demonic intervention. Yet 
                                                
124 See: "Divination and Magic" in the Catechism of the Catholic Church: "2116 All forms of divination are to be 
rejected: recourse to Satan or demons, conjuring up the dead or other practices falsely supposed to "unveil" the 
future. Consulting horoscopes, astrology, palm reading, interpretation of omens and lots, the phenomena of 
clairvoyance, and recourse to mediums all conceal a desire for power over time, history, and, in the last analysis, other 
human beings, as well as a wish to conciliate hidden powers. They contradict the honor, respect, and loving fear that we 
owe to God alone. 2117 All practices of magic or sorcery, by which one attempts to tame occult powers, so as to place 
them at one's service and have a supernatural power over others - even if this were for the sake of restoring their health 
- are gravely contrary to the virtue of religion. These practices are even more to be condemned when accompanied by 
the intention of harming someone, or when they have recourse to the intervention of demons. Wearing charms is also 
reprehensible. Spiritism often implies divination or magical practices; the Church for her part warns the faithful against 
it. Recourse to so-called traditional cures does not justify either the invocation of evil powers or the exploitation of 
another's credulity" (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 2008) 213f., here #2116 and #2117. 
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unlike Augustine, Aquinas succeeded in establishing the inevitability of the demonic pact 
as the only possible explanation for any extra-ecclesial efficacious ritual.125 What had 
previously been open to debate, as in William of Auvergne's argument – the 
unknowability of the magician's state of grace (i.e. purity) –, was resolved as sin (i.e. 
impurity) in Aquinas. If nothing else, the magician had sinned in his pursuit of something 
that the Church in its wisdom had forbidden. This allowed Aquinas to conclude that, in 
such a state of sin, the power of God could not be available to the magician. Moreover, 
Aquinas used the apocryphal Solomon narrative to argue his point. 
The part of the argument that Aquinas opens to debate in the Quaestio concerns 
how – under what circumstances – demons might be compelled. His inclusion of article 
10 of Quaestio 6 in Disputed Questions on the Power of God is thus significant. The 
thesis, as he initially frames it, would seem not to pertain to the "power of God" at all. He 
writes, "The tenth point of inquiry is whether demons by sensible and corporeal objects, 
deeds, or words, [might] be forced to work the miracles that seem to be wrought by 
magic: and seemingly they can." The power of God is by definition not "sensible means," 
but this is part of the strategy of Aquinas' argument and an effect of the rhetorical 
structure of disputed questions that begin "videtur…" (it would seem), and conclude "sed 
contra…" (but to the contrary). Aquinas intends to refute the proposition – for this is how 
                                                
125 For some discussion of the inevitability of the demonic pact in the anti-magic theology ("systematic magiology") of 
Thomas Aquinas, see: Thomas Linsenmann, Die Magie bei Thomas von Aquin (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2011), here 
330f. Linsemann writes, "Jede Magische Handlung, dies sei vorausgeschickt, ist sündhaft. Dies liegt im Wirken der 
Dämonen begründet, das die Grundbedingung dafür ist, daß Magie vorliegt. Magie kann aus dem Werk Thomas von 
Aquins definiert werden als der Versuch des Menschen, Dinge zu erfahren oder zu bewirken, die zu erfahren oder zu 
bewirken ihm auf naturgemäße Weise nicht möglich ist. Daher nimmt er seine Zuflucht zu den Dämonen. Dies 
geschieht einerseits auf indirekte und meist unbewußte Weise, indem er sein Ziel durch die Anwendung von Mitteln zu 
erreichen sucht, die dafür völlig ungeeignet sind. Dadurch wird eine eitle Handlung vollzogen, die den Dämonen 
Gelegenheit gibt, sich einzumischen: Ein pactum tacitum entsteht. Auf direkte Weise dagegen geschieht die 
Hinwendung zu den Dämonen, indem der Mensch sie anruft: Ein pactum expressum entsteht." 
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disputed questions are presented – that demons are compelled by sensible means, and he 
wishes to conclude "to the contrary" that they are only compelled by the power of God. 
There is another interesting feature to his argument that concerns us. The 
inclusion of the example of Solomon's exorcisms as they were widely known through the 
medieval traditions of Solomonic magic implicates the power of the name of God in the 
hands of illicit actors, which Aquinas seeks to limit, without limiting the power of God 
himself. Though this connection is not made explicit in the disputed question, it 
represents another logical and clearly implied connection between the apocryphal 
narrative and the Potentia Dei (i.e. "power of God"). Moreover, it bears mention that 
Aquinas does not debate whether the effects of magic are achievable by any means other 
than demonic pact. This latter rhetorical move is instrumental to his argument. If Aquinas 
were to allow that the effects of magic were achievable by other means (such as the 
astrological sympathies that William of Auvergne denies or the natural qualities of 
speech considered by Thomas of Chobham), then his argument would simply not hold. 
Furthermore, by only considering the effects of magic as achievable through demonic 
pact, Aquinas is able to leverage the canonical example of Solomon's idolatry (i.e. 
impurity) and his own conclusions about authority over demons as a gift of grace as 
universally significant.  
The importance of Aquinas' focus on the inherited narrative material for the 
purpose of manipulating the condition of the performer as "pure" in his theory of magic 
(i.e. implicit or explicit pact with interceding demons) logically follows from his 
explanation of miracles in the previous article (Q 6, A 10). There, he concludes that, 
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"saints rightly disposed can also instrumentally work miracles by their prayers and 
power, and even faith without charity congruously merits that one's petition for a miracle 
be heard, although charity is the foundation of meriting."126 The difference between 
miracle and magic for Aquinas is thus in the condition of the performer: saints are pure, 
enjoying the favor of god, but magicians are not. The ingenuity of Aquinas' solution is 
that he creates two separate discourses: one that is efficacious because it is pure, and 
another that is efficacious because it is impure. The impure discourse had been the 
stumbling block for so many of his predecessors. The ancient fathers clearly saw only 
one discourse when they argued that demons obeyed when compelled in the name of 
Jesus and did not obey otherwise (e.g. when compelled in the name of Solomon or by his 
formulae). William of Auvergne likewise struggled – unable to separate purity and 
demonic intervention. Only in Aquinas do we at least find a clear theory in which the 
efficacy of magic is defined by impurity and a distinct theory of miracle defined by a 
form of "purity" firmly in the control of the institutional Church. Thus, he is able to 
conclude that saints are rightly disposed when they work miracles and, by contrast, 
magicians are wrongly disposed for miracles but rightly disposed for "magic." The 
difference in the condition of the performer is the presence or absence of grace-as-purity. 
Since Aquinas has established that grace is only obtainable through the Church, it thus 
follows that purity is only obtainable within the Church. Thus, extra-ecclesial demon 
compulsion must be graceless and therefore de facto involve demonic pact. 
                                                
126 The quote is the summary of Article 9 from the introduction in: Richard J. Regan, Power of God: By Thomas 
Aquinas (Cary: Oxford University Press, USA, 2014) xxi.  
 










THE SOLOMON NARRATIVE IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY: 
OVERT VERSUS IMPLIED 
 
 During the sixteenth century, discourse on the apocryphal narrative of Solomon's 
authority over demons became polyphonic. On the one hand, the medieval Scholastic 
instrumentalization of the narrative continued overtly – though gradually waning. It still 
cropped up into the seventeenth century, for instance, in the Disquisitionum Magicarum 
Libri Sex (Magical Investigation in Six Books, 1599-1600) of Spanish Jesuit, Martín Del 
Rio (1551-1608). On the other, it appears to be absent from both Renaissance humanist 
and Protestant theological discourse. We will argue here for its continuing presence, 
albeit in implicit and allusive forms.  
 The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that the apocryphal Solomon 
narrative and its influence on theological constructs of licit and illicit demon compulsion 
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– including the significance of "purity" as the requisite condition of the performer – were 
not simply abandoned as some artifact of the "Catholic Middle Ages" as a result of 
humanist and Protestant reforms. It argues, instead, that the narrative merely became 
necessarily covert – implied – in response to a combination of pressures on the authors of 
a number of published Renaissance magico-philosophical and magico-theological texts. 
This in turn allows for new readings of certain texts that have long puzzled scholars – 
Johannes Reuchlin's De Verbo Mirifico (1494) in this chapter, and Martin Luther's Vom 
Schemhamphoras (1543) in the following one. 
This chapter is not primarily concerned with the spiritualization and 
metaphoricization of "purity." Rather, it digresses – necessarily – from this project's strict 
longitudinal orientation. In the following chapter, discussion will return to the subject of 
"purity" and reveal Luther's responses to both magical and non-magical encounters with 
the devil (demons), to involve "faith-as-purity" as the requisite condition of the 
performer. However, in order to facilitate the next phase of the study in the following 
chapter, which demonstrates two distinct (early and late) anti-magic theological strategies 
in the writings of Martin Luther, both of which respond to the apocryphal Solomon 
narrative, it is first necessary to trace the continued instrumentalization of the narrative in 
humanist magico-theological discourse during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth 
centuries.  
While the work of the present chapter is primarily that of preparing for the 
argument in the following chapter, it nevertheless offers a unique contribution to 
scholarship with a new reading of an early theological text by a pillar of the Northern 
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Renaissance, Johannes Reuchlin (1455-1522). Here, we argue that Reuchlin's De Verbo 
Mirifico (Concerning the Wonderworking Word, 1494) was in fact likely to have been 
influenced by the Liber Razielis, a Latin translation of a Hebrew manual of ritual 
Solomonic demon compulsion (Sepher Raziel) that Reuchlin is known to have owned and 
read. This reading contradicts and resolves multiple disparate readings of De Verbo 
Mirifico currently represented in the scholarship. In demonstrating the influence of the 
Liber Razielis on Reuchlin's De Verbo Mirifico, we not only prepare to identify Luther's 
Vom Schemhamphoras (1543) as the full and final articulation of his anti-magic theology, 
but also to connect both Luther and Reuchlin to the apocryphal Solomon narrative and 
the implications of its attendant condition of the performer as "purity."  
This chapter proceeds in three sections. The first will demonstrate the ubiquity of 
the apocryphal Solomon narrative during late medieval and early modern eras in 
connection with magic as demon compulsion in non-published anonymous sources and 
offer an interpretation as to the significance of the comparative lack of references to it in 
sixteenth century published works. The second identifies and traces those references and 
allusions to the apocryphal Solomon narrative persisting in humanist magico-theological 
discourse in order to reveal what is at stake in Reuchlin's De Verbo Mirifico. The third 
and final section of this chapter briefly compares Reuchlin's De Verbo Mirifico with the 
Liber Razielis in order to reveal similarities between the operative assumptions of the 
rituals described in the two texts (i.e. formula, rite, and condition of the performer). It 
will also clarify Reuchlin's engagement both with "purity" as condition of the performer 
and with the ineffable and efficacious name of God (i.e. Shem ha-Mephorash or 
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Tetragrammaton) as formula in the Malinowskian tripartite paradigm that this study 
follows.  
Demonstrating the connection of Reuchlin's De Verbo Mirifico with the 
apocryphal narrative of Solomon's power over demons, in turn, will facilitate our 
following reading of Luther's anti-magic theology not only as anti- popular (Solomonic) 
magic, but also as indicative of his having turned against humanist thinkers whom he had 
previously supported (e.g. Reuchlin and Pico della Mirandola).1 
 
The Apocryphal Solomon Narrative in the Late Medieval and Early Modern Eras  
As indicated above, the apocryphal Solomon narrative which forms the meridian 
for our study outwardly appears not to have been carried over from the Scholastic 
discourse on "magic" into humanist magico-theological and Lutheran anti-magical 
discourses. Overt references to the wise Solomon's apotropaic powers almost never 
appear in humanist or Lutheran theological texts, yet one finds frequent mention of the 
efficacious name(s) of God, the content of his wisdom.  
Thus, this section begins the present chapter's work of uncovering the apocryphal 
narrative as covert and implied (rather than absent) in humanist and Lutheran discourses 
by first demonstrating its pervasiveness in the preceding and coeval Catholic magic/anti-
magic discourse of the late medieval and early modern eras. We begin in this way – 
                                                
1 Erika Rummel notes: "In [Luther's] Resolutions of the Disputations Concerning the Efficacy of Indulgences (1518) he 
complained that the inquisitors were so zealous that they made heretics of the most pious Christians. 'For what else do 
the cases of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Lorenzo Valla, Petrus Ravenna, Johannes Vesalius, and most recently, 
Johann Reuchlin and Jacques Lefèvre show? Contrary to their own intentions, their well-meaning words were turned 
into evil.'" See: Erika Rummel, The Confessionalization of Humanism in Reformation Germany (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000) 17. This is also mentioned in the next chapter. 
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establishing the backdrop of a consistent and pervasive model of magical efficacy – not 
only to lend credibility but also comprehensibility to the following arguments for the 
presence of the narrative in humanist and Protestant magic/anti-magic discourses by 
implication and allusion rather than overt reference. 
The path we follow is well worn by the several scholars who have already turned 
their attention to the significance of the apocryphal Solomon narrative in the popular 
imagination and, consequently, in the construction of Catholic anti-magic theology. 
Perhaps the boldest claim in these studies – and the most illustrative – belongs to Joshua 
Trachtenberg, who writes the following in his The Devil and the Jews (1943): 
The Solomon cycle of legends merits special attention since it seems to have 
made a particularly strong impression on the medieval imagination. These legends 
possessed two main elements: the wise monarch’s dominion over the devil and 
demons and his utilization of this power for magical ends. This latter theme was 
developed with all sorts of variations, so that Solomon came to be regarded both 
as the type of the sorcerer and the original source of the occult science. So deeply 
did the belief in his magical supremacy enter into medieval thought that nothing 
more was required to authenticate the worth of a formula or an amulet than to 
trace it to him, and the most popular magical works drew their authority from his 
reputation.2 
 
We will return to Trachtenberg below to address an evidentiary claim he goes on to make 
that, "the number of Solomonic pseudoepigrapha devoted to magic runs into the scores."3 
First, however, we introduce other important scholars who have come to similar 
conclusions regarding the significance of allusive potential of the figure of Solomon in 
the medieval and into the early modern era.  
                                                
2 Trachtenberg 63. 
3 Trachtenberg 63. 
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The earliest study of this sort predates Trachtenberg's by two decades, and is in 
fact among the sources which Trachtenberg himself consulted. American historian, Lynn 
Thorndike devoted an entire chapter of his monumental, eight-volume study, History of 
Magic and Experimental Science (1923-1958) to magical Solomonic pseudoepigrapha.4 
He introduces it as follows:  
It was only natural that Solomon, regarded as the wisest man in the history of the 
world, should be represented in oriental tradition as the worker of many marvels 
and that in the course of time books of magic should be attributed to him, just as 
treatises on the interpretations of dreams should be interpreted to Joseph and 
Daniel.5  
 
Also writing in the first half of the twentieth century, still a few years before 
Trachtenberg, was German folklorist, Will-Erich Peuckert. In his Pansophie: Ein 
Versuch zur Geschichte der weißen und schwarzen Magie (Pansophie: Towards a 
History of White and Black Magic: 1936, revised and expanded 1956), he remarks: 
King Solomon played a great role in magical writing. Apparently, one sees him 
appearing already at the end of the Hellenic period, at which time a "Testament of 
Solomon" emerges. God sent the Jewish king a magic ring through Raphael and 
with it Solomon compelled demons to reveal to him their station and abilities. In 
the twelfth or thirteenth century a Key of Solomon appears together with the 
Testament; the manuscript "Lemegeton" or of a "Lesser Key of Solomon" in the 
British museum is dated approximately to 1700.6 
 
It is evident from these brief quotes that both Thorndike and Peuckert also recognize the 
popularity of the narrative. Notably, Thorndike even speculates on the relationship of 
                                                
4 See Thorndike's chapter XLIX in vol. II, "Solomon and the Ars Notoria." 
5 Thorndike 279. 
6 The English translation is my own. Peuckert's German reads "Der König Salomo spielte im magischen Schrifttum 
eine große Rolle. Man sieht ihn anscheinend schon am Ende der hellenistischen Zeit auftauchen, in welche Zeit ein 
Testamentum Salomonis hinaufgeschoben wird. Gott schickte dem jüdischen König einen Zauberring durch Raphael 
und Salomo beschwor durch diesen die Dämonen, sich ihm in ihrem Amt und ihren Leistung zu offenbaren. Im 
zwölften oder dreizehnten Jahrhundert erscheint, zusammen geschrieben mit dem Testamentum, ein Schlüssel 
Salomonis; die Handschrift Lemegeton oder eines Lesser Key of Solomon im Britischen Museum wird um etwa 1700 
angesetzt." See: Will-Erich Peuckert Pansophie: [teil 1] (Berlin: E. Schmidt, 1956) 47. 
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magical practice to an allusive referent (i.e. Solomon to magic, Daniel and Joseph to 
dream interpretation) in terms that Dorothea Salzer would not theorize with her unio 
magica for almost another hundred years. 
Yet returning to studies on Solomon and magic specifically, shortly after 
Trachtenberg (though apparently unaware of his work), E. M. Butler follows with her 
study, Ritual Magic (1949). Nearly half of Butler's book deals with the significance of the 
figure of Solomon and the apocryphal narrative in ritual magic. Her first chapter, "The 
Solomon Cycle," begins: 
It is no more than Solomon's due that his is the name which carries the guns in the 
rituals of ceremonial magic; for his world-wide reputation as the master of legions 
of spirits has endured for at least two thousand years. The Wise King of the Bible, 
the Talmud and the Koran; the hero of the Arabian Nights, of Firdausī's Suleiman 
Namah and countless other poems and tales; the author of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, 
the Song of Songs, and Wisdom was rumored throughout the East and West to 
have left behind him secret books of magic. For only magic could account for the 
power, the glory and the riches associated with his name. Moreover the 
ambiguous light shed by the Old Testament over the great king in his declining 
years, when he loved strange women and followed after their gods, enveloped him 
in that atmosphere of mystery and guilt which vastly enhances the prestige of 
practicing magicians, about whom something holy and unholy perpetually 
revolves. So that it is doubtful at least if the rituals attributed to Solomon would 
have carried the spiritual underworld by storm as they did if no breath of things 
unlawful had ever tarnished his name.7 
 
More recent scholars, too, have repeated these observations with varying degrees of 
attention to Solomon specifically: Richard Kieckhefer in Magic in the Middle Ages 
(1989), for example, Pablo A. Torijano, in Solomon, the Esoteric King: From King to 
Magus, Development of a Tradition (2002), and Julien Véronèse in his article, "God's 
Names and Their Uses in the Books of Magic Attributed to King Solomon" (2010). The 
                                                
7 Butler 47. 
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list could continue, but the point is made: scholars who have investigated European 
magic as demon compulsion have unfailingly found the figure of Solomon at the center  
of such traditions. Thus we may return to Trachtenberg's claim that the texts of 
Solomonic pseudoepigrapha numbered into the scores. 
 Trachtenberg himself gives no more than a few examples of such texts, though he 
does additionally identify a few medieval Catholic theologians who either attributed all 
magic to Solomon himself or condemned the persistent pseudoepigraphy that multiplied 
the texts of Solomonic magic.8 Will-Erich Peuckert, however, opens a treasure trove that 
allows us to place ten or so Solomonic ritual texts in circulation in Germany in the late 
fifteenth and early sixteenth century by identifying as sources das puch aller verpoten 
kunst, ungelaubens und der zaubrey (The Book of All Forbidden Arts, Heresy and 
Sorcery, 1450s) of Bavarian physician, Johannes Hartlieb (ca. 1410-1486) and the 
Antipalus maleficiorum (1508) of Benedictine abbot, polymath, and occultist, Johannes 
Trithemius of Sponheim (1462-1516).9 
 Peuckert begins by quoting Hartlieb's warning to his readers against the practice 
of the "schwartze kunst" ("black art," i.e. nigromantia), in which he condemns four 
manuals of ritual magic by name: 
The masters of this art need various books, figures, and symbols for such things. 
One, they call sigillum Salomonis (Seal of Solomon), another claviculum 
Salomonis (Key of Solomon), the third Hierarchiam (Hierarchy), the fourth 
Schemhamphoras and various other symbols. With the symbols and execrable 
words the man binds himself to the devil and the devil to the man. The same 
writings of the evil art teach how one can compel the devil with symbols and 
                                                
8 See Trachtenberg 64. 
9 Peuckert 46-55. 
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secret words… The devil speaks to his master as though he suffers greatly that he 
must answer the summons and complains, "You torture me greatly. O poor 
master, miserably you allow yourself to be seduced and led astray…"10 
 
Both the titles Hartlieb gives and his reference to "compelling the devil with symbols and 
secret words" confirm that at least three of the four texts are connected to the apocryphal 
narrative of Solomon's control over demons: the Seal of Solomon, the Key of Solomon, 
and the Schemhamphoras.11 Each of these (though not the otherwise unattested 
Hierarchiam)12 also appears on the other list of ritual texts that Peuckert identifies: 
Trithemius' Antipalus maleficiorum.13 
The Antipalus provides a significantly longer list. Even though all three of the 
Solomonic texts attested in Hartlieb are reduplicated in Trithemius (fifty years later and 
elsewhere in Germany), he nevertheless raises the tally of late medieval and early modern 
Solomonic pseudoepigrapha considerably. Of the 38 manuals of demonic magic named in 
Antipalus, Trithemius reports that 8 are directly attributed to Solomon in brief 
descriptions he provides of each text.14 Significantly, many others contain wisdom or 
secrets of Solomon but are not attributed to him directly.15 
                                                
10 The English translation is my own. Peuckert's German reads "Zu sölichen sachen prauchen die maister dieser kunst 
gar manigerlay püch, vigur und caracter. ains haissen sy sigillum Salomonis, das ander claviculam Salomonis, das dritt 
Jerarchiam, das viert Schamphoras vnd sunst caracter gar manigerlay. mit den caractern vnd vnkunden worten verpint 
sich mit der mensch mit dem tuiffel vnd der tuifel mit dem menschen. die selb geschrift der bösen kunst lert, wie man 
den tuiffel pannen müg vnd sol mit den caractern vnd verporgen worten… Der tuiffel tüt zu seinem maister, als ob er 
groß leiden hab das er zu jm kommen müß vnd clagt vast: o laidigst mich groß vnd swärlich! O du armer maister, 
jämmerlich last du dich verlaiten vnd verführen…" (46). 
11 This may refer to a part of the Liber Razielis, which circulated independently of the rest of the text. See Page's note 
on p. 180.  
12 Leo Ruickbie, A Brief Guide to the Supernatural (Philadelphia: Running Press, 2012) 185. 
13 See Peuckert 47-55. 
14 Others, like the Picatrix are easily connected to Solomon in individual rituals, though not attributed to Solomon as a 
work. See: Ruickbe 185.  
15 Picatrix is a good example of this sort of text. 
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The eight or so titles of Solomonic pseudoepigrapha identified by Peuckert fall 
short of the "scores" that Trachtenberg claims, but the Hartlieb and Trithemius texts are 
not the only period sources from which to draw. Thorndike's even earlier study, about 
which it seems Peuckert was unaware, pulls from still other sources – lists of prohibited 
texts in the writings of medieval theologians William of Auvergne (ca. 1180/90-1249) 
and Albertus Magnus (ca. 1200-1280).16 Thorndike's two additional period sources,17 
however, appear to represent the last of the significant period lists of Solomonic 
pseudoepigrapha from the medieval or early modern eras that are presently known or 
considered by scholars. From there, the scholarship proceeds piecemeal, adding titles 
only one at a time. Yet even much of this work – slow though it is – has already been 
done by the other scholars, previously named, whose work likewise concerns the 
significance of the figure of Solomon in the practice of ritual magic (i.e. illicit demon 
compulsion).  
For instance, E. M. Butler reminds us of the ritual significance of the Testament of 
Solomon (already discussed in chapters 1 and 2) during the Middle Ages and early 
modern era and also adds the Herbarium Salomonis, Hygromantia Salomonis, Liber de 
Throno Salomonis, and the Schemhamphoras de Salomonis Regis (Schemhamphoras of 
Solomon the King) to our tally – presumably all from different sources.18 Likewise, Julien 
                                                
16 Thorndike writes, "The Liber sacratus, as William of Auvergne twice entitles it, or the Liber sacer or Liber juratus, 
as it is also called in the manuscripts, is associated with the name of Honorius as well as Solomon, and is often spoken 
of as the Sworn Book of Honorius" 283.  
17 Thorndike incorporates lists of Solomonic texts from the writings of both William of Auvergne and Albertus 
Magnus into his account. In Auvergne's De legibus (cap. 27), he finds the Idea Salomonis et entocta, the Sacratus, and 
the Mandel (or Almandal). In Albertus Magnus' Speculum Astronomiae (cap. 11), he claims to have located five 
"Solomonic" treatises, but lists only three: De figura Almandel, De novem candariis, and De quatuor annulis (280). 
18 Butler 48. 
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Véronèse adds the lesser-known Liber Bileth, as yet another explicitly Solomonic text in 
his article, "God's Names and Their Uses in the Books of Magic Attributed to King 
Solomon" (2010). Richard identifies the Munich Handbook of Necromancy,19 a 
compilation of rituals, which, though not attributed to Solomon as a whole, contains 
multiple "Solomonic" formulas.20  
Still other contemporary studies are available that pick up additional items in this 
list, including some that fall outside the time frame with which this study is concerned. 
Paul Kléber Monod's study, for example, Solomon's Secret Arts: The Occult in the Age of 
the Enlightenment, begins its examination of the numerous texts he covers with the mid 
seventeenth century, thus casting the apparent absence of the Solomon narrative in the 
sixteenth century under even greater suspicion.21 Nevertheless, the studies mentioned 
above are perhaps the best known and seem to account collectively for the historically 
attested Solomonic pseudoepigrapha that can be demonstrated to have been circulating 
during the late medieval and early modern eras.  
Overall, it would seem that Trachtenberg's claim of "scores" of magical 
Solomonic pseudoepigrapha in the late medieval and early modern eras may prove 
difficult to substantiate literally. Yet the number of such texts that can be identified – 
nearer to one score – is nevertheless sufficient to demonstrate the "particularly strong 
impression on the medieval imagination" of the Solomon narrative and to support the 
                                                
19 This text is Codex Latinus Monacensis 849 in the Bavarian State Library. 
20 See: Richard Kieckhefer, Forbidden Rites: A Necromancer's Manual of the Fifteenth Century (University Park, Pa. 
[u.a.: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 2012).  
21 See: Paul K. Monod, Solomon's Secret Arts: The Occult in the Age of Enlightenment (New Haven, Conn: Yale 
University Press, 2013).  
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plausibility of the other claim he makes (and to which we previously promised to return): 
namely, that "Solomon came to be regarded both as the type of the sorcerer and the 
original source of the occult science."22 This connection of the figure of Solomon to the 
act of demon compulsion also connects the act of demon compulsion to the figure of 
Solomon and thus the apocryphal narrative including Solomon's formula – the Shem ha-
Mephorash. 
Throughout the Middle Ages and even into the early modern era, then, evidence 
suggests that demonic magic – illicit demon compulsion – was absolutely connected with 
the figure of Solomon, not only in the popular imagination, but in Catholic theology as 
well. This much is demonstrated by the fact that most of the titles attested in the medieval 
and early modern periods survive in theological prohibitions and condemnations of ritual 
magic. Moreover, the fact that the apocryphal narrative of Solomon's power over demons 
continued to be a concern for Catholic demonologists is evident from the inclusion of 
magical Solomonic pseudepigrapha in the Index librorum Prohibitorum (Index of 
Forbidden Books 1559)23 and a brief description of the apocryphal Solomon narrative in 
the immensely popular three-volume Disquisitionum Magicarum Libri Sex (Magical 
Investigations in Six Books) of Martin Del Rio, who, as we have already mentioned, still 
found it necessary to rehearse and refute the Solomon narrative in 1599-1600 – nearly 
                                                
22 Trachtenberg 63. 
23 Prohibited under "Incertorum auctor. libri prohibiti." ("uncertain authors, prohibited books") as "Lib. Decem 
annullorum, Quattuor fpeculorú, Imaginú Thobiæ, Imaginum ptolomæi, Virginalis, Clauicula Salomonis. Libri 
Salomonis Magicis fuperftitionibus refertus." (The Books of...) in the 1559 edition of the Index, Antonio Blado, Index 
Auctorum Et Libroru[m] Qui Ab Officio Sanctae Rom. Et Vniversalis Inquisitionis Caueri Ab Omnibus Et Singulis in 
Vniuersa Christiana Republica Mandantur: Sub Censuris Contra Legentes, Uel Tenetes Libros Prohibitos in Bulla, 
Quae Lecta Est in Coena Dni Expressis, Et Sub Aliis Poenis in Decreto Eiusdem Sacri Officii Contentis. Roma: Apud 
Antonium Bladum, 1559. 
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one hundred years after Trithemius wrote his Antipalus maleficiorum.24 Thus, given the 
pervasiveness of the narrative in the medieval and early modern eras as well as how 
Scholastic anti-magic theology instrumentalized it for its purposes, not to mention its 
resurgence in the seventeenth century (as Monod has demonstrated with his book), it 
would be noteworthy indeed should that narrative be entirely missing from the magico-
theological and magico-philosophical writings of the humanists and the theology of 
Martin Luther. Yet none of the aforementioned studies mentions a humanist or Lutheran 
response to it. 
 
The Figure of Solomon Recedes from Published Sixteenth-Century  
Discourse on Magic  
Many scholars of sixteenth century magic seem to regard the model of magical 
efficacy based on the apocryphal narrative of Solomon's power over demons and the 
magical texts inspired by it as artifacts or remnants of the Middle Ages. Early scholars of 
Renaissance magic such as D. P. Walker and Frances Yates of the Warburg School, for 
instance, were highly dismissive of medieval magic and the possibility of its influence on 
Renaissance magic, to the point where they couched the Renaissance Hermetic Tradition 
                                                
24 See Libri II, Quaestio III in Martín A Delrío, Gérard Rivius, and Ernst, Disquisitionum Magicarum Libri Sex, in Tres 
Tomos Partiti. Auctore Martino Del Rio, Societatis Jesu Presbytero (Lovanii, ex officina Gerardi Rivii. Anno M.D. 
XCIX.-M. DC, 1599) 98-99. See also Marti ́n A Delri ́o and P G. Maxwell-Stuart Investigations into Magic 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000) 72. 
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in nearly sui generis terms, isolating it from both the Middle Ages and the Reformation 
alike.25 
Scholars like Walker and Yates thought they had found in Renaissance magic a 
reformation both analogous and contemporaneous to the sixteenth century Protestant 
Reformation. What they discovered, however, was in many respects a Renaissance 
rebranding of a familiar medieval paradigm that took place both north and south of the 
Alps. The narrative that such modern scholars reconstructed was the very narrative that 
Renaissance magicians offered in their own writing. The Renaissance magicians, 
however, had reasons to obscure part of their interests, since discussion of magic of any 
kind was potentially fraught, especially at the dawn of publishing when one's name was 
quite visibly attached to the assertions in a text.  
In their most cherished publicity accounts, Renaissance magician-theologians 
(like the sixteenth century Protestant reformers who followed them) presented their 
movement as a return to the "original sources" (ad fontes) – a re-discovery and re-
formation of the pristine wisdom of an incorrupt past. The original knowledge that they 
claimed to be uncovering had first been described in the writings of Marsilio Ficino as 
prisca theologia – a single, true theology, threading through all religions, and given by 
God to man in antiquity.26 Moreover, part of the program of uncovering the prisca 
                                                
25 For a thorough critique of the construction of the Middle Ages as a "fossilized" counterpart to the idealized 
"Renaissance," see: Tollebeek, J. "'Renaissance'; and 'fossilization': Michelet, Burckhardt, and Huizinga." Renaissance 
Studies. 15.3 (2001): 354-366. Tollebeek writes, "Associating the Renaissance so strongly with change and 
modernization also created a need for a conceptual counterpart to this Renaissance notion. This counterpart was found 
in the concept of 'fossilization'. Ranged against the Renaissance was a period which was seen as immobile, and which 
was said to have been brought to an end precisely by the dynamic of the Renaissance. This gave rise to an antagonistic 
relationship between the Renaissance and the Middle Ages" (356). 
26 Frances Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition (Routledge: London, 1964), 14–18 and 43f.  
 
  140 
theologia involved identifying and describing magia naturalis (natural magic) and 
disentangling it from the demonic pact of Aquinas' theory of demonic magic. The idea of 
a "natural magic," as we mentioned in the previous chapter, distinct from demonic magic 
had been initiated by William of Auvergne (ca. 1180/90-1249) in his De Legibus (On the 
Laws 1228-30),27 but development of this line of thought was hampered by Aquinas' 
subsequent demonology in De Potentia and the Summa Theolgia. It was the rehabilitation 
and cultivation of this pre-Thoman narrative of a natural magic that allowed Marsilio 
Ficino, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, and Johannes Reuchlin to distinguish their own 
magical interests and/or pursuits from the illicit magic that Aquinas described and what 
allowed their successor, Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa of Nettesheim (1486-1535), author 
of De Occulta Philosophia Libri Tres (1531), to look back with scorn on the "ignorant 
necromancers" of the previous century.28  
Perhaps by design or perhaps inadvertently, Aquinas' definition of magic – 
marvelous effects achieved through demonic intervention resulting from explicit or 
implicit demonic pact – had provided his successors, the Dominicans, the theological 
means to curtail not only experimentation but also even inquiry into questions of the 
nature of causation in the physical world. Anything that could not be demonstrated to be 
"natural" to the theologians' satisfaction could be condemned as resulting from demonic 
intervention. Moreover, after the elevation of idolatry to the capital crime of heresy in the 
"Witch Bull," Summis desiderantes affectibus of 1484, such experimentation or open 
                                                
27 Benedek Láng, Unlocked Books: Manuscripts of Learned Magic in the Medieval Libraries of Central Europe 
(Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press, 2010) 25. 
28 See: Brian P. Levack, The Witch-Hunt in Early Modern Europe (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2006) 62. 
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inquiry could be punishable by death. Scholastic demonology thus forced a particularly 
inconvenient interpretation of a personal and malevolent "demon" on the generation of 
humanist thinkers who had become fascinated by the Neo-Platonic cosmology through 
the recovery of a number of Platonic and Neo-Platonic texts. The contrast in what doors 
these two philosophies opened was striking. Aquinas' theory of magic did not allow for 
impersonal, non-malevolent demons, and the Neo-Platonic cosmology depended on 
intermediary forces (including impersonal, neutral "daimons") to explain causality in 
nature.29 Thus, the university theologians (Aquinas' successors) held an effective 
monopoly on the production and dissemination of knowledge as a result of their ability to 
condemn as "magic" anything that didn't suit them, and the inquisitive humanists found 
themselves between an epistemological rock and a hard place as they began to ponder 
and experiment with causal forces.  
Although these Renaissance magician-theologians presented their humanist 
researches into Greek, Hebrew, and Chaldean texts as the recovery of the true nature of 
religion and with it the true nature of magic, the question still remains as to the 
relationship of the magia naturalis that they claimed to be recovering to the prohibited 
medieval demonic theory of magic that preceded and surrounded them. Did they succeed 
in abandoning the paradigm of Solomonic demon compulsion? Furthermore, did they 
really even intend to? These questions are all the more pertinent because many of the 
                                                
29 "Prinzipiell hat Ficino in De Vita Freilich ein (aus christlicher Sicht) unorthodoxes, platonisches 
Dämonenverständnis vor Augen - er fasst die mit dem Begriff gekennzeichneten Zwischenwesen unter Anderem als 
Himmelskörpern zugeordnet seien und so auch auf den Menscheneinwirken könnten; im Hintergrund schwingen hier 
auch seine dämonologischen Ausführungen in De Amore mit." See: Otto, Bernd-Christian. Magie: Rezeptions und 
Diskursgeschichtliche Analysen von der Antike bis zur Neuzeit (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011) 459f. 
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texts which these humanist magician-theologians believed to be sources of this ancient 
wisdom were actually not at all ancient, and some of them, moreover, even included 
accounts of the apocryphal narrative of Solomon's control over demons. (We will discuss 
the influence of two such texts, Picatrix and Liber Razielis, on Ficino, Pico, and Reuchlin 
below.) Thus, insofar as each of them believed in the legitimacy of his pursuit of prisca 
theologia and magia naturalis as well as the antiquity and authority of the texts, he was 
confronted with evidence that there was at least some truth to the apocryphal Solomon 
narrative. For this reason, even the relatively small number of references (direct as well 
as oblique) to Solomon's power and authority in the writings of these magician-
theologians merits careful attention.  
Unlike those in the anonymous and pseudepigraphic magical literature that 
circulated in manuscript form at the same time (including, importantly, both Picatrix and 
the Liber Razielis), references to the apocryphal Solomon narrative in published magical 
works of the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries are indeed few. Nevertheless, each 
author demonstrates continued engagement with the logic of medieval theory of magic 
(i.e. demon compulsion), even as he attempted to circumvent Aquinas' prohibition by 
reframing the intermediary force in his theory of magic as something other than the 
demons of Aquinas' pact. Yet not all references to the narrative are allusive and covert. In 
De Verbo Mirifico, for instance, Reuchlin goes so far as to try to rehabilitate Solomon by 
arguing that the tradition rather than Solomon was corrupted because of insufficient 
knowledge of the necessary languages. We will return to this in our discussion of the 
potential link between the Liber Razielis and Reuchlin's De Verbo Mirifico, but we 
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remark here, in anticipation of that return, that the intermediary forces in the Liber 
Razielis are identified as angels, not demons. 
This section briefly traces the development of that Renaissance interest in magia 
naturalis (natural magic). It proceeds from the writings of Florentine Neo-Platonist and 
magician-theologian, Marsilio Ficino, who is credited with reestablishing the discourse of 
"natural magic" in the Renaissance, through the writings of Ficino's friend and younger 
contemporary, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, and into the Northern Renaissance by way 
of two important texts of Johannes Reuchlin (De Verbo Mirifico, 1496 and De Arte 
Cabalistica, 1517), who met Pico on a trip to Italy in 1490.30 It appears to have been Pico 
who introduced Reuchlin to the Christian exegetical potential of the Jewish Kabbalah as 
well as the idea of legitimizing Jewish theurgy31 (magic, including potentially that 
described in the Liber Razielis) as a form of natural magic.  
The purpose of tracing this evolution is twofold. First, it reveals part of the 
humanist interest in cultivating a discourse of natural magic to have been a response to 
the prohibition against nigromantia as defined by the paradigmatic apocryphal Solomon 
narrative and to the recent elevation of maleficium to the capital crime of heresy in 1484 
through the "Witch Bull." As we have mentioned, scholarly investigations of Renaissance 
magic has tended to focus on the importation of Hermeticism and Christian Cabala in the 
fifteenth century as moments of discovery or genesis, only to a lesser extent as strategic 
response or adaptation, and still less as a form of continuation. Yet it cannot be a mere 
                                                
30 See: Posset 73. 
31 From Greek θεουργία (theourgia), "theurgy" describes the practice of rituals, performed with the intention of 
invoking the action or evoking the presence of one or more gods (as opposed to demons). 
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coincidence that the new Renaissance theories of magic strove to sidestep Aquinas' 
prohibition of magic as explicit or implicit demonic pact, each in its own way. Second, 
comparing what Pico's own words about the Shem ha-Mephorash to the very central role 
it occupies in Johannes Reuchlin's De Verbo Mirifico calls into question the established 
scholarly interpretation of Reuchlin's authorship of De Verbo Mirifico as resulting 
primarily from his introduction to Kabbalah by Pico in Italy.  
As we will show instead, Pico does indeed write about "operating by means of the 
names of God" and deriving the name of seventy-two letters from the Tetragrammaton, 
but the wonderworking word of Reuchlin's De Verbo Mirifico bears a much stronger 
resemblance to the efficacious power of the ineffable name of God in the apocryphal 
Solomon narrative than the much more sophisticated gematria that Pico describes in his 
discussion of the Shem ha-Mephorash. This in turn points to a relative likelihood of 
Reuchlin's having drawn part of his inspiration for the De Verbo Mirifico from additional 
sources, including the Solomonic Liber Razielis, which Reuchlin is known to have owned 
and, because of its relatively wide circulation in Latin at the time, Reuchlin would have 
been able to read even before his knowledge of Hebrew was sufficient to read other 
Jewish texts.32   
 
Marsilio Ficino, Prisca Theologia and Magia Naturalis  
Though there are interesting details to be gleaned from both Ficino's writings and 
his biography regarding his engagement with the apocryphal Solomon narrative, the 
                                                
32 See: Posset (2.4, "In search of the name of God: Learning Hebrew, turning to theology"), 67-72. 
 
  145 
primary significance of Florentine humanist to the present project is not in the direct 
influence of the apocryphal Solomon narrative on his theories of magic. Rather, it lies in 
what he made possible for contemporaries and successors like Giovanni Pico and 
Johannes Reuchlin, by inaugurating the discourse of prisca theologia33 ("original 
theology") and reviving and cultivating that of magia naturalis. Actually, Ficino was the 
first to use the term prisca theologia and, likewise, it is Ficino whom scholars have 
credited with reestablishing the idea of magia naturalis in ways that pressed the question 
of its liceity and challenged blanket theological prohibitions against all magic as demonic 
intervention. As we will see, moreover, it was Ficino's development of these discourses 
that eventually enabled Reuchlin to reapproach the figure of Solomon – previously 
inextricably associated with illicit demonic magic – as prisca theologia in his De Verbo 
Mirifico.  
Taken together, the two theological discourses of prisca theologia and magia 
naturalis were the basis not only of Ficino's theory of magic, but also of those of both 
Giovanni Pico and Reuchlin, the latter, as we have said, being the first Northern 
European Christian to bring this kind of magico-theological thinking back across the 
Alps. The two concepts work together in this way: the case for magia naturalis (natural 
magic) is much stronger if what Ficino claims about prisca theologia is also true. If 
indeed God did give to mankind a single true theology in antiquity, parts of which were 
                                                
33 See: Bernd-Christian Otto, Magie: Rezeptions und Diskursgeschichtliche Analysen von der Antike bis zur Neuzeit 
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011) 423f. Regarding Ficino's role in the establishment of the discourse of prisca theologia, he 
writes: "Der Florentiner [Ficino] glaubte durch das Corpus Hermeticum Zugang zu einer uralten Weisheitslehre - einer 
prisca theologia - zu erhalten, die noch vor die biblischen Schriften zu datieren sei. [...] Durch die evolutionäre 
Konstruktion der prisca theologia - mit ihm selbst als zentralem, frühneuzeitlichem Protagonisten - hoffte er letzlich 
auch die angestrebte Synthese des durch ihn wiederbelebten Platonismus mit dem Christentum legitimieren zu 
können."  
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to be found even in the teachings of pagans, then it would certainly be not only 
permissible, but also even necessary, to seek it.  
This strategy, as we will see, worked to counter an effective theological 
prohibition against inquiry into the nature of causality in the physical world (framed as 
"magic"). In this context, the stronger and more convincing the case for the reality of a 
prisca theologia, the more intriguing – and ideally the more permissible – the study of 
previously forbidden texts would become. The value of such a strategy can be 
appreciated against the backdrop of ongoing late medieval and early modern dispute 
among theologians as to whether anything of value could be salvaged from pagan 
philosophy. Consequently, if the contemplation of such previously forbidden texts were 
to be tolerated by the institutional Church for the very reason that they might contain part 
of God's revelation, then the content of those texts – even "magical" content – could not 
so easily be forbidden or even dismissed. It was conceivable, after all, that some form of 
"natural magic" (as opposed to demonic magic) was included in God's original revelation, 
for tradition maintained that many of the apostles and prophets had worked wonders… to 
say nothing of Solomon. 
The texts that interested Ficino were mostly Greek Platonic and Neo-Platonic 
works that had been previously thought lost, but also some known only through Latin 
translations which Ficino considered deficient.34 That Ficino came to know of these texts 
                                                
34 It is important to note the distinction was not made at the time. Medievals thought that Neo-Platonism was older 
than it was. This is especially relevant to discussion of the Corpus Hermeticum and the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius 
the Areopagite. The author of the Corpus Hermeticum (dating from the 2nd and 3rd centuries CE) was thought to have 
been a contemporary of Moses and the author of the Corpus Dionysiacum, i.e. Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (late 
fifth - early sixth centuries) was thought to have been the same Dionysius who knew the apostle Paul. 
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at all is the result of unique circumstances. At a young age, he was brought into the 
household of Cosimo de' Medici under his lifelong patronage, learned ancient Greek – 
one of the first Christians of the Latin West to do so –, and translated numerous texts for 
his master. The resources and influence of his patron not only enabled Ficino to devote 
himself to his studies, but also afforded him access to rare Greek manuscripts, including 
works of Plato previously lost to the Latin West, and importantly, the Asclepius, a 
magico-philosophical Neo-Platonic text, which was thought to have been written by the 
legendary Egyptian magus, Hermes Trismegistus, and which Ficino translated into Latin 
for Cosimo in 1463. Ficino's famous translation of the Asclepius and his publication of it 
together with Poimandres as Corpus Hermeticum in 1471 had far-reaching consequences 
for the development of the discourses of Renaissance magic. Studies like Otto's Magie 
have already treated Ficino's understanding of Hermetic philosophy and his role in its 
revival.35 However, it is his development of a Christian apologia for his translation of 
pagan Greek philosophy and his own theory of magic that primarily concerns us here. 
The Greek philosophy and pagan theology with which Ficino concerned himself 
often included references to magic, or at least something that the Church regarded as 
magic. Yet the specter of Aquinas with his catch-all theory of magic still potentially 
barred individual humanist like Ficino from accessing the magical content of those texts. 
Thus, avoiding charges of the heresies associated with magic would require an additional 
strategy. In order for Ficino and others to pursue their inquiries and experiments into the 
nature of "magical" causality, Aquinas would have to be proven wrong, or better still, 
                                                
35 See also: D. P. Walker, Spiritual & Demonic Magic from Ficino to Campanella (University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 2003). 
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incomplete. Ficino met that challenge by constructing a theory of natural magic that 
worked to undermine Aquinas' prohibition, by arguing that magic – true magic – was in 
fact natural to God's created order and distinct from nigromantia. Thus, rhetorically, 
Ficino is able to avoid directly contradicting Aquinas' description of nigromantia, by 
siding with Aquinas against nigromantia (as illicit) while extolling the virtues of magia 
naturalis (as licit). His effective suggestion, then, is that both the Scholastic theologians 
and earlier magicians had merely failed to distinguish between magia innaturalis 
("unnatural magic," i.e. demonic magic) and magia naturalis (natural magic).  
The logic underlying this argument is telling. Ficino had two options available for 
undermining Aquinas' definition of magic as inevitably including an idolatrous pact with 
a demon. One possibility was to demonstrate that the demons that intervened in magic 
were not the same evil angels who had rebelled against God, upon which Aquinas' theory 
of illicit magic depends. The other was to show that the effects of magic were not the 
result of demonic intervention at all. In fact, Ficino claims both, as we will see. We will 
return to his redefinition of magic, but proceed here with an excerpt from his 
Commentary on Plato's Symposium on Love (written c. 1469, published 1484) in which 
he mounts a careful apologia regarding the nature demons, reconciling the philosophy of 
Plato with the theology of Dionysius the Areopagite. Ficino writes: 
The Soul of the World, that is of Prime Matter, and the souls of the twelve spheres 
and the stars the Platonists call gods because they are very close to the Angelic 
Mind and the Supreme God. The creatures which inhabit the region of ethereal 
fire, located under the moon, and the regions of pure air and humid air (next to 
water), the Platonists call daemons. But those which inhabit the earth, and are 
rational, the Platonists call men. The gods are both immortal and impassible; men 
are both mortal and passible; demons are of course immortal but are also passible. 
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The Platonists do not attribute to daemons the passions of the body, but only 
certain passions of the soul which somehow cause them to like good men and 
dislike bad ones. Daemons involve themselves very closely and zealously in 
taking care of the affairs of lower creatures, especially human beings. Because of 
this service, all daemons seem good. Some Platonists and some Christian 
theologians have said that there are some other daemons which are evil, but for 
the present we shall not argue about the evil daemons. 
 
The good daemons, who are our guardians, Dionysius the Areopagite usually calls 
by the proper name angels, rulers of the lower world; this differs very little from 
the opinion of Plato. Moreover, those souls whom Plato calls gods, or the souls of 
the spheres of the stars, we can call angels, or ministers of God, as Dionysius 
does. This, too, does not disagree with Plato, for the reason that, as is apparent in 
the tenth book of the Laws, Plato does not in the least enclose souls of this kind 
within the confines of their spheres in the way that he confines the souls of earthly 
creatures to their bodies. Rather he asserts that the heavenly souls are endowed 
with such great power by the supreme God that they are able at the same time to 
enjoy the sight of God, and without and effort or trouble control and move the 
spheres of the universe according to the will of their father, and, by moving the 
spheres, easily govern lower things. Thus the difference between Plato and 
Dionysius is a matter of words rather than opinion.36 
 
Ficino thus begins by dividing demons into good and evil, which he identified previously 
as "kalodemons" and "kakodemons" respectively,37 and then focuses on the good 
demons, which "Dionysius the Areopagite usually calls by the proper name, angels," 
while brushing aside discussion of the daemons, which "some Platonists and some 
Christian theologians" have called evil. 
At the time Ficino wrote his Commentary, Dionysius the Areopagite was still 
considered a canonical authority in the Western Church (not yet "Pseudo-Dionysius" that 
Western theologians know today), so Ficino's comparison of Plato to Dionysius may be 
understood as strategic. In the same way that Aquinas "baptized" Aristotle by reconciling 
                                                
36 Marsilio Ficino and Sears R. Jayne, Commentary on Plato's Symposium on Love (Woodstock, CT: Spring 
Publications, 1985) 110f.  
37 Ficino and Jayne 119. 
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him with the writings of Augustine, Ficino attempts to show agreement between 
philosopher and theologian: "Thus the difference between Plato and Dionysius is a matter 
of words rather than opinion."38 
Yet merely to redefine the demon would still leave Ficino with no theory of 
causality in his defense of magic. He has not addressed how the effects of magic are 
achieved, which is critical because, even if Ficino is convincing in his rehabilitation of 
good daemons as angels, he must address Aquinas' assertion in De Potentia that "angels 
are not compelled."39 Ficino's solution is a causality defined not by the intercession of 
intermediary beings, but rather as the universal force of attraction known as love. It is for 
this reason that we find the earliest articulation of Ficino's theory of magic in a 
commentary on Plato's Symposium on Love. 
In the quote below, also from his Commentary, we can see how Ficino 
undermines Aquinas' fundamental assumptions about the nature of magic in at least three 
places: the nature of demons, the nature of magical causality as demonic intervention, 
and the nature of the relationship of the demon with the human agent. He writes: 
From this common relationship is born a common love; from love, a common 
attraction. And this is the true magic. Thus fire is drawn upward by the concavity 
of the sphere of the moon, because of a congruity of nature; air by the concavity 
of the fire; earth is drawn downward by the center of the world; water also is 
drawn by this region. Thus also the loadstone draws iron, amber draws chaff, and 
sulphur, fire; the sun turns many flowers and leaves toward itself, and the moon, 
the waters; Mars is accustomed to stir the winds, and the various plants also 
                                                
38 The eighteen books of Marsilio Ficino's Platonic Theology (Latin: Theologia platonica de immortalitate animorum) 
written between 1469 and 1474 and it was published in 1482 are often regarded as Ficino's philosophical masterpiece. 
39 See Aquinas' De Potentia Q 6, A10: "It is clear, therefore, that these results of magic are produced by some external 
spirits: not however by righteous and good spirits; and this is clear for two reasons, First, because good spirits would 
not associate themselves with wicked men, such as are the majority of magicians; secondly, because they would not co-
operate with man in wrong-doing, which is often the result of magic. It remains then for us to conclude that they are 
produced by evil spirits whom we call demons." 
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attract to themselves various kinds of animals. In human affairs also, "his own 
pleasure draws each." Therefore the works of magic are the works of nature, but 
art is its handmaiden. For where anything is lacking in a natural relationship, art 
supplies it through vapors, numbers, figures, and qualities at the proper times. Just 
as in agriculture, nature produces crops, but art makes the preparations. The 
ancients attributed this art to daemons because the daemons understand what is 
the inter-relation of natural things, what is appropriate to each, and how the 
harmony of things, if it is lacking anywhere can be restored. Some are said to 
have been either friends, through some similarity of nature, such as Zoroaster and 
Socrates, or their beloveds, through worship, such as Apollonius Tyaneus and 
Porphyry. For this reason, signs, voices and portents from daemons are said to 
have come to them, when they were awake, or oracles and visions when they were 
asleep. They seem to have become magicians through the friendship of the 
demons, just as the daemons are magicians through understanding the friendship 
of things themselves. And nature, because of mutual love, is called a magician.40 
 
Ficino's theory of magic thus asserts three issues (the nature of demons is benevolent, 
generous, and wise; that the causality of magic is a natural force; and the relationship 
between the demon and the human agent is one of mutual love) as it demonstrates a 
strategic circumvention of Aquinas' anti-magic theology, and, as such, the influence of 
the apocryphal Solomon narrative is conspicuous not by its presence, but by the shadow 
it casts. Ultimately, the degree to which Ficino's theory of magic must depart from the 
apocryphal Solomon narrative is equal to the degree to which Aquinas has 
instrumentalized it.  
Ficino begins the description of his theory of magic by establishing that its effects 
are achieved not through demonic manipulation of the material world, but rather through 
natural affinities and attractions. He accounts for the effects of the processes which he 
cites in his examples (e.g. magnetism, static electricity, combustibility, and gravity) with 
a single causality – the cosmic force of love. Implicit, therefore, in Ficino's single theory 
                                                
40 Ficino and Jayne 127. 
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of causality of love is, first, the assumption that this single causality would naturally 
extend to other – perhaps less well understood – "magical" processes as well, and, 
second, that it would be incumbent upon the theologian who objects to Ficino's theory to 
account otherwise for these natural phenomena in his objection. Thus, the use of the 
particular examples need not necessarily be taken as indicative of Ficino's interest in the 
natural phenomena he describes, but more likely of what he considers their rhetorical 
value in pointing to the limitations on investigations into causality in the physical world 
and occult phenomena of all sorts through the over zealous application of Aquinas' 
demonology – a growing concern for intellectuals beginning in the late fifteenth century 
during the rise of Scholastic demonology and witch trials. 
In Ficino's theory, magical knowledge becomes knowledge of the natural, not the 
unnatural. By eliminating the intervention of the demon and casting "magic" as a natural 
force that acts upon everything at all times, Ficino provides a theory of causality within 
nature/creation which does not depend upon the intervention of the sort of demons 
described by Aquinas. Without a demonic causality, the demonic pact also becomes 
unnecessary. Yet Ficino does not eliminate demons from his theory of magic, but rather, 
he changes their relationship to the magician in a way that creates a transition for his 
contemporaries to move past Aquinas. Ficino replaces the demonic pact with a friendship 
– itself a kind of love – with a good demon, whom Ficino has redefined from Aquinas' 
malevolent fallen angel, into a benevolent and generous expert in the natural attractions 
and affinities between and among all things. Thus, while Ficino's theory of magic is still 
in one sense "demonic," it nevertheless pushes back against Aquinas' use of the 
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apocryphal narrative of Solomon's ability to compel demons to establish a corpus delicti. 
Because Aquinas assumes no other possible causality than the intervention of demons, 
and, moreover, because he allows for only one definition of demon (kakodaemon) in his 
theory of magic, magic's effects necessarily also serve as evidence of a sin committed. 
The demon Aquinas describes could only be compelled or bribed with worship (which he 
was able to isolate as idolatry because of the apocryphal Solomon narrative). In contrast, 
Ficino's model cannot take the effects of magic as evidence of the commission of idolatry 
(or any other sin, for that matter). 
While Ficino's examples certainly seem to apply principally to what we would 
consider natural phenomena, it is clear from his brief description of the "art" of magic, 
that he does not exclude the magic that William of Auvergne railed against when he 
condemned the "idolatrous" cult of the stars and its use of seals, rings, characters, and 
images. Recall that Ficino describes the art of magic in very similar terms, writing, "For 
where anything is lacking in a natural relationship, art supplies it through vapors, 
numbers, figures, and qualities at the proper times." Thus in a real sense, Ficino's theory 
of magic in the Commentary does not seem to represent a new approach to magic so 
much an apologia for the old way.  
 History offers documentation for this assumption, in the form of Ficino's 
reception by the Church. After Ficino finished his translation of the complete works of 
Plato, he immediately wrote his first (Latin) version of the Commentary. After he 
finished that, he took holy orders (1473). Thus, when Ficino wrote the theory of magic in 
the Commentary that proposed a new approach to magic, he was not yet a cleric. 
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However, when he published the work in 1484 (the same year as the promulgation of the 
"Witch Bull," Summis desiderantes affectibus), he was. Likewise, it was as a priest that 
he was accused of magic before Pope Innocent VIII (reigned 1484-1492) in 1489, not for 
his Commentary, but rather for parts of his De Vita Libri Tres, published that same year. 
Little is known about the incident except that he was eventually cleared of all charges of 
heresy though apparently through the intercession of connections in the papal court. 
For our purposes, Ficino's later articulation of his theory of magic in De Vita Libri 
Tres is similar to that in his earlier theory: in effect, he still accounts for all of the 
trappings of medieval magic – the vapors, etc. that he names in Commentary –, though 
explained in new forms. As before, these accounts serve to rectify imbalances. The 
primary difference between the theories in the two texts would seem to be a further 
definition of the cosmic force. What Ficino previously described as love drawing things 
together, he describes in the later work as emanations down through the spheres 
originating with planetary spirits.41 As with his early theory of the magical force of love, 
these emanations are cast as natural part of the created order. Yet despite Ficino's careful 
description of these forces as impersonal planetary spirits, in his later theory, the art of 
magic which he describes as the influence of planetary spirits was apparently sufficiently 
objectionable to warrant an accusation of the heresy of magic even under the protection 
of his powerful patron, Lorenzo de' Medici ("the Magnificent"). Ficino, it seems, had 
pushed his apologia for magic to the limits by restoring any form of demonic intervention 
to the equation and allowing for the symbols, vapors, and other trappings of medieval 
                                                
41 D. P. Walker, Spiritual & Demonic Magic from Ficino to Campanella (University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2003) 12-24. 
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astrological magic – what William of Auvergne had condemned as the "idolatrous cult of 
the stars."42 
Despite these difficulties, at least as important as Ficino's translations and original 
writings for the development of the Renaissance discourse of natural magic were Ficino's 
powerful and influential friends. No matter how knowledgeable and persuasive Ficino 
might have been, this alone did not preserve him from being tried for heresy. In 1489 he 
was indeed accused of magic before Pope Innocent VIII for certain assertions in the third 
book of his De Vita Libri Tres, published that same year, and thus found himself under 
suspicion of heresy.43 It was the same Pope Innocent VIII who had promulgated the 
"Witch Bull" five years earlier in 1484 and who had condemned 13 of Pico's 900 theses 
as heretical or smacking of heresy in 1486.   
Nonetheless, with intersession by others, he was pardoned, and so his 
interventions of prisca theologia and magic became standards for the humanists who 
were interested in magic after Aquinas. The situation would be exacerbated for one of his 
friends. 
 
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and the "Practical Science" of Kabbalah 
                                                
42 For more on Ficino's reintroduction of demons into his theory of magic see: Otto 459-462. 
43 "[...] Ficino came close enough to theological unacceptability that the publication of Three Books on Life signaled 
the only time, seemingly, that his work drew negative attention from Church authorities. What precisely happened is 
vague, but a substantial correspondence after May, 1490, in which Ficino asked certain friends of his at the court of 
Pope Innocent VIII for help, suggests that certain people had called his orthodoxy into question. [Paul O. Kristeller, 
Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters: 4 (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1996) 265-76]. By August of 
that year, Ficino was assured that his reputation was favorable at the Papal Court." See: Christopher S. Celenza 
"Marsilio Ficino," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 14 Feb. 2012, 
plato.stanford.edu/entries/ficino/. 
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Count Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-94), Ficino's friend, and younger 
contemporary, shared his convictions about prisca theologia and magia naturalis. Like 
Ficino, Pico's search for them included the works of Greek Neo-Platonists. Unlike Ficino, 
however, that search also included the writings of Jewish Kabbalists. His own knowledge 
of the Hebrew language in which most such texts were written was not particularly 
advanced, but the count of Mirandola paid the learned Italian Jew Falvius Mithradates to 
translate for him into Latin.44 Thus, working from these translations, Pico was able to 
incorporate "Kabbalistic Conclusions" into his famous 900 Theses, along with numerous 
conclusions drawn from the writings of Greek Neo-Platonists.  
Whereas Ficino's inclusion in our project mostly serves the single purpose of 
establishing the origin of the Renaissance discourse of prisca theologia magical 
apologetics, Pico's is twofold. Not only did Pico introduce Reuchlin to the idea prisca 
theologia, thus serving as a sort of link in a chain between Ficino and Reuchlin, but he 
also seems to have been at least partially responsible for the latter's interest in the 
possibility of a Christian application for the Jewish Kabbalah.45 By tracing the 
development of Pico's (mis)understanding of the Kabbalah, we are now able to establish 
a second important connection between Renaissance Italian and Northern thought. Not 
only did Pico himself continued to be influenced by the medieval Christian tradition of 
Solomonic demon compulsion as he attempted to decipher the Jewish Kabbalah, but his 
work also establishes points of reference for the view of the Jewish Kabbalah that 
                                                
44 For a thorough discussion of the importance of Mithradates in the development of Christian Cabala, see: Wirszubski 
69. See also: Posset 68-70, for discussion of Mithradates' influence on Reuchlin specifically. 
45 See: Posset 94-98.  
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Reuchlin would have learned from Pico when he met him in 1490 prior to authoring his 
De Verbo Mirifico in 1494. 
As Pico understood it, the Kabbalah was not merely ancient wisdom, but in fact 
part of God's original direct revelation to mankind. Chaim Wirszubski, twentieth century 
scholar of Jewish Kabbalah, explains in Pico della Mirandola's Encounter with Jewish 
Mysticism (1989):  
Jewish traditionalism throve on the idea that all true tradition is ultimately 
revelation. The classic expression of that idea is that the whole body of Oral Law 
[i.e. Kabbalah], all niceties and elaborations included, had been revealed to Moses 
on Mount Sinai.46  
 
Thus, the enthusiasm that Pico felt for Jewish mysticism and magic was understandable. 
In the Kabbalah, Pico thought he had discovered what he was looking for: prisca 
theologia. What is more, its precepts seemed to Pico to provide both a Jewish witness to 
the truth of Christianity, which could be used to convince the Jews of the truth of 
Catholic teaching,47 and a legitimation of magia naturalis.48  
Though Pico eagerly accepted this Jewish myth of Kabbalah's divine origins, his 
grasp of its teachings was not necessarily an accurate representation of Jewish tradition, 
as Wirszubski demonstrates at length in his book. One particular example of Pico's 
understandings and misunderstandings of the Jewish Kabbalah, however, is of interest to 
the present study: Pico's division of the Kabbalah into discreet practical and speculative 
                                                
46 Wirszubski 121. 
47 See: Wirszubski 121. 
48 See: Zika "There seems to be an attempt once again here to present the Christian magic of soliloquia as a 
continuation and fulfillment not only of the operations of the ancient Jews, but also of those performed by the prisci 
magi" (133f.). 
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sciences.49 This position is reflected in the first of his "Cabalistic Conclusions 
Confirming the Christian Religion," which reads: 
11>1. Whatever other Cabalists say, in a first division I distinguish the science of 
Cabala into the science of sefirot and shemot [names], as it were into practical and 
speculative science.50 
 
Wirszubski notes that the division Pico makes can indeed be traced to at least one Jewish 
Kabbalist author, Abraham Abulafia (b. 1240, died after 1291), but that such division 
represents a late and by no means universal opinion among Jewish Kabbalists.51  
There are two points about Pico's division of the Kabbalah to which we would 
like to draw the reader's attention before proceeding because they exemplify the 
complicated terrain that Pico was negotiating and the limits on our understanding of it. 
First, most of the available scholarship has interpreted Pico as having associated the 
sefirot (emanations) with speculative science and the shemot (names) with practical 
science, i.e. "magic." Notably, this is opposite to the respective order in which Pico 
presents them.52 However, such a reading is consistent with Abulafia's division (Pico's 
source), as attested in a letter Abulafia wrote to his disciple Yehuda Salmon, which 
appears anonymously in Cod. Vat. Ebr. 190 (fol. 120v) as Summa Brevis Cabalae Que 
Intitulatur Rabi Ueude. The relevant passage (Fol. 122 r) reads: 
I say now that this occult wisdom of the Kabbalah is indeed from a multitude of 
our doctors who are practiced in another wisdom of ours, which is called Talmud. 
And this wisdom is divided into two parts, generally, which are the science of the 
                                                
49 Wirszubski 135. 
50 S. A. Farmer, Syncretism in the West: Pico's 900 Theses [1486] (S.l.: ACMRS [ARIZONA CENTER FOR, 2016) 
519. 
51 Wirszubski writes, "Few Kabbalists were as conscious as was Abulafia of the difference between the Kabbala of the 
sefirot and the Kabbala of divine names" (135f.). 
52 For Farmer's justification of his minority, opposing reading: of see: Farmer n 518f. 
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name of god, Tetragrammaton, through the mode of the ten numerations which 
are called sefirot (among which whoever separates is said to cut off the soles of 
the feet) And it is those which reveal the secret of unity. The second part is the 
science of the great name through the way of the 22 letters from which and by the 
points of which and by the accents of which are composed the names and 
characters and seals which names are invoked is spoken (God speaks) with the 
prophets in dreams, by urim and thummim, and through the holy spirit and 
through the prophets.53  
 
 Aside from this transposition of categories, the second point necessary to our 
vision of what Pico was attempting is this: the very division of the Kabbalah into discreet 
speculative and practical sciences is questionable in Pico's Christian Cabala and not the 
matter of which should be associated with shemot (i.e. names) and which with sefirot (i.e. 
emanations).54 Once again, Wirszubski identifies the questionable readings of Kabbalah 
source materials:  
The superposition of the relatively late distinction between speculative and 
practical Kabbalah upon the bipartite division of Kabbalah into the science of 
sefirot and the science of names produced Pico's first division of Kabbala "in 
scientiam sephiroth et semot tanquam in practicam et speculativam […into the 
science of sefirot and shemot, as it were into practical and speculative science]."55  
 
Thus, whether Pico thought of the science of shemot (i.e. names) as practical and the 
science of sefirot (i.e. emanations) as speculative, or vice versa, he nonetheless affirmed a 
division that was neither longstanding nor universal in Jewish Kabbalistic tradition. 
                                                
53 Wirszubski gives the Latin as: "Dico igitur nunc quod hec sapientia cabale oculta quidem est a multitudine doctorum 
nostrum qui exercentur in sapientia alta nostra que dicitur Talmud et dividitur quidem in duas partes in universali que 
sunt sciencia nominis dei Tetragramaton per modum decem numerationum que vocantur plante inter quas qui separat 
diciur truncare plantas. Et hi sunt qui revelant secretum unitatis. Secunda pars est scientia magni nominis per viam 
viginti duaraum licterarum a quibus et ab earum punctis et ab earum accentibus composita sunt nomina et caracteres 
seu sigilla que nomina invocata sunt que locuntur cum prophetis in somnis et per hurim at tumim et per spiritum 
sanctum et per prophetas"(134).  
54 Most basically, the sefirot are understood in the Kabbalah as emanations of God. It is difficult, however, to define 
the term any more specifically without then excluding schools of Kabbalistic thought that disagree about the nature of 
those emanations. One such disagreement, for example, is whether God, in this act of emanation, "shines forth" in light 
only or in substance. Thus, the simplest definition, while perhaps wanting in specificity, avoids unnecessary exclusion 
of many legitimate contemporaneous views of the nature of the sefirot. 
55 Wirszubski 135. 
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Moreover, he also superimposed his own (Christian) division between practical and 
speculative on top of that fraught choice of Judaic source accounts.  
 For this reason, it seems prudent to assume that Pico's division of Kabbalah into 
speculative and practical sciences along the axis of a separate division between shemot 
(i.e. names) and sefirot (i.e. emanations) on the basis of one or two late Jewish sources 
should be regarded as the effect of Pico's projection of a Christian dichotomy between 
magic and theology onto Jewish tradition. After all, what was self-evident to Pico 
(namely, a distinction between speculative theology and practical magic), was by no 
means self-evident to all Jewish Kabbalists. However, where Pico saw efficacious names, 
we suggest, he thought to recognize "magic" because of his familiarity with medieval 
discourse on Solomonic demon compulsion – he was superimposing several generations' 
accounts, thereby skewing them and creating a very particular reading of his the Jewish 
Kabbalah for his Christian readers. 
Returning to our main argument, Pico identified in the Jewish Kabbalah, a 
"practical science" (magia naturalis) regardless of "whatever other Kabbalists say." In 
this move, moreover, most scholars agree that he associated the science of names 
(shemot) with the practical (i.e. magia naturalis). If this is true, then it potentially 
represents the same "magical" use of divine names associated with the apocryphal 
Solomon narrative going back to antiquity. Moreover, as Wirszubski further remarks, 
"The theurgic or magical use of divine names in Judaism is older than the earliest known 
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instance of the ten sefirot."56 Yet how are we to read Pico's conclusions dealing explicitly 
with the Shem ha-Mephorash? There are only a very few such conclusions included in his 
texts (suggesting again that he was more interested in his contemporaneous readers than 
in faithful accounts of the past). Two of them, conclusions 56 and 57 of Pico's "Seventy-
one Cabalistic Conclusions According to My Own Opinion, Strongly Confirming the 
Christian Religion Using the Hebrew Wisemen's Own Principles," are as follows:  
11>56. Anyone who knows how to unfold the quarternarius into the denarius will 
have the method, if he is skilled in the Cabala, of deducing the name of seventy-
two letters from the ineffable name.  
 
11>57. From the last conclusion anyone knowledgeable in formal arithmetic can 
understand that to operate through the shem ha-mephorash is proper to the 
rational nature.57  
 
Pico's assertion in his conclusion 57 that "to operate through the shem ha-mephorash is 
proper to the rational nature" certainly serves the program he had already begun of 
legitimizing magia naturalis since his solution to the problem of causality is the power of 
God himself rather than demons. Unfortunately, however, it does not clarify what sort of 
operations Pico had in mind.  
However, Pico's previous conclusion potentially reveals the most about the 
relationship of his Kabbalistic theses to Reuchlin's De Verbo Mirifico, for their respective 
accounts of uses of Kabbalah are quite different. Conclusion 56 involves gematria, a 
Kabbalistic method of interpreting Hebrew scripture (in this case, the Shem ha-
                                                
56 Chaim Wirszubski, Pico Della Mirandola's Encounter with Jewish Mysticism, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1989) 135. 
57 11>56. Qui sciuerit explicare quaternarium in denarium habebit modum, si sit peritus Cabalae, deducendi ex nomine 
ineffabili nomen .lxxii. litterarum. Farmer 885. 11>57. Per praecedentum conclusionem potest intelligens in arithmetica 
formali intelligere quod operari per scemamphoras est proprium rationalis naturae. Farmer 885. 
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Mephorash, YHWH) by calculating the numerical values of words based on those of their 
constituent letters. One unfolds the quaternarius into the denarius thus: 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 
10. Pico's meaning is that one can add the numerical equivalents of the letters of the 
ineffable name YHVH, (10 + 5 + 6 + 5 = 26), and through further operations known to 
those "skilled" in Kabbalah derive the name of seventy-two letters. As we will see, 
Reuchlin's use of "Kabbalah" in De Verbo Mirifico is nothing of the sort. His derivation 
of the name of God is a poetic exegesis and a Christian apologia. As a result of the 
obvious differences, we may conclude that Reuchlin's early interest in the Kabbalah was, 
at the very least, anything but gematric. In fact, as we will argue below, it bears a far 
greater resemblance to the Christian Contra-Iudaeos polemics on the name of Jesus as 
the ultimate divine name, which we have discussed above in chapter one.  
 
Pico's Influence on Reuchlin 
Like Pico's Conclusions 56 and 57, Reuchlin's book-length triologue, De Verbo 
Mirifico, is also based on the idea of the Tetragrammaton or Shem ha-Mephorash – the 
ineffable and efficacious name of God. Reuchlin's incorporation of Kabbalah in De Verbo 
Mirifico will be discussed in greater detail below, but it suffices here to say first of all 
that it does not involve gematria in anything approaching the level of mathematical 
sophistication of "unfolding the quaternarius into the denarius." Rather, it is much more a 
poetical exegesis in which Reuchlin builds upon the idea of the efficacious power of the 
Shem ha-Mephorash or Tetragrammaton and eventually reveals that the eponymous 
"wonderworking word" in De Verbo Mirifico is not the Tetragrammaton mathematically 
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unfolded into the name of seventy-two letters, but the Tetragrammaton transformed 
symbolically-poetically into Pentagrammaton through the incarnation of Jesus.  
The transformation results from Reuchlin's Christian Cabalistic exegesis of the 
Tetragrammaton, YHWH. In place of the Tetragrammaton, Reuchlin proposes a 
Pentagrammaton (YHSWH) under the impression that his alternation has changed the 
name from Yahweh to Yeshua (Jesus) in Hebrew. Though irretrievably mistaken 
(Yeshua, in Hebrew is spelled יהוה or "YSWH," and thus, is just as much a 
Tetragrammaton as YHWH),58 Reuchlin's explanation reflected his (and Pico's) interest 
in the potential of Kabbalistic-type exegesis within a Christian context. According to 
Reuchlin's exegetical reasoning, the insertion of the "ש" (shin) to the Tetragrammaton not 
only renders the ineffable name of God pronounceable (as Yeshua, i.e. "Jesus"), but also 
symbolically represented the formless taking form: God becomes incarnate and thus 
comprehensible through the birth of Jesus.59  
Notably, the point at which Reuchlin arrives through his exegesis is virtually the 
same as that of Justin Martyr in his Dialogue with Trypho (discussed in chapter 1). Recall 
Justin's argument with Trypho: 
For every demon, when exorcised in the name of this very Son of God […] is 
overcome and subdued. But though you exorcise any demon in the name of any of 
those who were amongst you—either kings, or righteous men, or prophets, or 
patriarchs—it will not be subject to you. But if any of you exorcise it in [the name 
                                                
58  Fellow humanist theologian, Lefèvre d'Étaples points out the error in his Quincuplex Psalterium of 1508. See: 
François Secret, Les Kabbalistes Chre ́tiens De La Renaissance (Neully S/Seine: Arma Artis, 1985) 136f.  
59 Schmidt-Biggemann offers a useful discussion of the Pentagrammaton in the writings of Pico and Reuchlin. See: 
Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, Philosophia Perennis: Historical Outlines of Western Spirituality in Ancient, Medieval 
and Early Modern Thought (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011) 96-99. 
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of] the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, it will 
perhaps be subject to you.60 
 
Like Justin Martyr and the other early Christian apologists, Reuchlin simply proposes a 
better "magical" name – not a treatise on the sefirot. At its core, his De Verbo Mirifico is 
part of the late antique apologetic and Contra-Iudaeos polemics that sought to undermine 
the figure of Solomon and replace it with that of Jesus through performative exorcisms 
"in the name of Jesus." 
Despite the clear similarities between the sort of late antique Christian Contra-
Iudaeos polemics and apologia which were discussed in chapter one above, there is an 
important difference between those and the models proposed by Pico and Reuchlin. In the 
examples from Christian antiquity, the demons are crucial to the logic, but in the 
Renaissance works of Pico and Reuchlin (after the medieval establishment of distinct 
theological discourses of magic and exorcism) demons are not directly mentioned. 
Rather, in their theories of magia naturalis, it appears to be nature itself that is compelled 
by the name of God, whether that name be "Tetragrammaton" in Pico or 
"Pentagrammaton" in Reuchlin. Recall that Ficino's solution to the problem of causality 
is a cosmological force of love that can be aided through judicious application of the 
magical art: "For where anything is lacking in a natural relationship, art supplies it 
through vapors, numbers, figures, and qualities at the proper times."61 Presumably this 
must also apply to the name(s) of God (including "Jesus") and would account for the 
                                                
60 George Reith, Marcus Dods, and B. P. Pratten The Writings of Justin Martyr and Athenagoras (Edinburgh: T & T. 
Clark, 1867) 205. 
61 Ficino and Jayne 127. 
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apocryphal Solomon narrative, which, as we will see in the following section, Reuchlin 
incorporates explicitly into his De Verbo Mirifico. 
Yet, ultimately, neither Pico in his Theses nor Reuchlin in his De Verbo Mirifico 
appears to have had a very firm grasp on the Jewish Kabbalistic tradition. Preeminent 
scholar of the Jewish Kabbalah, Moshe Idel, tells us that, "Pico's Theses, his most 
important kabbalistic composition, contains a very heterogeneous selection of subject 
matter and a relatively small amount of Kabbalah."62 Likewise, Charles Zika, one of the 
first scholars to give serious attention to De Verbo Mirifico, comments concerning that 
work, "it contributes little to an understanding of Reuchlin's intellectual concerns to 
describe the DVM as the first stage in the development of his Hebraic and Kabbalistic 
studies."63 Thus, regardless of Pico's divisions of the Kabbalah and regardless of whether 
he thought that the science of names (shemot) was practical or speculative, we are left 
with the question of the possible extent of his influence on the thinking of Johannes 
Reuchlin, whose De Verbo Mirifico at least, as Zika observes, does not really contain 
much Kabbalah either. While it is true that by 1517, when Reuchlin published his De 
Arte Cabalistica, he was one of the foremost Christian Hebraists in Europe (if not the 
foremost), in 1494 when he published his De Verbo Mirifico, he actually knew very little 
about Hebrew or the Jewish Kabbalah.64  
                                                
62 Moshe Idel, "The Magical and Neoplatonic Interpretations of the Kabbalah in the Renaissance," Essential Papers on 
Jewish Culture in Renaissance and Baroque Italy, Ed. David B. Ruderman (New York: New York UP, 1992) 107-69 
here 111. 
63 Charles Zika, "Reuchlin's De Verbo Mirifico and the Magic Debate of the Late Fifteenth Century," Journal of the 
Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 39 (1976) 104-138, here 105. 
64 For some discussions of the failings of Reuchlin's De Verbo Mirifico as a work of "Christianized Jewish Kabbalah" 
(as opposed to "Christian Kabbalah"), see: Robert J. Wilkinson Tetragrammaton: Western Christians and the Hebrew 
Name of God: from the Beginnings to the Seventeenth Century (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2015) 319-323. 
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 Here, historical connections amplify my point. It had only been four years earlier, 
in 1490, that Reuchlin had met Pico in Italy. Certainly, the two would have spoken about 
what Pico had already written. By that time, both Pico's Theses (1486) and the Apologia 
(1487) had been already been published. We can only speculate as to what else they 
discussed, however, and the fact remains that Reuchlin's incorporation of the Kabbalah 
into his writings is different from Pico's. It bears and even greater resemblance to late 
antique and medieval "Solomonic" traditions of demon compulsion. Published four years 
after their meeting, Reuchlin's De Verbo Mirifico (1494) focuses on the wonder-working 
effects of a single word of five letters, not the gematrical process of deriving other names 
from it. Thus, the question is: How did Reuchlin arrive at this understanding of the 
Kabbalah?  
The simplest and most likely explanation would be that he in fact got the idea 
from Pico. In the fourteenth of Pico's seventy-two conclusions on the Kabbalah, Pico had 
actually argued that the insertion of the shin "ש" into the Tetragrammaton represents the 
descent of the fiery Holy Spirit into the fourfold realm of matter – the incarnation of God 
in human flesh. Pico held that the addition of the shin made the previously ineffable 
YHVH pronounceable.65 The possible connection is obvious enough – Reuchlin appears 
                                                
65 Schmidt-Biggemann cites Pico's exegesis on the "ש" (shin) as the "first step in his attempt at Christian cabala." Pico 
arrives at the "ש" (shin) in his Conclusio 11>14. "By the letter <ש>, that is, shin, which mediates in the name of Jesus, 
it is indicated to us Cabalistically that the world then rested perfectly, as though in its perfection, when Yod was 
conjoined with Vav – which happened in Christ, who was the true Son of God, and man." It is interesting to note that 
Pico's process presupposes a different spelling of Jesus' name than Reuchlin's. The former opts for Yeshu, and the latter, 
Yeshua. In Pico's exegesis, the shin is arrived at because it is the only letter present in Jesus' name that is not also 
present in the Tetragrammaton (יהוה). Yod and the Vav are present in both. The significance, then, of Pico's explanation 
in Conclusio 11>14 of the shin's mediation between the Yod and the Vav is that the Shin represents Jesus, and the Yod 
and the Vav represent God and the world, respectively, as Jesus mediates between God and the world.  Wilhelm 
Schmidt Biggemann, Philosophia Perennis: Historical Outlines of Western Spirituality in Ancient, Medieval and Early 
Modern Thought (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011) 94. 
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simply to have expounded upon one of Pico's exegetical ideas. However, it does not 
necessarily follow that Reuchlin adopted all of Pico's ideas about a Christian Cabala, nor 
that he developed the idea in the same way that Pico would have. For instance, Reuchlin's 
exegesis on the Pentagrammaton (which must belong to the science of shemot if it is to be 
regarded as Kabbalah at all within Pico's divisions) does not appear to be in any way 
derived from or include the gematria that Pico describes in his Cabalistic theses (56 and 
57). Rather, it is something else – something seemingly more related to the Christian 
discourse of demon compulsion derived from the apocryphal Solomon narrative, albeit 
without explicit mention of demons.66 That is, Reuchlin may have been inspired by Pico, 
but he has approached the problem of Aquinas' demonology differently.   
The challenge of removing demons from the chain of causality in theories of 
magic is already familiar. Before Reuchlin wrote his De Verbo Mirifico, both Ficino and 
Pico had already tried to disentangle inquiry into and experimentation with causality as 
"magic" from Aquinas' explicit or implicit demonic pact by replacing Aquinas' particular 
definition of demons. Ficino had attempted to do so by proposing a different, 
nondemonic, causality. Pico had skirted the issue.  
Reuchlin, however, writing in 1494, had the advantage of having witnessed both 
of his predecessors' attempts and difficulties. From his temporal vantage point nearly 
eight years after the publication of the Apologia Pico was forced to write for his 900 
                                                
66 One need not look far for examples of ritual use of the divine name of Jesus in the context of otherwise "Solomonic 
demon compulsion." Véronèse identified several in his study of 9 texts of "Solomonic" magical pseudepigrapha. He 
writes, "Jesus, Christus, or Jesus Christus is also widely used (ninety occurrences). Being particular to the Christian 
world, it does not appear in Liber Bileth or in Liber Razielis. The translation of this latter text from Hebrew to Castilian 
and Latin appears not to have involved any effort at Christianization. Jesus Christus appears in all the other texts, 
however, with the majority of uses found in Clavicula (58%)." See: Julien Véronèse, "God's Names and Their Uses in 
the Books of Magic Attributed to King Solomon," Magic, Ritual, and Witchcraft, 5.1 (2010): 30-50, here 33. 
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Theses and 5 years after Ficino was accused of heresy for his assertions in the third book 
of De Vita Libri Tres, Reuchlin no doubt recognized the familiar concern of the late 
antique Christian apologists and medieval Christian theologians for controlling (limiting) 
authorization for efficacious ritual (whether "magical" or "religious"). Even if Ficino's 
theory of magia naturalis and Pico's of a science of practical Cabala were couched in 
perfectly Orthodox terms, they would have been rendered unacceptable because the very 
existence of legitimate (i.e. non-diabolical) "magical" power outside of the control of the 
Church would contradict its self-styled position as the only source of truth. In short, 
whether it was natural or not, no pagan or Jewish magic could ever be allowed to be 
legitimate (i.e. both valid and licit) because it was not contingent upon the sacrifice, 
death, and resurrection of Jesus, on which the Church was the ultimate authority. To draw 
a parallel to Origen's vague but firm objection, "Sed ipsi qui utuntur adjurationibus illis, 
aliquoties nec idoneis constitutis libris utuntur: quibusdam autem et de Hebraeo acceptis 
adjurant daemonia."67 
As we have seen, however, there had been other theories of magic available 
before Aquinas. In the cases of both Ficino and Pico, because of the lack of contingency 
on Jesus (the source of the institutional Church's authority, and thus, power), the 
condition of the performer, "purity" as presence-of-grace is missing, is missing from their 
theories of magic. Each of them has effectively proposed a different condition of the 
performer, some version of what we might call "knowledge-of-nature" or "knowledge-of-
                                                
67 "It is customary to adjure demons with adjurations written by Solomon. But they themselves who use these 
adjurations sometimes use books not properly constituted; indeed they even adjure demons with some books taken 
from Hebrew." See: Mattheum comm. ser. (tract. 33) 110, Migne, PG vol. 13 1757; McCown, Testament, p. 94; JPOS 
2 (1922) 9. See also: Duling (1983), 949. 
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truth." It is outside the scope of the present study to attempt to determine whether their 
changes to the condition of the performer also represent a spiritualization and 
metaphoricization of "purity." However, one speculates that they do not, because of the 
dependent relationship of "purity" to hegemonic structures (e.g. the Jewish Temple or the 
institutional medieval Church). The value of "purity" as authorizing condition of the 
performer is undermined when it becomes possible to self-authorize. 
 It is for this reason that Reuchlin's choice to make his theory of magic not just 
inclusive of Jesus (as Pico had done), but rather absolutely contingent on Jesus, as we 
will see. In so doing, he has tied his version of that generation's argument about causality 
and knowledge into the institutional Church as he knew it. Reuchlin does so by deploying 
resources from the tradition of Solomonic magic that Pico and Ficino did not.    
 
Reuchlin's De Verbo Mirifico and the Liber Razielis 
To answer the question of what actually Reuchlin used as his additional source, in 
this section we propose a connection between the Liber Razielis, a medieval manual of 
Solomonic magic, and Reuchlin's De Verbo Mirifico. While it is known that Reuchlin at 
one point owned at least part of the Liber Razielis,68 any connection between the two 
texts is necessarily tenuous, since at the time that Reuchlin wrote and published his De 
Verbo Mirifico (1494), the Liber Razielis circulated in multiple differing versions, and it 
is not known which version(s) Reuchlin had or had access to. Nevertheless, what 
Malinowski has isolated as the rite, the formula, and the condition of the performer do 
                                                
68 Reuchlin owned at least part of the Liber Razielis See Franz Posset, Johann Reuchlin (1455-1522): A Theological 
Biography (Berlin: Gruyter, Walter de, & Co, 2015) 653. 
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remain consistent among the various extant versions of the Liber Razielis that are known 
to have circulated at the time. In consequence, a fruitful comparison is possible with 
Reuchlin's use of the rite, the formula, and the condition of the performer in De Verbo 
Mirifico. In this comparison, we can recover Reuchlin's distinctive logic as an advance 
beyond that of Pico and Ficino, albeit one executed with their work in mind. 
By aligning our comparison in this way, we will recover De Verbo Mirifico as an 
attempt on Reuchlin's part to rehabilitate magic – to make it a legitimate, non-heretical 
field of inquiry, as Ficino and Pico before him had tried. At the same time, he also tried 
to create a theologically acceptable theory of magic (causality) that could replace or at 
least coexist with Aquinas' theory of magic as demonic intervention and idolatrous 
demonic pact. As we will see, like Ficino before him, Reuchlin avoids directly 
contradicting Aquinas' demonology and argues instead for the existence of an additional, 
licit form of magic not contingent upon demonic pacts.  
The prefatory letter to De Verbo Mirifico, which is included in the first 
publication, is addressed to Johannes Dalberg, the Bishop of Worms and Chancellor of 
the University of Heidelberg. It provides a statement of Reuchlin's intentions and 
establishes the outline of his strategy from the very beginning of his work: 
Certain diligent explorers of arcane matters […] whom the recondite powers of 
words, the abstruse energies of utterances and the divine characters of secret 
names excite, have been detected in our age (in so far as I judge it correctly) to 
draw away considerably from the most ancient tracks of the first philosophers and 
err gravely concerning the operations of mysteries, most full of wonderful effects; 
and especially for this reason, that either because of the fleeting obscurity of 
figures which have been obliterated, or perverse and faulty alterations by 
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librarians, these symbols of that sacred philosophy and most venerable seals of 
supernatural powers, have not been able to be read, let alone understood.69 
 
From the above quote, it is clear that Reuchlin intends to write an apologia for "magic" in 
terms familiar to a long-standing tradition of explaining "causality." What he describes – 
the powers of words, the energies of utterances, and secret names – can hardly refer to 
anything else or even be meant allegorically, since he goes on refer to "operations of 
mysteries" and "wonderful effects." Moreover, by attributing the grave errors of "certain 
diligent explorers of arcane matters" to problems of language, which, he suggests, are the 
result of a failure to copy, read, or understand correctly, Reuchlin isolates the formula in 
the theology of his argument. Thus he casts the "magical" formulae – whatever they 
might be – as deficient from the very beginning of his text. Reuchlin's proposed solution, 
as we will see, is a new formula – the name of Jesus, albeit in Hebrew –, which thus 
addresses the weakness we have addressed in the theories of magic proposed by both 
Ficino and Pico, for by proposing a new formula – YHSWH, the Pentagrammaton – 
Reuchlin proposes a theory of magic that is contingent upon Christian truth.  
 This part of our comparison – the formula that Reuchlin develops– is well 
researched. Briefly, Reuchlin argues that, as the language of God's original revelation, the 
Hebrew language does have a special efficacious potential, but, that, since the time of the 
incarnation of Jesus, the Shem ha-Mephorash is no longer the verbum mirificum 
("wonder-working word") referred to in the title. The Tetragrammaton (YHWH) has been 
superseded and replaced by the Pentagrammaton (YHSWH) as the efficacious name of 
                                                
69 Zika (1976), 23. 
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God. This is the logic that has been traced in other studies.70 In consequence, we focus 
the efforts of our comparison here primarily on the significance of the rite and the 
condition of the performer in each text, working within the logics we have been tracing.  
 Significantly, in De Verbo Mirifico, Reuchlin stipulates belief – conversion to 
Christianity – as the requisite condition of the performer. This move allows Reuchlin to 
offer De Verbo Mirifico as an apologia akin to the late antique Christian apologiae of 
Justin Martyr and the anonymous author of the Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila in which 
the efficacious power of the older formulae (e.g. names) is lost with the institution of the 
new covenant (i.e. Jesus). More than this, by stipulating conversion – belief – as the 
requisite condition of the performer, he also embraces the effect – if not the mechanism – 
of Aquinas' demonology. Because Reuchlin's theory of magic is contingent not only upon 
"Jesus" as formula, but also upon belief in Jesus as condition of the performer, he limits 
the liceity of efficacious ritual to its exercise under the auspices of the institutional 
Church. 
 Yet Reuchlin's apologia for magic in De Verbo Mirifico is at least partially open-
ended. While the majority of the text is devoted to the formula and the condition of the 
performer, Reuchlin offers very little description of the rite. Cleverly, he has couched the 
revelation of the formula as reward for achieving the requisite condition of the performer 
as believer. The efficacious Pentagrammaton is not revealed to the initiates until they 
                                                
70 See, for example: Charles Zika, "Reuchlin's De Verbo Mirifico and the Magic Debate of the Late Fifteenth 
Century," Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 39 (1976): 104-138. See also: Robert J. 
Wilkinson, Tetragrammaton: Western Christians and the Hebrew Name of God: from the Beginnings to the 
Seventeenth Century (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2015). See also: Chaim Wirszubski, Pico Della Mirandola's Encounter 
with Jewish Mysticism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989). See also: Wilhelm Schmidt-
Biggemann, Philosophia Perennis: Historical Outlines of Western Spirituality in Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern 
Thought (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011) especially 59-128. 
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have embraced the "truth" of Christianity. However, the rite – the ritual application of the 
formula – is only very vaguely described. This is of particular interest because of the 
significance of the rite in Aquinas' theory of magic, which he determines must 
necessarily involve idolatry and a demonic pact. Clearly, this is Reuchlin's way of not 
engaging directly with Aquinas. Yet, as is evident in the prefatory letter we have already 
cited, Reuchlin's view of the "secret powers of names" as "symbols of that sacred 
philosophy and most venerable seals of supernatural powers" seems quite favorable. The 
problem, for Reuchlin, is "the fleeting obscurity of figures which have been obliterated, 
or perverse and faulty alterations by librarians." Reuchlin refrains from issuing any 
blanket criticisms of the rites in those texts, even, as we will see, when discussing some 
of them specifically. In this, Reuchlin attempts to satisfy both the institutionalized Church 
and the new desiderata identified by Pico and Reuchlin in their attempts to move beyond 
Aquinas. 
Though Reuchlin does not press the argument he so carefully sets up to its logical 
end, it clearly implies that he could reclaim as legitimate (i.e. licit) a number of existing 
texts of ritual magic by explaining that the figures and names (to which William of 
Auvergne so vehemently objected as communications with demons) were not original to 
the text, but rather, had been "obliterated," or "perversely altered." Whatever is 
objectionable to the theologians could be dismissed as a corruption of the text resulting 
from insufficient knowledge of the original language(s) – a nice dodge to the questions of 
Church authority/authorization that Aquinas had highlighted. Of course, this strategy 
could be applied to any number of texts – pagan as well as Jewish –, but as the narrative 
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of De Verbo Mirifico unfolds, it becomes increasingly clear what sort of text it is that 
interests Reuchlin.  
The triologue format of the text between a pagan, a Jew, and a Christian allows 
Reuchlin to separate himself from any implicit objections even as he makes statements 
that approach the limits of the acceptable. Reuchlin puts the words in the mouth of the 
pagan Sidonius, and not in that of his alter-ego, the Christian Capnion: 
[Josephus] says indeed in his eighth book of 'Antiquities' that for the good of 
mankind Solomon had invented an art to be used against daemons, spells against 
sickness, and a method of conjuration.71 
 
and still more when, again in the voice of Sidonius, he confirms: 
 
Robert, Bacon, Abanus, Picatrix and the whole council of masters could 
appreciate and teach none of this properly, as it should be done, chiefly because 
they did not know the languages.72 
 
Once again, the strong implication is that what is wrong with these texts (as they were 
known at the end of the fifteenth century and implicitly working against those following 
Aquinas) is primarily the corrupted state of the language. By contrast, Reuchlin has 
surprisingly little to say about the nature of the rite in these texts, a fact to which we will 
return below. 
In fact, Sidonius' comments uphold the basic idea of "secret names" and the 
"powers of words" which Reuchlin first associates with the apocryphal Solomon 
                                                
71 Reuchlin's original Latin reads: "Ait enim ille antiquitatum octavo, Salomonem contra daemones artem ad utilitatem 
hominum et eorum curas invenisse, incantatmenta contra aegritudines instituisse, modum etiam coniurationum." See 
Johannes Reuchlin, De Verbo Mirifico: (1494) = Das Wundertätige Wort (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-
Holzboog, 1996) 122. The English translation is from Michael Mitchell's Hidden Mutualities: Faustian Themes from 
Gnostic Origins to the Postcolonial (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006) 35. 
72 Reuchlin's Latin reads: "Nihil igitur horum Roberthus et Bacon et Abanus et Picatrix et concilius magistrorum, vel 
maxime ob linguarum ignorantiam ad amissim, ut opportet, tenere atque docere, …" 124. Once again, the English 
translation is from Mitchell (35). 
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narrative through reference to Josephus' Antiquities, and then through reference to a list 
of specific medieval magical texts. Each of the names Reuchlin lists through the voice of 
Sidonius is the supposed author of a medieval manual or ritual magic associated with the 
Solomonic tradition of demon compulsion. "Robert" probably refers here to Rupertus 
Lombardus (dates not known), to whom, along with Roger Bacon (c. 1219/20 – 1292), a 
work of Solomonic demon compulsion known as De nigromancia was attributed.73 The 
inclusion of "Picatrix" in this list reflects the late medieval misconception that what is in 
fact the title of the work was the name of its author. We have previously discussed the 
connections with the apocryphal Solomon narrative in Picatrix. "Abanus" refers to Pietro 
D'Abano (c. 1257-1316) who was thought to have been the author of a medieval work 
known as "Heptameron." Joseph Peterson has argued that the Heptameron shows signs of 
being indebted to the Liber Razielis.74 This brings us to our discussion of the Liber 
Razielis as the unmentioned but more probable direct source for Reuchlin. 
Although in his later magico-theological work, De Arte Cabalistica, Reuchlin 
makes a clear reference to the Liber Razielis by incorporating part of its frame story into 
his description of the origin of Kabbalah,75 he makes no such overt reference to it in the 
early De Verbo Mirifico. Clearly, Reuchlin was aware of other medieval manuals of ritual 
magic, as evidenced by Sidonius' list, yet, as we have said, he is known to have owned at 
                                                
73 There is a modern edition of this text in English translation: Roger Bacon and Michael-Albion Macdonald, De 
Nigromancia (Gillette, N.J: Heptangle Books, 1988). 
74 Peterson writes, "Note that the theoretical framework for the text is indebted to Sepher Razielis, though redacted or 
adapted." See: Joseph H. Peterson, Peter De Abano: Heptameron, or Magical Elements (N.P.: Esoteric Archives, 1998. 
Web. 29 July 2017. <http://www.esotericarchives.com/solomon/heptamer.htm>). 
75 Johannes Reuchlin, On the Art of the Kabbalah =: De Arte Cabalistica (Lincoln [etc.: University of Nebraska Press, 
1993) 69,79,83. For more discussion about Reuchlin's incorporation of the Raziel narrative, see: Schmidt-Biggemann 
98. 
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least part of copy of the Liber Razielis. However, Reuchlin's attested ownership of the 
text is not the only reason to suspect its influence on his early magico-religious thought.  
This text is of particular interest to us because it enjoyed a unique status among 
manuals of ritual magic at the time that Reuchlin wrote De Verbo Mirifico. Preeminent 
scholar of the Jewish Kabbalah, Moshe Idel, has remarked that, as far as we know, Sefer 
Raziel is the only major document written in the first stage of the Spanish Kabbalah that 
was translated into any European language before the Renaissance.76 Thus, the Sefer 
Raziel in Latin translation would have been one of the few Jewish texts that Reuchlin 
(and Pico before him) would have been able to read without the aid of a translator when 
Reuchlin composed De Verbo Mirifico early on in his study Hebrew and the Jewish 
Kabbalah. 
 Like Picatrix, the Sefer Raziel had been translated into Latin (as Liber Razielis) 
and was circulating in Europe already in the thirteenth century as a result of the interests 
of Alfonso X ("the Wise") of Castile, León, and Galicia (1221-1284), who ordered those, 
and numerous other foreign texts translated.77 As we have already mentioned, both texts 
were well known at the end of the fifteenth century. They are, in fact, the first two texts 
of the 38 texts of "demonic" magic described by Trithemius in his Antipalus. Moreover, 
both texts make overt and explicit reference to the apocryphal narrative of Solomon's 
                                                
76 Idel 233. 
77 Other important translations include the Siete Partidas and the Lapidario. For further discussion of the translations 
produced at Alfonso's behest, see: Francis Tobienne, The Position of Magic in Selected Medieval Spanish Texts 
(Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2008) 50-51. 
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power over demons. The frame narrative of some of the Latin versions of the Liber 
Razielis even claims Solomonic authorship.78  
Scholars have already demonstrated the circulation of these texts in the Italian 
Renaissance. Geoffrey Pearce attributes Ficino's knowledge astrological magic to 
Picatrix,79 and Frances Yates notes that there was a copy of Picatrix in Pico della 
Mirandola's library.80 Scholars have also demonstrated that a number of other pieces of 
Solomonic magical pseudepigrapha were read by the circle of Lorenzo de' Medici in 
Florence and noted that several authors mention the Sefer Razi'el, which they attributed to 
King Solomon.81 Nicolas of Cusa (1401-1464) cites a book "qui Salomoni inscribitur et 
vocantur Sepher Raziel" in the first part of his Sermo I, De nominibus.82 Yet unlike 
Picatrix, which was "pagan" (Arabic astrology), the Liber Razielis was Jewish. It was 
possibly the only piece of Jewish Kabbalah circulating in Latin before Reuchlin began his 
studies of Hebrew, and Reuchlin owned a copy. 
What little is known about the Liber Razielis manuscript that Reuchlin owned is 
gleaned from a letter to Reuchlin dated July 20, 1515, from his friend, Lorenz Behaim. In 
the letter Behaim reminds Reuchlin of Reuchlin's having gifted him the seventh book of 
                                                
78 Don Karr offers a useful survey of the so-called 'Solomonic cycle" of magic texts and some discussion of the 
problems of determining exactly what makes (or doesn't make) a ritual text "Solomonic." See: Donn Karr and Stephen 
Skinner, Sepher Raziel, Also Known As Liber Salomonis: A 1564 English Grimoire from Sloane Ms 3826 (Singapore: 
Golden Hoard Press, 2010) 25-47. 
79 Yates 73. See also "Ficino and Astrology," in Michael Shepherd, Friend to Mankind: Marsilio Ficino, 1433-1499 
(London: Shepheard-Walwyn, 1999) 109. 
80 Yates observes, "The Latin Picatrix was certainly circulating a good deal in the Italian Renaissance" (50). 
81 See: Moshe Idel, "The Magical and Neoplatonic Interpretations of the Kabbalah in the Renaissance." Essential 
Papers on Jewish Culture in Renaissance and Baroque Italy, edited by David B. Ruderman (New York: New York 
University Press, 1992) pp. 107–169, here 112. 
82 "Cusanus cites a book 'qui Salomoni inscribitur et vocantur Sepher Raziel' in the first part of his Sermo I, De 
nominibus (Cusanus, Opera omnia, vol. 17, Sermones I.1, ed. R. Haubst et al. [Hamburg, 1970], p. 6.). 
 
  178 
the Liber Razielis during their travels together in Rome in 1498 in search of Hebrew 
books.83 While the letter would seem to provide very little to go on, two details are 
significant. The first is the date. By 1498, Reuchlin was either done with his copy of the 
manuscript or had a copy to spare. This alone does not prove that he had consulted it in 
the composition of De Verbo Mirifico, but, because of another detail, it does give us some 
insight into the kind of texts Reuchlin probably had at the time he wrote De Verbo 
Mirifico a few years earlier in 1494.  
The second detail is Behaim's reference to the seventh book specifically. The 
Liber Razielis consists of seven "books," each of which is named individually. Sophie 
Page informs us that the seventh book of the original Alfonsine translation (or 
compilation) was substituted soon after its translation for the Liber virtutis, which was an 
abridged version of an appended work called Liber Semaforas84: 
Contemporaneously with the construction of Alfonso's volume, a Liber 
institutionis Razielis, with the incipit "In prima huius proemii parte de angulis 
tractemus," was condemned in the influential Speculum astronomiae. On the basis 
                                                
83 Posset suggests that, "Reuchlin was perhaps the first to have retrieved it from the tradition of the Jews or he picked it 
from a Latin translation, namely the Liber Razielis (in seven parts). Since he did not have much use for it because of its 
content of 'magic,' he had given it away, i.e. the seventh book, whereby it is not clear whether he possessed the other 
six parts or not. The recipient of his gift was Lorenz Behaim with whom Reuchlin had roamed around Rome in 1498 in 
search of Hebrew books. When Behaim returned from Rome to a position at the main church in Bamberg he reminded 
Reuchlin in his letter of 20 July 1515 of their shared experience in Rome and the fact that Reuchlin had given him the 
seventh part of the Book Raziel which he liked to carry with him always and everywhere" (653). See also: Reuchlin 
Briefwechsel III, 236-241, lines 17-20 (#272), and note 10 on p. 237, as cited in Posset 653. 
84 Sophie Page, "Uplifting Souls: The Liber De Essentia Spiritum and the Liber Razielis," Invoking Angels: Theurgic 
Ideas and Practices, Thirteenth to Sixteenth Centuries (University Park: Penn State Univ, 2015) 79-112, here 82."This 
Alfonsine Liber Razielis is structured in the form of seven books said to have been brought together by Solomon, to 
which a number of related texts from the Solomonic and Hermetic magical traditions were added as appendices. Each 
book focuses on a different element of magical practice: the Liber clavis on astrology, the Liber Ale on natural magic, 
the Liber thymiama on suffumigations, the Liber temporum on angels associated with divisions of time, the Liber 
mundicie et abstentie with cleanliness and abstinence, and the Liber Sameyn on the angels of heaven. Two different 
versions of the seventh book circulated: the Liber magice, which focused on image magic, and the Liber virtutis, and 
abridged version of the first appended work, the Liber Semaforas (Semhemaforas, Semiphoras, Seminafora, Semforas), 
which was concerned with names of power. The preface to the Alfonsine Liber Razielis cites a Hebrew original for the 
compilation, the 'Çeffer Raziel, qoud vult dicere in ebrayco Volumen secretorum Dei,' although it is likely that the 
structure is partly if not entirely a creation of Alfonso himself and his translators." 
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of the Speculum astronomiae's focus on image magic, this work has been 
identified with the Liber magice. It therefore seems likely that the Liber magice 
was replaced at some point with the Liber Semaforas by an influential copyist in 
order to avert criticism, and the names of the books themselves can be viewed as 
expressive of this aim.85  
 
Given this history of the seventh book of the Liber Razielis, as well as their mutual 
interest in Hebrew books, it seems likely that the gift Behaim received from Reuchlin 
was some version of the Liber Semaforas rather than of the original Liber magice. 
 An investigation of the content of the Liber vertutis, the abridged version of the 
Liber Semamforas, would appear to confirm our suspicions. Its brief introduction 
explains that the "semiforas" were given to Adam in paradise and describes their various 
applications according to Adam's uses of them. With the first, he spoke to God in 
paradise; with the second to angels, with the third to devils, with the fourth to men and 
animals. With the fifth, he spoke to plants and growing things; with the sixth, the 
elements. With the seventh, we are told, he spoke to the sun, the moon, and the planets.86 
The various "semiforas," as they are given in the text, mostly appear to be litanies of 
simple verba ignota with an admixture of a few recognizable Hebrew names.87 These 
names (as the author sometimes refers to them) are supposed to be derived from the 
Tetragrammaton, but there is no indication as to how this was done. 
Given the limited information, a comparison between the Liber Virtutis (i.e. the 
seventh book of the Liber Razielis) and Reuchlin's De Verbo Mirifico cannot be 
conclusively demonstrate whether, or to what extent, Reuchlin was influenced by all or 
                                                
85 Page 82. 
86 Karr 222. 
87 See, for example, Karr's effort to make sense of the third Semiforas: "Adona[i], Sabaoth, Adonay, Cados [Kadosh], 
Addona, Annora" (223).  
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any part of the Liber Razielis. However, that is not the only possible value of the 
comparison. The comparison is valuable in its own right, for it points to the similarity 
between Reuchlin's first work of "Christian Cabala" and the medieval discourse of 
Solomonic magic. Thus, whether or not Reuchlin's De Verbo Mirifico can be 
demonstrated to be a direct product of the discourse, it would have been at least 
recognizable within it. 
 It is important to note that not all scholars would consider De Verbo Mirifico a 
work of Christian Kabbalah. The opinion among scholars that De Verbo Mirifico is not 
Kabbalistic results from the fact that Reuchlin's two magico-theological works are quite 
different and fall on opposite sides of an epistemological divide in modern scholarship. 
Kabbalah scholar Moshe Idel provides a description of that divide that helps to clarify the 
difficult position of De Verbo Mirifico in modern scholarship:  
The dominant scholarly definition of Kabbalah regards its crucial component as a 
concern with the ten divine powers, the ten sefirot. In line with this view, Jewish 
Kabbalah emerged in Languedoc in the last decades of the twelfth century, and 
Christian Kabbalah in the final decades of the thirteenth. But if we turn to another 
way of defining the Kabbalah, found already in the eleventh century, as an 
esoteric tradition concerning divine names, the situation becomes much more 
complex. Indeed some passages dealing with divine names recur in Christian texts 
recur in Christian texts early in the thirteenth century[…]88 
 
Idel's comments draw our attention to an important fact that is important for Reuchlin's 
case: the definition of Kabbalah as necessarily – and even exclusively – pertaining to the 
sefirot is a modern scholarly convention, not necessarily a historic one. Reuchlin's later 
De Arte Cabalistica, thus fits the universally accepted definition of Kabbalah as it is 
                                                
88 Idel (2011), 227. 
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concerned with the ten sefirot. However, if one includes shemot (divine names) as part of 
Kabbalah, the implications change. For example, whether or not Reuchlin's first magico-
theological text, De Verbo Mirifico, is "Kabbalistic" or not depends on one's definition of 
"Kabbalah." 
 On a certain level, this observation is no more than axiomatic (i.e. Whether a 
token is included in a type will depend upon how the type is described). However, in the 
case of Reuchlin's De Verbo Mirifico and the comparison we will make in the following 
between it and the Liber Razielis, this observation is quite significant. The reason for this, 
put bluntly, it is the difference between, on the one hand, suggesting that Reuchlin had 
tried to Christianize two different varieties of one "type" (i.e. Kabbalah), and, on the 
other, suggesting that before trying to Christianize the Kabbalah, Reuchlin tried to 
Christianize nigromantia (i.e. "black" or "demonic" magic) – in other words, two 
different "types" of magic. Because of the association within Christian discourse of an 
"esoteric tradition concerning divine names" (Idel's description of the Kabbalistic 
tradition of shemot) with nigromantia ("demonic magic") going all the way back to the 
earliest Christian Contra-Iudaeos apologia, the implication is that if Reuchlin's use of 
divine names in De Verbo Mirifico is not "Kabbalistic," then it must represent medieval 
magic. In fact, both are true. 
Idel's observation allows us to appreciate Reuchlin's De Verbo Mirifico as both 
Kabbalistic, and, to some extent, at least, nigromantic. If we return to the axiom, we see 
what is at stake in his text identification: if the description of a type determines the 
inclusion or exclusion of a token, then whoever describes the type therefore also 
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determines the inclusion or exclusion of a given token (or tokens). Within Christian 
theological discourse, then, the token of Solomonic demon compulsion (both Christian 
and Jewish) is excluded from religion as "type" and included in nigromantia because the 
theologians who contributed to those descriptions were institutionally empowered to 
"describe." With this in mind, we suggest that Reuchlin's first work of Christian Cabala, 
his De Verbo Mirifico, specifically chose its inspiration from a text that was known to 
medieval Christendom as a Solomonic grimoire, the Liber Razielis, since its status as 
nigromantia within Christian discourse does not preclude its status as "Kabbalah" within 
a Jewish discourse, which Reuchlin was attempting to syncretize. Moreover, for the 
purposes of the present discussion, it is ultimately of less concern whether modern 
scholarship should include "esoteric tradition concerning divine names" in its definitions 
of Kabbalah than it is of concern whether Pico and Reuchlin considered it part of the 
Kabbalah. Clearly, they did. 
Returning now to our points of comparison, we may appreciate how the two texts 
line up. The formula in the Liber virtutis consists of litanies of divine names. There is no 
indication of their having been derived through gematria. As with Reuchlin's 
Pentagrammaton, they are simply transformations. In both texts, the names are 
"revealed," not derived. The Shem ha-Mephorash, we are told, was revealed to Adam in 
Paradise and Reuchlin's Pentagrammaton was revealed as the coming of Jesus. In the 
case of both the Liber Razielis and De Verbo Mirifico, the text provides the reader with 
divine names (i.e. "magic words") to use, and not with a means for deriving them as is the 
case with gematria. Reuchlin's use of the condition of the performer we have already 
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noted: his theory of efficacy requires conversion – belief – of the person who wishes to 
work miracles by the Pentagrammaton.89 By comparison, the full version of the Liber 
Razielis devotes its entire fifth book, Liber mundicie et abstentie (Book of cleanliness and 
abstinence) to "purity." Its frame narrative reports: 
And Solomon said about Semiforas, "These are necessary with meekness, fasting, 
with orison [prayer], belief, clarity, purity, patience, meekness and constancy of a 
man, without which you might work nothing. And with [these qualities] you shall 
get whatever you wish."90  
 
Even the abridged version of the Liber Virtutis specifies, "And these are letters piteously, 
devoutly, and meekly named [so] that petitions for all things [may be] fulfilled."91 Both 
in its long and short forms, the Liber Razielis (Liber Virtutis) also require "belief." 
Finally, we return to the rite. As it is described in the Liber Virtutis, it involves 
speaking to God, angels, demons, animals, plants, elements, etc. in such a way that one 
can be heard by those invoked. Simplistic though it is, this model could serve Reuchlin in 
an argument against the prevalent model of Aquinas' demonology since according to such 
a model, while demon compulsion is possible, it is not necessary. If the name(s) of God 
can move angels, men, beasts, and elements directly, demonic intercession is 
unnecessary. Yet Reuchlin goes a step further in having Capnion claim that man does not 
in fact perform miracles. "This of course, as his Jewish interlocutor is later to point out, is 
to misunderstand Capnion and wholly ignore the possibility of agents and the use of 
                                                
89 Zika (2003) comments, "Capnion continues the preparation for the revelation of the wonderworking word with a 
kind of purgative rite. The three disputants are to offer themselves to the divine light, and with closed senses, allow the 
rain of supercelestial waters to descend on their heads – meanwhile praising and adoring with quiet minds the 'sea of 
goodness,' from which the flood of the most divine river of all wonders, of all marvelous names and sacred words, 
derives and emanates" (39). 
90 Karr 216. 
91 Karr 222. 
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metaphor in speech. We may say that men do miracles by the spirit of God, but what we 
actually mean is that God himself does them through men."92 With that explanation, not 
only does Reuchlin evade the Scholastic demonological trap of demonic pacts in his 
theory of causality, he also continues to offer an implicit apologia for texts of Jewish 
magic by putting the clarification in the mouth of Baruchias: the texts have been 
'misunderstood' by the Scholastic theologians and can indeed be recovered for the 
contemporaneous audience. 
 Such similarities between Reuchlin's earliest magico-theological work with 
particular parts of the medieval book of nigromantia known as the Liber Razielis, finally, 
suggests how the previous chapter's discussion of the apocryphal narrative of Solomon's 
power over demons connects to the discussion in the following chapter, which connects 
the Vom Schemhamphoras (1543) of Martin Luther to the same discourse. We have 
demonstrated that, whether or not Reuchlin's earliest magico-theological work of 
Christian Cabala was directly influenced by all or part of the Liber Razielis, the 
hypothesis of how Reuchlin's work relates to the Solomonic tradition is plausible and the 
comparison is fruitful, demonstrating the continued engagement with the apocryphal 
narrative of Solomon's power over demons both directly, with unio magica allusive 
references to the figure of Solomon, and indirectly, through the continued influence of 
Aquinas' anti-magic demonology, which he constructed through instrumentalization of 
the paradigmatic condition of the performer.  
                                                
92 Zika (2003), 41. 
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 The magical apologiae of Ficino and Pico had attempted to legitimize magic by 
providing for a condition of the performer that was achievable outside of the institutional 
Church. In De Verbo Mirifico, however, Reuchlin provides a theory of "magical" 
causality entirely dependent upon God and contingent upon a condition of the performer 
– conversion to Christianity –, which in 1494 before the Reformation, was within the 
control of the institutional Church. 
 
Conclusion 
The connections of history and theology sketched here are critical to tying in 
Renaissance thought to the theology of Aquinas, and thus to the dominant Church beliefs. 
During the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, before Luther composed his Small 
Catechism (1529) and Vom Schemhamphoras (1543), to which we turn in the following 
chapter, multiple humanist-magicians, and humanist magician-theologians had been 
decades at work reframing theories of "magic" in ways that would sidestep Aquinas' 
prohibitions of magic as explicit or implicit demonic pact and, with them, the dangerous 
charge of heresy after the promulgation of the "Witch Bull" in 1484.  
Those humanist theologians making experiments most relevant to this study, 
Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499), Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494), and Johannes 
Reuchlin (1455-1522), all produced influential philosophico-religious and philosophico-
magical humanist works on the eve of the Reformation. Each of these humanists – two 
Italians and a German – offers an alternative theory of magical efficacy (efficacious 
ritual) in his writings, and all of them were also framing their responses as reactions to 
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the apocryphal Solomon narrative, or at least significant parts of it. Evidence suggesting 
that none of them escaped it entirely can be found in the ways which each of them 
attempted to reframe the narrative.  
Given their relationship to the apocryphal Solomon narrative and the Shem ha-
Mephorash, it follows that Luther's Vom Schemhamphoras was also directed at the 
philosophico-religious and philosophico-magical humanist works of Ficino, Pico, and 
Reuchlin, as we will demonstrate in the next chapter of the present study. These 
connections support some of the more recent innovations in Renaissance studies, such as 
the arguments of Erika Rummel in The Confessionalization of Humanism (2000) and 
others who have challenged older assumptions regarding Reuchlin's status as "proto-
Reformer" and the relationship of the Reformation to humanism in general.93 
My account adds texture to theirs, but also goes further in tying the humanists and 
the Reformation into the Church's hegemonic theologies. From the perspective pursued in 
the present study, these humanists, and others like them (far more than Luther, as we 
shall see), obscured the figure of Solomon in their respective reframings of magic and so 
(to greater or lesser degrees) began to shift theories of magic away from models of overt 
demon compulsion. In this, they moved in the direction already delineated as licit by 
Aquinas, but also simultaneously amplified what demon compulsion (licit or illicit) 
meant, clearly implicating in it what was coming to be known as natural theology. And 
                                                
93 See: Erika Rummel, The Confessionalization of Humanism in Reformation Germany (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), especially 29, where she writes, "The idea that humanists were either forerunners of or comrades-in-arms 
with the Reformation was kept alive in both Protestant and Catholic historiography until the middle of the century. In 
this manner humanism became an issue in the Reformation debate and its champions implicated in questions that were 
peripheral to the primary mission of the movement, which was cultural. 
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they did so in full awareness that they were close to crossing lines within the theological 
tradition based on Aquinas – at least that they were drawing a broader picture than he 
had.  
We thus have come full circle and returned here to the attack on the apocryphal 
Solomon narrative, which we mentioned earlier. During the late medieval and early 
modern period, most scholars agree, the relationship of the apocryphal Solomon narrative 
to new theories of ritual magic (Ficino, Pico, Reuchlin, et al.) and anti-magic theology 
changed noticeably. The work accomplished in this chapter suggests, however, that these 
changes are best understood by approaching them not as a single cause and effect, but 
rather as a chain of causes and effects that reveal several layers of implication for this 
documented shift.  
To begin, the figure of Solomon did not recede from the narrative as a direct 
result of Aquinas' definition and prohibition of magic as explicit or implicit demonic 
pact.94 In fact, judging from the subsequent proliferation of Solomonic pseudoepigrapha 
traced at the beginning of this chapter, Aquinas seems to have inadvertently promoted 
interest in Solomonic magic by acknowledging it. However, the later elevation of 
witchcraft to the capital crime of heresy in the "Witch Bull" depended upon Aquinas' 
theory of magic as the effects of explicit or implicit demonic pacts. Nevertheless, even 
the potentially deadly consequences of being discovered with a text of Solomonic ritual 
magic cannot be credited with the shift away from overt references to Solomon in 
                                                
94 The logic of the Solomonic paradigm is that man can compel a demon without a pact. Aquinas argues that that is a 
deception and that in such cases the pact is nevertheless present, but implicit. 
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sixteenth-century texts, for numerous manuscripts survived the sixteenth century and still 
others were composed in the seventeenth.  
Interestingly enough, it would appear to be both of these conditions (Aquinas' 
addition of the "implicit pact" and the elevation of witchcraft to the crime of heresy) 
combined with the advent of publishing and an early turn in the development of 
intellectual property that pushed published theories of magic away from the apocryphal 
narrative of Solomon.95 To be sure, each of these humanists would have been free to read 
and write magical texts after the Solomonic model (admittedly at their own peril), but not 
to publish them, let alone to do so under their own names. The desire for recognition as 
author at the advent of book publishing in a context that included both the censorship of 
publications for heresy and the possibility of severe consequences (i.e. either punishment 
for the crime of heresy or the humiliation of a forced retraction/recantation of one's 
intellectual property) appears to have created a newly augmented perfect storm aimed at 
suppressing the visible traces of the figure of Solomon and demon compulsion from 
published late medieval and early modern models of "magic." 
The attack on the figure of Solomon in the apocryphal narrative materials 
associated with the problem of magic as demon compulsion thus came in the forms of 
both external persecution in anti-magic theology written by orthodox theologians and 
internal adaptation to theories of magic by published magician-theologians. In the 
Northern Renaissance especially, the cumulative effect of these competing forces in this 
new phase in the debate codified by Aquinas resulted in a shift in emphasis from the 
                                                
95 Evidence in support of this theory may be found in the continuous interest in the apocryphal Solomon narrative in 
anonymous or pseudepigraphic magical manuscripts, which were obviously never intended for publication. 
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figure of the wise Solomon to the content of his wisdom: the ineffable and efficacious 
name of God. The idea of the Shem ha-Mephorash, which is demonstrably connected 
with the Solomon narrative as far back as the Greek Magical Papyri,96 now provided a 
renewed focal point for the same apocryphal narrative of demon compulsion they had 
inherited, but a focal point which allowed for the inclusion of the figure of Solomon by 
implication rather than by name, thus side-stepping the existing prohibitions against 
books attributed to Solomon in the theological writings already mentioned.97 
The history of a new era of study of classical texts also clearly plays a role. The 
effects of humanist scholarship no doubt also influenced the approaches of Renaissance 
humanist theologian-magicians to the apocryphal narrative of Solomon's power over 
demons. Advances in textual scholarship ushered in with Renaissance humanism would 
thus also have been at least partly responsible for the decline in interest in medieval Latin 
texts of Solomonic ritual such as those discussed in the previous chapter. Today, we 
know that the very scholars who were most interested in these texts of magical 
pseudoepigrapha were also the most capable of determining them to be fakes, forgeries, 
or tendentious revisions. The humanist drive to return ad fontes (to the sources) would 
have driven scholars behind such Latin pseudepigrapha.  
However, as we pointed out in the introduction to this project, the Latin tradition 
of the apocryphal narrative is not the only one to preserve narratives about Solomonic 
magic. Two texts in particular came into the Latin tradition from elsewhere, both of them 
                                                
96 Refer to our discussion in Chapter 1. 
97 We refer to the explicit prohibitions of particular "Solomonic" texts as with William of Auvergne (already 
discussed) and to prohibitions like that of the Index librorum prohibitorum (also already discussed). 
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during the thirteenth century in the Castilian court of Alfonso X "the Wise" (1221-1284). 
These were the Arabic Picatrix and the Hebrew Sepher Raziel. Both of these texts refer to 
Solomon's power over demons. While the Picatrix, which is a compilation, is not 
attributed to Solomon's authorship in its entirety, the Sepher Raziel is. These texts, as we 
have argued, came to the fore again as part of the Hebrew corpus that had caught the 
humanists' attention. 
With this analysis, we also set the stage for the final stage of the present project: 
the contextualization of Luther's work on Kabbalah and magic within the tradition of 
Solomonic demon compulsion and the theological debates associated with it. As we shall 
see, the absence of any reference to the figure of Solomon in Luther's Vom 
Schemhamphoras should thus be understood as an "evolutionary response": evolutions in 
the prey (i.e. the "magician") necessitate evolutions in the predator (i.e. the theologian). 
Because these humanist magicians had shifted their published theories of "magic" away 
from reliance on the figure of Solomon, Luther's anti-magic response could not attack 
them there, and so he had to reply to them on the ground they already had staked out, 
while furthering his own project in texts that today baffle some scholars, but which open 
out as interesting cultural-theological documents in this reading context.  
As we shall see, Luther's theological ambitions made his responses difficult.  
Luther's anti-magic strategy seeks to undermine the narrative at the level of belief in the 
possibility of human agency within the causal chain addressed by these earlier 
theologians and humanists – and significantly, not at the level of belief in supernatural 
agency, for Luther does not dismiss the agency of the devil and his evil angels. In 
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consequence, Luther creates an argument that becomes applicable both inside and beyond 
an explicitly Solomonic paradigm.  
Nevertheless, absence of the overt reference to the apocryphal Solomonic 
narrative in humanist writings need not be understood as an abandonment of the 
paradigm. As we have seen, moreover, especially in the writings of Reuchlin, much of 
the apocryphal narrative often remained palpable, a source of narratives for authorization 
about knowledge well into the early modern period. The Solomonic narrative materials 
were no medieval relict forms, but active parts of ongoing theological debates. 
  
 










PURITY AS THE PRESENCE-OF-FAITH: 




The present chapter extends the discussion of "purity" as the requisite condition of 
the performer within the Christian discourses of demon compulsion from the previous 
ones by examining fundamental differences between the changes in theological 
assumptions and constructs of what we have identified as "purity" between the new 
Protestant theology of Martin Luther on the one hand, and those of the medieval 
Scholastic theology that preceded them, on the other. In Luther's theology Christian ideas 
of demon compulsion do again arise, focusing specifically on what Malinowski isolates 
as the condition of the performer in his tripartite analysis of "magic." As we shall see, 
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what is at stake in this comparison between Luther's anti-magic theological argument and 
his predecessors is a demonstrable continuity of the influence of the apocryphal narrative 
of Solomon's power over demons not only within Catholic Scholastic theology, but also 
from medieval Catholic magic/anti-magic discourse into the emergent discourse of 
Lutheran (and, by extension, post-Lutheran Protestant) theology. That is, the paradigm of 
conditional investiture with divine authority supported by the apocryphal Solomon 
narrative is the meridian along which this longitudinal study runs, and as such, part of the 
work of the present chapter remains devoted to demonstrating its continuity in Luther's 
anti-magic theology. That continuity grounds the main argument of the project as a whole 
– the spiritualization and metaphoricization of "purity" within Christian magic/anti-magic 
discourse and the implications of that process.  
I believe, first, that if such continuity can be demonstrated, then multiple related 
conclusions and observations are facilitated by an identifiably Lutheran construct of 
"faith" as requisite condition of the performer in discourses of both licit demon 
compulsion and illicit demon compulsion, i.e. "magic." The possibility of identifying 
texts of early modern ritual magic as being influenced by Protestant theology, as I already 
mentioned in the introduction of this project, is one of them.  
Yet perhaps more significant – and more broadly applicable – in taking up 
Luther's anti-magic polemics in light of precursor texts is the possibility of identifying 
"faith" as a further development in the spiritualization and metaphoricization of "purity" 
(i.e. faith-as-purity) with the movement of Christian sects further away from the Christian 
"Temple" (i.e. Jesus incarnate) in time and space. I stake this claim as a proposed 
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analogue to what Mary Douglas has posited concerning Jewish sects in relation to the 
Temple in Jerusalem: the fundamental discussions remain in place as religions change 
and adapt, but they need to be updated to remain relevant to new states of affairs (here: 
Luther's doctrine of sola fide and related theology). 
The previous chapter showed how the apocryphal Solomon narrative continued to 
be influential (even where it appears to be absent); it did so by tracing how the authors of 
published sixteenth century magico-theological texts generally avoided direct reference 
to the figure of Solomon and focused instead on what Malinowski isolates as the formula, 
in this case, the ineffable Hebrew name of God. Even in such cases, I argued, the 
Solomon narrative had nonetheless to remain implicit because, by that time, the formula 
(i.e. certain Hebrew names of God) had come to be so ubiquitously associated with the 
apocryphal accounts of Solomon's demon compulsion within the Christian discourse that 
explicit mention of Solomon was no longer necessary – the kind of allusive connection 
necessary for what Dorothea Salzer has theorized as unio magica had become a 
commonplace.1  
Thus if the previous chapter started as a seeming digression, it nonetheless 
demonstrates that the "magical" practices that confronted Martin Luther – particularly 
those originating in the Northern Renaissance – represented more of a continuation of 
medieval (Solomonic) demon compulsion than has been appreciated by previous 
scholars, who generally see a break in the theology and philosophy of magic between the 
                                                
1 Again, as Trachtenberg observes, the association was so strong that Solomon had become the prototypical magician 
and the "type" of magician (i.e. "Solomonic" magic). See Trachtenberg 63. 
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medieval period and the revival of Hermeticism in the Renaissance.2 That "digression," 
as we have seen, was not one: it grounds the present chapter in extending the longitudinal 
model proposed in this project as a whole, moving out from my demonstration that the 
apocryphal Solomon narrative continued to occupy a central role in the construction of 
"purity" in magic/anti-magic discourses in Lutheran theology even as the specific details 
of the Solomon narrative itself begin to recede from both the theological and magical 
sides of the published discourse (though not necessarily in the magical manuscript 
tradition).  
In this chapter, then, I suggest that the next development in that process of the 
spiritualization and metaphoricization of "purity" is Luther's theological construct of 
"faith" (like "grace," an abstract theological construct). His construct of "faith" depends 
upon a different understanding of "grace" than that of Aquinas and the Scholastics 
(integral to the previous instantiation of "purity" as the presence-of-grace). In 
consequence, the present chapter makes a brief but necessary digression into a 
comparison between Aquinas' and Luther's respective constructs of "grace." This 
                                                
2 For more discussion of this divide, see: Frank Klaassen, The Transformations of Magic: Illicit Learned Magic in the 
Later Middle Ages and Renaissance. University Park, Penn: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2013. Klaassen 
writes, "Until relatively recently, the historiography of illicit learned magic has fallen roughly into two streams [...]. In 
one, historians concentrated on the relationship between science and magic, and in the other on the relationship 
between religion and magic. Lynn Thorndike's eight-volume History of Magic and Experimental Science epitomizes 
the first approach. [...] Frances Yates significantly extended this approach to the Renaissance, emphasizing the 
connections with Renaissance magic, which she understood as fundamentally concerned with magic. In the other 
stream, which emphasizes the relationship between religion and magic, such scholars as Keith Thomas, Norman Cohn, 
and Edward Peters have examined the relationship of magic to broader cultural issues, and have worked to locate magic 
in the complex nexus of moral, legal, and religious thought. Thomas's classic Religion and the Decline of Magic 
assumed as its starting point that religion and magic were inextricably interwoven in the medieval period. Norman 
Cohn sought to understand the part that ritual magic played in late medieval conceptions of witchcraft and evil. 
Scholars have also tended tacitly to assume a division between magic before and after the 1480s, when Marsilio Ficino 
and Pico della Mirandola produced their powerful new syntheses. Some, like Frances Yates have explicitly contrasted 
medieval and Renaissance magic; but for the most part this has been an unspoken divide that few scholars have 
crossed" (6). 
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represents in some ways an ancillary argument but it allows me to suggest that the 
performance of acts of faith for the purpose of proving or increasing faith-as-purity3 may 
be understood as an efficacious ritual act analogous to the performance of ritual ablutions 
for the attainment of ritual purity (such as in ancient Judaism) and to ritual participation 
in the sacraments for the accumulation of sanctifying grace-as-purity (such as in 
Scholastic Catholicism).  
 The previous chapter unmasked the apocryphal Solomon narrative in the late 
fifteenth and early sixteenth century magic/anti-magic discourse in which, we have 
argued, its inclusion becomes implicit rather than explicit – covert rather than overt. That 
discourse focused on the ineffable name of God (e.g. Tetragrammaton or the Shem ha-
Mephorash) rather than the figure of Solomon in the early stages of print technology and 
print censorship, but which belongs to the same Christian discourse of demon 
compulsion, as we have shown. Now, we pick up our investigation of the spiritualization 
and metaphoricization of "purity" (as condition of the performer) where we left it off at 
the end of chapter 2, moving from the Scholastic-Thoman construct of "purity" as 
presence-of-grace (presented in chapter 2) to the sixteenth century Lutheran turn to purity 
as the presence-of-faith.  
                                                
3 Our formulation here of "proving or increasing faith" is not merely speculative or theoretical. In his Vom 
Schemhamphoras, Luther himself discusses "faith" in these terms. The following is from Gerhard Falk's translation of 
the work - the first English translation of that work - which appears in his 1992 The Jew in Christian Theology: "For as 
I plainly stipulated in [On the Jews and Their Lies], it is not my opinion that I can write against the Jews in the hope of 
converting them. That is why I did not call that pamphlet Against the Jews, but Against the Jews and Their Lies, so that 
we Germans may know from historical evidence what a Jew is so that we can warn our Christians against them as we 
warn against the Devil himself in order to strengthen and honor our belief [emphasis added]; not to convert the Jews 
which is about as possible as converting the Devil." See: Gerhard Falk, The Jew in Christian Theology: Martin Luther's 
"Vom Schem Hamphoras", Previously Unpublished in English, and Other Milestones in Church Doctrine Concerning 
Judaism (McFarland & Co., U.S, 1992) 166. 
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Yet the Christian theological anti-magic discourse becomes polyphonic with the 
rise of Reformation theology (i.e. that it develops distinct, contemporaneous Catholic and 
Lutheran anti-magic argumentation strategies). Because of this, it is also necessary to 
demonstrate the influence of the apocryphal Solomon narrative on Luther's theological 
ideas specifically since the trope of Solomon's demon compulsion also appears absent 
from Luther's writings.4 In consequence, we must also show that Luther is somehow 
responding to or operating within the apocryphal Solomon narrative in his anti-magic 
theology. To accomplish this, we will first and foremost need to demonstrate Luther's use 
of the unique narrative paradigm that we have been pursing: the conditional investiture of 
the human agent with divine authority in exchange/as reward for achieving and 
maintaining "purity." We will uncover evidence of the apocryphal Solomon narrative in 
Luther's implication and allusion in a discussion of the efficacious power of the name of 
God (i.e. Shem ha-Mephorash or Tetragrammaton) – that ineffable name familiar from 
both late antique references to the "Seal of Solomon" and medieval magic/anti-magic 
discourses of demon compulsion associated with Solomon.  
This strategy also allows us to adduce evidence that Luther recognized the efforts 
of the authors of Renaissance magico-theological texts (e.g. Ficino, Pico, and Reuchlin), 
who, as we argued in the previous chapter, were instrumental in obscuring the Solomonic 
narrative paradigm in response to theological censorship. Ultimately, the evidence that 
we will present suggests that, in his Vom Schemhamphoras, Luther shaped his anti-magic 
theology according to these constraints. He constructed his theological argument against 
                                                
4 Its influence on Catholic discourse is easily demonstrated, as we have shown, and thus not in question. 
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the magical invocation of the name(s) of God by extending to all of Jewry the narrative of 
Solomon's loss of divine favor, which Aquinas had instrumentalized in his anti-magic 
theology. In short, as we shall see, Luther argues that Christians who invoke the Shem ha-
Mephorash are not Christians at all, but rather Jews, and that Jews are idolaters in service 
of the devil. Thus, Christians who "magically" invoke the Shem ha-Mephorash are 
worshipping the devil. In equating the Christian "magical" invocation of the name(s) of 
God with the practice of Judaism, which he defines as idolatry, we shall see, Luther uses 
a version of the same anti-magic argument that Aquinas had crafted by combining 
aspects of the apocryphal Solomon narrative and Solomon's paradigmatic sin of idolatry 
from 1 Kings 11. 
The final thrust of the chapter will offer our readings of Luther's two separate 
attempts at an anti-magic theology: first in his Small Catechism (1529), and then in Vom 
Schemhamphoras (1543). This reading accomplishes primarily two things. First, it lays 
out Luther's construction of "faith-as-purity" in the process of spiritualization and 
metaphoricization within the context of demon compulsion that has existed within 
Christian discourse since late antiquity. Second, it presents the "performance of faith" as 
an efficacious ritual act, analogous to the performance of Levitical ablutions and 
performative participation in Catholic sacraments as means of attaining the requisite 
condition of the performer. To make this case in another way, the project's conclusion 
will return explicitly to the compulsion of demons, now in forms that construct "faith-as-
purity," as is accomplished in two early modern texts of ritual magic, the Arbatel and the 
Book of Abramelin. 
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"Magic" as Luther Knew it: Anti-Magic Theology in the Small Catechism and Licit 
Demon Compulsion  
As we have seen, as early as Origen (185-254) and as late as William of Auvergne 
(1180/90-1249) the name(s) of God were believed to have a certain power to compel 
demons even when invoked by non-Christians.5 Likewise, we have already pointed to 
fifteenth century examples from the ample record of the Christian awareness of the 
Jewish tradition of the Shem ha-Mephorash (both from Kabbalistic and pre-Kabbalistic 
sources). Such examples include Johannes Hartlieb's reference to a manual of illicit 
magic by the name of Schemhamphoras in his Buch Aller Verbotenen Kunst (1456), Pico 
della Mirandola's discussion of the Shem ha-Mephorash in his 900 Theses (1486), and 
Trithemius of Spanheim's inclusion of it in his Antipalus Maleficiorum (1508).  
Perhaps most significantly for the purposes of the present project, we have also 
considered at length Johannes Reuchlin's book-length meditation on the idea of the 
ineffable name of God in his De Verbo Mirifico (1494). Moreover, to these we might also 
add Roger Bacon's discussion of a book titled Liber semamphoras, in which he 
complains of the linguistic corruption that occurs in translating Hebrew to Latin,6 and 
Scholastic theologian Nicholas of Cusa's (1401-1464) treatment of the subject of the 
                                                
5 As we have demonstrated in our analysis of his demonology, William of Auvergne was indeed preoccupied with the 
significance of "purity" in relation of "magical" ritual (such as demon compulsion). Presumably, some association 
between physical forms of "purity" as condition of the performer and the efficacy of the ritual act also existed in 
Christian antiquity. A number of studies that treat the subject of purity in ancient Christianity have been published in 
recent years, but to the best of my knowledge, there has not yet been any scholarship that has sought to connect 
Origen's particular non-canonical views on demon compulsion with these early Christian purity practices.  
6 Julien Véronèse, "Magic, Theurgy, and Spirituality in the Medieval Ritual of the Ars Notoria," Trans. Claire 
Fanger, Invoking Angels: Theurgic Ideas and Practices, Thirteenth to Sixteenth Centuries (University Park: Penn State 
Univ, 2015) 37-78, here 60f. 
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Shem ha-Mephorash, albeit referring to it by the Greek "Tetragrammaton," in his 
theological writings.7 
 Such examples provide abundant evidence that, for more than a hundred years 
before Luther's Small Catechism (1529) and Vom Schemhamphoras (1543), the 
efficacious power of the ineffable Hebrew name of God (whether referred to by the 
Hebrew "Shem ha-Mephorash" or the Greek "Tetragrammaton") had been widely 
pondered, theologized, and homilized by Christian theologians independent of the 
polemics and counter-polemics of the Toledot Yeshu discussed in the previous chapter.  
In a similar vein, we may assume that Christian magicians practiced the 
invocation of the name(s) of God, based on the textual evidence of surviving manuals of 
ritual magic. At the same time, the connection of the ineffable Hebrew name of God to 
the apocryphal Solomon narrative was also well known. The rhetoric of the anti-magic 
theology of William of Auvergne and Thomas Aquinas, like that of their predecessors at 
the University of Paris, demonstrates as much. Yet with the rise of print technology and 
the publication of texts of Renaissance magic – theologically censored, non-anonymous 
printed discourse –, overt reference to the figure of Solomon as well as the compulsion of 
demons became altogether scarce in comparison to references in medieval Christian 
magic/anti-magic discourse.  
Scholastic theology, as we have shown, had increasingly come to associate all 
magic with Solomon. Demonstration of a causal relationship between print publication 
                                                
7 For a survey of Cusa's engagement with the idea of the Tetragrammaton, including a list of his works which this 
interest is reflected, see: Robert J. Wilkinson, Tetragrammaton: Western Christians and the Hebrew Name of God: 
from the Beginnings to the Seventeenth Century (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2015) 277-79. 
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and theological censorship on the one hand and the near absence of the Solomon 
narrative in printed sixteenth century texts about magic on the other is beyond the scope 
of this project. However, based on the difficulties which Ficino, Pico, Reuchlin, and 
Agrippa all had with theological censorship and accusations of heresy, one may hazard 
the assumption that overt references to Solomon's alleged authority over demons 
represented an unnecessary risk, given the vigorous theological condemnation of that 
narrative beginning with William of Auvergne (ca. 1180/90 – 1249). 
Whether or not Luther was familiar with all of the above sources, he would have 
known many of them through his own studies as a theologian. As Trachtenberg and 
others have written (See: Trachtenberg, 1943), and as we have endeavored to 
demonstrate, there was no escaping the association of the ineffable name(s) of God with 
illicit magic and demon compulsion in the medieval and early modern periods in the 
Christian magic/anti-magic discourse. Moreover, Luther was an early advocate of the 
works of both Pico della Mirandola and Reuchlin,8 each of whom wrote about the 
efficacious power of the Shem ha-Mephorash in their magico-theological works, as we 
have shown. Given the ubiquity of the pre-existing discourse, what the Renaissance 
authors like Reuchlin and his predecessors were engaged in with their theories of magic 
                                                
8 Erika Rummel notes: "In [Luther's] Resolutions of the Disputations Concerning the Efficacy of Indulgences (1518) he 
complained that the inquisitors were so zealous that they made heretics of the most pious Christians. 'For what else do 
the cases of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Lorenzo Valla, Petrus Ravenna, Johannes Vesalius, and most recently, 
Johann Reuchlin and Jacques Lefèvre show? Contrary to their own intentions, their well-meaning words were turned 
into evil.'" See: Erika Rummel, The Confessionalization of Humanism in Reformation Germany (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000) 17. 
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should thus be understood as more of a rehabilitation of the "magical" use of the name(s) 
of God than innovation.9 
Luther would also have known the discourse of divine names (both theological-
exegetical and magical/anti-magical) from his studies as a theologian and recognized the 
magico-theological attempts at its rehabilitation as efforts to legitimize magical practices. 
Certainly, by the time he wrote his Vom Schemhamphoras (1543), he had become aware 
of the account of the significance of the shem (Shem ha-Mephorash) in the Toledot Yeshu 
through the 1520 publication of Victoria Poercheti adversos impios Hebraeos (c. 1303) 
of the Genoese Carthusian monk Porchetus (died c. 1315). In Luther's Vom 
Schemhamphoras, he translates from Latin to German Porchetus' version of the Toledot 
Yeshu which is itself copied from Raymund Martín's Pugio Fidei (c. 1280) discussed in 
chapter 2. 
As a theologian, Luther was thus confronted with two theories of magic: medieval 
"demonic" and Renaissance "non-demonic" magic. His challenge was to develop an anti-
magic theology that refuted and forbade both – something that Scholastic demonology 
was failing to do. As we have shown in the previous chapter, in the late fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries, magicians, theologians, and magician-theologians continued to 
modify their theories of magic to avoid or obscure reliance on the intercession of demons 
by making use of newly recovered and translated ancient authorities. There is no reason 
                                                
9 The recent and extensive volume on the life and works of Johannes Reuchlin by Franz Posset is the only one who has 
tried to argue that what Reuchlin was doing with his Christian Cabala was somehow completely distinct from the late 
medieval and early modern discourses on "magic." To the detriment of an otherwise impressive feat of scholarship, 
Posset simply ignores the wealth of research that has addressed this topic over the last several decades. For more on 
Posset's hypothesis of Reuchlin's "orthodox Catholic Cabala," see Franz Posset, Johann Reuchlin (1455-1522): A 
Theological Biography (Berlin: Gruyter, Walter de, & Co, 2015). 
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to suspect that these humanist magicians were not genuinely intrigued and inspired by the 
recovery of certain ancient and early medieval Greek texts through contemporaneous 
humanist translations,10 but the simple rhetorical utility of recently recovered ancient pro-
magic authorities not yet condemned by the theologians cannot be discounted – all sides 
had access to a new body of texts that were not a priori forbidden, and so could return to 
these debates about magic and the nature of causality. Drawing on such sources, then, 
some, like Marsilio Ficino, tried to recast "magic" as a natural force (i.e. natural magic or 
magia naturalis) and thus remove it from theological jurisdiction. Others, like Johannes 
Reuchlin, sought to legitimize such causality within the framework of Catholic 
theology.11  
The next section will be concerned with the latter strategy, since both Luther's 
earlier anti-magic theological strategy in his Small Catechism (1529) and his later attempt 
in Vom Schemhamphoras (1543) address the magical use of the name of God and forbid 
such practices on theological (as opposed to natural) grounds. We will address the 
                                                
10 Ficino's translation into Latin of the Greek Corpus Hermeticum provides an interesting example. On the one hand, as 
has been noted by George Sarton, it went through eight early printed editions appeared before 1500 and a further 
twenty-two by 1641. This indicates it was immensely popular. See Sarton's review of Walter Scott's Hermetica, Isis 8.2 
(May 1926) 343-346, here p. 345. On the other, as Brian Copenhaver has argued, "the philosophical theory of magic 
presented in De Vita III depends much more on Proclus, and Plotinus and other Neoplatonic philosophers than on 
Ficino's famous discovery," the Hermetica, which have little to say about magic and whose philosophical content is 
banal, eclectic and incoherent. See: Brian P. Copenhaver, "Scholastic Philosophy and Renaissance Magic in the 'de 
Vita' of Marsilio Ficino" (Renaissance Quarterly. 37.4 (1984) 523. This indicates that its popularity is not necessarily 
evident in the theories of magic that arose in conjunction with its discovery. This leads us to consider its rhetorical 
value as an authority in the face of theological censorship. 
11 Posset, as we have noted, holds a different opinion. He sees an initial distancing from "magic" in Reuchlin's De 
Verbo Mirifico: "Reuchlin shunned the realm of magic and the company of dubious magicians precisely because he 
wanted to be a good Catholic," in Franz Posset, Johann Reuchlin (1455-1522): A Theological Biography (Berlin: 
Gruyter, Walter de, & Co, 2015) 125. For Posset, Reuchlin's initial movement away from "magic" in De Verbo Mirifico 
becomes absolute in De Arte Cabalistica. He writes, "Magic practice is dark and demonic as it employs names of 
ghosts and evil spirits. Here in his mature opus Reuchlin, therefore, avoids the word 'magic' altogether because in his 
view any miraculous power Cabalist no longer needs to rely on, but instead relies on the names of the angels. 'Magic' 
was banned from The Art of the Cabala. Reuchlin sorted out one specific book which is ascribed to 'Solomon' as he 
deliberately excluded the Liber Razielis as 'occult nonsense (652).'"  
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changes in Luther's anti-magic theology as reflected in Vom Schemhamphoras at the end 
of this chapter, but proceed here by outlining the conditions and implications of his initial 
attempt in his Small Catechism. These discussions help to position Luther with respect to 
the theological debates of his era, as they illuminate his own intellectual agenda and 
strategies in dealing with contemporaneous theological debates. 
 
Luther's Initial Prohibition of the "Magical" Invocation of the Name of God as a 
Sin of Blasphemy in the Small Catechism of 1529 
Luther's first iteration of an anti-magic theology can be found in his Small 
Catechism (Der Kleine Katechismus), published in 1529 for the religious instruction of 
children. Its format is simple, consisting of reviews and short explanations of the Ten 
Commandments, the Apostles' Creed, the Lord's Prayer, the Sacrament of Holy 
Baptism, the Office of the Keys and Confession and the Sacrament of the Eucharist. The 
attention that Luther devotes to "magic" in the Small Catechism seems to be no more than 
passing, yet it was reflective of the practice of "magic" as Luther would have known it – 
the invocation of divine names – and addresses and forbids the practice as such. For this 
reason, it seems, he includes the practice of magic in a gloss to the Second 
Commandment, which he renders as: "You shall not use the name of the Lord, your God, 
in vain; for the Lord will not leave unpunished him who abuses His name."12 Unlike with 
the familiar English rendering, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord, they God, in 
vain," Luther's translation seems to acknowledge the possibility of the efficacious power 
                                                
12 Luther's German is as follows: "Du sollst den Namen des Herrn, deines Gottes, nicht unnützlich führen; denn der 
Herr wird den nicht ungestraft lassen, der seinen Namen mißbraucht." 
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of the name of God. Also, unlike the familiar English, Luther's translation suggests 
severe consequences for disobeying the Commandment.  
The explanatory gloss with which he follows the translation is simple and 
catechetical. As he does after each of the Ten Commandments, Luther begins with the 
question "What does that mean?"13 It is in his brief answer that we find the first iteration 
of his anti-magical theology. He writes, "We should fear and love God, that by His name 
we do not curse, swear, work magic, lie, or deceive, but rather call upon it in every 
trouble, pray, praise, and give thanks to it."14  
What is most significant for the purposes of the present study is that Luther 
frames his prohibition against "magic" as a sin against the Second Commandment – as 
sin against the name of God. For Luther, then, magic is a sin of blasphemy. As we have 
discussed in the previous chapter, in contrast, Aquinas' persistent theory of magic, which 
he elaborates in De Potentia, forbids magic as idolatry – a sin against the First 
Commandment. The whole of Scholastic demonology depended upon this framing. We 
may contrast this with Luther's translation and discussion of the First Commandment in 
his Small Catechism:  
I am the Lord, your God. You shall have no other gods besides me. You shall 
make for yourself no image or representation, neither of that which is in heaven 
                                                
13 "Was ist das?" 
14 "Du sollst den Namen des Herrn, deines Gottes, nicht unnützlich führen; denn der Herr wird den nicht ungestraft 
lassen, der seinen Namen mißbraucht. 
Was ist das? 
Wir sollen Gott fürchten und lieben, daß wir bei seinem Namen nicht fluchen, schwören, zaubern, lügen oder trügen, 
sondern denselben in allen Nöten anrufen, beten, loben und danken." 
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above, nor upon the earth below, nor of that in the water below the earth. Neither 
worship them nor serve them.15 
 
What does that mean?  
We should fear, love, and trust God above all things.16  
Significantly in light of Aquinas' demonology, Luther's gloss to the First Commandment 
makes no reference to magic. 
Luther's choice to break with the well-established tradition of Scholastic 
demonology can only be read as intentional; it effectively meant starting over from 
scratch. The apparent advantage of this approach is that it allowed him to prohibit both 
medieval nigromantia and Renaissance Christian Cabala with a single, simple gloss. 
While Renaissance Christian Cabala (including Reuchlin's two Cabalistic works, De 
Verbo Mirifico and De Arte Cabalistica) attempted to eliminate or obscure dependence 
on demonic intervention (thus making the debate over compulsion vs. pact obsolete), it 
shared a reliance on the Shem ha-Mephorash or Tetragrammaton with medieval magic. In 
Malinowskian terms, then, Luther was able to attack both theories of magic at their 
common point: the formula. 
Of course there were still outliers – theories of magic that were seemingly 
unaffected by Luther's prohibition. However, many of the texts recovered and translated 
during the Renaissance that contributed to the proliferation of "magic," like the famous 
Corpus Hermeticum translated by Marsilio Ficino in 1486, did not receive or require the 
                                                
15 "Ich bin der Herr, dein Gott. Du sollst nicht andere Götter haben neben mir. Du sollst dir kein Bildnis noch irgend 
ein Gleichnis machen, weder des, das oben im Himmel, noch des, das unten auf Erden, oder des, das im Wasser unter 
der Erde ist. Bete sie nicht an und diene ihnen nicht." 
16 "Was ist das? Wir sollen Gott über alle Dinge fürchten, lieben und vertrauen." 
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individual attention of Luther's anti-magic theology. The reason for this is that 
Renaissance magician-theologians who appealed to such Greek pagan sources were 
attempting to use them to interpret scripture in the way that Aquinas had used Aristotle. 
This was, in turn, the very interpretation of scripture in the theology of Aquinas to which 
Luther so strongly objected, and early on, he had made his position on the relationship of 
philosophy to theology abundantly clear. In his Disputation against Scholastic Theology 
(These 43-44 and 50), he writes: "It is an error to say that no man can become a 
theologian unless he becomes one with Aristotle. Briefly, the whole of Aristotle is to 
theology as darkness is to light. This in opposition to the scholastics."17 For Luther, 
scripture did not require external illumination, let alone from pagans. Thus, as pagan 
philosophers, Aristotle and Hermes were two parts of the same problem and equally 
objectionable to Luther, no matter if used by Aquinas or Ficino. In this respect, as we 
trace in more detail below, Luther's doctrine of sola scriptura also served as an anti- 
pagan magic theology18: with that single teaching, Luther closed off both Aristotelian 
(Scholastic) and Hermetic (magical) interpretations of scripture and exegesis. No doubt it 
is because of this we do not find separate condemnations of Renaissance Hermetic magic 
                                                
17 See: Martin Luther, "Disputation against Scholastic Theology" (1517), in LW, xxxi, 9-16. 
18 In The Popular Encyclopedia of Church History, Edward E. Hindson and Dan Mitchell write the following 
concerning the source and content of the Protestant doctrine sola scriptura: "In sola scriptura, the Bible is the only and 
final source of authority for religious beliefs. Luther appealed to sola scriptura when he called upon to defend his 
views before the Diet of Worms" (Eugene, Oregon: Harvest House Publishers, 2013) 312. Luther's (1521) statement is 
recorded as, "Unless I am convinced by the testimony of the Holy Scriptures or by evident reason - for I can believe 
neither the pope nor councils alone, as it is clear that they have erred repeatedly and contradicted themselves - I 
consider myself convicted by the testimony of Holy Scripture, which is my basis; my conscience is captive to the Word 
of God. Thus I cannot and will not recant, because acting against one's conscience is neither safe nor sound. God help 
me. Amen" (Luther, cited in Heiko Oberman, Luther: Man between God and the Devil [New York: Image Books, 
1982] 36).   
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in Luther's writings. In taking on Aquinas, Luther had his proxy to debate, and one of 
more contemporary value to his audience. 
Luther's approach to magic as a sin of blasphemy also allowed him to address the 
popularization of Jewish Kabbalistic mystical and exegetical techniques among 
Christians. At the same time that humanist scholars began translating texts of Neo-
Platonic Greek philosophy and magic, they were also translating texts of Jewish 
"magical" tradition of Kabbalah. Their efforts (led by Pico della Mirandola and Reuchlin) 
to introduce Jewish Kabbalah into Christianity resulted in what have come to call 
"Christian Cabala." While these and other Christian Cabalists sought – like the 
Hermeticists – to illuminate scripture and theology, the basic premise of their exegetical 
technique slipped past the firewall of Luther's doctrine of sola scriptura for the simple 
reason that the Christian Cabalists did not claim to add or reconcile one theology or 
philosophy with another (as both the Scholastics and the Hermeticists did), but rather 
claimed knowledge and understanding of the existence of hidden features of the Hebrew 
scripture – scriptura – itself, placed there by God, in the language of his original 
revelation. Thus, because Luther could not or would not dismiss the Hebrew bible, he 
was forced to confront the proliferation of Christian Cabalistic "magical" uses of the 
name(s) of God head-on in his theological anti-magic attempts to define a new orthodoxy 
and orthopraxy.  
For this reason – because sixteenth century Christian Cabala (like medieval 
nigromantia) tended to focus on various aspects of the efficacious power of the ineffable 
name(s) of God – Luther's anti-magic theology appears to be exclusively couched in 
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terms of correcting and chastising his followers regarding magical invocations of the 
name(s) of God to the exclusion of separate objections to pagan (Hermetic) authorities. 
Because of this, we suspect, most of the relatively small number of scholars who have 
addressed Luther's anti-magic writings at all have mistaken them for criticisms of Jewish 
practice rather than attempts to enforce orthopraxy within Christianity.19  
By undermining that part of "magic" which Malinowski isolates as formula, then, 
Luther, unlike the Scholastics, was able to address both medieval Solomonic nigromantia 
and Renaissance Christian Cabala with a single anti-magic theological argument. Yet it 
was a bold move. In it, he risked the appearance of limiting the power of God, whose 
name had so long been held to be efficacious.20 Even Aquinas had only implied as much 
by not directly addressing the subject in De potentia.21 Perhaps it is for this reason that in 
the first iteration of Luther's anti-magic theology – the Small Catechism (1529) – he 
forbade the magical invocation of the name of God without overtly denying its efficacy, 
thus taking on only part of the theology that we have been tracing here. Only near the end 
                                                
19 For example, Hsia describes Vom Schemhamphoras as "a work that attacks the Kabbalah as mere superstition and 
word magic" in R. Po-chia Hsia, The Myth of Ritual Murder: Jews and Magic in Reformation Germany (Boulder: 
University Pr. of Colorado, 2004) 132. 
20 The power of the divine name of YHWH is illustrated in Isaiah 45:23-24: "I have sworn by myself, the word has 
gone forth from my mouth in righteousness and will not turn back, that to me every knee will bow, every tongue will 
swear allegiance. They will say of me, 'only in the Lord are righteousness and strength.' men will come to him, and all 
who were angry at him will be put to shame." the power of the divine name of the son is likewise argued in Philippians 
2:9-11: "for this reason also, God highly exalted him, and bestowed on him the name which is above every name, so 
that at the name of Jesus every knee will bow, of those who are in heaven and on earth and under the earth, and that 
every tongue will confess that Jesus Christ is lord, to the glory of god the father." 
21 Aquinas "reply to the fifth objection. Again, by coming when adjured by the invocation of the divine majesty, they 
wish men to think that they are not utterly banished by the justice of god. For they do not desire to be as gods, as 
altogether equal to god, but rejoice in receiving from men divine worship under him." Aquinas' Latin original reads: 
"Ad quintum dicendum, quod in hoc etiam quod ad invocationem divinae virtutis adveniunt, volunt intelligi quod non 
sint a divina iustitia omnino exclusi; non enim sic divinitatem appetunt ut summo Deo velint aequari omnino, sed sub 
eo, divinitatis cultum sibi ab hominibus exhiberi gaudent." See: De Potentia, Q 6, A 10, ad. 5. 
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of his life (1546) does he specifically deny any "magical" efficacy of the name of God in 
Vom Schemhamphoras (1543), as we will discuss near the end of the chapter. 
We note here an important difference in the respective circumstances of Aquinas 
and Luther's anti-magic theologies that helps us locate Luther's position within 
contemporaneous theology: the problem of Solomonic magic (medieval nigromantia) 
that confronted Aquinas belonged to the Scholastic discourse of which he himself was a 
part and which he sought to uphold. The same is not true of Luther, who was forced to 
address both the efficacious power of the name(s) of God and the compulsion of demons 
because of the prevalence of that narrative outside of the discourse that he was trying to 
establish. In his own theology, Luther did not allow for the real, physical intervention or 
compulsion of demons.22 For Luther, the contested spaces that supported the discourses 
of both medieval nigromantia and Renaissance magic (including Christian Cabala) were 
exogenous problems: he was, for example, uninterested in the ambivalent relationship of 
                                                
22 Luther's demonology presents something of an inconsistent hodge-podge. On the one hand, witches may present a 
real danger, and on the other Luther consistently grants the devil (and demons) no more than the power of illusion. 
Erika Rummel has made the backwards connection (in a blog article!) from the much clearer writings of Johann Weyer 
- a generation later - to Luther. Weyer explicitly denies that demons are able to directly physically affect the material 
world. Rummel observes: "A generation after Luther, the German physician Johann Weyer declared that witchcraft was 
an illusion, a 'trick played on the optical nerves.' So-called witchcraft could usually be explained by 'the stupidity of old 
age, the inconstancy and fickleness of females, a weak mind, despair, and mental illness.' [...] Weyer's book [De 
praestigiis daemonum, "On the Tricks/Illusions of Demons"] was so popular that it went through four editions (1563-
68). "Like Luther," she continues, [Weyer] suspected that the devil was behind those illusions. People might be 
'deceived by their imagination or by the wiles of the evil spirit.'" Rummel then quotes from Luther's Commentary upon 
the Epistle to the Galatians: "This sin was very common before the light of the Gospel appeared. When I was a child 
there were many witches and sorcerers around who 'bewitched' cattle, and people, particularly children, and did much 
harm. But now that the Gospel is here you do not hear so much about it because the Gospel drives out the devil with all 
his illusions. Now he bewitches people in a worse way with spiritual sorcery. Witchcraft is a brand of idolatry. As 
witches used to bewitch cattle and men, so idolaters, i.e., all the self-righteous, go around to bewitch God and to make 
Him out as one who justifies men not by grace through faith in Christ but by the works of men's own choosing. They 
bewitch and deceive themselves. If they continue in their wicked thoughts of God they will die in their idolatry." See: 
Rummel, Erika. "THERE ARE NO WITCHES IN GERMANY?" FACTS Are Stranger than HISTORICAL FICTION, 
28 Nov. 2013, rummelsincrediblestories.blogspot.com/2013/11/thereare-no-witches-in-germany-check.html. Thus, it 
would seem, that according to Luther, witches and sorcerers can bewitch animals and children, but the Devil can create 
no more than illusions. This tension remains unresolved in Luther's theology, perhaps because allowing any physical 
power to the Devil (or demons) would risk validating the "work" of banishing them in the familiar Catholic ways. 
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Scholastic demonology to the apocryphal narrative of Solomon's demon compulsion. 
Moreover, the external nature of that discourse was another part of the reason that Luther 
was able to condemn both medieval nigromantia (Solomonic and otherwise) and early 
modern Christian Cabala with the same anti-magic theological argument.  
Luther's magic/anti-magic theology was not demonological – it did not depend on 
explaining the nature of demonic intervention (e.g. explicit or implicit pact) to justify its 
prohibition of magic. The involvement of demons, which was the apparent difference 
between medieval and Renaissance theories of magic, was irrelevant to Luther's anti-
magic theology. Where the Scholastics were tied up with the intricacies of their 
demonologies for much of the sixteenth century, debating the precise nature of the 
intermediary forces in the causal chain (e.g. angel, demon, impersonal planetary spirit, 
etc.) and the relationship of the magician or exorcist to that force (e.g. explicit or implicit 
pact, passive recipient of natural emanations, ecclesiastically authorized grace-imbued 
exorcist, etc.), Luther's strategy was to eliminate the formula and redefine the condition 
of the performer. We can see his strategy at work in his representation of licit (i.e. 
legitimate) demon compulsion in the quote from his Tischreden:  
3840: Satan may be [conquered/vanquished] by contempt, but in faith, not in 
presumption. However, he is certainly not to be invited; for he is a powerful 
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enemy, seeing and hearing everything that lies before us and that we are now 
talking about. And God permitting, he spoils everything that is good.23 
1557: When the devil comes during the night to plague me, I give him this 
answer: "Devil, I must sleep now; for this is God's command: Work during the 
day, sleep at night." If he does not stop to vex me but faces me with my sins, I 
reply: "Dear devil, I have heard the record. But I have committed far more sins 
which do not even stand in your record. Put them down too. . . . ." If he still does 
not stop accusing me as a sinner, I say to him in contempt: "Holy Satan, pray for 
me! You never have done anything evil and alone are holy. Go to God and 
acquire grace for yourself. If you want to make me righteous, I tell you: Physician 
heal yourself."24 
                                                
23 Martin Luther, Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische gesammtausgabe; Tischreden: 1531-46. 3. Band, Tischreden aus 
den Dreißiger Jahren (Heimar: H. Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1914). 651-53, here #3840 (Dresd. I. 423, 214; laut. 1538, 64): 
"Illa vespera aderat magister simon, heluetiorum bernensis superattendens, et coenavit cum Luth[ero et familiariss[ime 
colloquebatur bonam spem de heluetiis indicans; nam bucerus ultra vires laboraret et maxime senesceret. Deinde de 
conzeno bernensi doctissimo, wie er wol zur einigkeit riethe, dicebatque de conzeno historiam, quod quandam 
mulierculam strepitu sathanae diu veatam admonuisset, ut illum contemneret et diceret: las mich zu frieden, und solst 
zu conzeno kommen! Quod cum fecisset illa mulier, ut sathan conzenum deberet visitare, illico illa hora abiit sathan et 
accessit conzenum et per integrum annum variis tumultibus eum vexavit. R[espondit luth[erus: sathan (dresd. I. 423, 
215) contemnendo est vincendus, sed in fide, non praesumptione. Man sol in gleich wol nicht zu gast laden, den er ist 
ein starcker feindt, den er sicht und horet alles, was fur uns ist, was wir ietzund renden, et permissione dei omnia bona 
currumpit. Er wolte, das nicht ein gresleyn oder leublein wuchs. Das heist sathanae potentia. Sed tamen nostra corda 
conscientiam et fidem perspicere non potest. Habet aliquam similitudinem divinitatis, sed deus sibi praeservavit veram 
divinitatem. Der kan dem teuffel weren. Drumb spricht Christus: confidete, ego vici mundum, id est, totum diabolum. 
Ideo oramus: libera nos a malo. Πονηρον est multifarium, omnes calamitates, miseriae, peccata, scandala. Summa, es 
ist kein auffhoren. Contra hoc malum in dies (dresd. I. 423, 216) oramus et exaudimur, sicut videmus, quomodo 
impeditur, et nos credentes iudicamus angelos malos, 1. Cor. 6. Wiewol er imer wider einschleicht, den er wil sich 
nicht gern aus dem praescriptum laßen bringen. Es ist aber der teuffel eyn nerrischer geist, quia ipse dat occasionem 
christo, torquendo infirmos confirmat autoritatem christi et apostolorum sanantium languidos. Potius sathan deberet 
quiescere, sed illa extrema nocendi cupiditas pellit eum etiam ad sui confessionem. Deinde recitavit miracula magna 
apostolorum et cursum praedicationis ipsorum, excellentius quam personae christi: nam petrus una contione tria milia 
lucriecit, quod non legitur de christo. Ideo christus (dresd. I. 423, 217) dicit matth. 11: qui autem minor est in regno 
coelorum, maior est illo. Christus tamen infirmissimo suo regno magnificentissima. Miracula ostendit." the partial 
English translation is from: martin Luther and ewald m. Plass, What Luther Says: An Anthology (Saint Louis, MO: 
Concordia Publishing House, 1972) 1: 402, quote #1187. 
24 Martin Luther, D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesammtausgabe; Tischreden: 1531-46. 2. Band, Tischreden 
aus den Dreisiger Jahren (Weimar: H. Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1913). 132, here #1557: "Wie man den teufel anweisen 
sol. Wen der teufl zu nacht an mich kompt, so gib ich im diese antwort: teufl, ich muß jetzt schlaffen, den das ist Gottes 
bevelch, des tags erbeitten, des nachts schlafen. Deinde quando non cessat me vexare obtrudens mihi peccata mea, 
resp[ondeo: Lieber Teufel, ich habs register gehert, aber ich hab noch mehr sund getan, die stehn nicht in deim register; 
schreibs auch an: Ich hab die hosen und bruch geschissen; hengs an hals undh wisch maul dran. Terio si non cessat 
inculpans me peccatorem, tunc dico per contemptum: Sancte Satane, ora pro me! Denn du hast nie ubel gehandelt et es 
solus sanctus; gehe hin zu Gott, erwurb dir selber gnade, et si me vis probum facere, tunc dico tibi: Medice, cura te 
ipsum! Der Teufel aber ist ein solcher boswicht, quod grandia mala et horribilia non offert mihi ut celebrationem 
missae, contemptum Dei etc. Auch behut mich Gott Darfur! Wen es einfiel cum potentia, illa magnitude peccati, was es 
vor ein grevel ist, ich must sterben." The English translation is taken from: Martin Luther, and Ewald M. Plass What 
Luther Says: An Anthology (Saint Louis, Mo: Concordia Publishing House, 1972) 1: 403f., quote #1191. 
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With the words "he is certainly not to be invited," Luther effectively addresses the 
conjuration and compulsion of medieval magic. His framing of the encounter suggests 
that he is describing an appropriate response to the sort of diabolical harassment so 
characteristic of Luther's writings, yet he does not eliminate from his account 
Malinowski's idea of the rite. The rite and condition of the performer are thus present; 
only the formula appears to be absent: "Satan may be overcome by contempt, but in faith, 
not in presumption." An examination of the rest of the quote confirms "faith" as Luther's 
requisite condition of the performer, and suggests the act of mockery ("contempt") of 
Satan as rite (rather than formula). 
In the above quote we see an example of Luther's awareness of the anti-magic 
theological of Aquinas and thus of the era's theological norms for discussing it. Like 
Aquinas, Luther also attempts to make fundamental distinctions between illicit demon 
compulsion, on the one hand (i.e. "He is certainly not to be invited."), and licit demon 
compulsion, on the other, by assigning them fundamentally different mechanisms. In 
other words, Luther, like Aquinas, has two separate theories of magic – at least as seen 
from the perspective of the theorist, if not the theologian. Unlike Aquinas, Luther only 
allows that one of the two theories is efficacious: that form of demon compulsion, which 
belongs to the religious experience of the obedient Christian (illicit demon compulsion 
will, by definition, never work in Luther's model).  
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For Luther, this distinction fits firmly within his theology: the Devil and demons 
were real and present threats with which one regularly had to contend.25 Luther's battles 
with the Devil are infamous, as are the accompanying inkwells and flatulence that Luther 
directed at him. Consequently, like Aquinas, Luther needed to account for some 
authorized licit protection from (if not authority over) the malign spirits that functioned 
as negative motivation in his theology. Yet Luther's own theology does place these spirits 
within a causal chain, as Aquinas does in De Potentia (Q 6, A 10). However, the 
Scholastic particulars regarding the intervention of demons and the possibility of their 
compulsion appear to have been part of the whole Aristotelian abomination that Luther 
sought to undo. It is therefore not surprising that Luther avoids the word "compel" 
(adiūrō)26 and opts instead for "conquered/vanquished" (vincō)27 in the previous example. 
Furthermore, in this way, Luther is able to frame "compulsion" (i.e. "magic") right out of 
the discussion.  
We can see even more clearly, in the following example from Luther's 
Hauspostille,28 how at least part of his solution to the theological problem of confronting 
                                                
25 Heiko Oberman has persuasively argued that Luther's belief in the Devil, etc. was not only quite literal, but also 
theologically significant. For example: "Luther's world of thought is wholly distorted and apologetically misconstrued 
if his conception of the Devil is dismissed as a medieval phenomenon and only his faith in Christ retained as relevant or 
as the only decisive factor. Christ and the Devil were equally real to him: one was the perpetual intercessor for 
Christianity, the other was a menace to mankind till the end. To argue that Luther never overcame the medieval belief 
in the Devil says far too little; he even intensified it and lent to it additional urgency: Christ and Satan wage a cosmic 
war for mastery over Church and world. No one can evade involvement in this struggle. Even for the believer there is 
no refuge – neither monastery nor seclusion of the wilderness offer him a chance for escape. The Devil is the 
omnipresent threat, and exactly for this reason the faithful need the proper weapons for survival." Heiko A. 
Oberman, Luther (New York: Image Books, 1962) 104.  
26 The typical Latin would be "adiurare" - to "adjure." 
27 Luther's original macaronic passage in Tischreden gives this phrase in Latin: "Sathan contemnendo est vincendus." 
"Vincendus," is the future passive participle of vincō (to win, conquer), and thus, the passage is better rendered "Satan 
is conquered/vanquished by contempt." 
28 A "Hauspostille" is collection of religious or edifying stories and sayings for reading to the family. 
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supernatural evil was to break the old "Great Chain of Being" paradigm and to replace it 
with a new paradigm in which demon compulsion (at least as it had previously been 
understood as "binding") was unnecessary. He assumes instead a paradigm in which the 
Devil was already bound. Luther writes: 
Why should you fear? Why should you be afraid? Do you not know that the 
prince of this world has been judged? He is no lord, no prince any more. You 
have a different, a stronger Lord, Christ, who has overcome and bound him. 
Therefore let the prince and god of this world look sour, bare his teeth, make a 
great noise, threaten, and act in an unmannerly way; he can do no more than a bad 
dog on a chain, which may bark, run here and there, and tear at the chain. But 
because it is tied and you avoid it, it cannot bite you. So the devil acts toward 
every Christian. Therefore everything depends on this that we do not feel secure 
but continue in the fear of God and in prayer; then the chained dog cannot harm 
us. [Emphasis added] But this chained dog may at least frighten him who would 
be secure and go ahead without caution, although he may not come close enough 
to be bitten.29 
 
Luther's admonishment to his reader not to feel secure but rather to "continue in the fear 
of God and in prayer" represents a further example of his emphasis on "faith." However, 
it also demonstrates the difficulty he has in breaking the paradigm of a performative (i.e. 
ritual) attainment of the requisite condition of the performer even as he attempts to shift 
                                                
29 See: Martin Luther, Dr. Martin Luthers Sämmtliche Werke: 1 : Abt. 1, Homiletische und Katechetische Schriften 
(Erlangen: Heyder, 1862) 259. "Das wissen die Unchristen nit. Derhalb, ob sie schon bisweilen zum Wort kommen, 
und ansahen zu glauben; alsbald die Welt drumb saur sehen und zürnen will, förchten sie sich, und fallen wieder davon 
ab, wie Christus sagt im Gleichnuß von dem Samen auf dem Felsen. Die Christen aber halten fest. Denn da klingt ihnen 
die Straf des heiligen Geists immer im Herzen und Ohren: Was willt du dich förchten? warum willt erschrecken? weißt 
du denn nicht, daß der Fürst dieser Welt gerichtet ist? Er ist kein Herr, kein Fürst mehr. Du hast einen andered 
stärkeren Herrn, Christum, der ihn uberwunden und gebunden hat. Darumb laß den Fürsten und Gott dieser Welt saur 
sehen, die Zähn blecken, scharren, drowen, und sich ungebärdig stellen, er kann doch nicht mehr, denn ein böser Hund 
an einer Ketten; der mag bellen, hin und wieder laufen, an der Ketten sich reißen; er kann dich aber nit beißen, weil er 
angebunden ist, und du ihm aus dem Weg gehest. Also ist der Teufel gegn einem jeden Christen auch. Darumb liegt es 
alles daran, daß man nicht sicher sei, sonder sich in Gottesforcht und an das Gebet halte, so soll der Kettenhund uns 
nicht schaden mögen. Wer aber sichen sein, und ohn alle Sorg, sicher daher gehn wollte, den könnt solcher Kettenhund 
zum wenigsten schrecken, wenn er ihm so nahend nit käme, daß er ihn beißen könnt; wie man an den bösen Hunden 
siehet, daß sie lauschen und sich nit allweg hören lassen." 
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the paradigm for the encounter with malign spirits from compulsion to restraint.30 Note 
that the paradigm we may extrapolate from the above quote effectively remains "Do X, 
and God will continue to restrain the Devil/demon." On the one hand, this paradigm does 
allow Luther to undermine (and thus counter) the discourse of magic as demon 
compulsion; on the other hand, the requisite condition of the performer in the encounter 
Luther describes is nevertheless ultimately reducible to the familiar magical logic of "do 
ut des" – the contractual "I give that you might give."31 The ritual logic is nonetheless 
upheld: the Christian whom Luther describes does not affect (compel/repel) the demon by 
achieving purity as absence-of-defilement through ritual ablutions or obtaining purity-as-
grace through participation in the sacraments, but he or she still has to do something to 
acquire it, even if that something is "have faith." If that obligation is not met, then there is 
no contract – no exchange. 
With Luther's paradigm shift away from the compulsion of demons as magic (i.e. 
Solomonic paradigm) as well as away from the presence of mediated grace acquired 
through the sacraments (Scholastic) and toward the insurance of divine restraint of the 
Devil (and demons), he subverts the medieval discourse of nigromantia in his new 
theology. Christian souls are protected – at least those who are predestined – as long as 
they continue to fear and pray. The opportunity for illicit demon compulsion is logically 
                                                
30 For instance, Luther paradoxically argues first in On the Freedom of a Christian (1520) that, "a Christian who, 
consecrated through faith, does good works will not become a better or more consecrated Christian through them (for 
they do nothing to increase faith)." See Freedom, Art 22. Later, however, he writes in Vom Schemhamphoras (1543) 
that he doesn't write against the Jews in the hope of converting them in Against the Jews and Their Lies. He does so, 
rather, so that we Germans may know from historical evidence what a Jew is so that we can warn our Christians against 
them as we warn against the Devil himself in order to strengthen and honor our belief [...]." See: Falk, 166. 
31 For further discussion of the ritual logic of "do ut des" in late antiquity, see: Georg Luck, Arcana Mundi: Magic and 
the Occult in the Greek and Roman Worlds (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006 [1985]) 479. 
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closed. However, what Luther has failed to achieve is a satisfying explication of the 
underlying sin inherent in the attempt to do "magic," as compared to Aquinas' implication 
of the sin of idolatry as core to his theory of magic (i.e. explicit or implicit demonic pact). 
Aquinas' prohibition is logically contingent upon his acceptance of the reality of magic. 
In Aquinas' model, the very success of a magical act itself becomes evidence of the pact 
that he claims is necessary to achieve the effects of magic (corpus delicti, the evidence is 
provided by the crime). Luther, it will be recalled, allows for one of his theories of magic 
(i.e. licit, "religious" compulsion/restraint) to be efficacious, but not the other (i.e. illicit 
"magical"). Thus, in Luther's model of illicit magic, there is no evidence that a sin has 
been committed. 
In this sense, Luther's association of the magical invocation of the name(s) of God 
with the sin of blasphemy in his first attempt to forbid magic, in the Small Catechism, 
was a significant break with Aquinas' strategy and thus with established Scholastic 
theology. We will discuss below why doing so was a necessity for Luther – a decision 
based on his theology of grace. The result of this action, however, was a relatively very 
weak prohibition. Luther was in competition with humanist Christian Cabalists to 
recatechize the German people. Changing the condition of the performer that had 
previously both ensured salvation and granted some degree of agency over malevolent 
forces no doubt made his anti-magic theology a difficult sell, as it both removed the 
possibility of any magical agency and rendered the effective "cost" of divine protection 
unknowable and intangible. Moreover, Luther's early prohibition of the magical 
invocation of the name(s) of God – without the later explicit denial of the efficacy – seem 
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to have implied that it was wrong to invoke the name of God because it was efficacious. 
In forbidding the formula, but not yet denying its efficacy, Luther appears to be trying to 
guard it very much in the way Malinowski suggests magicians treat formulae.32 The point 
of this observation is not to suggest that Luther actually believed in the "magical" 
efficacy of the Hebrew name(s) of God, much less that Luther was a magician, but rather 
to suggest that, within a magical discourse (humanist Christian Cabala and medieval 
nigromantia), Luther's initial prohibition would likely have had the opposite effect of the 
one he intended. For, why forbid (i.e. guard) an inefficacious formula?  
Where Aquinas had accounted for the marvelous effects of the magical arts by 
attributing them to intervention of demons in physical reality, Luther denied the physical 
                                                
32 As cited in the introduction, Malinowski writes, "The spell is the part of the magic which is kept secret and known 
only to the esoteric circle of practitioners. When a magic is handed over, whether by purchase, gift, or inheritance, only 
the spell has to be taught to the new recipient […]. When one speaks about magical knowledge, or inquires whether an 
individual knows some magic, this invariably refers to the formula, for the nature of the rite is always quite public 
knowledge" (418). 
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effects of magical arts, attributing their marvelous effects to demonic illusion.33 (See 
example above.) For Luther, demons were real, but could not actually affect any real 
change. Moreover, where Aquinas conceded the validity (i.e. physical effects) of magical 
acts because doing so implicates the magician in the sin of idolatry, Luther attempted to 
implicate the magician in the sin of blasphemy. However, Luther also conceded the 
occasional possible apparent validity (albeit only an illusion) of the magical act, and so 
did not satisfactorily connect the magician with a "sin of magic" since he denied the 
actual efficacy of the magical act.34 In short, the demons of Luther's anti-magic theology 
appeared – but only appeared – to produce magical effects. They could create nothing 
more than illusions, and this they did to seduce the magicians into the sin of blasphemy. 
Since, however, the effects of the demon's intervention were illusory and ephemeral, and 
                                                
33 In Martin Luther's commentary on Paul's Epistle to the Galatians (1535), we find another example of a devil whose 
powers are seemingly limited to illusion and deception: who hath bewitched you, that ye should not obey the truth? 
Paul calls the Galatians foolish and bewitched. In the fifth chapter he mentions sorcery among the works of the flesh, 
declaring that witchcraft and sorcery are real manifestations and legitimate activities of the devil. We are all exposed to 
the influence of the devil, because he is the prince and god of the world in which we live. Satan is clever. He does not 
only bewitch men in a crude manner, but also in a more artful fashion. He bedevils the minds of men with hideous 
fallacies. Not only is he able to deceive the self-assured, but even those who profess the true Christian faith. There is 
not one among us who is not at times seduced by Satan into false beliefs. This accounts for the many new battles we 
have to wage nowadays. But the attacks of the old serpent are not without profit to us, for they confirm our doctrine and 
strengthen our faith in Christ. Many a time we were wrestled down in these conflicts with Satan, but Christ has always 
triumphed and always will triumph. Do not think that the Galatians were the only ones to be bewitched by the devil. 
Let us realize that we too may be seduced by Satan. In this sentence Paul excuses the Galatians, while he blames the 
false apostles for the apostasy of the Galatians. As if he were saying: "I know your defection was not willful. The devil 
sent the false apostles to you, and they talked you into believing that you are justified by the law. With this our epistle 
we endeavor to undo the damage which the false apostles have inflicted upon you." like Paul, we struggle with the 
word of god against the fanatical Anabaptists of our day; and our efforts are not entirely in vain. The trouble is there are 
many who refuse to be instructed. They will not listen to reason; they will not listen to the scriptures, because they are 
bewitched by the tricky devil who can make a lie look like the truth. Since the devil has this uncanny ability to make us 
believe a lie until we would swear a thousand times it were the truth, we must not be proud, but walk in fear and 
humility, and call upon the lord Jesus to save us from temptation. Although I am a doctor of divinity, and have 
preached Christ and fought his battles for a long time, I know from personal experience how difficult it is to hold fast to 
the truth. I cannot always shake off Satan. I cannot always apprehend Christ as the scriptures portray him. Sometimes 
the devil distorts Christ to my vision. But thanks be to god, who keeps us in his word, in faith, and in prayer. The 
spiritual witchery of the devil creates in the heart a wrong idea of Christ. Those who share the opinion that a person is 
justified by the works of the law, are simply bewitched. Their belief goes against faith and Christ. 
34 We will return to the significance of the differences between the underlying sins inherent to the practice of magic in 
the two respective theologies below.  
 
  220 
the actions of the magician – in Luther's own theology – are not causally related to the 
demonic illusions, Luther's anti-magic theology utterly fails (like William of Auvergne's) 
to connect the magician to the sin. 
However strained this argument might sound today, it is structured within the 
constraints of the theological argumentation system that Luther inherited and was trying 
to combat. Like Aquinas, Luther describes "magic" as fundamentally distinct from licit 
(i.e. "religious") demon compulsion/restraint (as opposed to the late antique apologists 
and earlier medieval theologians who did not). With Aquinas, Luther also seems to have 
believed that the same grace necessary for salvation (justification) also conferred God's 
authority (i.e. conditional investiture) over malevolent spirits in licit encounters. 
However, Aquinas' solution to the problem of extra-ecclesial (i.e. illicit) demon 
compulsion by effectively controlling access to the flow of grace by limiting it to 
mediation through the Church's sacraments was not open to Luther because of other 
aspects of Luther's grace theology. Luther was actively working against an idea of grace 
that was only mediated through the Church.  
Much as Aquinas' manipulation of his theology of sacramental grace effectively 
served to police religious orthopraxy (e.g. curtail the practice of ritual "Solomonic" 
magic), Luther's own theology of sacramental grace effectively served to provide a 
solution to the abuses within the Roman Church (e.g. famously, the sale of indulgences). 
Luther uncoupled the mediation of grace (necessary for both salvation and the 
authorization to compel demons) from the sacraments. According to Luther's theology, 
all who had faith received God's grace directly from God. However, Luther's solution to 
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the problem of abuses, facilitated by Aquinas' Scholastic theology of sacramental grace, 
reintroduced one of the very problems that such Scholastic theology had served to 
address: the apparent Christian authorization to practice "magic" (compel demons) by 
invoking the name(s) of God. In other words, by undoing mediation of grace in Aquinas' 
sacramental theology, Luther inadvertently reintroduced one of the problems Aquinas' 
theology had served to correct. 
In Luther's theology of grace, all who believed were justified (sanctified). What 
Luther seems not to have predicted is the persistence of Aquinas' teaching from De 
Potentia that sanctifying grace also confers authority over demons. We have already cited 
examples of the persistence of that model including, importantly, its inclusion in Johann 
Weyer's De Praestigiis Daemonum (1563), almost 20 years after Luther's death.35 In the 
doctrinal confusion of the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, this model appeared to 
apply whether "demons" were understood as the fallen angels of Aquinas' theology, 
Ficino's impersonal planetary spirits, or anything in between. Moreover, it was at that 
same historical moment – the moment of Luther's new grace theology – that the magico-
theological Tetragrammaton/Shem ha-Mephorash discourse reached fever pitch, with 
numerous Christian Hebraists and theologians industriously elaborating a Christian 
Cabala based in large part on speculations about the power of the name of God (including 
                                                
35 Weyer writes, "Rightly, therefore does St. Thomas say: 'If Solomon performed exorcisms at the time when he was in 
a state of salvation, those exorcisms could have had the power to constrain demons – as a result of the power of God. If, 
however, he performed them at the time when he adored idols – i.e., if he performed them through the arts of magic – 
then those exorcisms had no power to constrain the demons.'" Johann Weyer, Benjamin G. Kohl, John Shea, John 
Weber, Erik Midelfort, and Helen Bacon. Witches, Devils, and Doctors in the Renaissance: Johann Weyer, De 
Praestigiis Daemonum. Tempe (Ariz.: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1998) 473. 
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the name of Jesus or Pentagrammaton) and the Hebrew alphabet.36 Reuchlin's De Verbo 
Mirifico (1494) and his De Arte Cabalistica (1517) are the two most famous early 
examples in the Northern Renaissance with which Luther would have been primarily 
concerned. 
Luther's theology of grace not only complicated his own anti-magic theology (i.e. 
inadvertently authorizing all who believe), but also by leaving Luther no theological (as 
opposed to rational) grounds for objecting to the invocation of the name(s) of God for 
magical purposes other than blasphemy. His solution, in turn, seems not only to have 
been quite ineffective, but also to have inadvertently lent credibility to Christian 
Cabalists' as well as medieval nigromancers' claims of the "magical" efficacy of the 
names of God. Luther's solution of undermining the efficacious power of the name of 
God (i.e. the formula) rather than focusing on demonic pacts (i.e. condition of the 
performer) allowed him to address both medieval nigromantia and the emergent 
Christian Cabala simultaneously. However, it also meant that Aquinas' use of the sin of 
idolatry (Solomon's paradigmatic sin from 1 Kings 11) as the basis for objecting to the 
practice of magic, was no longer logically applicable. In removing idols (i.e. demons) 
from his anti-magic theology, Luther also removed the possibility of idolatry. By 
contrast, according to Thomas Aquinas, the effects of magic were achieved through 
demonic intervention as a result of explicit or implicit pact with a demon. The sin for 
which Solomon lost his favor with God was that he had rendered unto idols the worship 
                                                
36 For a thorough discussion of the Hebrew name of God in late medieval and early modern Christian theology, see 
Robert J Wilkinson, Tetragrammaton: Western Christians and the Hebrew Name of God: from the Beginnings to the 
Seventeenth Century (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2015), especially Chapter 9, "Early Christian Kabbalists and the 
Tetragrammaton," 313-350. 
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and service that belonged to God alone: latria. Aquinas had forbidden magic on such 
grounds in his De Potentia.37 Concerning the significance of works in latria, there can be 
no misinterpreting Aquinas, for elsewhere, in the Summa Theologica II-I, Q 108, A 1, 
resp., he states quite explicitly:  
I answer that, as stated above (I-II:106:2), the New Law consists chiefly in the 
grace of the Holy Ghost, which is shown forth by faith that worketh through love. 
Now men become receivers of this grace through God's Son made man, Whose 
humanity grace filled first, and thence flowed forth to us. Hence it is written (John 
1:14): "The Word was made flesh," and afterwards: "full of grace and truth"; and 
further on: "Of His fullness we all have received, and grace for grace." Hence it is 
added that "grace" and truth came by Jesus Christ." Consequently it was 
becoming that the grace flows from the  incarnate Word should be given to us by 
means of certain external sensible objects; and that from this inward grace, 
whereby the flesh is subjected to the Spirit, certain external works should ensue. 
Accordingly external acts may have a twofold connection with grace. In the first 
place, as leading in some way to grace. Such are the sacramental acts which are 
instituted in the New Law, e.g. Baptism, the Eucharist, and the like. 
In the second place there are those external acts which ensue from the promptings 
of grace: and herein we must observe a difference. For there are some which are 
necessarily in keeping with, or in opposition to inward grace consisting in faith 
that worketh through love. Such external works are prescribed or forbidden in the 
New Law; thus confession of faith is prescribed, and denial of faith is forbidden; 
for it is written (Matthew 10:32-33) "(Every one) that shall confess Me before 
men, I will also confess him before My Father . . . But he that shall deny Me 
before men, I will also deny him before My Father." On the other hand, there are 
works which are not necessarily opposed to, or in keeping with faith that worketh 
through love. Such works are not prescribed or forbidden in the New Law, by 
virtue of its primitive institution; but have been left by the Lawgiver, i.e. Christ, to 
the discretion of each individual. And so to each one it is free to decide what he 
should do or avoid; and to each superior, to direct his subjects in such matters as 
regards what they must do or avoid. Wherefore also in this respect the Gospel is 
                                                
37 For more on this, see the discussion in chapter 2. 
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called the "law of liberty" [Cf. Reply to Objection 2]: since the Old Law decided 
many points and left few to man to decide as he chose.38 
Of idolatry, Aquinas writes in II-II Q 94, A 1, resp.: 
Now just as this divine worship was given to sensible creatures by means of 
sensible signs, such as sacrifices, games, and the like, so too was it given to a 
creature represented by some sensible form or shape, which is called an "idol." 
Yet divine worship was given to idols in various ways. For some, by means of a 
nefarious art, constructed images which produced certain effects by the power of 
the demons: wherefore they deemed that the images themselves contained 
something God-like, and consequently that divine worship was due to them. This 
was the opinion of Hermes Trismegistus [De Natura Deorum, ad Asclep], as 
Augustine states (De Civ. Dei viii, 23): while others gave divine worship not to 
the images, but to the creatures represented thereby. The Apostle alludes to both 
of these (Romans 1:23-25). For, as regards the former, he says: "They changed 
the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible 
man, and of birds, and of four-footed beasts, and of creeping things," and of the 
latter he says: "Who worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator." 
 
Finally, in his response to the second objection to that question, the connection between 
latria, outward signs, and the sin of idolatry is made explicit: 
The term latria may be taken in two senses. On one sense it may denote a human 
act pertaining to the worship of God: and then its signification remains the same, 
to whomsoever it be shown, because, in this sense, the thing to which it is shown 
is not included in its definition. Taken thus latria is applied univocally, whether to 
true religion or to idolatry, just as the payment of a tax is univocally the same, 
whether it is paid to the true or to a false king. On another sense latria denotes the 
same as religion, and then, since it is a virtue, it is essential thereto that divine 
worship be given to whom it ought to be given; and in this way latria is applied 
equivocally to the latria of true religion, and to idolatry: just as prudence is 
applied equivocally to the prudence that is a virtue, and to that which is carnal.39 
 
As is evident here, idol-latria (idolatria in Latin) prior to Luther had been understood as 
a sin of bad works, not a sin of bad faith. Luther would have known this sin in his native 
                                                
38 Thomas Aquinas, "Question 108, Things That Are Contained in the New Law," Translated by Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province, Summa Theologiae: Things That Are Contained in the New Law (Prima Secundae Partis, Q. 108) 
(2016) www.newadvent.org/summa/2108.htm. 
39 Aquinas, ST II-II, Q 94, A 1, resp. and ad 2, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 
http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3094.htm. 
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German as Götzendienst (literally, "the service of idols"). Thus, whatever else Luther 
considered when he addressed the rising practice of "magic" among Protestants, he must 
have recognized that he could not assert a special negative merit of magic as the service 
of idols without beginning to undermine his own argument against any sanctifying merit 
of works done in the service of God. For why would service misdirected to idols anger 
God, if such service had no merit?40  
Not only had Luther removed the possibility of the sin of idolatry from his anti-
magic theology, but, as a result of his own theology of grace, he had effectively removed 
it – at least as it had been previously described – as a possible sin altogether. The 
meaning of the First Commandment upon which Aquinas had based his anti-magic 
theology becomes somewhat vague in the light of Luther's doctrine of sola fide. By 
denying the spiritual merit of good works, Luther had unwittingly reopened the loophole 
of Solomonic "magic" (i.e. the compulsion of demons by the efficacious name of God) 
that Aquinas had closed in De Potentia by concluding that demons are not compelled by 
sensible means, not even divine names, but rather through the idolatry inherent to explicit 
or implicit demonic pacts. Logically, if latria alone could not move God to mercy, then 
idolatria alone could not move God to anger. As a theologian, then, Luther faced a 
conundrum: What were the consequences of doing magic if all work (whether "good" or 
                                                
40 This was Luther's theological bind and possibly the source of his choice to translate superstitio, which for Aquinas 
had been synonymous with idolatria, as Aberglaube rather than Götzendienst. See, for example, Article 24 of On the 
Freedom of a Christian, which begins, "On the one hand, for he who is without faith, no good work is conducive 
toward piety and salvation; on the other, no evil work will make him evil and damned. But unbelief, which makes the 
person [...] evil, does evil and damned works. Therefore if one will be pious or evil, one begins not with works but with 
faith" (Helfferich, 34). 
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not) was equally damnable without faith?41 Was it possible to merit God's wrath with 
"bad" works (e.g. idolatry, magic, etc.) even though it was impossible to merit his favor 
with good works? How was "magically" invoking God's name any more sinful than doing 
anything else "without faith?"  
On the level of everyday life and tradition, Luther's first address to the problem of 
magic was thus less than a success. Not surprisingly, in 1543, Luther drastically changed 
his anti-magic theology from its earlier expression in the Small Catechism (1529) to its 
full and final expression in Vom Schemhamphoras. Yet Luther's grace theology left him 
few options in revising his anti-magic theology: he had removed demons (idols) and left 
only the name(s) of God. How could he connect the invocation of God with sin in a 
religion defined entirely by faith? Because he insisted that the soul was justified by faith 
alone (iustificatio sola fide) and that "works" had no merit, he would have to find a way 
to equate the magical invocation of the name(s) of God with bad faith. Aquinas had been 
able to implicate the magician in the sin of idolatry because of the involvement of the 
demon in the effects of magic (according to his theory of magic). Because Luther's anti-
magic theology was not demonological and focused instead on the Shem ha-Mephorash 
(i.e. on the formula rather than the condition of the performer), Luther would, in order to 
achieve the same effect, have to find a way to argue that the magician who "magically" 
invokes the name of God was actually guilty of invoking a false god, yet even then his 
                                                
41 In his 1520 On the Freedom of a Christian, for example, Luther articulates this idea: "Thus a Christian who, 
consecrated through faith, does good works will not become a better or more consecrated Christian through them (for 
they do nothing to increase faith). Indeed, if he did not already believe and was not a true Christian, then all of his 
works would count for nothing, but would instead be purely foolish, wanton, damnable sins." See: Martin Luther and 
Tryntje Helfferich, On the Freedom of a Christian: With Related Texts (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
Inc, 2013) 33. 
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denial of the physical effects of magic would leave him with no proof that a sin had been 
committed.  
This would seem to be impossible with regard to the invocation of the Christian 
god by his Hebrew name, yet in the full and final version of Luther's anti-magic theology, 
this is exactly what he attempts to do. However, in order for us to properly clarify and 
contextualize Luther's theological strategy, it will first be necessary to make the 
digression (promised in the introduction) into a brief comparison of Aquinas and Luther's 
constructs of "grace" and "faith."  
 
Digression: Comparative Discussion of "Grace" and "Faith" in Aquinas and 
Luther 
I have been arguing for a reading of Luther's construct of "faith" as the next turn 
(after Aquinas' "grace") in the metaphoricization and spiritualization of purity as 
condition of the performer in the Christian discourse of demon compulsion. That 
argument depends on the continuation of the apocryphal narrative of Solomon's power 
over demons continues in shaping that Christian discourse.  
However, because both "grace" and "faith" are discursive constructs and because 
Scholastic and Lutheran theologies represent distinct discourses, we must here digress 
briefly to discuss how the concepts were being redefined in this difference between 
Luther and Aquinas. Tracking this difference is necessary because these theological 
discourses had not merely turned from "purity" as the presence-of-grace to "purity" as the 
presence-of-faith within a single discourse (either Scholastic or Lutheran), but rather 
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from "grace" to "faith" across what had become two distinct theological discourses. In 
other words, by the time Luther works through his problem with magic, Aquinas and 
Luther do not mean the same things when each of them refers to "grace" or "faith," and 
therefore, likewise, do not agree on the difference between the terms. As we shall see, 
this necessitates a comparison of the terms' respective attributes within their theological 
discursive spaces. My particular goal is to track any changes (i.e. spiritualization and 
metaphoricization, how they are rendered abstract and polyvalent) in their de facto 
descriptions of the condition of the performer within the framework the still-persisting 
apocryphal narrative of Solomon's power over demons.  
Needless to say, "purity" as the overarching category is also a discursive 
construct. However, its value in the present project is descriptive rather than prescriptive, 
in the consideration of Aquinas and Luther's uses of both "grace" and "faith." For our 
purposes, the minimal definition of "purity" (in the theoretical rather than theological 
sense) as requisite condition of the performer for demon compulsion (i.e. "magic") within 
Christian tradition (pre-Scholastic, Scholastic, and Protestant) is sufficient. Indeed, this 
minimal definition allows us to consider both presence-of-grace and presence-of-faith as 
manifestations of the spiritualization and metaphoricization of "purity" developing from 
the much earlier Levitical manifestation as absence-of-contamination. Any attempt at a 
more precise or limiting definition seems to obscure the consideration of the presence-of-
faith as a spiritualization or metaphoricization of "purity."  
Logically, any discursive theological construct (such as "purity") that tends 
toward abstraction as it evolves would eventually lead to notions so far removed from the 
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original as to be unrecognizable. This, we suggest, is the case with "faith" and "purity." In 
consequence, two questions present themselves. First, how can a given late and 
presumably unrecognizable instantiation of "purity" (i.e. "faith") be demonstrated to be 
related in this way to a much earlier one (i.e. Levitical, ritual "purity")? Second, What is 
the value of conceptualizing the latter (i.e. "faith") as some version of the former (i.e. 
"purity") rather than, say, referring to them both by a third and more theoretical term?  
Both questions are answered by reference to the apocryphal Solomon narrative, as 
we shall now see. Both "faith" in Lutheran theological discourse and "grace" in 
Scholastic discourse may be causally related to the idea of "purity" in ancient Judaism 
because they all refer to the same element in the discourse space of demon compulsion 
developing out of the original apocryphal narrative of Solomon's power over demons – 
the condition of the performer. As we have seen, the successful performer must always be  
"pure." The use of Malinowski's condition of the performer to differentiate between these 
two discourses, however, does not capture the nuance of the evolution I am tracing here, 
no matter that it allows us to see how the original terms have been spiritualized and 
metaphoricized. For this reason, we use both concepts here in combination: condition of 
the performer and "pure" and distinguish the earliest forms of "purity" by using the 
modifier, "Levitical." The primary value of this comparison, which extends well beyond 
this study, is the strong suggestion of the performativity of "faith" (or acts of faith) as 
efficacious ritual within Protestant religious practice, a suggestion with implications for 
understanding the relationship of belief to practice in modern scholarship concerned with 
religion and magic. 
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 Let us now turn directly to how Luther's theology of "grace" (not limited to 
Christian discourses of demon compulsion) forced a turn in the condition of the 
performer much in the way that Aquinas' effective commodification of grace made it 
possible to conceive of grace as something that could be obtained. In fact, as we shall see, 
Luther's turn in the condition of the performer (from "purity" defined as presence-of-
grace to presence-of-faith) may be understood as – to some extent – causally related to 
Aquinas' turn. As we compare their two moves, it will emerge that Luther's turn (i.e. 
justification by faith alone) served to undermine the abuses of the Roman Church that 
were made possible as a result of Aquinas' commodification of grace. We turn now to 
two questions: how and why Luther arrived at such a construct in his theology of grace, 
as well as the implications of that grace theology for the condition of the performer as 
"pure" in Christian discourses of demon compulsion and "magic." 
The documentation of what Luther did is compelling and familiar to many. In a 
series of heated debates carried out primarily through open missives,42 Luther argued that 
it was impossible to earn one's way into heaven by means of "good works" because 
works were meaningless without faith.43 In the Augsburg Confession (Article 20, "Of 
Good Works"), he writes: 
[O]ur teachers have instructed the churches concerning faith as follows:— 
 
                                                
42 Most famously with the Dutch humanist theologian Erasmus of Rotterdam in a series of tracts concerned with the 
debate over free will and merit. 
43 See, for example, Luther's On the Freedom of a Christian, Art. 25: "For where these [doctrines] contain the false 
stipulation and the perverse opinion that we become pious and saved through works, then already such works are not 
good and completely damnable, for they are not free and blaspheme the grace of God, who alone makes us pious and 
saved through faith. This is something works cannot accomplish, yet they presume to be able to do it and thereby usurp 
grace in its work and honor" (Helfferich, p. 36). 
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First, that our works cannot reconcile God or merit forgiveness of sins, grace, and 
justification, but that we obtain this only by faith when we believe that we are 
received into favor for Christ's sake, who alone has been set forth the Mediator 
and Propitiation, 1 Tim. 2, 5, in order that the Father may be reconciled through 
Him. Whoever, therefore, trusts that by works he merits grace, despises the merit 
and grace of Christ, and seeks a way to God without Christ, by human strength, 
[…] 
 
Men are also admonished that here the term "faith" does not signify merely the 
knowledge of the history, […] but also the effect of the history—namely, this 
article: the forgiveness of sins, to wit, that we have grace, righteousness, and 
forgiveness of sins through Christ. […] 
 
Furthermore, it is taught on our part that it is necessary to do good works, not that 
we should trust to merit grace by them, but because it is the will of God. It is only 
by faith that forgiveness of sins is apprehended, and that, for nothing. And 
because through faith the Holy Ghost is received, hearts are renewed and 
endowed with new affections, so as to be able to bring forth good works. […] 
Besides, they are in the power of the devil who impels men to divers sins, to 
ungodly opinions, to open crimes. This we may see in the philosophers, who, 
although they endeavored to live an honest life could not succeed, but were 
defiled with many open crimes. Such is the feebleness of man when he is without 
faith and without the Holy Ghost, and governs himself only by human strength.44 
 
and in Article 4, "Of Justification": 
 
Also they teach that men cannot be justified before God by their own strength, 
merits, or works, but are freely justified for Christ's sake, through faith, when they 
believe that they are received into favor, and that their sins are forgiven for 
Christ's sake, who, by His death, has made satisfaction for our sins. This faith 
God imputes for righteousness in His sight. Rom. 3 and 4.45 
 
Familiarly, this position puts Luther at odds with the Scholastics of the Roman Church 
who followed Aquinas. According to Luther, the grace necessary for salvation is 
achieved "through faith," whereas according to Aquinas, grace is achieved through 
                                                
44 AC 20:8, 9, 23, 27-29, and 32-34 in Triglot Concordia (1921), 53, 55, & 57.  
45 AC 4, in Triglot Concordia (1921), 45. 
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participation in the sacraments. "Faith" and "participation in the sacraments" would 
appear to be two different and not necessarily mutually exclusive premises.  
 On its own, Luther's position thus has the appearance of a straw man argument 
vis-à-vis the position of his Roman interlocutors, who did not actually assert that one 
could earn one's way into heaven with good works but without faith.46 What is at stake in 
their debate is whether "faith" is an aspect of grace47 – in other words, whether it is even 
possible to have "faith" without already having grace. The disjuncture between these 
arguments, in fact, results from two different and irreconcilable premises. On the one 
side, Catholic orthodoxy held that original prelapsarian grace – the state in which Adam 
and Eve first existed in Eden before the Fall – had been gravely wounded in the Fall of 
mankind,48 but not extinguished. Opposing this position, Luther insisted that original sin 
                                                
46 Council of Trent (1547), Session 6 Canon 1 states: "The holy Synod declares first, that, for the correct and sound 
understanding of the doctrine of Justification, it is necessary that each one recognise and confess, that, whereas all men 
had lost their innocence in the prevarication of Adam-having become unclean, and, as the apostle says, by nature 
children of wrath, as (this Synod) has set forth in the decree on original sin,-they were so far the servants of sin, and 
under the power of the devil and of death, that not the Gentiles only by the force of nature, but not even the Jews by the 
very letter itself of the law of Moses, were able to be liberated, or to arise, therefrom; although free will, attenuated as it 
was in its powers, and bent down, was by no means extinguished in them." Further in Canon 8, it states, "And whereas 
the Apostle saith, that man is justified by faith and freely, those words are to be understood in that sense which the 
perpetual consent of the Catholic Church hath held and expressed; to wit, that we are therefore said to be justified by 
faith, because faith is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation, and the root of all Justification; without which 
it is impossible to please God, and to come unto the fellowship of His sons: but we are therefore said to be justified 
freely, because that none of those things which precede justification-whether faith or works-merit the grace itself of 
justification. For, if it be a grace, it is not now by works, otherwise, as the same Apostle says, grace is no more grace." 
See: Adrien Nampon, Catholic Doctrine As Defined by the Council of Trent: Expounded in a Series of Conferences 
Delivered in Geneva ... Translated from the French ... by a Member of the University Oxford (Philadelphia, 1869) 281, 
285f.  
47 Against the established theological logic, Luther's position presented a logical inconsistency: One could not receive 
grace through faith because grace was believed to necessarily precede faith. Regarding this catalytic concept of the 
relationship between grace and faith within established Catholic theology, see Augustine's On the Predestination of the 
Saints (B I: 4). Augustine writes, "[G]race precedes faith; otherwise, if faith precedes grace, beyond a doubt will also 
precedes it, because there cannot be faith without will. But if grace precedes will, certainly it precedes all obedience; it 
also precedes love, by which alone God is truly and pleasantly obeyed. And all these things grace works in him to 
whom it is given, and in whom it is given, and in whom it precedes all these things. See: Philip Schaff and Aurelius 
Augustinus, A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church: Vol. 5  (New York: The 
Christian literature company, 1887) 542. 
48 In Discourse Concerning Free Will, Erasmus writes: "One is the grace naturally present in us, vitiated, as we said, 
but not destroyed, by sin; some call it a 'natural influence (influxum naturalem)'" See: Clarence H Miller, Peter 
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had obliterated original prelapsarian grace and, consequently, after the Fall, humanity 
existed in a state of total depravity.49 This position is also reflected in the Augsburg 
Confession (1530) 
Article II: Of Original Sin. 
Also they [i.e. Lutherans] teach that since the fall of Adam all men begotten in the 
natural way are born with sin, that is, without the fear of God, without trust in 
God, and with concupiscence; and that this disease, or vice of origin, is truly sin, 
even now condemning and bringing eternal death upon those not born again 
through Baptism and the Holy Ghost. 
 
They condemn the Pelagians and others who deny that original depravity is sin, 
and who, to obscure the glory of Christ's merit and benefits, argue that man can be 
justified before God by his own strength and reason.50 
 
Both Luther and the Scholastics of the Roman Church agreed that mankind had been 
created pure and subsequently defiled itself through disobedience.51 They also agreed that 
the defilement (i.e. original sin) was hereditary.52 Furthermore, they agreed that it was 
                                                                                                                                            
Macardle, Desiderius Erasmus, and Martin Luther. Erasmus and Luther: The Battle Over Free Will (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Pub, 2012) 9. 
49 On Luther's teachings regarding total depravity, see for example: Article 2, "Of Original Sin," in the Confessio 
Augustana (1530), which states, 1] "[T]hey [i.e. Lutherans] teach that since the fall of Adam all men begotten in the 
natural way are born with sin, that is, without the fear of God, without trust in God, and with 2] concupiscence; and that 
this disease, or vice of origin, is truly sin, even now condemning and bringing eternal death upon those not born again 
through Baptism and the Holy Ghost. 3] They condemn the Pelagians and others who deny that original depravity is 
sin, and who, to obscure the glory of Christ's merit and benefits, argue that man can be justified before God by his own 
strength and reason." See also the Formula concordiae (1577): I. Original Sin, "[Original sin] is an entire want or lack 
of the concreated hereditary righteousness in Paradise, or of God's image, according to which man was originally 
created in truth, holiness, and righteousness; and at the same time an inability and unfitness for all the things of God, 
or, as the Latin words read: Desciptio peccati originalis detrahit naturae non renovatae et dona et vim seu facultatem et 
actus inchoandi et efficiendi spiritualia; that is: The definition of original sin takes away from the unrenewed nature the 
gifts, the power, and all activity for beginning and effecting anything in spiritual things." For additional discussion, see: 
Robert R. Williams, "Sin and Evil," in Peter C. Hodgson and Robert H. King, Christian Theology: An Introduction to 
Its Traditions and Tasks (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1994) 204. 
50 AC 2, "Of Original Sin." See: Triglot Concordia = Concordia Triglotta: The Symbolical Books of the Ev. Lutheran 
Church, German-Latin-English (St. Louis, MO: Concordia, 1921) 43 & 45. 
51 Again, this shared Christian teaching accounts for "purity" as condition of the performer in Christian discourse as 
the presence (as opposed to absence) of something. Effectively, it is only possible to remove the contamination of sin 
through the application of something else (grace, faith). 
52 For a general orientation to Augustine's doctrine of original sin, see: Ernesto Bonaiuti and Giorgio La Piana "The 
Genesis of St. Augustine's Idea of Original Sin, "The Harvard Theological Review 10. 2, (1917) 159–175. 
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beyond humanity's power to purify itself without God' s help (i.e. grace). Where they 
disagreed was whether any of the original God-given grace had survived the Fall.  
According to the Roman Church's position, humanity still had some grace, which 
allowed the individual to choose to do good works (including choosing to have "faith").53 
According to Luther, the individual was incapable of choosing to do good works without 
receiving grace through faith.54 The Scholastics insisted that grace preceded faith, and 
Luther insisted on a model of grace through faith, which suggests that faith necessarily 
precedes grace. These questions belong to the sixteenth century debate over free will, but 
may perhaps be more easily understood outside the context of theology as a proxy debate 
or as necessary theological preconditions for a different debate. That debate asked: What 
was at stake was the question of who had grace (or grace-as-purity) and who did not, and 
whether or how one could obtain grace (or more of it). Prior to Luther, the Roman 
Church had effectively created a spiritual economy in which it held the monopoly on the 
mediation of God's grace, a role justified by Aquinas' teaching on the mediation of grace 
                                                
53 See, for example, Augustine's On the Predestination of the Saints II, 41: "Therefore, also grace precedes faith; 
otherwise, if faith precedes grace, beyond a doubt will also precedes it, because there cannot be faith without will. But 
if grace precedes faith because it precedes will, certainly it precedes all obedience; it also precedes charity, by which 
alone God is truly and pleasantly obeyed" in: Augustine, Marcus Dods, John R. King, Peter Holmes, Richard Stothert, J 
G. Cunningham, James F. Shaw, Arthur W. Haddan, William Findlay, Steward D. F. Salmond, John Gibb, James 
Innes, Joseph G. Pilkington, and Robert E. Wallis, The Works of Aurelius Augustine: A New Translation (Edinburgh: T. 
& T. Clark, 1993) 210. 
54 For Luther's seminal theological articulation of the reception of "grace through faith," see the Smalcald Articles, Part 
two, Article 1: "The first and chief article is this: Jesus Christ, our God and Lord, died for our sins and was raised again 
for our justification (Romans 3:24-25). He alone is the Lamb of God who takes away the sins of the world (John1:29), 
and God has laid on Him the iniquity of us all (Isaiah 53:6). All have sinned and are justified freely, without their own 
works and merits, by His grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, in His blood (Romans 3:23-25). This is 
necessary to believe. This cannot be otherwise acquired or grasped by any work, law or merit. Therefore, it is clear and 
certain that this faith alone justifies us ... Nothing of this article can be yielded or surrendered, even though heaven and 
earth and everything else falls" (Mark 13:31). Paul T McCain, W H. T. Dau, and F Bente, Concordia: The Lutheran 
Confessions: a Reader's Edition of the Book of Concord (St. Louis, MO: Concordia Pub. House, 2009) 289. For further 
discussion of Luther's "grace through faith" theology, see Markus Wriedt, "Luther's Theology," in The Cambridge 
Companion to Luther (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 88–94. 
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through the sacraments.55 Consequently, it also created a monopoly on salvation (i.e. 
one's state of grace or sanctification) and therefore, as pertains to the present study, on 
licit (i.e. "religious") demon compulsion, as well. In that economy, the gift of God's grace 
was potentially available to anyone, but only to those in communion with the Church, 
since grace was mediated through the sacraments. 
Aquinas had equated the condition of the performer necessary for licit demon 
compulsion in De Potentia with the condition necessary for salvation (sanctification/ 
justification), effectively making orthodoxy and orthopraxy the only ways to achieve the 
purity-as-grace necessary for licit demon compulsion (i.e. exorcism as opposed to illicit 
demon compulsion as "magic"). In contrast, in order to wrest grace – and with it salvation 
– from the Church's control, Luther advanced a theology of iustificatio sola fide 
(justification by faith alone) which did not depend on the mediation of grace through the 
sacraments.56 According to Luther, those who have "faith" receive grace that is both 
sanctifying and gratuitously given (i.e. does not require "merit").57 Though perhaps 
unintended, a secondary consequence of Luther's position on grace and salvation was its 
                                                
55 Again, Aquinas' sacramental theology makes the Church's sacraments particular conduits of sanctifying grace. See, 
ST Q 61, A1, ad 2: "God's grace is a sufficient cause of man's salvation. But God gives grace to man in a way which is 
suitable to him. Hence it is that man needs the sacraments that he may obtain grace." 
56 See: Carl R. Trueman “Reformers, Puritans, and Evangelicals: the Lay Connection.” The Rise of the Laity in 
Evangelical Protestantism, edited by Deryck W. Lovegrove, London ; New York : Routledge, 2002, pp. 17–35. 
Trueman writes, "Luther formulated his understanding of the universal priesthood of all believers in 1520. This is 
significant, for at one level the term captures in a nutshell Luther's understanding of grace, justification and salvation. 
These are not mediated via the institutional church or by the priestly hierarchy of that church, but are the direct 
privilege of every believer who through faith can have dealings with God in Christ on a personal basis" (19). 
57 AC 13:1-3 "Of the Use of the Sacraments": "Of the use of the sacraments they teach that the sacraments were 
ordained, not only to be marks of profession among men, but rather to be signs and testimonies of the will of God 
toward us, instituted to awaken and confirm faith in those who use them. Wherefore we must so use the sacraments that 
faith be added to awaken and confirm faith in those who use them. Wherefore we must so use the sacraments that faith 
be added to believe the promises where are offered and set forth through the sacraments. The therefore condemn those 
who teach the sacraments justify by the outward act, and who do not teach that, in the use of the sacraments, faith 
which believes that sins are forgiven, is required" in Triglot Concordia (1921), 49. 
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implications for demon compulsion (by which "magic" had been defined in the 
apocryphal Solomon narrative since antiquity, as outlined above). What is more, these 
implications were not unimportant for Luther, who so frequently and infamously claimed 
to battle with the devil. Nor were they insignificant to a sixteenth-century Germany that 
was replete with medieval nigromantia, Renaissance magic, Scholastic demonology, and 
witch trials.  
Luther and the Roman Church both agreed that grace was necessary for salvation 
and both seem to have agreed that a state of salvation (i.e. justification or sanctification) 
was necessary for compelling or "overcoming" demons. The difference in their positions 
was that, according to the Roman Church, there were at least two different kinds of grace, 
whereas according to Luther, there was only one.58 What Luther argued against had been 
spelled out by Aquinas in the Summa Theologia (1225-1274) as a distinction between 
gratia gratum faciens ("grace that makes pleasing [to God]," now called "sanctifying 
grace") and gratia gratis data ("grace gratuitously given"). Thus, when Luther argued 
that works do not justify (sanctify), he was essentially rejecting and disregarding the 
distinction between the two types of grace, which Aquinas makes in Quaestio CXI, "De 
divisione gratiae" ("On the divisions of grace"), in the Summa Theologica:  
                                                
58 In his Discourse Concerning Free Will (1524), Erasmus explains: "And so Augustine teaches that man, in thrall to 
sin, cannot change his ways so as to amend his life, or do anything that contributed to salvation, unless he divinely 
impelled by the freely given grace of God to desire what leads to eternal life. Some call this grace 'prevenient'; 
Augustine calls it 'operating,' for even faith, the doorway to salvation, is itself a freely given gift of God. The charity 
added to faith by an even more generous gift of the Holy Spirit he calls cooperating grace, for it unceasingly helps 
those are making an effort until they achieve their goal; but altogether free will and grace cooperate in the same task, 
grace is the leader, not merely a partner. Some theologians, however, make a distinction here saying that if you 
consider it according to the merit involved, the more important is grace. And yet faith, the reason that we desire what 
leads to salvation, and charity, the reason that we do not desire it in vain, are distinguished not so much in time as in 
nature (though they can both increase with time.) And so, since 'grace' means 'favor freely bestowed,' it is possible to 
posit three or indeed even four kinds of grace." See: Clarence H Miller, Peter Macardle, Desiderius Erasmus, and 
Martin Luther. Erasmus and Luther: The Battle Over Free Will (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub, 2012) 8f. 
 
  237 
I respond: As the Apostle says in Romans 13:1, "Things that are from God are 
well-ordered." Now as Dionysius says in De Caelesti Hierarchia, the order of 
things consists in some things being led back to God through other things. 
Therefore, since grace is ordered toward man's being led back to God, this is done 
in a certain order, viz., with some being led back to God by others. Accordingly, 
there are two kinds of grace: 
(a) One kind of grace is such that through it a man is himself joined to 
God, and this is called sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faciens). 
(b) On the other hand, the second kind of grace is such that through it one 
man cooperates with another in order to be led back to God. Now a gift of this 
sort is called gratuitously given grace (gratia gratis data) since (a) it lies beyond 
the power of nature and (b) is given to a man beyond his personal merits (supra 
meritum personae); however, because it is given not in order that the man himself 
should be justified by it, but rather in order that he cooperate in the justification of 
others, it is not called sanctifying grace. And it is of this kind of grace that the 
Apostle is speaking in 1 Corinthians 12:7, "To each is given the manifestation of 
the Spirit for its usefulness," viz., its usefulness for others.59  
 
For Aquinas, in order to merit sanctifying grace, some effort (i.e. "work") is required on 
the part of the individual. The good works that constituted that effort were possible 
because of the presence of "grace gratuitously given" (gratia gratis data), but 
sanctification (justification) was not an aspect of gratia gratis data (grace gratuitously 
given). The grace economy of the Catholic Church was built on this idea of a distinct 
sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faciens), as was the idea of a distinct sanctifying grace 
to which Luther objected. Moreover, the Scholastics solved the theological problem of 
how someone who has not received sanctifying grace (through the sacraments) might be 
moved to seek it in the first place by accepting this differentiation between these two 
                                                
59 Aquinas, ST I-II, Q 111, A 1, resp.: "Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, ad Rom. XIII, quae a Deo 
sunt, ordinata sunt. In hoc autem ordo rerum consistit, quod quaedam per alia in Deum reducuntur; ut Dionysius dicit, 
in Cael. Hier. Cum igitur gratia ad hoc ordinetur ut homo reducatur in Deum, ordine quodam hoc agitur, ut scilicet 
quidam per alios in Deum reducantur. Secundum hoc igitur duplex est gratia. Una quidem per quam ipse homo Deo 
coniungitur, quae vocatur gratia gratum faciens. Alia vero per quam unus homo cooperatur alteri ad hoc quod ad Deum 
reducatur. Huiusmodi autem donum vocatur gratia gratis data, quia supra facultatem naturae, et supra meritum 
personae, homini conceditur, sed quia non datur ad hoc ut homo ipse per eam iustificetur, sed potius ut ad 
iustificationem alterius cooperetur, ideo non vocatur gratum faciens. Et de hac dicit apostolus, I ad Cor. XII, unicuique 
datur manifestatio spiritus ad utilitatem, scilicet aliorum. 
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distinct forms of grace. In other words, gratia gratis data (grace gratuitously given) 
solves the problem of what might move an unbaptized sinner to seek baptism (or "have 
faith") and thus begin to receive sanctifying grace through the sacraments. 
For Luther, the soul exists after the Fall in a state of total depravity, with no free 
will; through the act of faith, it is filled with one grace that is both gratuitously given 
(gratia gratis data) and sanctifying (gratia gratum faciens). In contrast, the position of 
the Roman Church was that, after the Fall, the soul existed with the wounded or 
diminished original grace gratuitously given (gratia gratis data). That grace, moreover, 
was sufficient to preserve free will so that man was capable of choosing to do good, 
thereby meriting sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faciens), not because of his own 
inherent goodness, but because of the gift of God's grace that remained in him. The 
Roman Church taught that, by exercising one's free will and choosing to do good works, 
one could acquire more and more sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faciens) because 
"facientibus quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam" ("To those who do what lies 
within them God denies not grace").60 The significance of this series of assumptions is 
                                                
60 "For the origin of the formula and its development up through the twelfth century, see Michael Landgraf, 
Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik, vol. I.1, Regensburg 1952, pp. 249-264. In Saint Thomas there is a decided 
change in interpretation between his early commentary on Lombard and the Summa theologica, e.g. II Sent. d. 28 q. 1 
art. 4: 'Et ideo aliis consentiendo dicimus quod ad gratiam gratum facientem habendem ex solo libero arbitrio se homo 
potest praeparare, faciendo enim quod in se est gratiam a Deo consequitur. Hoc autem solum in nobis est quod in 
potestate liberi arbitrii constitutum est.' S.T. I-II q. 109 art. 6 ad 2: 'Ad secundum illud Joan. 15.5, Sine me nihil potestis 
facere. Et ideo cum dicitur homo facere quod in se est dicitur hoc esse in potestate hominis secundum quod est motus a 
Deo.' See also ibid., I-II q. 112 arts. 2 and 3. Giles of Rome interprets the formula in a way similar to Thomas's mature 
opinion, 'In epist. ad Romanos,' Primus tomus operum D. Aegidii Romani, Rome 1555, fol, fol. 76v: 'Dicendum quod 
nos laribus rebus, propter quod adgeneratur in nobis forma et habitus saecularibus rebus, propter quod adgeneratur in 
nobis forma et habitu saecularis concupiscientiae. Sed tamen per auxilium divinum possumus haec vitare. Verum quia 
Deus quantum est de se semper est paratus, ideo dicitur hoc esse in potestate mostra, quia utinam ita essemus parati 
facere quod in nobis est, sicut Deus, paratus est facere quod in se est.' For the formula in Gabriel Biel (ca. 1410-1495), 
see Heiko A. Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, Cambridge, Mass. 1963, esp. pp. 129-145. During the 
Reformation it was a subject of polemic, e.g. WA, vol. 1, p. 354." As cited in: John W. O'Malley, Giles of Viterbo on 
Church and Reform: A Study in Renaissance Thought (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986) 26f. 
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that a theology that supported the merit of "good works" allowed for the actual 
commodification of the merit of God's favor as a proxy for grace (since grace itself was a 
gift from God and could not be sold). This was the logic that led to the infamous sale of 
indulgences, since the money for which an indulgence was sold represented a sacrifice of 
previous effort for the good on the part of the penitent, who purchased merit (worthiness) 
of God's gift of grace through the sacraments, which the Church controlled.61 
Returning to our main argument, it is clear that from Aquinas' De Potentia that he 
held that acquiring grace through the sacraments both secures salvation and 
facilitates/authorizes licit (i.e. "religious" as opposed to "magical") demon compulsion. 
The "purity" that justifies/sanctifies the soul (i.e. ensures salvation) also serves as God's 
authorization, describing the condition of the performer (conditional investiture with his 
divine authority) within the familiar Solomonic paradigm. Luther's theological 
intervention into the nature of grace thus attacked the Scholastic (Thoman) model of the 
acquisition of grace (necessary for justification/salvation) as mediated through the 
Church's sacraments by means of merit (i.e. "good works," including the purchase of 
indulgences). Luther's model supplants the Thoman one by positing the acquisition of 
grace (also necessary for justification/salvation) "through faith."  
                                                
61 In Aquinas (ST, Suppl. IIIae, Q 25 [Indulgences], A 1), we find the basic theological underpinning of the idea of the 
'treasury of merit': "Now one man can satisfy for another, as we have explained above (Supplement:13:2). And 
the saints in whom this super-abundance of satisfactions is found, did not perform their good works for this or that 
particular person, who needs the remission of his punishment (else he would have received this remission without 
any indulgence at all), but they performed them for the whole Church in general, even as the Apostle declares that he 
fills up 'those things that are wanting of the sufferings of Christ ... for His body, which is the Church' to whom he wrote 
(Colossians 1:24). These merits, then, are the common property of the whole Church. Now those things which are the 
common property of a number are distributed to the various individuals according to the judgment of him who rules 
them all. Hence, just as one man would obtain the remission of his punishment if another were to satisfy for him, so 
would he too if another's satisfactions be applied to him by one who has the power to do so." 
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Here, I am extending a logic explicitly that both Aquinas and Luther extend only 
implicitly, given that the accompanying authority to compel demons is only their 
secondary concern. (The same would not have been the case for contemporaneous 
magicians, and it is the magicians and exorcists.) Yet thanks to Aquinas, the means by 
which a soul acquired grace had come to be understood as the same means by which one 
achieved the requisite condition of the performer for the licit compulsion of demons. As 
such, Luther's redefinition of how grace is acquired also redefined the necessary steps 
(i.e. ritual) for achieving the requisite condition of the performer. Thus, Luther's own 
descriptions of encounters with the devil, who may be "conquered/vanquished" through 
faith, reflect his awareness of and continued reliance on Aquinas' instrumentalization of 
the apocryphal Solomon narrative.  
Luther's redefinition of the nature of grace, however, was not without ripple 
effects. Aquinas had solved the problem of selectively deauthorizing illicit demon 
compulsion as magic by controlling the flow of that grace which (primarily) achieved 
salvation and (secondarily) facilitated and authorized licit (i.e. "religious") demon 
compulsion. Luther, by undermining the grace economy in his effort to end such abuses 
as the sale of indulgences, had inadvertently reopened the compulsion of demons by the 
authority of God to anyone who had "faith," and through that faith, the requisite condition 
of the performer: justifying (or sanctifying) grace (i.e. salvation). Faith was the condition 
through which an individual became part of God's authority, and so, in this redefinition, 
Luther also disrupted the previous certainty of having received grace that followed from 
participation in sacramental ritual.  
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Within the Scholastic paradigm, the acquisition of that grace that both justifies the 
soul and authorizes it for the compulsion of demons had been insured through 
participation in the sacraments as reliable conduits of that grace (i.e. performance of 
"purity" ritual). A magician or exorcist could thus "know" he was authorized for demon 
compulsion (i.e. had achieved the requisite condition of the performer) because he had 
ritually enacted the acquisition of grace-as-purity.62 The Lutheran, however, even 
believing that he is authorized if he has faith, cannot have the same confidence in the 
ultimate status of his authorization/"purity" (i.e. condition of the performer) to compel 
demons for the same reason that he cannot know the status of his salvation – that status is 
completely internal and thus has no external proof. For how could he be sure that he had 
in fact acquired grace?  
It is on this observation that we suggest understanding the performance of acts of 
faith as ritual acts in Luther's (and later Lutheran) discourse. In this we include not only 
Luther's own infamous battles with the devil, but also later early modern examples of 
ritual magic to be discussed in the conclusion to the present project. There, we also 
suggest that the performance of such acts/tests of faith be read as a ritual means for 
acquiring and maintaining the faith-as-purity necessary not only for salvation, but also for 
demon compulsion itself. By extension, this allows us to speculate as to the nature of 
certain early modern manuals of demon compulsion as (unorthodox) Protestant rituals 
intended – at least in part – as indirect evidence or assurance of salvation (i.e. 
                                                
62 This also appears to be the point of departure for illicit demon compulsion. Magician authors of medieval grimoires 
tend to accept the sacramental ideas about grace-as-purity and selectively disregard the prohibitions against the practice 
of magic. 
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justification). Their textual logic relies on the conclusions made to this point. Since 
salvation is not directly knowable within a theology of predestination, while the same 
grace that secures salvation also authorizes demon compulsion, then one may indirectly 
know that sanctifying grace is present (i.e. that one is "in statu salutis" or justified) upon 
the "successful" completion of a demon compelling ritual. In other words, if one survives 
an encounter (whether framed as compulsion, restraint, or "overcoming") with a demon 
or the devil, then one must necessarily be justified ("saved") since that justification is an 
understood necessary precondition for surviving such an encounter. Survival of a 
diabolical or demonic encounter is ex post facto proof of justification and, because it is 
unknowable beforehand, the choice to "believe" that one is justified (and will thus 
emerge victorious) may be understood as a ritual performance of faith. 
Ultimately, Luther cast the practice of "magic" not as individual sins of idolatry 
("bad works," as it were), but rather in two different ways: first, in his Small Catechism 
(1529), as sins of blasphemy, and then, in his Vom Schemhamphoras (1543), as outward 
signs of an internal state of total apostasy (in other words, "bad faith"). For Luther 
"grace" is not merited (as a result of good works or "faith"), but rather given freely by 
God through faith. In consequence, "grace" and "faith" become causally indistinguishable 
in Luther's theology.  
Let us now return to the main course of the chapter. 
 
Works and Merit – The Theological Impasse in Luther's Anti-Magic Argument: 
From Aquinas' De Potentia to Luther's Vom Schemhamphoras 
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As we will see, the core of the formulation of Aquinas' Scholastic anti-magic 
theological argument remained essentially unchanged throughout the sixteenth century – 
throughout witch trials, the popularization and even publication of texts of ritual magic,63 
the Christianization of the Kabbalah, and widespread interest in alchemy. Scholastic 
theologians (or those in dialogue with them) sought to forbid or permit all of these 
practices arguing either for the presence or absence of Aquinas' explicit or implicit 
demonic pacts.64 However, as just argued, this Scholastic strategy was incompatible with 
emerging Lutheran (and post-Lutheran Protestant) theology. Luther's doctrine of 
justification by faith alone (iustificatio sola fide) precluded his use of Aquinas' anti-magic 
argument because Luther's teaching denied the spiritual merit of "good works" upon 
which Aquinas' anti-magic argument in De Potentia depended. These assertions find 
ample support throughout Luther's writings (in his On the Freedom of a Christian (1520), 
On the Bondage of the Will (1525), etc.). Throughout his career as a reformer, Luther had 
argued that good works have no sanctifying merit, going so far as to insist that without 
faith, any work – no matter how good – was a damnable sin.65 Luther repeats this claim 
again and again.  
The reason that Aquinas' anti-magic solution was unavailable to Luther was that 
                                                
63 The De Occulta Philosophia Libri Tres (1531) of Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim is certainly the most 
famous example. 
64 The Jesuit demonologist, Martin Delrio, is still arguing against magic in terms demonic pacts in his Disquisitionum 
Magicarum Libri Sex, which was published in three volumes between 1599 and 1601. See: See Libri II, Quaestio III in 
Martín A Delrío, Gérard Rivius, and Ernst, Disquisitionum Magicarum Libri Sex, in Tres Tomos Partiti. Auctore 
Martino Del Rio, Societatis Jesu Presbytero (Lovanii, ex officina Gerardi Rivii. Anno M.D.)   
65 Oberman notes: "There is ...good reason to believe that Luther at the end of 1509 has become independent of the 
nominalistic tradition as regards the relation of faith and reason while retaining till 1515-16 the doctrine of the facere 
quod in se est in its application to the relation of will and grace." See: Heiko A. Oberman "Facientibus quod in se est 
Deus non denegat gratiam: Robert Holcot, O.P. and the Beginnings of Luther's Theology," Harvard Theological 
Review, 55.4 (1962): 317-342, here 333.  
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Aquinas had both allowed for the real physical effects of "magic" and concluded that 
these effects were affected by demons that intervened into physical reality in exchange 
for the magician's worship of them, which is to say, idolatry. For Aquinas, the effects of 
magic served as evidence of the commission of the sin of idolatry, in a logic of corpus 
delicti, requiring physical or visible evidence of the sin.66 According to Aquinas, the sin 
of idolatry consists of the fact that latria – the service and veneration properly due only to 
God – is rendered to idols rather than to God, thus idolatry (idol+latria).67 In Aquinas' 
model, latria is effectively a "good work" which merits spiritual reward – God's favor.68 
Thus, its perversion (i.e. idolatria) is a sin of "works." In consequence, Luther could not 
rely on the sin of idolatry to anchor the anti-magic theology of his Small Catechism and 
Vom Schemhamphoras in the way that Aquinas had in his De Potentia and Summa. Had 
he followed Aquinas' definition of latria, he would have (at least indirectly) contradicted 
                                                
66 The phrase corpus delicti refers to the substantial and fundamental fact necessary to prove the commission of a 
crime, such as a corpse, in the case of murder.  
67 For more detail, see the discussion in the previous chapter. 
68 Such merit, however, is not possible without grace. In Roman theology, this merit is possible because of gratia 
gratis data (grace gratuitously given), the existence of which Luther denied. See above quote from Summa Contra 
Gentiles. See Aquinas, ST II-I, Q 114, A 1, resp.: "I answer that, Merit and reward refer to the same, for a reward 
means something given anyone in return for work or toil, as a price for it. Hence, as it is an act of justice to give a just 
price for anything received from another, so also is it an act of justice to make a return for work or toil. Now justice is a 
kind of equality, as is clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 3), and hence justice is simply between those that are simply 
equal; but where there is no absolute equality between them, neither is there absolute justice, but there may be a certain 
manner of justice, as when we speak of a father's or a master's right (Ethic. v, 6), as the Philosopher says. And hence 
where there is justice simply, there is the character of merit and reward simply. But where there is no simple right, but 
only relative, there is no character of merit simply, but only relatively, in so far as the character of justice is found 
there, since the child merits something from his father and the slave from his lord. Now it is clear that between God and 
man there is the greatest inequality: for they are infinitely apart, and all man's good is from God. Hence there can be no 
justice of absolute equality between man and God, but only of a certain proportion, inasmuch as both operate after their 
own manner. Now the manner and measure of human virtue is in man from God. Hence man's merit with God only 
exists on the presupposition of the Divine ordination, so that man obtains from God, as a reward of his operation, what 
God gave him the power of operation for, even as natural things by their proper movements and operations obtain that 
to which they were ordained by God; differently, indeed, since the rational creature moves itself to act by its free-will, 
hence its action has the character of merit, which is not so in other creatures." 
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his own teachings concerning the meaninglessness of "good works" and thus effectively 
conceded the validity of the sale of indulgences, etc.  
This is the fundamental difference that completes the Protestant "faith" turn in the 
Christian discourse on Solomon, "purity," and demon compulsion in the magic/anti-
magic debate. Unlike the Scholastics, Luther did not initially build his arguments against 
"magic" (the magical invocation of the name of God) on the negative example of 
Solomon's idolatry. However, neither did he define magic as demonic intervention 
elicited through explicit or implicit demonic pact. Because of the nature of Luther's own 
theological position concerning works and merit in relation to justification and grace, he 
could not.  
For Luther, the underlying sin of "magic" thus could not be located in the act 
itself. For that reason, he locates it in the inward state of unbelief in the sovereignty of 
God (i.e. bad "faith") from which it is possible for such "blasphemous" acts to follow. 
Consequently, in Luther's Protestant theology, the sin of magic is no longer necessarily 
connected to the practice of magic (i.e. "works"), not only the sin of idolatry, and the 
figure of Solomon (as the archetypal idolater) and the demonic pact are no longer crucial 
elements of the initial anti-magic argument. Luther's changes to the framing of the sin of 
magic had rendered the figure of Solomon ill suited to his anti-magic theology. 
Nevertheless, as we have shown, Luther continues to rely on the Solomonic paradigm, if 
not the narrative, in his adaptation of Aquinas' two-theory model. Luther ultimately 
returns to it (as paradigm) in his Vom Schemhamphoras in which he describes the 
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invocation of the Shem ha-Mephorash as idolatry, and extends Solomon's paradigmatic 
transgression to all of Jewry.  
Vom Schemhamphoras thus becomes a critical document for his theological logic, 
not (just) for the cultural history of anti-Semitism. Unlike the Scholastics and the early 
apologists before them, Luther does not single out Solomon specifically as the archetypal 
idolater for his explanation of the sin of magic. Instead, he condemns all of Jewry for 
refusing to recognize Jesus as the Messiah and equates their adherence to the Old 
Testament Law (i.e. the "good works" prescribed by the Law) with idolatry (i.e. service 
and worship due properly to only to God, now in the person of Jesus). In Luther's 
theology, then, idolatry has become indistinguishable from apostasy because of his 
teachings on the meaninglessness of "works" without faith.  
For Luther, because the Jews do not have faith in salvation through Jesus, but 
rather, through adherence to the Law (i.e. "works"), they are idolaters. Thus, in his new 
anti-magic argument, Luther changes Aquinas' formulation of the paradigmatic sin from 
idolatry to the related sin of apostasy and the paradigmatic sinner from Solomon (as 
idolater) to all of Jewry (as apostates). Luther thus has both affirmed the narrative 
tradition association with demon compelling and reread it by redefining the sin lying at 
its heart as apostasy.69 This shift from idolatry to apostasy is an inevitable consequence of 
Luther's own theological innovations (as we have explained). In doing so, he also 
reflected the slippage of "magic" from being associated with Solomon in particular to 
                                                
69 The polemical strategy of casting Jews as a sort of Christian apostate (i.e. as refusing to accept the fulfillment of 
their own prophecies) has a history that began long before Luther. For more on this history, see Chazan's discussion of 
Peter the Venerable (12-16). 
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Jews in general that had already been observable during the later Middle Ages (as 
Trachtenberg has noted).  
As a result of his doctrine of justification by faith alone, Luther's theology 
rendered indistinguishable certain previously distinct sins, particularly the related sins of 
idolatry and apostasy. By way of analogy, one may understand the offense against God 
committed in the sin of idolatry as being parallel to the crime of sedition committed 
against a crown or a state. Both of these examples represent conduct or service (i.e. 
"works") done in breach of due fealty, but not necessarily representing the total and final 
renunciation of that fealty – which is to say, treason.70 By denying the spiritual merit of 
works independent of "faith," however, Luther effectively removes the possibility for 
seditious acts to be identified separately from a completely treasonous heart and mind – 
what Catholic theology has in two domains (works and mental disposition), Luther has 
                                                
70 Luther himself uses this metaphor (i.e. "idolatry = treason") in Babylonian captivity where he accuses "popish 
flatters" of " treason against the gospel." See also: Martin Luther, Erik H. Herrmann, and Paul W. Robinson The 
Babylonian Captivity of the Church, 1520 (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2016) 26. Elsewhere, in Tischreden 
(DLXXXI), Luther connects witchcraft with idolatry (in line with Aquinas' demonology in De Potentia) and idolatry 
with heresy (in line with the Witch Bull, Desiderantes affectibus, of 1484). However, in his own discussion, Luther 
then makes the connection between witchcraft and treason explicit in order to justify his call for the execution of 
witches: "August 25, 1538, the conversation fell upon witches who spoil milk, eggs, and butter in farm-yards. Dr. 
Luther said: "I should have no compassion on these witches; I would burn all of them. [...] Our ordinary sins offend and 
anger God. What, then, must be his wrath against witchcraft, which we may justly designate high treason against the 
divine majesty, a revolt against the infinite power of God. The jurisconsults who have so learnedly and pertinently 
treated of rebellion, affirm that the subject who rebels against the sovereign, is worthy of death. Does not witchcraft, 
then, merit death, which is a revolt of the creature against the Creator, a denial to God of the authority it accords to the 
demon?" The English translation is taken from: Martin Luther and William Hazlitt, The Table Talk or Familiar 
Discourse of Martin Luther (London: D. Bogue, 1848) 252. Finally, in Luther's Commentary on The Letter of Paul to 
the Galatians, chapter 5, vs. 19 & 20, he writes: This sin [witchcraft] was very common before the light of the Gospel 
appeared. When I was a child there were many witches and sorcerers around who 'bewitched' cattle, and people, 
particularly children, and did much harm. But now that the Gospel is here you do not hear so much about it because the 
Gospel drives the devil away. Now he bewitches people in a worse way with spiritual sorcery. Witchcraft is a brand of 
idolatry. As witches used to bewitch cattle and men, so idolaters, i.e., all the self-righteous, go around to bewitch God 
and to make Him out as one who justifies men not by grace through faith in Christ but by the works of men’s own 
choosing. They bewitch and deceive themselves. If they continue in their wicked thoughts of God they will die in their 
idolatry." For further discussion of Luther's construction of witchcraft as treason in Sigrid Brauner and Robert H. 
Brown, Fearless Wives and Frightened Shrews: The Construction of the Witch in Early Modern Germany (Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 2001) 53-58. 
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collapsed into one. For Luther, acts (i.e. "works") in themselves are not discrete entities, 
but rather follow from faith, and as such are only symptoms of belief.71 His theology thus 
does not allow for the possibility of doing bad while being essentially good. As a result, 
for Luther, idolatry cannot be merely a seditious act. On the contrary, it can only be an 
outward sign of inward spiritual treason, in other words, apostasy – the total renunciation 
of faith. Thus, in Luther's theological paradigm, Solomon's sin of idolatry as described in 
1 Kings 11 and as instrumentalized in Aquinas' De Potentia is indistinguishable from the 
related sin of apostasy – the total renunciation of God or "bad faith."  
This, the reader will recall, we have previously identified as the analogue to 
Aquinas' anti-magic strategy in De Potentia, which would be necessary in order for 
Luther to implicate a sin other than blasphemy into the act of magic (i.e. magically 
invoking the name of God) in a religion defined by faith alone. Yet even so, Luther does 
not directly instrumentalize the example of Solomon in his Vom Schemhamphoras. On 
the one hand, it is possible that Luther's reason was a desire not to build his anti-magic 
argument on a trope so demonstrative of the difference between Scholastic definitions of 
idolatry and his own (i.e. apocryphal Solomon narrative). On the other, by convicting all 
of Jewry of Solomon's paradigmatic sin (i.e. idolatry, indistinguishable from apostasy), 
Luther is able to combine his anti-magic theology with his particularly vitriolic late-in-
                                                
71 For Luther, acts (i.e. "works") in themselves are not discrete entities, but rather follow from faith, and as such are 
only symptoms of belief. In On the Freedom of a Christian, Article 23, he writes: "Thus these two sayings are true: 
'Good pious works never make a good pious man, but a good pious man does good pious works. Evil works never 
make an evil man, but an evil man does evil works.' Therefore, the person must always be good an pious first, before 
all of his good works, and good works follow and proceed from the pious, good person" (Helfferich, 33f.)  
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life anti-Jewish polemics.72 It is worth mentioning that Luther's Vom Schemhamphoras 
was written as a sequel to Von den Juden und Ihren Lügen (On the Jews and Their Lies, 
also 1543) and has been regarded by scholars and even Luther's contemporaries as 
demonstrably more anti-Semitic than its prequel.73 
That it took even Luther a while to reach a distinct position on this theological 
issue cannot be doubted. The fact that idolatry and apostasy are ultimately not logically 
distinguishable in the light of Luther's teachings on the merit of "works" does not mean 
that he refrains from using the term in other contexts. While he does seem to admonish 
against most sins as some form of blasphemy, he does not altogether avoid discussion of 
idolatry.74 A few such examples can be found his Tischreden (Table Talk), which was 
compiled from notes taken by his students over the course of the years between 1531 and 
1544 and published after his death in 1566. The students' notes are grouped by theme into 
sections, and one of those themes is idolatry. 
 In Luther's Tischreden, it is immediately apparent that his interest in the subject of 
idolatry does not concern the worship of pagan gods or even demons under the guise of 
pagan gods (as previous theologians beginning with Justin Martyr had explained it). 
                                                
72 For a good orientation to the anti-Semitism of Luther's later writings, see Mark U. Edwards, Luther's Last Battles: A 
Study of the Polemics of the Older Luther, 1531-1546. Ithaca [N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983) especially chapter 
6, "Against the Jews." Regarding Luther's later polemics more broadly, Mark Edwards writes, "[S]ome of the later 
polemics were so violent and vulgar that they offended contemporaries and remain offensive to this day. In the last five 
or six years of his life, for example, Luther published violent attacks on Catholics, Turks, Jews, and other Protestants. 
By far the most notorious of these polemics are his attacks on the Jews, especially his On the Jews and Their Lies and 
his On the Ineffable Name and On Christ's Lineage (Vom Schemhamphoras und Vom Geschlecht Christi), both of 
1543" (3).  
73 Edwards also offers helpful discussion of the contemporaneous and later reception of Vom Schemhamphoras (135). 
74 For some discussion of Aquinas extension of the sin of idolatry to include all forms of superstition and the 
implications of this move in his theology, see, for example: Brian Davies, Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae: A 
Guide and Commentary (Oxford [GB: Oxford University Press, 2014) 162-164. 
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Rather, Luther effectively redefines the sin of idolatry in order to deploy it in his 
polemics against "works." The following is from his Tischreden, "Of Idolatry," CLXXI: 
Idolatry is all manner of seeming holiness and worshipping, let these counterfeit 
spiritualities shine outwardly as glorious and fair as they may; in a word, all 
manner of devotion in those that we would serve God without Christ the 
Mediator, his Word and command. […] All manner of religion, where people 
serve God without his Word and command, is simple idolatry, and the more holy 
and spiritual such a religion seems, the more hurtful and venomous it is; for it 
leads people away from the faith of Christ, and makes them rely upon their own 
strength, works, and righteousness.75 
 
Likewise, in CLXXII, he writes: 
 
But if a man take in hand a work or a service, out of his own devotion, as he 
thinks good, thereby to appease God's anger, or to obtain forgiveness of sins, 
everlasting life, and salvation as is the manner of all hypocrites and seeming holy 
workers, then, I say flatly, he honors and worships an idol in heart; and it helps 
him nothing at all, that he thinks he does it to the honor of the true God; for that 
which is not faith is sin.76 
 
Thus, two things are clear. First, Luther is not talking about the service of idols 
(Götzendienst) in the literal sense, as Aquinas had done, but is once again issuing 
invectives against "good works" and merit. Second, Luther has clearly placed idolatry 
(defined as works) in diametric opposition to faith alone since he believes that any 
service that God has not commanded is idolatry.77 
This definition of idolatry as any service to God that God has not commanded 
rather than as service to false gods (i.e. idols) allows Luther to revise his anti-magic 
theology into its full and final articulation in Vom Schemhamphoras. As we will see, 
Luther in fact references the distinction between service God has commanded and not 
                                                
75 See: Martin Luther and William Hazlitt. The Table Talk of Martin Luther (London: George Bell & Sons, 1881) 68f. 
76 Luther and Hazlitt 70. 
77 See: Tischreden, CLXXVII in Luther and Hazlitt, 72. 
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commanded in Vom Schemhamphoras as an apologia for the apparent self-contradiction, 
given his teaching of the importance of baptism. His distinction is first and foremost 
strategic. First, it allows him to make Jews into idolaters for refusing to recognize the 
divinity of Jesus and for continuing to keep the "Old Law" (service which, according to 
Luther, God no longer commands). As a consequence, it also allows him to cast any 
Christian who believes in the validity of Jewish "works" (e.g. the "magical" invocation of 
the Shem ha-Mephorash) as a Jew, and thus, an idolater. In his Vom Schemhamphoras, as 
we will see, this is exactly what he does. 
 
Vom Schemhamphoras: Where Theology Converges with History 
Luther published his brief tract, Vom Schemhamphoras (usually translated as On 
the Ineffable Name), as a sequel to On the Jews and Their Lies in 1543, three years before 
his death. It is the second of the three of his so-called Judenschriften ("writings on Jews") 
written during that year and was published together with the third, Vom Geschlecht 
Christi (usually translated as "The Generations of Christ" or "Of the Lineage of Christ"). 
The publishing history of Luther's Vom Schemhamphoras, which included seven 
reprints,78 indicates significant early interest in the work – an interest that has puzzled 
modern scholars, who have had little to say about the text. Yet despite the early interest, 
alone among Luther's polemics, it was never translated from German into Latin. Justus 
                                                
78 Of the four later Judenschriften, Vom Schemhamphoras "was reprinted most, with seven German editions, five 
published in Wittenberg and two in Frankfurt. It is unclear why this treatise should have been the one most reprinted of 
the four later treatises; perhaps its sensational first half, recounting Porchetus's tale of Christ the magician, appealed to 
the curious. On the Last Words of David saw only two printings, while Against the Sabbatarians and On the Jews and 
Their Lies saw three printings each." See: Edwards 136. 
 
  252 
Jonas, who translated the much longer prequel, On the Jews and Their Lies, declined the 
task of translating Vom Schemhamphoras, citing as his reason, "non est facile transferes 
in Latinum."79  
Even among Luther's colleagues and supporters, reaction to the text appears to 
have been one of disgust. The scatological polemics and vitriolic anti-Semitism in 
Luther's Vom Schemhamphoras – eclipsing even that of On the Jews and Their Lies – 
were too much for Luther's fellow Protestant theologians.80 What is more, the initial 
inclination of Luther's movement to distance itself from this particular work appears to 
have continued. For example, Vom Schemhamphoras is absent from the 1971 Concordia 
Press English language publication, The Collected Works of Martin Luther.81 And, while 
the Vom Schemhamphoras is included in the 1920 Bohlaus Edition,82 the critical 
commentary to the text is uncharacteristically anonymous.83 Astonishingly, it was not 
until 1992 that a complete English translation became available when Gerhard Falk 
published his book, The Jew in Christian Theology. 
Perhaps as a result of a combination of the unavailability of a translation and the 
de facto taboo status of the text, Luther's Vom Schemhamphoras has received 
comparatively little attention from modern scholars. What attention it has received is 
seldom more than a passing mention of its relationship as sequel to the better-known On 
the Jews and Their Lies, thus including it among Luther's Judenschriften. When scholars 
                                                
79 "It is not easy to translate into Latin." 
80 Edwards 135. 
81 Gerhard Falk, The Jew in Christian Theology: Martin Luther's "Vom Schem Hamphoras", Previously Unpublished 
in English, and Other Milestones in Church Doctrine Concerning Judaism (McFarland & Co., U.S, 1992) 164. 
82 Editorial work on the Weimarer Ausgabe began in 1883, and was completed in 2009. 
83 Falk 164. 
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do offer some analysis, with few exceptions, they tend to take the text for nothing more 
than an anti-Semitic tirade or, at most, an anti- Jewish Kabbalah polemic. It is no doubt 
due to the absence of a Scholastic demonology (including, potentially, some reference to 
the figure of Solomon) in Luther's Vom Schemhamphoras that scholars have largely 
failed to recognize it as an articulation of his anti-magic theology. Yet, as we have 
explained, Luther's anti-magic theology does not depend upon the figure of the demon.  
To the best of our knowledge, only Franz Posset has correctly identified the text 
as anti- Christian Cabala.84 None, however, seem to have connected Luther's prohibition 
of the "magical" invocation of the Shem ha-Mephorash with both Renaissance Christian 
Cabala and medieval nigromantia, nor does there appear to be any scholarly comparison 
of the articulation of Luther's anti-magic argumentation in the Vom Schemhamphoras 
with the earlier and much simpler articulation in his Small Catechism. 
Scholars consistently regard Luther's Vom Schemhamphoras as one of his 
Judenschriften, as we have said, but our reading of the text potentially complicates that 
taxonomy. While there is no question that, in Vom Schemhamphoras, Luther writes – or 
claims to write – about the Jews, Luther himself is quite clear in the opening of the text 
that it was written not for the sake of Jews, but rather, for the sakes of Christians who 
"want to become Jews." More to the point, however, our analysis of Vom 
Schemhamphoras will show that, in addition to his instrumentalization of the Jews as 
paradigmatic idolaters (as Aquinas used Solomon), Luther in fact uses the Jews in a 
manner analogous to Aquinas' use of demons in order to solve to solve the corpus dilecti 
                                                
84 Posset writes, "In 1543 Luther published his somewhat anti-Reuchlin book Of the Unknowable God and the 
Genealogy of Christ (Vom Schem Hamphoras), i.e., about the ineffable Tetragrammaton" (708). 
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problem of his earlier anti-magic theological prohibition. In other words, we argue that 
Luther's Vom Schemhamphoras need not necessarily be read as one of his Judenschriften 
(in the strictest sense) because Jews fulfill the same function in Luther's text as demons 
do in Aquinas' anti-magic theology – the Jews in Luther's Vom Schemhamphoras are not 
Jews, but demons. In Vom Schemhamphoras, Luther functionally demonizes the Jews as 
evidence of the commission of the sin of idolatry (i.e. corpus delicti) to the extent that the 
text may be read as Luther's demonology. 
Turning now to the text itself, it is straightforward to examine how Vom 
Schemhamphoras' rhetorical structure retreats from Luther's initial prohibition against 
magic as blasphemy and asserts a model very much akin to Aquinas demonological (and 
Solomonic) prohibition of magic as idolatry. At the opening of the text, we read: 
1. In the last pamphlet [Of the Jews and Their Lies] I have announced that 
I will henceforth ignore what the ferocious, miserable Jews lie about their Shem 
Hamphoras as described by Purchetus [sic.] in his book called Victoria.85 
This I have done herewith, in honor of our belief, and in opposition to the 
devilish lies of the Jews so that those who want to become Jews will see what 
kind of "fine" dogmas they must believe and keep among the Jews. 
For as I plainly stipulated in that pamphlet, it is not my opinion that I can 
write against the Jews in the hope of converting them. That is why I did not call 
that pamphlet Against the Jews, but Against the Jews and Their Lies, so that we 
Germans may know from historical evidence what a Jew is so that we can warn 
our Christians against them as we warn against the Devil himself in order to 
strengthen and honor our belief; not to convert the Jews which is about as possible 
as converting the Devil.86 
 
                                                
85 Victoria Porcheti adversos impios Hebraeos, written c. 1303 by the Genoese Carthusian monk, Porchetus, died c. 
1315. The full original title is: Victoria Porcheti aduersus impios Hebręos, in qua tum ex sacris literis, tum ex dictis 
Talmud, ac Caballistarum, et aliorum omnium authorum, quos Hebręi recipiunt, monstratur veritas catholicę fidei. 
("Victory of Porchetus against the unbelieving Jews, wherein partly from the holy scriptures and partly from the words 
of the Talmud and of the Kabbalists and all the other authors who are influential among the Jews, the truth of the 
Catholic religion is shown.") 
86 Falk 166. 
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The possibility of sixteenth century German Christians literally converting to Judaism on 
any scale that would have interested Luther seems highly unlikely. It is far more likely 
that Luther's reference to "those who would become Jews" was intended as a polemic 
against something he considered "Judaizing" – Christian Cabalistic interest in the Shem 
ha-Mephorash and the medieval magical practices of demon compulsion, which the 
Christianization of the Shem ha-Mephorash threatened to legitimize. By this late point in 
Luther's life, there can be no question that the connection between the Shem ha-
Mephorash in the Christian Cabala and medieval nigromantia was clear to him. The 
reason for this is that the "Victoria of Purchetus" that Luther references included 
Raymundus Martín's translation of the satirical and polemical Jewish anti-Christian tract, 
Toledot Yeshu, and had been printed for the first time in 1520. 
The reader will recall that Luther's own theology, which defines justification 
(salvation) solely in terms of "faith" (i.e. belief), presented him with unique challenges in 
policing religious orthopraxy, and, furthermore, that he treats actions, not as discreet 
entities, but as symptoms of belief. It is the combination of these conditions that informs 
our reading of rhetorical structure of Luther's Vom Schemhamphoras. For Luther, a 
Christian who does what Jews do or who believes what Jews believe, is not a Christian, 
but rather a Jew. Again, in Luther's theological paradigm, action is only an outward sign 
of an inward state. It therefore must follow that someone acting like a Jew is as Jew. 
Thus, if Luther can establish that belief in the "magical" qualities of the Shem ha-
Mephorash is "Jewish," it follows that a Christian who is interested in the "magical" 
qualities of Shem ha-Mephorash "wants to become a Jew," and that one who invokes it 
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already has. This stroke solves the corpus dilecti problem of his earlier anti-magic 
strategy (i.e. classifying Shem ha-Mephorash as blasphemy). With his new solution, 
Luther does not need to concede the efficacy of a magical act as evidence of an idolatrous 
demonic pact because, by making all Jews idolaters and unsavable, he can now convict 
Christians of apostasy to an idolatrous religion whenever they express interest in "magic" 
(i.e. the Shem ha-Mephorash).  
To make that fate completely unacceptable to the Christian, Luther then proceeds 
to paint Judaism in the most disgusting terms he can muster – not unlike repulsive 
portrayals of demons in Scholastic demonologies. Effectively, Luther is saying, "To 
believe in the efficacy of the Shem ha-Mephorash is to become that" (i.e. Luther's 
singularly repugnant portrait of Jews). This, we suggest, is what Luther meant in the 
opening of Vom Schemhamphoras, when he writes, "This I have done herewith, in honor 
of our belief, and in opposition to the devilish lies of the Jews so that those who want to 
become Jews will see what kind of 'fine' dogmas they must believe and keep among the 
Jews."87 
 The rhetorical structure of Vom Schemhamphoras follows this simple logic. 
Already in the first sentences of the introduction, Luther begins casting the Jews as 
apostates ("so that we Germans may know from historical evidence what a Jew is so that 
we can warn our Christians against them as we warn against the Devil himself"). He 
continues, underscoring the permanence of what he casts as the Jewish defection from 
God: 
                                                
87 Falk 167. 
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A Jew or a Jewish heart is as hard as stone and iron and cannot be moved by any 
means. Even if Moses and all he Prophets came and did their wondrous works in 
front of their eyes as did Christ and his apostles, so that they would have to quit 
their unreason, it would still be useless. 
Even if they were punished in the most gruesome manner that the streets ran with 
blood, that their dead would not be counted, not in the hundreds of thousands but 
in the millions, […] still they must insist on being right even if after these 1,500 
years they were in misery another 1,500 years. Still God must be a liar and they 
must be correct.88 
 
Rhetorically, what Luther establishes with the above quote is equivalent to the fall of the 
angels (i.e. the creation of demons). He paints the Jews in the familiar tones of medieval 
demonology: proud, fallen, and unsavable. While it is true that one can find similar 
depictions of Jews in other Christian theological texts (both earlier and 
contemporaneous), Luther's instrumentalization of the Jews as evidence of Christian guilt 
of the sin of apostasy (corpus delicti), used to guarantee his prohibition against the 
Christian practice of magic, distinguishes Luther's Vom Schemhamphoras. 
Immediately following these early passages, and without introduction, is Luther's 
translation of the Toledot Yeshu in its entirety, drawn from the 1520 publication of 
Porchetus' Victoria Porcheti adversos impios Hebraeos. The strategy for its inclusion is 
clear: Luther means to show that not only do Jews not believe in the divinity of Christ, 
but they also mock and ridicule him. This translation thus combines with Luther's 
reminder – which he treats almost as a refrain – to stress that this is what you must belief 
if you with to become a Jew (i.e. believe in the efficacy of the Shem ha-Mephorash). 
Here again, he wishes to further the mutual exclusivity of Judaism and Christianity.  
                                                
88 Falk 167. 
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 The transition from his translation of the Toledot Yeshu to the rest of the text is as 
abrupt as is the transition from the introduction to the translation. Luther simply follows 
the translation with an immediate and triumphant, "gotcha!":  
Where are they now, the unfaithful Christians who became Jews or wish to 
become Jews? Come here for a kiss, the devil has thrown it in the N. and emptied 
his stomach again, that is truly a holy place for the Jews, and whoever wants to 
become [a] Jew, must kiss, devour, [guzzle] and pray to and then the devil also 
[guzzles] and devours which his disciples [i.e. the Jews] and can throw out both 
from above and below.89 
 
"Where are they now?" is an invitation for those who believe in the efficacy of the Shem 
ha-Mephorash to identify themselves, even after he has revealed the "truth" of the Jewish 
belief in its power. The words with which Luther transitions to the rest of his tract 
support this reading: 
Now let us take a look, one at a time, at the "fine" dogmas of the Jewish belief as 
given in this essay, so that anyone who has the inclination to become a Jew will 
be relieved. If you want to become a true Jew then listen and learn the catechism 
of the holy Jewish belief, but not in the name of God.90 
 
In what follows, Luther proceeds to elaborate not upon his objections to Jewish teaching 
in general, but everything that he finds wrong with the story of the Toledot Yeshu from 
his Christian perspective in particular. The "fine dogmas" that he discusses are particular 
to the "magic" of the Shem ha-Mephorash. 
 After several examples of what Luther considers to be either heretical or absurd 
claims inherent to the story of the Toledot Yeshu, he comes to his crucial rhetorical 
                                                
89 Gerhard Falk, The Jew in Christian Theology: Martin Luther's "Vom Schem Hamphoras", Previously Unpublished 
in English, and Other Milestones in Church Doctrine Concerning Judaism (McFarland & Co., U.S, 1992) 171. 
90 Falk 171. 
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equivocation of the Jewish belief in the power of the ineffable name of God (i.e. the Shem 
ha-Mephorash) with the belief in false gods, in other words, idolatry: 
Indeed those are holy children of God who placed [as] many gods over their own 
God as there are letters in the Shem Hamphoras. It is said that there are 216 of 
them as will follow; that is, they pray to 216 thousand devils and not the right 
God whom they insult [thus] and whose divine honor they steal with the Shem 
Hamphoras; they are the same ones who appropriate the miserable letter.91 
 
Luther thus makes Jews into idolaters in their "worship" of the Shem ha-Mephorash. He 
continues: 
Oh, how the mad Jews had it coming! they did no want to accept Jesus of 
Nazareth as savior and son of God so that they could have remained with the only 
righteous God as we Christians have remained. For it is impossible that he who 
accepts the right belief and Jesus Christ as Messiah should or could accept more 
than one, right an unified God for he must, as the devil wants, accept strange and 
several more Gods even if it is only naked, dead, worthless letters or Shem 
Hamphoras, that is, big bags full of piled-up devils. Yes, such Gods the Jews 
wanted to have instead of the right God, Jesus of Nazareth.92 
 
With that, the rhetorical chain is complete. Christians who believe in the Shem ha-
Mephorash are Jews because they embrace "fine" Jewish beliefs, and Jews function both 
as idolaters (Solomon) worshipping as many devils as there are letters in the Shem ha-
Mephorash, and as the demons themselves in that association with them is "proof" of 
guilt (corpus delicti). Thus, the Shem ha-Mephorash itself takes the place of the efficacy 
of the magical act in Aquinas' model providing post facto evidence (corpus delicti) of the 
idolatrous pact. Its presence in a Christian text or ritual becomes evidence of guilt of the 
sin of idolatry/apostasy. Therefore, Christians who believe in the Shem ha-Mephorash 
are, like Jews, idolaters who worship devils rather than the true God.  
                                                
91 Falk 171. 
92 Falk 176. 
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Luther's final rhetorical move is to leave no doubts about the invalidity (i.e. 
inefficacy) of the "magic" of the Shem ha-Mephorash. Most of the remainder of the text 
consists of explanations and examples intended to ridicule the Kabbalistic technique of 
gematria,93 a Kabbalistic technique of interpreting the Hebrew scripture by computing 
the numerical value of words, based on those of their constituent letters. Yet prior to his 
farcical demonstration of Kabbalistic techniques, Luther inserts an apologia for the 
apparent similarity of the words spoken during the Christian ritual of baptism with the 
Shem ha-Mephorash and equates Catholic ritual with the "idolatry" of belief in the Shem 
ha-Mephorash. Concerning baptism, he writes, "[B]oth water and letters are in baptism 
(not otherwise) full and rich in God's grace and power, because he has promised and 
revealed it, he himself will do it."94  
Still, for Luther, the words of baptism are fundamentally different from the 
magical invocation of the Shem ha-Mephorash because God has commanded baptism. 
For this reason, he implicates and "rejects the Pope together with his whole church, for he 
filled the whole world with similar tricks, magic, idol worship for he too has his 
particular Shem Hamphoras […]" Luther similarly equates the prayers used for the 
blessing of holy water and candles with the "void and empty letters" of the Shem ha-
Mephorash and the pope with an "arch trickster, magician, and idol worshipper." He 
continues:  
So [the pope] conjured caps and plates and all the world with mere words or 
letters, so that they become monks who, nuns, priests, who hold mass and sell, 
                                                
93 For Luther's satirical description of gematria, see: Falk 178-180. 
94 Falk 171. 
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call upon and celebrate saints, cash in indulgences, pray to corpses, serve the 
Devil, and earn heaven through their own works, that is, that heaven in which the 
Devil is bishop and pope. [Hell]95 
 
Once again, Luther equates "good works" with idolatry and idolatry with apostasy.  
 Interesting, however, is the full and final iteration of his anti-magic theology, in 
which Luther also manages to blur the distinction between idolatry and blasphemy (i.e. 
between the First and Second Commandments). Here, the pope's idolatrous (apostate) 
need for good works and his invocation of God's name is made even worse because not 
only did God not command such use of his name, but he in fact specifically forbade such 
abuse of his name. Luther punctuates his condemnation by quoting the Second 
Commandment, "You shall not misuse God's name." In an interesting twist, even though 
Luther has carefully avoided Scholastic demonology and solved his corpus dilecti 
problem, not only does he seem uncertain as to whether the "magical" invocation of the 
Shem ha-Mephorash is idolatry (apostasy) or blasphemy, he also seems unwilling to 
absolutely commit to its inefficacy: 
If however, something does occur because of [the Shem ha-Mephorash], it is not 
the work of God but of the Devil, so as to strengthen his lies and tricks (through 
God's permission) to confuse the unbelievers and to warn them; as we can see 
witches and other magicians often do great harm.96  
 
Luther here tries to implicate both the sin of idolatry and the sin of blasphemy into the 
invocation of the Shem ha-Mephorash, in his suggestion that "witches and magicians 
often do great harm" (with the permission of God and through the aid of the devil). Yet 
                                                
95 Falk 177. 
96 Falk 177. 
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this represents an even further concession in the direction of Scholastic demonology, 




As we have been tracing it, the apocryphal narrative of Solomon's power over 
demons as well as its theological implications persisted into the sixteenth century, not 
only in the works of early modern Scholastic demonologists and Renaissance magician-
theologians but also in the theology of Protestant reformer, Martin Luther. While the 
figure of Solomon himself receded from published (though not necessarily manuscript) 
discourse, the late antique paradigm of the magician/exorcist's conditional investiture 
with divine authority over supernatural agents as an aspect of God's favor in reward for 
"purity" continued to shape both the practice of "magic" and the theological struggle to 
forbid it. The continuity of the narrative – more specifically, its paradigm – provides us 
with a means of demonstrating the persistence of "purity" as the condition of the 
performer within the Christian discourse of licit (i.e. "religious" as opposed to "magical") 
demon compulsion.  
Informed by Mary Douglas' observations concerning the spiritualization and 
metaphoricization of "purity" in Jewish sects as they move farther away from the Temple 
in time and space after its destruction, we have posited a similar spiritualization and 
metaphoricization of "purity" within the development of Christianity. By identifying the 
paradigmatic role of the apocryphal narrative of Solomon's power over demons within 
the Christian discourse of demon compulsion and further identifying "purity" as the 
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initial (earliest) prescribed condition of the performer within that discourse, we have 
traced the transformation of "purity" from purity as absence-of-defilement in late 
antiquity to purity as presence-of-grace with Aquinas, and then, with Luther, to purity as 
presence-of-faith. 
An examination of Luther's anti-magic theology reveals his theory of (illicit) 
magic to be non-demonological (strictly speaking) and – in the end – to represent magic 
as "invalid" because he ultimately denies the efficacy of the magical invocation of the 
Shem ha-Mephorash. Nonetheless, a separate examination of his accounts of "religious" 
encounters with the devil/demons does indeed describe a distinct, valid, and licit means 
of compelling ("overcoming") such malevolent spirits. This two-theory strategy, which 
Luther adopts – even as he denies validity to one of the theories in Vom Schemhamphoras 
–, we have traced to Aquinas' instrumentalization of the conditional investiture paradigm 
of the apocryphal Solomon narrative in De Potentia. Vom Schemhamphoras does indeed 
provide evidence for Luther's continued reliance on that paradigm as he redefines the 
requisite condition of the performer as presence-of-faith rather than presence-of-grace or 
absence-of-contamination or defilement.  
Moreover, Luther's Vom Schemhamphoras ultimately implicates in his anti-magic 
theological argument the sin of idolatry (albeit redefined as apostate worship of "works"). 
In so doing, he takes up an argument which had been previously established as the 
underlying sin inherent to "magic" (illicit demon compulsion) through Aquinas, who 
brought the apocryphal Solomon narrative together with the canonical narrative of the 
king's idolatry in 1 Kings 11. This evidence identifies Luther's stipulation of "faith" as the 
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requisite condition of the performer both for salvation and for "overcoming" the devil as 
a move analogous to Aquinas' stipulation of grace in De Potentia in yet another 
transformation of "purity."  
This realignment of Luther's work suggests many implications beyond the scope 
of the present project. One such implication would call into question the traditional 
purity-belief dichotomies used within religious studies more broadly, because, in this 
case, purity and belief have clearly been placed on a continuity, rather than in contrast. 
Another set of implications concern the historical evolution I have found here. Quite 
simply, because Luther's anti-magic theology treats "faith" as the requisite condition of 
the performer in licit (i.e. "religious") demon compulsion in the same way that Aquinas 
treats "grace" in his own anti-magic argumentation, we must consider the possibility that 
early modern texts of ritual magic stipulating "faith" as a condition of the performer may 
not be medieval Catholic "survivals," but also unique products of a relatively unexplored 
"magical" side of the Reformation.  
Thus this chapter also suggests that treating the Reformation as a break from 
Scholastic theology may be shortsighted, if not downright misleading. Here, by 
establishing a relationship between Aquinas' use of presence-of-grace and Luther's use of 
presence-of-faith as condition of the performer, we have restored part of Luther's 
theological dialogue with Scholastic demonology in the sixteenth century – making that 
dialogue central to understanding the Reformation. Luther's Vom Schemhamphoras – 
perhaps the least understood of his so-called Judenschriften – has emerged here as the 
full and final articulation of his unique anti-magic theology Its status as a Protestant 
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"demonology" analogous to demonologies (Scholastic, etc.) may, thus potentially also 
account for the text's popularity in the sixteenth century, which has thus far remained 
surprising to many scholars.97 In this reading, Vom Schemhamphoras also provides 
scholars with another period source for understanding constructs of "magic" in the 
sixteenth century in addition to the more thoroughly researched (and usually Catholic) 
demonologies (e.g. Malleus Maleficarum 1486, Daemonolatreiae libri tres 1595, 
Compendium Maleficarum 1608, etc.). This, by extension, invites further investigation of 
what we have claimed represents Luther's functional theological demonization of Jews in 
Vom Schemhamphoras.  
Moreover, my argument also sets Luther's work more solidly within its historical 
context, strongly suggesting that Luther wrote his Vom Schemhamphoras in large part in 
response to the popularity of the De Verbo Mirifico (1494) and De Arte Cabalistica 
(1517) of German humanist Johannes Reuchlin. In this sense, the work of the present 
chapter also sheds further light on both the nature and reception of humanist theology in 
Reformation Germany, adding to recent work like that of Erika Rummel who has argued 
against the scholarship that casts Reuchlin as a "proto-Reformer."98  
Finally, this chapter's comparison of Luther's and Aquinas' constructs of "grace" 
has identified presence-of-faith as spiritualized and metaphoricized form of "purity" (yet 
                                                
97 For example, Edwards writes, "In contrast to Luther's other writings against the Jews, section one of this treatise is 
singularly devoid of any edifying theological, exegetical or historical comments. Even by Luther's standards the 
vulgarity excessive and usually humorless" (133). 
98 See: Erika Rummel, The Confessionalization of Humanism in Reformation Germany (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), especially 29, where she writes, "The idea that humanists were either forerunners of or comrades-in-arms 
with the Reformation was kept alive in both Protestant and Catholic historiography until the middle of the century. In 
this manner humanism became an issue in the Reformation debate and its champions implicated in questions that were 
peripheral to the primary mission of the movement, which was cultural." 
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another redefinition of the condition of the performer). This comparison calls for 
scholarship to acknowledge the performance of acts/tests of faith as a Protestant ritual 
means for acquiring and maintaining the faith-as-purity necessary for salvation, not just 
demon compulsion, but also as indirect evidence of salvation. Because in both Aquinas' 
and Luther's models, the same grace that secures salvation also authorizes demon 
compulsion, Luther's innovation needs to be considered as initiating modern performative 
practices of evangelical "spiritual warfare," much like his own battles with the Devil. 
These accounts, in their way, belong to a tradition of what is effectively a Protestant 
demonology including not only the Reformation theology of Martin Luther, but also 
sixteenth century Protestant texts of ritual magic. Luther, as an individual struggling with 
his faith, enters into a discourse that allies himself with God, and his demon is banished – 
a rewrite of the underlying narrative material of Solomonic demon compulsion 
compatible with the new sole fide theology, but by no means a break with the traditions 










 As this project has demonstrated, a consistent Christian discourse of "Solomonic" 
demon compulsion existed from the first century C.E. through the sixteenth century and 
beyond. Over this long stretch of time, textual evidence supports the hypothesis of a 
unified Christian magic/anti-magic discourse, with ritual magic and anti-magic theology 
emerging as highly constructed categories that served very particular purposes for the 
theorists who posited them.    
 What emerged as a theological discourse on "magic" was not initially cast in 
those terms, but rather, simply in terms of demon compulsion (i.e. in Christian antiquity). 
The distinction between ritual magic and exorcism arose gradually from an institutional 
need to deauthorize certain attempts at demon compulsion selectively while continuing to 
authorize others – that is, to manage certain parts of inherited religious knowledge and 
practice. Following Solomonic demon compulsion though a millennium and a half of 
transformations has allowed us to argue that, a single discourse, "learned" ritual magic 
may be best understood as illicit theology. Conversely, of course, religious ritual may just 
as easily be understood as licit magic. This argument, in turn, supports claims like those 
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of Richard Kieckhefer, who identified a magical "clerical underground," not only with 
textual references to clerical practices of illicit magic (as other scholars have 
demonstrated),1 but also by virtue of specific theological constructs that inhere in the 
assumptions of the illicit ("magical") rituals described in the texts.  
 To understand this unified magic/anti-magic discourse space, I have used the 
three elements defined by Bronislaw Malinowski as universal to the practice of magic: 
the formula, the rite, and the condition of the performer. These elements have recurred 
throughout my exploration of important theological and "magical" texts, and they serve 
as a tool even when we moved beyond the way Malinowski isolated magic as its own 
discourse of practice. By turning to the theological assumptions underlying these texts, 
we have shown here the developments and changes in the construction of "purity" as the 
requisite condition of the performer within Christian discourses of demon compulsion 
(magic/anti-magic) from late antiquity through the early modern era. 
 Malinowski's model, extended here to include theology as well as social space, 
has helped us trace shifts to the conditional nature of authorization to efficacious ritual 
action, thereby highlighting the potential for how hegemonic definitions of "purity" as 
condition of the performer could emerge as a hegemonic force. Defining "purity" allows 
an entity or actor to asset the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the "performer's" authorization 
for the execution of a "magical" act (demon compulsion). Moreover, it allows us to track 
how anti-magic theology and "learned" magic come to represent competing strategies for 
                                                
1 Kieckhefer 153.  
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authorization within a shared discourse, and how the specific nature of the competition 
changes across major schisms and shifts within Christianity.   
 Paying special attention to the figure of Solomon within the magic/anti-magic 
discourse reveals a spiritualization and metaphoricization of "purity" akin to that posited 
by Jacob Neusner and Mary Douglas in Judaism, as its various sects moved farther from 
the Temple in time and space. Here again, the present project fills in more of the religious 
landscape of the era they discuss. The discourse of demon compulsion and its reliance on 
the purity of the performer provided us with a useful constant amid the myriad religious 
and confessional changes in the development of Christianity.  
 Comprehending these seemingly disparate theological constructs as a continuum 
has important implications not only within the Christian discourse(s) of demon 
compulsion (i.e. exorcism and "magic") but also in Christian theological discourses more 
broadly. In our study, we have shown this by correlating the changes to the theological 
constructs of "purity" with major doctrinal and institutional changes within the 
development of Christianity. Each of the "turns" we have identified is presented as a 
chapter that documents the evolving definition of "magic" as a theological concept.  
 Chapter 1 focused on the comparison between the figure of Solomon and the 
figure of Jesus in early Christian Contra-Iudaeos polemics and apologiae. Our 
investigation of that comparison in the light of Malinowski's model of "magic" confirmed 
and augmented Ramsey MacMullen's observations about the role of exorcism (i.e. demon 
compulsion) in the prosthelytic rhetoric (and/or performatives) of early Christianity. In 
that era, Malinowski's observations about the primacy of the formula within the tripartite 
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structure of "magic" still applied to Christian discourse of demon compulsion. The 
constellation of competing Christian and Jewish monotheisms, the inherited cultic 
understanding of idolatry-as-impurity (or, conversely, purity as absence-of-idolatry) and 
the argument logic(s) of demon compulsion led to the convenient singling out of 
Solomon as a Jewish proxy in the ex post facto "proofs" of a deity's superiority in early 
Christian Contra-Iudaeos apologiae and polemics. 
 However, in order to apply the argument logic, that same discourse of early 
Christian Contra-Iudaeos polemics also implied a kind of parity between the figure of 
Solomon and the figure of Jesus. It gave attention and significance to Solomon's 
apocryphal power over demons that it otherwise would not have had, which, in turn, 
fulfilled the necessary conditions for what Dorothea Salzer has termed unio magica – a 
type of "magical thinking" in which the ritual act is undertaken not with or through, but 
as the allusive referent, in this case Solomon. The persistent and consistent Christian 
descriptions of Solomon's (albeit former) power over demons thus gave the figure of 
Solomon the allusive potential necessary for the development of "Solomonic" magic, 
complete with discourse-specific forms of the rite, the formula, and the condition of the 
performer. Moreover, this development came to anchor the Christian discourse of demon 
compulsion – the discourse that became anti-magic theology (i.e. demonology) in the 
Middle Ages – to the original Contra-Iudaeos polemics of Christian antiquity thus 
resulting in a persistent vague or even direct association between "magic" and Jews in 
Christian anti-magic theology.  
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 Chapter 2 dealt with the theological process by which Thomas Aquinas and his 
predecessors solved the problem of selectively deauthorizing demon compulsion by 
definitively splitting the inherited account into two distinct discourses: exorcism as licit 
demon compulsion, and "magic" as illicit demon compulsion. Additionally, the chapter 
proposed a significant historical connection between Aquinas' redefinition of the requisite 
condition of the performer to "purity" as presence-of-grace and the Dominican discovery 
of the Jewish anti-Christian polemical tract, Toledot Yeshu, which presented Jesus as a 
magician. 
Where Aquinas' predecessors had failed to distinguish exorcism from magic 
definitively because of the indemonstrability of the understood requisite "pure" condition 
of the performer within a single discourse of demon compulsion, Aquinas specified the 
meaning of "exorcism" by defining the requisite "purity" in its ritual as the presence-of-
grace, which could only be achieved within the sanctioned operations of the institutional 
Church – the sacraments, etc. Additionally, and importantly, Aquinas defined a second, 
distinct, discourse of "magic" by conceding the efficacy of the ritual act, but attributing 
the efficacy of its rituals to a different requisite condition of the performer: impurity-as-
idolatry. He grounded this distinct discourse of "magic" and his definition of its condition 
of the performer in the canonical account of Solomon's idolatry in 1 Kings 11 and the 
apocryphal narrative of Solomon's power over demons.  
 This move had far-reaching implications. Within the discourse itself, it meant that 
Solomon retrospectively became the father of a distinct discourse of nigromantia (i.e. 
demonic magic) defined in terms which supported the hierarchical and institutional 
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structures of Christianity by defining "impurity" as illicit authorization for some types of 
religious power and authority. This no doubt further contributed to the Contra-Iudaeos 
(and later, anti-Semitic) nature of Christian anti-magic theology, as noted by 
Trachtenberg (1946). Nonetheless, by conceding the efficacy of the illicit ritual act, but 
connecting it causally to a requisite "impure" condition of the performer (i.e. impurity-as-
idolatry), Aquinas did resolve the corpus delicti problem that had vexed his predecessor, 
William of Auvergne. In Aquinas' two-theory model, the success of any demon 
compulsion not specifically sanctioned by the Church served as evidence of guilt of the 
sin of idolatry.  
 Yet Aquinas' gains were not without a cost. His crucial instrumentalization of the 
figure of Solomon from both the apocryphal and canonical accounts only added to the 
allusive potential (unio magica) of the figure of Solomon within Christian discourses of 
demon compulsion, and thus inadvertently supported the discourse of illicit Solomonic 
magic. Moreover, it resulted in a theory of magic defined almost exclusively in the 
theological terms of idolatry and demonic intervention. The rhetorical effectiveness of 
Aquinas' theory of magic no doubt contributed to the proliferation of Scholastic 
demonology which not only consolidated religious power and authority within the 
hierarchical structures of the institutional Church, but also brought any and all inquiry or 
experimentation into the nature of physical causality under the jurisdiction of the Church 
as a result of Aquinas' attribution of the effects of magic to the intervention of demons. 
 The connection we proposed there, between the Dominican discovery of the 
polemical Jewish Toledot Yeshu and Aquinas' commodification of grace, is plausible but 
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inconclusive. It is certainly interesting to note that Aquinas denies the possibility of 
compelling demons "by sensible means" in his De Potentia Dei within two years of the 
discovery of a tract which portrays the figure of Jesus as working magic by ultimately 
"sensible means." It is further interesting to note that Aquinas' redefinition of "purity" as 
presence-of-grace, which "proves" by reason of impossibility – whether Aquinas was 
aware of the Toledot Yeshu or not – that Jesus could not have been a magician, does so by  
commodifying grace and tacitly denying the efficacious power of the name of God. More 
research into Aquinas' possible awareness of the Toledot Yeshu and evolution of his 
theology of grace might lead to important discoveries about the relationship of Scholastic 
sacramental theology, "Solomonic" magic, and the history of Contra-Iudaeos polemics. 
 Finally, outside of Christian discourses of demon compulsion, the findings of 
chapter 2 demonstrate what appears to be a meaningful exception to Malinowski's 
observation of the primacy of the formula in the tripartite division of magic.2 Aquinas' 
tacit denial of the ipso facto efficacy of the name of God (i.e. formula) as "sensible 
means" creates a void which he fills with the condition of the performer in his theories of 
both licit and illicit demon compulsion (i.e. magic). This suggests a more broadly 
applicable pattern of selective institutional authorization for religious and ritual acts in 
groups which define themselves by knowledge of the formulae – as in revealed, axial 
religion. In other words, when both rite (as Malinowski notes) and formula are public 
knowledge, only the condition of the performer can emerge as "the most important part." 
                                                
2 As we cited in the Introduction to the project, Malinowski writes, "To direct questions on the subject, the natives 
always reply that the spell is the more important part. The question: 'where is the real strength of magic?' would always 
receive the reply: 'in the spell.' The condition of the magicians is, like the rite, essential to the performance of the 
magic, but it is also considered by the natives as subservient to the spell" (404). 
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 Much of Chapter 3 was dedicated to an exposition establishing the continuity of 
the Solomonic discourse, a longitudinal extension of our argument. Here, however, a 
number of related points emerge as significant. First, the apparent absence of the figure of 
Solomon in Renaissance and Reformation discourses of magic (Hermeticism, Christian 
Cabala, and Protestant anti-magic theology) may have more to do with the vigorous 
suppression of "Solomonic" magic per se, than with waning interest in the paradigmatic 
model and in Solomon as the allusive referent (unio magica). This observation has 
bearing on broader discussions of the history of the book – authorship, publication, and 
censorship. It also has bearing on intertextuality in the sixteenth century, serving as a 
case-in-point that absence of (overt) evidence does not equal evidence of absence.  
 Second, the same text that conclusively demonstrates the (covert) persistence of 
the Solomonic paradigm in the Northern Renaissance during the sixteenth century, 
Reuchlin's De Verbo Mirifico, also reveals direct connections between Reuchlin's 
Christian Cabala and medieval manual of ritual magic, the Liber Razielis (more 
specifically, the Liber Semamforas, which circulated as the seventh book of the Liber 
Razielis).  
 The findings of Chapter 4 dealt largely with the anti-magic theology of Protestant 
Reformer Martin Luther and the final turn in the spiritualization and metaphoricization of 
"purity" that we discussed in this study. By identifying Luther's use of presence-of-faith 
as the condition of the performer in his own theory of licit (i.e. religious) demon 
compulsion, we showed the extent to which Luther was still in dialogue with Aquinas 
even near the end of his life.  
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Luther's struggle in his Vom Schemhamphoras (1543) to solve what we have 
called the corpus delicti problem in his anti-magic theology without relying on a 
Scholastic demonology shows just how heavily Christian anti-magic discourse had come 
to rely on the idea of idolatry to define and forbid the practice of magic. Unfortunately 
for Luther, it highlights not only the intended but also the unintended consequences of his 
own doctrine of justification by faith alone. As Luther undermined Aquinas' 
commodification of grace, he supported his own combat against the sale of indulgences, 
etc. However, adhering to his doctrine of sola fide also left Luther with the same corpus 
delicti problem that theologians had faced before Aquinas. Luther could not rhetorically 
demonstrate spiritual guilt ("impurity") as sin without conceding the efficacy of "illicit" 
ritual acts, and he could not concede the efficacy of ritual acts without granting the 
validity of "works." The theological impasses multiplied from this point forward, as well: 
Luther's theology not only rendered null the merit of works (as latria, the service 
rendered to God), but also rendered the traditional understanding of the First 
Commandment meaningless (as a prohibition against idolatria, the service rendered to 
false gods). 
 Sorting out the problematics raised by Luther's anti-magic theology allowed us to 
understand his largely neglected and virulently anti-Semitic text, Vom Schemhamphoras, 
in terms not heretofore employed. It is not merely an anti-Semitic rant devoid of any 
theology (as one scholar suggested), nor is it a polemic against the Jewish Kabbalah. 
Rather, we have argued it here as the full and final iteration of Luther's anti-magic 
theology, a text directed at Christians against the practice of "Solomonic" magic 
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identified by the ineffable and efficacious name of God – the Shem ha-Mephorash. 
Moreover, we suggest, it is Luther's "missing" demonology. Luther's portrayal of the 
Jews in this text represents a literal demonization of Jews – the theological 
instrumentalization of Jews into a function analogous to that of demons in Scholastic 
theology: association with demons/Jews = "idolatrous" intent. For Luther, one can no 
more legitimately invite interaction with a Jew than with a demon. The mere intention to 
do so served in this late theological work as Luther's last attempt to provide the corpus 
delicti that was missing in his earlier anti-magic prohibition in the Small Catechism.  
This line of argumentation about Solomonic demon compulsion and the condition 
of the performer, however, has ramifications beyond the immediate discussions we have 
tracked or alluded to. As we have shown, this study contributes to scholarship concerned 
with the development of Christianity, medieval studies, Renaissance and Reformation 
studies, and even – to an extent – to Jewish studies. By tracing the development of 
"purity" as condition of the performer from antiquity forward through the early modern 
era, we have been able to correlate major theological developments with specific changes 
in one set of traditional theological logics, using as our evidence the texts' solutions to the 
requisite condition of the performer in one of a number of archetypal "magical" acts 
within Christian discourse: demon compulsion.  
In fact, this study stands virtually alone as an examination of changing Christian 
hegemonic strategies of selective authorization for efficacious ritual. Nonetheless, this 
setting of the project is timely and justifiable since, as Richard Kieckhefer has 
demonstrated, the discourse of ritual magic – particularly in the Middle Ages – belonged 
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to a "clerical underground." The work of Kieckhefer and others confirms that the authors 
of ritual texts were aware of and conversant in the theological discourse that strove to 
forbid their magical activities – a fact that is evident in the magical texts themselves as 
they visibly engage in dialogue with orthodox theology. For example, such texts of ritual 
magic – some of which can be sourced back to the twelfth century – reveal a critical 
concern for orthodox forms of "purity" as condition of the performer in their "magical" 
acts. 
The examination of these texts – their incorporation into a study set up like this 
one is – is the next logical step in research into the changing constructs of "purity" within 
Christian discourse(s) of demon compulsion. Yet the insight that follows such an 
investigative procedure would offer is not limited to conclusions about discourses of 
demon compulsion or even "magic." Scholars would do well to remember that, as 
theologically literate clerics, the authors of these texts may be relied upon (at least 
collectively if not individually) to represent period understandings of "purity" in their 
texts. In their writings – far more than in that of the anti-magic theologians –, the 
equation of purity with absence-of-defilement, presence-of-grace, and presence-of-faith is 
made explicit. Representatively, the Liber Consecratus (fourteenth century, possibly 
earlier) prescribes not only ablutions and abstinence but also participation in the 
sacraments (confession and communion) in preparation for the ritual act(s) described in 
the text.3 
                                                
3 See: Honorius of Thebes and Joseph Peterson, The Sworn Book of Honorius: Liber Iuratus Honorii (Berwick: 
Nicolas-Hays Inc., 2016) 36. Peterson summarizes the preparations: "They include a special diet, shaving the hair from 
your body, sexual abstinence, confession and contrition, observing physical and spiritual purity, giving alms to three 
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Such examples offer the scholar a period witness to more popular understandings 
of sacraments, grace, and spiritual authority and power. Moreover, they also suggest 
significant possibilities for dating texts whose provenance has been in doubt in the 
scholarship. For example, the presence of a particular spiritualized form of "purity" in a 
text can provide a useful post quem – a date before which certain theological constructs 
of "purity" simply did not exist in familiar theological debates.4 This function is 
particularly significant in the example of two texts to which we will return below, the 
Arbatel and the Book of Abramelin, which seems to reflect the Protestant notions of 
"purity."  
In the case of our present example, the Liber Consecratus, the oldest preserved 
manuscript dates to the fourteenth century, Sloane MS 3854 (fol 117-144), although the 
text may have originated earlier. The optic recommended here would stress that its 
operant definition of "purity" does not appear to reflect Aquinas' commodification of 
grace. Combined with other evidence, this discrepancy may be used either to source the 
text to a particular date or place, or (if that can be established by other means) it could be 
used to help trace the spread of the influence Aquinas' theology over time on the ground. 
If the text can be demonstrated to postdate Aquinas, but does not reflect his ideas of 
grace, it follows that Aquinas formulation of grace was not yet convincing enough to risk 
incorporating into a ritual act.  
                                                                                                                                            
poor persons, and frequent prayer." Peterson does not include attending mass (i.e. receiving communion), but the text 
does prescribe this. 
4 Since, logically, either the magical text postdates the theological innovation or – far less likely – an anonymous 
magician would have had to anticipate the theological innovation.  
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As we previously mentioned, this sort of sourcing by presence or absence of 
particular constructs of "purity" could also be especially helpful in the investigation of 
certain early modern texts, even those considered more secular in origin. For example, 
the anonymous Arbatel de magia veterum (1575) and the so-called Book of Abramelin, a 
pseudepigraphic epistolary magical text which dates itself internally to the fifteenth 
century, provide two excellent examples. The former seems to stipulate a form of purity-
as-predestination as part of the requisite condition of the performer.5 Such resonance with 
Protestant theology cannot be ignored in a sixteenth century text. The latter text makes 
internal claims to be of fifteenth century Jewish origin, yet the text reflects marked sola 
fide tendencies in addition to more pro forma prescriptions of ablutions and abstentions.6 
The theology helps create the possibility of refuting these internal claims (as well as, 
potentially, forming a hypothesis about the correct placement of the text) by identifying 
an anachronistic or out-of-place form of "purity" in the ritual preparations has not yet 
been explored. 
 This last example points to still broader potential for the findings of the present 
study. While we have focused here on the clearly definable, continuous, paradigmatically 
consistent ritual example of demon compulsion, the significance of spiritualized and 
metaphoricized forms of "purity" within Christian ritual discourses more broadly 
                                                
5 Peterson notes that, "like Paracelsus, Arbatel asserts that people are predisposed from birth for certain callings, 
including magic" (Aphorisms 17, 18, 39, and 42). See Joseph H. Peterson, Arbatel – Concerning the Magic of the 
Ancients: Original Sourcebook of Angel Magic (Lake Worth, FL: Ibis Press, 2009) xvi. 
6 There are many examples in the text that smack of sixteenth century. One particular example recalls Luther's 
encounters with the Devil" "[The demons] will list for you all your sins. They will particularly try to dispute your belief 
in God." See: Abraham ben S, Georg Dehn, Steven Guth, and S L. M. G. Mathers, The Book of Abramelin: A New 
Translation (Lakeworth, FL: Ibis Press, 2006) 116. 
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represents the farthest reaching potential of this study. In those loci where we can indeed 
demonstrate the presence of constructs "purity" as the requisite, authorizing condition of 
the performer, we must also infer the existence of a performer. In the study of Catholic 
efficacious ritual this may yield interesting details about the evolution of the sacraments 
(e.g. stories of medieval abbesses being deputized to hear confessions in the absence of a 
priest). Likewise, it may add to our understanding of the changes over time to the rite of 
exorcism, which began as a lay charism but has become restricted to specially trained 
(and authorized!) priests.  
Perhaps more significantly, in the case of Protestantism(s), the very existence of a 
construct of "purity" as requisite authorizing condition of the performer not only forces 
us to infer the existence of the performer, but also the performance. Returning briefly to 
Malinowski's observations, we note again his statement that the rite was public 
knowledge and his suggestion that the formula was the most important of the three 
elements. As we have shown, where the group defines itself by knowledge of the 
formula, the formula by itself ceases to authorize. It is no longer the most important 
element. Thus, with both formula and rite – whether formally acknowledged or not – 
publically known, only the condition of the performer remains as a means for authorizing 
at any level within a socio-religious hierarchy from entrance to leadership. Whether the 
authorizing condition of the performer be in statu salutis, justified by faith, sanctified by 
grace, predestined, elect, saved, prosperity, etc., it must be performed if it is to be 
apprehended by the individual or the group. 
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If the Protestant condition of the performer, then, is "purity" as presence-of-faith7 
and, furthermore, if that "purity" – as we have shown – is understood both to authorize 
demon compulsion and to justify/sanctify (i.e. insures salvation), then that purity-as-faith 
must be performed in order to be apprehended both by the individual and the socio-
religious group. Moreover, presumably, the more elevated the status within the hierarchy 
of group, the more (or greater) the performance that authorizes that status – with no 
external evidence, the state is not verifiable. Thus, the locus of this performance – 
whether or not it is formally acknowledged as efficacious ritual by the individual or the 
group – must be examined as such by the scholar. For the scholar, there can be no sola 
fide, if faith must be performed. 
 The implications of identifying efficacious ritual through the condition of the 
performer as a visible sign of religious authorization to act ritually implicate a set of 
scholarly habits that apply equally to historical and modern examples, as does the 
absolute necessity of performance as the one and only means of demonstrating one's 
authorization. From this perspective we may reapproach other sixteenth-century 
Protestant phenomena, such as apocalypticism (i.e. prophecy and the interpretation of 
signs),8 and an important performative in the absence of other, theologically prescribed 
forms. Likewise, as we have already suggested in chapter 4, we may approach modern 
                                                
7 This would also apply to any further spiritualization or metaphoricization of "purity" such as – perhaps – absence-of-
doubt, presence-of-election, etc. 
8 See for example: Robin B. Barnes, Prophecy and Gnosis: Apocalypticism in the Wake of the Lutheran Reformation 
(Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1988). See also: Ken Kurihara, Celestial Wonders in Reformation Germany 
(London: Taylor and Francis, 2015). 
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evangelical "spiritual warfare"9 as a possibly structurally crucial performative – one that 
potentially dates back to Luther’s infamous battles with the Devil as the one and only 
means of externally recognizing the state of one's internal disposition of faith as a direct 
consequence of Luther's redefinition of "purity" to exclude latria.  
 Other extensions of scholarly practice can be posited on the basis of how 
historical evidence and textual evidence has been handled in the present project. For the 
moment, however, let us take up a more strictly textual piece of evidence logic before we 
close this conclusion. Let us return briefly to Aquinas' De Potentia as the historical 
moment of a distinct discourse of "magic." There, as we have seen, Aquinas constructed 
what amounts to a red herring – a complete theory of magic that served to create a valid 
but illicit (i.e. institutionally deauthorized) form of ritual action. Luther, as we have 
shown, was still thinking within this logic and thus could not break entirely with Aquinas. 
He kept the licit, authorized form and then merely denied efficacy to the illicit form of 
magic that Aquinas elaborated.  
 In our explication of this case, we have combined two different strategies of 
explanation. It is a limitation of scholarly theories of "magic" that they have long 
addressed themselves to these red herrings (deauthorized forms) alone. As we have 
endeavored to demonstrate, not only illicit forms, but indeed every efficacious ritual act, 
including justification, sanctification, etc., may legitimately and fruitfully be investigated 
                                                
9 For an authoritative account of spiritual warfare in modern Protestantism, see for example: Sara Diamond, Spiritual 
Warfare: The Politics of the Christian Right (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1990). 
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as a "magical" (i.e. efficacious) ritual act in the terms with which Malinowski provides us 
if it must be performed. 
 It is our hope that both the reading of the tradition of Solomonic major and our 
strategy for recovering its theological referents have offered a rich interpretive 
environment for readers in both Renaissance/Reformation studies in general, and 
Religious Studies in particular. Most particularly, we recommend the heuristic of a 
discursive space in which events (conversations, debates) offer evidence of what textual 
reports mean and what was at stake for the authors involved. In using it, we can combine 
multimodal corpuses and deal with textual and authority traditions that become 
contemporaneous in specific contexts of use and understanding, no matter that they stem 
from different eras and places. In using it, we can also avoid too-simple models of what it 
means to protest, revolt, or reform, seeing them as closer to a Foucauldian epistemic 
rupture (a break in eras that does not happen cleanly, or immediately though all 
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